PREFACE

This edition of the Tarkabhāsā is specially prepared with a view to meet the needs of students studying for University examinations The English Translation of the entire text has been printed just below it for ready reference In the Notes all points which an ordinary student requires to be explained are explained. The notes are to the point and sufficiently exhaustive The Introduction deals with questions like the date and life of the author, a general review of the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems a critical appreciation of the Tarkabhasa etc Care is taken not to swell the volume of the book by the addition of irrelevant matter or by the inclusion of unnecessary details which bewilder the student instead of helping him

This edition is thus on the same lines as those which we followed in our edition of the Tarkasamgraha which we are glad to state met with unstinted approval from the students and professors alike In the Notes is incorporated most of the important matter from the Tarkasamgraha The text is divided into suitable sections and is presented in a form which would enable the student to grasp the subject matter easily

We have to offer our grateful thanks to the Managers of the Āryabhusana Press for the efficient printing work done in a short time

Sir Parashurambhau College
POONA 2
20th August 1934

A B G
R D K

INTRODUCTION

I THE AUTHOR

HIS LIFE AND DATE

Beyond the fact that the name of the author of the Tarkabhasa is Kesavamisra, we have no definite knowledge about the author Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana says that Kesava misra "was a native of Mithila and a preceptor of Govardhana Misra who wrote a commentary on the Tarkabhasa, called Tarkabhasa Prakāsa"[1] Kesavamisra quotes Udayana in his work[2] from which it is clear that he must have lived after Udayana Now Udayana (or Udayanacarya or Ācarya as he is often reverentially called), the author of the well known works, Kusumañjali, Kiranavali, Laksanavali etc, is definitely known to have lived about 950–1000 A D, as is clear from the colophon to his Laksanavali which gives 984 A D (Saka year 906) as the date of its composition So Kesavamisra could not have lived before 1000 A D

Now, Cinnabhatta a commentator on the Tarkabhasa is definitely proved to have lived about 1350 A D, by Sir R G Bhandarkar[3] Cinnabhatta lived about 1350 A D at the court of Harihara, brother to Bukkaraya of Vijayanagar, and was thus the contemporary of the famous Sayanacarya and Madhavacarya, so Kesavamisra's date could not be later than 1350 A D The most probable date for Kesavamisra therefore would be about 1250 A D

About Kesavamisra's personal history we know nothing Whether he wrote any other work or works is also a sealed book for the present.

II NYAYA AND VAISESIKA SYSTEMS

The student of a manual like the Tarkabhasa is certainly not expected to be acquainted with the history of the develop-

(1) A History of Indian Logic, P 381

(2) P 104, अत्रोदयनेन व्याप्तस्य हेतो पक्षधर्मतया प्रतीति सिद्धस्त्वभावाऽसिद्धिरिति सिद्धिलक्षणमुक्तम् ।

(3) Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1882–83

ment of the Nyāya and Vaisesika systems But it is worth his while to know the salient features thereof Both these systems originated independently about the beginning of the Christian era but it was found soon afterwards that their tenets had nothing irreconcilable about them, and long before writers like Sivāditya came into the field expressly for the purpose of blending the two systems the Nyāya and the Vaisesika systems had come to be grouped together, like the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems

Like all other Darsanas or systems of philosophy, the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems have their own Sutras which must be regarded as the basis of their doctrines The Vaisesika system is also known as the system of Kanada or Auluka (son of Uluka) Kanada (probably a nick name due to his having propounded the theory of Kanas or atoms) was the son of Uluka, of Kasyapa gotra He is said to have been so called (Kanada or Kanabhaksa), because he maintained himself on rice grains fallen in streets like a pigeon According to another tradition God revealed himself to Kanada who was practising penance, in the form of an owl to expound the six Padarthas, hence the system received the name Aulukyadarsana Kautilya does not mention the Vaisesikas by name, but Nagarjuna and Āryadeva (about the 3rd century A D) criticise their doctrines The Vaiśesikasutras may therefore be said to have been composed about the first or second century A D It is possible that these Sutras may have been revised from time to time, before they assumed their present form.

There is no Atomic theory in the Upanisads, though the word Anu occurs many times The Bauddhas had something of an Atomic theory and the Vaisesikas may have been indebted to them for that doctrine There is no direct evidence to show that the Vaisesikas had come under Greek influence in the beginning

As regards the Nyāya system, Gautama is said to be the author of the Nyayasutras In the Pratimanātaka of Bhasa, the Nyayasastra of Medhatithi is referred to According to the Mahābharata Gautama and Medhatithi refer to the same person Dr Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana regards this Medhatithi Gautama as the founder of Anviksiki, and thus quite a

different person from Gautama Akṣapāda[1] (hence the name Akṣapādadarsana for the Nyāya system) the founder of the Nyāya system. The identification of Gautama Akṣapāda with the Gautama of the Gautama Dharmasutras is without any basis. Vātsyayana wrote his famous commentary on the Nyaya sūtras about the fourth century A D. It is therefore safe to say that Gautama Akṣapada must have lived at least a century or two earlier than Vatsyayana. *Gautama's date cannot be* pushed further back than that.

The Vaiśeṣikasutras *contain ten* Adhyayas or books. Book I discusses the five Padarthas that enter into the Samavāya relation. In Book II there is the discussion about Dravyas. Book III discusses the nature of Ātman and Manas. Book IV deals with the nature of the body and the Atomic theory. Book V deals with Karman. Book VI with the Srautadharmas and Aśramadharmas. *Book VII with Guṇa and Samavaya*. Book VIII with *Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka* perception. Book IX with Buddhi and Book X with causality and Anumāna (Read the following from the Sarvadarsanasamgraha तत्राह्निकद्वयात्मके प्रथमेऽध्याये समवेताशेषपदार्थकथनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमाह्निके जातिमन्निरूपणम् । द्वितीयाह्निके जातिविशेषयोर्निरूपणम् । आह्निकद्वययुक्ते द्वितीयेऽध्याये द्रव्यनिरूपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमाह्निके भूतविशेषलक्षणम् । द्वितीये दिक्कालप्रतिपादनम् । आह्निकद्वययुक्ते तृतीये आत्मान्तःकरणलक्षणम् । तत्रात्मलक्षणं प्रथमे । द्वितीयेऽन्तःकरणलक्षणम् । आह्निकद्वययुक्ते चतुर्थे शरीरतदुपयोगिविवेचनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे तदुपयोगिविवेचनम् । द्वितीये शरीरविवेचनम् । आह्निकद्वयवति पञ्चमे कर्मप्रतिपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे शरीरसम्बन्धिकर्मचिन्तनम् । द्वितीये मानसकर्मचिन्तनम् । आह्निकद्वयशालिनि षष्ठे श्रौतधर्मनिरूपणम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे दानप्रतिग्रहधर्मविवेकः । द्वितीये चातुराश्रम्योचितधर्मनिरूपणम् । तथाविधे सप्तमे गुणसमवायप्रतिपादनम् । तत्रापि प्रथमे बुद्धिनिरपेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनम् । द्वितीये तत्सापेक्षगुणप्रतिपादनं समवायप्रतिपादनं च । अष्टमे निर्विकल्पकसविकल्पकप्रत्यक्षप्रमाणचिन्तनम् । नवमे बुद्धिविशेषप्रतिपादनम् । दशमे अनुमानभेदप्रतिपादनम् ।)

The Nyayasutras contain five Adhyayas or Books. Book I deals with the sixteen Padarthas. Book II with the four Pra

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1 Akṣapada literally means having eyes on the feet. Absurd traditions are in vogue to account for this appellation. One tradition says that Gautama was given a second pair of eyes on the feet by God as he happened to fall in a well being absorbed in his meditations. According to another account Gautama once looked at his pupil Vyāsa with the eyes on his feet!

mānas and Samsaya and the rejection of Arthāpatti etc as independent Pramānas, Book III with Ātman, body, sense-organs, objects of senses, Buddhi and Manas, Book IV with Pravrtti, Dosa, Pretyabhāva, Phala, Duhkha, Apavarga and the theory of Dosas, and Book V with the divisions of Jāti and Nigrahasthāna (Read the following from the Sarvadarsanasamgraha, न्यायशास्त्रं च पञ्चाध्यायात्मकम्। तत्र प्रत्यध्यायमाह्निकद्वयम्। तत्र प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथमाह्निके भगवता गौतमेन प्रमाणादिपदार्थनवकलक्षणनिरूपणं विधाय द्वितीये वादादिसप्तपदार्थलक्षणनिरूपणं कृतम्। द्वितीयस्य प्रथमे संशयपरीक्षणं प्रमाणचतुष्टयाप्रामाण्यशङ्कानिराकरणं च। द्वितीये अर्थापत्त्यादेरन्तर्भावनिरूपणम्। तृतीयस्य प्रथमे आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थपरीक्षणम्। द्वितीये बुद्धिमनःपरीक्षणम्। चतुर्थस्य प्रथमे प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गपरीक्षणम्। द्वितीये दोषनिमित्तकत्वनिरूपणमवयव्यादिनिरूपणं च। पञ्चमस्य प्रथमे जातिभेदनिरूपणम्। द्वितीये निग्रहस्थानभेदनिरूपणम्।) It will be seen that the Nyāyasūtras are more properly and systematically arranged than the Vaisesikasūtras The Nyāyasūtras declare in the very first sūtra that the study of the sixteen Padarthas or topics mentioned therein is to lead to Nihsreyas. They are obviously intended to make the student fit for carrying on controversies and therefore explain in detail the Jātis and the Nigrahasthānas etc. The Vaisesikasutras are more concerned with the nature of the Padārthas or categories (the Padarthas of the Nyāyasutras are mere topics for discussion and should not have been so called at all) than with anything else, though they too bring in the Āsramadharmas and Srautadharmas so as to make their system as complete as possible It is now usually conceded that the Vaisesikasūtras are older than the Nyāyasutras.

We shall now merely mention some of the great writers of both the systems, who have played an important part in their development As regards the Vaisesikadarsana, the following authors should be noted —Prasastapāda (the writer of Kanādasūtrabhāsya, 500 A D.), Udayana (the author of Kiranāvali, a commentary on Prasastapādabhāsya, 1000 A D.), Sridhara (the author of Nyāyakandali, 991 A D), and Sankaramisra (the author of Kanādarahasya and Upaskāra, about 1425 A. D) As regards the Nyāyadarsana, the following are the writers of note —Vātsyāyana (the author of Nyāyasutrabhāsya about the fourth century A. D), Uddyotakara (the author of

Nyayabhasyavartika 7th century A D) Vācaspatimisra (the author of Nyayasutroddhāra 9th century A. D) and Gaṅges opadhyaya (the author of Tattvacintamani, 12th century A D)

After the doctrines of the two systems had been more or less stabilised by the above writers by their commentaries on the Sutras or sub commentaries on the commentaries there arose about the 10th century a class of writers who made it their business to show how the two systems were really complementary to each other and their tenets easily reconcilable (such a tendency was visible it must be confessed even earlier to some extent) Kesavamisra belonged to this class of writers who claimed no originality but whose works are none the less important Bhasarvajna (the author of Nyayasara about 1000 A D) Annambhatta (the author of Tarkasamgraha about 1700 A D) Sivaditya (the author of Saptapadarthi about the 11th century A D) Laugaksibhaskara (the author of Tarkakaumud 17th century A D) are some of the authors belonging to what may be called the Syncretist School Bhāsarvajna and Kesavamisra were Naiyayikas and the last three Vaisesikas

III THE TARKABHASA A CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Kesavamisra wrote his Tarkabhasa with the express purpose of furnishing an easy text book or manual for a beginner desirous of studying the tenets of Nyaya [1] and it can be easily proved that he has admirably succeeded in his attempt There is also another purpose which he has in view namely to reconcile the tenets of Nyaya with those of the Vaisesika system While dealing with Arthas [2] he mentions the six padarthas of the Vaisesikas as Arthas instead of the gandha rasa etc[3] mentioned in the Nyayasutras and being fully conscious of the disturbance[4] in the original arrangement involved in equating the Vaisesika padarthas with the Naiyayika arthas he

1 बालोऽपि यो न्यायनये प्रवेशमल्पेन वाञ्छत्यलसः श्रुतेन । etc the opening sloka

2 P 63 section 4 अथ षट्पदार्थाः । ते च द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाः ।

3 गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दाः पृथिव्यादिगुणास्तदर्थाः । (Nyayasutra I 1 14)

4 Thus Atman etc have to be discussed twice (Atman sections 44 and 57 Buddhi 74 87 Duhkha-76 94 Manas-46 58 89 Iccha and Dvesa 77–78 and once again under Dosa in 91 Viparyaya under Buddhi in 87 and again under Dosa in 91)

justifies his action by saying that he has done it on purpose[1] And that purpose is obviously to show that there is no conflict between the Nyaya system and the Vaisesika system We have pointed out that this purpose, however laudable it might be, is bound to fail in the very nature of things[2] But writers of the Syncretist school deliberately shut their eyes against the inherent absurdity of such a procedure and Kesavamisra is no exception to them Truly is it said that none are so blind as those who will not see

Kesavamisra begins his work with quoting the first Nyaya sutra where the sixteen padarthas are mentioned, thus showing that he is a Naiyayika (Annambhatta begins his Tarkasamgraha with the mention of the seven Padarthas of the Vaisesikas, which shows that the Tarkasamgraha is a Vaisesika treatise) He then quotes the Vātsyayanabhasya to show the procedure he is going to adopt in his work viz Uddesa Laksana and Pariksa After defining these terms, he takes the sixteen topics, one by one and while closely following the Nyayasutras goes on discussing all relevant matters in a very systematic manner, Kesavamisra himself tells us at the end of his work what procedure he has followed in the presentation of the subject matter of his work He says–' Here [in this treatise] there is treatment again and again of most useful [or important matters] in their nature and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not defined is no fault By so much only is accomplished the training of beginners[3] We shall presently show how the above statement by the author himself describes the actual state of things —

Thus for a Naiyāyika the important topics in the Nyāya system are undoubtedly the Anumāna pramāna (with the fallacies) that pramānas are four and the nature of samavāya (or intimate relation) Kesavamisra treats the Anumāna topic in great detail He is not tired of repetition Whenever some important point is to be discussed he proceeds to do it step by step always beginning his treatment with tathāhi

(to explain the same thing in detail) which expression occurs no less than a dozen times in sections 18 32 that treat of anumana The fallacies or hetvabhasas with their divisions and sub-divisions are expounded twice once as a part of Anumana (sections 28 32) and again as an independent topic (sections 106–114) Here there is much of repetition but Kesavamisra risks it to make the beginner understand the nature of fallacies thoroughly as the detection of fallacies is undoubtedly the most important thing in the eyes of a Naiyā yika Similarly Kesavamisra describes in detail the nature of Karana and Karana the six fold contact of sense organ and object the undesirability of admitting non perception and presumption as independent pramanas the nature of vakyapratiti and pada pratiti and so on The self validity of knowledge also is described as an independent topic with considerable acumen Un important topics such as Chala Jati Nigrahasthana Vada Jalpa etc are simply referred to and no detailed treatment is given, as they are useful only for one who has thoroughly mastered the Nyaya technique and not for a beginner

It will be clear from the amount of space devoted to the treatment of different topics what topics are regarded as im portant by the author Thus of the sixteen padarthas treat in the Tarkabhasa in 121 pages

Pramana is described in 58 pages (		1—58)
Prameya	38	(58—95)
Hetvabhasas are	15	(104 118)
		(and also in 35 40) under Pramāna.

The three topics Pramāna Prameya and Hetvabhasas together have 111 pages devoted to them while the remaining thirteen topics are dismissed in ten pages! The last topic Nigrahasthana has one whole section devoted to it in the Nyāyasutra (V 2) where all the twenty two varieties are mentioned Kesavamisra just mentions only seven of them He also mentions only two varieties (out of twenty four) of Jāti and only one of Chala (out of three)

It will thus be seen that the Tarkabhasa is an admi rable manual for a beginner It is also complete in itself and compares favourably with the Tarkasamgraha in this respect The Tarkasamgraha is more scrappy in its treatment (even when read along with the Tarka d pika) it

might be said to ignore altogether some of the topics of the Naiyayikas The Tarkabhasa on the other hand, pays due attention to the controversy about the self-validity of knowledge, non perception and presumption as independent pramanas and other interesting matters The treatment in the Tarkabhasa almost takes the form of lecture-notes in a class room The views of the opponent are mentioned clearly and fully the argument is advanced step by step even a similar topic is treated independently and the device of referring the reader to other topics described before *mutatis mutandis*, is rarely resorted to Consequently there is much of repetition, but the interests of the reader are thoroughly guarded

Kesavamisra writes clearly and there is hardly any ambiguity about his statements There is some looseness about his syllogism or anumānavakya Thus he says अनित्य शब्द in place of शब्द अनित्य, sometimes the उदाहरणम् is given as यो यो धूमवान् sometimes as यत्र यत्र धूम etc But such lapses are very few, and on the whole, the Tarkabhasa can be justly described as an excellent manual of logic complete in itself, and doing full justice to the Nyayanaya which it professes to expound

IV THE NAIYAYIKAS AND THE VAISESIKAS THEIR DIVERGENT VIEWS

It is necessary that the student should have a general idea about the points on which the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas differ We give below in parallel columns the views of both on some important topics (The list is not exhaustive)

Vaisesikas	*Naiyāyikas*
(1) पदार्थs are seven, द्रव्यम् गुण कर्म सामान्यम् विशेष समवाय अभाव इति (or six if अभाव is not admitted)	(1) पदार्थs are sixteen प्रमाणम् प्रमेयम् संशय प्रयोजनम् दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्त अवयव तर्क निर्णय वाद जल्प वितण्डा हेत्वाभास छलम् जाति and निग्रहस्थानम्
(2) विशेषs are admitted as a पदार्थ	(2) नव्यनैयायिकs do not admit विशेषs as a पदार्थ.
(3) समवाय is अतीन्द्रिय and only अनुमेय.	(3) समवाय is प्रत्यक्ष by the इन्द्रिय-संबद्धविशेषणतासन्निकर्ष

(4) The Vaisesikas are पीलुपाकवादिन्s (पीलवः परमाणव एव स्वतन्त्रा पच्यन्ते । तेनैव पूर्वरूपनाशाभिनवरूपाद्युत्पत्ति । आरम्भगुणप्रक्रमेण चावयविनि रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः)	(4) The Naiyayikas are पिठरपाकवादिन्s (कार्यकारणसमुदाय एव पच्यते न तु पीलवः पच्यन्ते)
(5) द्वित्वादि is regarded as अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य	(5) द्वित्वादि is regarded as अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाश्य
(6) The Vaisesikas admit विभागजविभाग	(6) The Naiyayikas do not admit विभागजविभाग
(7) आत्मन् is अप्रत्यक्ष and only अनुमानगम्य	(7) आत्मन् is मानसप्रत्यक्षविषय
(8) There are only two प्रमाणs प्रत्यक्षम् and अनुमानम् (शब्द and उपमान are included in अनुमान and should not be regarded as separate प्रमाणs)	(8) Pramanas are four — प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् उपमानम् and शब्द
(9) Only 3 हेत्वाभासs are admitted (सव्यभिचार or सन्दिग्ध विरुद्ध and असिद्ध)	(9) Five हेत्वाभासs are admitted.

[The Naiyayikas are sometimes divided into two schools the ancients and the moderns But these terms are often very loosely used Sometimes the Vaisesikas are meant by the term 'the ancients and sometimes older Bhasyakaras Prasastapada Vatsyayana and others]

Kesavamisra accepts all the tenets of the Naiyayikas except Nos. 4-6 He admits the पीलुपाकवाद when he says about रूप स्थानित्य पृथिव्यामिति regards द्वित्व as अनित्य everywhere and mentions the विभागजविभाग variety He refers to the Vaisesika padarthas under अर्थ

Kesavamisra generally follows the ancients In his treatment of Karana he accepts the ancient view (व्यापारवदसाधारण कारण करणम्) as regards प्रत्यक्ष for he mentions the अवान्तरव्यापार in the case of the three करणs (इन्द्रियम्, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष and ज्ञानम्) He follows the modern view (फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न करणम्) as regards अनुमान for he gives लिङ्गपरामर्श (and not लिङ्ग) as its करण In the case of उपमान he again seems to follow the ancient view as the करण is given there as the सादृश्यज्ञान (and अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरण as the अवान्तर व्यापार)

विषयानुक्रमणी

(२) प्रमेयम्

॥ श्री ॥

तर्कभाषा

उपोद्घातश्लोक. ।

बालोऽपि यो न्यायनये प्रवेश-
मल्पेन वाञ्छत्यलस श्रुतेन ।
संक्षिप्तयुक्त्यन्विततर्कभाषा
प्रकाश्यते तस्य कृते मयैषा ॥ १ ॥

षोडशपदार्थानाम् उद्देश ।

प्रमाण प्रमेय संशय प्रयोजन दृष्टान्त सिद्धान्त अवयव तर्क निर्णय-वाद जल्प वितण्डा हेत्वाभास च्छल जाति निग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञा-नान्नि·श्रेयसाधिगम इति न्यायस्यादिमं सूत्रम्(न्या सू.१ १ १)। अस्यार्थ । प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्मोक्षप्राप्तिर्भवतीति ॥ २ ॥

TARKABHASA

[EXPOSITION OF REASONING]

(1) For the sake of him who though a man of immature understanding (*bālah*) and lazy desires entrance into the system of Nyaya [philosophy] with a little study is brought out by me this Tarkabhasa [Exposition of Reasoning] concise, and accompanied by arguments [or accompanied by brief arguments, or having brief arguments and consistent, or in such a way as to give brief arguments, O wise one (*anvita*)] ,.

(2) 'The acquisition of the highest beatitude [is] from the true comprehension of (1) Proof [or, Means of right knowledge], (2) Object of knowledge (3) Doubt, (4) Motive, (5) Instance, (6) Tenet [or Demon trated truth] (7) Member of syllogism (8) Hypothetical reasoning, (9) Conclusion, (10) Discussion (11) Wrangling, (12) Cavilling, (13) Fallacy, (14) Perversion, (15) Futility, and (16) Ground for confutation ' —this [is] the first aphorism of the Nyāya [–sutras of Gautama] The meaning of this [is] that there would be the attainment of final liberation from the true comprehension of the sixteen categories proof etc

उद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षाविचारः ।

न च प्रमाणादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानं सम्यग् ज्ञानं तावद्भवति यावदेतेषामुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षा न क्रियन्ते । यदाह भाष्यकारः—त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिरुद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति । (वा० भाष्य०)

उद्देशस्तु नाममात्रेण वस्तुसंकीर्तनम् । तच्चास्मिन्नेव सूत्रे कृतम् । लक्षणं त्वसाधारणधर्मवचनम् । यथा गोः सास्नादिमत्त्वम् । यथालक्षितस्यैतत्[1] लक्षणमुपपद्यते न वेति विचारः परीक्षा । तेनेते लक्षणपरीक्षे प्रमाणादीनां तत्त्वज्ञानार्थमवश्यं कर्तव्ये ॥ ३ ॥

(१) प्रमाणम् ।

प्रमाणलक्षणं प्रमालक्षणं च ।

तत्रापि प्रथममुद्दिष्टस्य प्रमाणस्य तावल्लक्षणमुच्यते प्रमाकरणं

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(3) Add further (*ca*) true comprehension—right knowledge—of proof etc, would not take place so long as Enumeration, Definition [or Characterization] and Examination of these are not made, as says the author of the Bhāsya [Vātsyāyana, who wrote a commentary on the Nyāya-sutras]—the procedure in this science, again, [is] threefold—Enumeration, Definition, and Examination

As for (*tu*) Enumeration [it is] the statement of things [or topics] merely by name and that has been done in this very aphorism

Definition again, [is] the statement of a peculiar characteristic, as the possession of a dew lap etc [in the case] of a cow

Examination [is] the investigation as to whether the *definition in question* (*etat*) of [a thing] defined in a particular way (*yathā*) is applicable or not

Therefore [owing to Uddesa having been already made in the first aphorism] these two Definition and Examination must needs be gone through for the sake of true comprehension of [the categories] proof etc

(4) And therein too the definition of *proof* [which is] enumerated first is now stated—proof [is] the instrument of

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१ लक्षितस्य लक्षणं ।

प्रमाणम् । अत्र च प्रमाणं लक्ष्यम् प्रमाकरणं लक्षणम् ।

ननु प्रमायाः करणं चेत् प्रमाणं तर्हि तस्य फलं वक्तव्यम् करणस्य फलवत्त्वनियमात् । सत्यम् । प्रमैव फलं साध्यमित्यर्थः । यथा छिदाकरणस्य परशोश्छिदेव फलम् ॥ ४ ॥

प्रमानिरूपणम् ।

का पुनः प्रमा यस्याः करणं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा । यथार्थ इत्ययथार्थानां संशयविपर्ययतर्कज्ञानानां निरासः । अनुभव इति स्मृतेर्निरासः । अनुभवो नाम स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानम् ॥५॥

करणनिरूपणम्

किं पुनः करणम् । साधकतमं करणम् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमं प्रकृष्टं कारणमित्यर्थः ।

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right cognition Here again proof [is] what is defined, instrument of right cognition [is] the definition

I say [says the objector *nanu*] if proof [is] the instrument of right cognition, then its result [or effect, fruit] deserves to be stated, for an instrument is as a rule possessed of [that is, associated with] a result [The siddhantin replies—that is] true, right cognition itself [is] the result—what is to be accomplished, this [is] what is meant, as of the axe—the instrument of cutting [is] the cutting itself the result

(5) What again [is this] right cognition of which the instrument [is] proof ? It is answered [as follows]—Right cognition [is] the apprehension of a thing as it is (*yathārtha*) By [the expression] 'of a thing as it is' [is effected] the exclusion of cognitions-Doubt, Error and Hypothetical reasoning, [which are] not in accord with their objects By [the expression] 'apprehension' [is effected] the exclusion of Remembrance [For] apprehension indeed (*nāma*) [is all] cognition other than remembrance

(6) What again [is] the Instrument? Instrument [is] the most effective [agency] Most effective [means] exceedingly effective; that is to say (*ityarthah*) the most efficient [or principal] cause

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१ निरासः । ज्ञातविषय ज्ञानं स्मृति । २ साधकतम कारणम् ।

ननु साधकं कारणमिति पर्यायस्तदेव न ज्ञायते किं तत् कारणमिति। उच्यते। यस्य कार्यात् पूर्वभावो नियतोऽनन्यथासिद्धश्च तत् कारणम्। यथा तन्तुवेमादिकं पटस्य। यद्यपि पटोत्पत्तौ दैवादागतस्य रासभादेः पूर्वभावो विद्यते तथापि नासौ नियतः। तन्तुरूपस्य तु नियतः पूर्वभावोऽस्त्येव किंत्वन्यथासिद्धः पटरूपजननोपक्षीणत्वात्। पटं प्रत्यपि कारणत्वे कल्पनागौरवप्रसंगात्।

तेनानन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्वभावित्वं कारणत्वम्। अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपश्चाद्भावित्वं कार्यत्वम्।

१२ यत्तु कश्चिदाह कार्यानुकृतान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वं कारणत्वमिति

I say [s]ādhaka [effective] and karana [cause] [are but] *synonyms and it is not yet known what that* 'cause' is We reply—That whose antecedent existence to the effect [is] invariable and not established [or proved] to be otherwise [that is, for another purpose than that of producing the effect] [is] the Cause—as for instance, threads loom etc [that are the cause] of cloth Even though, in the case of the production of cloth, there does exist *the antecedent existence of a donkey etc* come [there] by chance, yet that [antecedent existence is] not invariable [hence, a donkey and other things can not be regarded as the cause of cloth] There does indeed obtain the invariable antecedent existence of the thread-colour but [that is] proved to be [there] for another purpose, owing to [its] being exhausted in producing the colour of the *cloth*, [*in regarding the thread colour*] as the cause of cloth also there would arise the undesirable contingency of a complicated assumption

Therefore, the state of being a cause [is] the state of being an invariable antecedent not proved *to be [there]* otherwise [or for another purpose], the state of being the effect [is] the state of invariably following [the cause] and not proved [to have come into existence] otherwise [that is, through another cause]

As regards what some one contends [viz] the state of being a cause [is] the state of having the presence and

तदयुक्तम् । नित्यविभूनां व्योमादीनां कालतो देशतश्च व्यतिरेकासम्भ
वादकारणत्वप्रसंगात् ॥ ६ ॥

समवायिकारणनिरूपणम् ।

तच्च कारणं त्रिविधम् । समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तभेदात् । तत्र यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायिकारणम् । यथा तन्तवः पटस्य समवायिकारणम् । यतस्तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु ।

ननु तन्तुसंबन्ध इव तुर्यादिसंबन्धोऽपि पटस्य विद्यते तत् कथं तन्तुष्वेव पटः समवेतो जायते न तुर्यादिषु । सत्यम् । द्विविधः संबन्धः संयोगः समवायश्चेति । तत्रायुतसिद्धयोः संबन्धः समवायः । अन्ययोस्तु संयोग एव ॥ ७ ॥

absence [of a thing] corresponding to [the presence and absence of] the effect, that [is] improper, for [if the above view is accepted] owing to the impossibility of [their] absence in point of time and space eternal and all-pervading [things like] ether and others, could not be a cause, which is an undesirable contingency

(7) That cause again [is] of three kinds on account of the distinction of Intimate [or Material or Constituent or Substantial or Inherent] Non-intimate [or Non-constituent] and Instrumental [or Efficient] Of these (*tatra*) Intimate cause [is] that in inseparable [or intimate or inherent] relation with which an effect is produced as for instance, threads [are] the intimate cause of [a piece of] cloth, for cloth is produced in intimate relation with the threads alone [and] not in [intimate relation with] shuttle and others

I say, there does exist, like the connection with the threads, a connection also with the shuttle and others of the cloth, then how is the cloth produced in intimate relation with the threads alone [and] not in [intimate relation with] the shuttle and others? Right [in a sense is your statement] Connection [is] two fold—Conjunction and Inherence Of these, the connection of two [things that are] known to be never dissociated or separated [or joined, that is, which are permanently connected] [is] Inherence, that again between other two [things is] simple Conjunction

'अयुतसिद्धौ कौ' इति निरूपणम् ।

कौ पुनरयुतसिद्धौ । ययोर्मध्ये एकमविनश्यदपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ । तदुक्तम् ।

तावेवायुतसिद्धौ द्वौ विज्ञातव्यौ ययोर्द्वयो ।
अविनश्यदेकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते ॥

यथा अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति । अवयव्यादयो हि यथाक्रममवयवाद्याश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्तेऽविनश्यन्त । विनश्यदवस्थास्त्वनाश्रिता एवावतिष्ठन्ते । यथा तन्तुनाशे सति पट । यथा वा आश्रयनाशे सति गुण । विनश्यत्ता तु विनाशकारणसामग्रीसान्निध्यम् ।

तन्तुपटावप्यवयवावयविनौ । तेन तयो सम्बन्ध समवायोऽयुत

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(8) Which again [are] the two [things which are] known to be never dissociated? Those [two things are] known to be never dissociated [or are permanently connected] between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other As [it] is said—

Those two [things] alone should be understood to be Ayutasiddha between which two the one as long as it is not destroyed continues to be just dependent upon the other

Thus—parts and the whole quality and the qualified or substratum action and [its] possessor class-characteristic and individual and particularity and eternal substance For the whole etc as long as they are not destroyed continue to be just dependent upon the parts etc in order [or respectively] But [when they are] in the state of being destroyed, [they] remain just not resorting to anything as for instance, the cloth [does not remain resorting to anything] when there is the destruction of the threads or the quality when there is the destruction of [its] substratum. The state of being destroyed again [means] the presence of the totality of causes of [that is conducive to] destruction

Threads and cloth again [are in the relation of] parts and the whole Hence the connection between them [is] inherence owing to [their] being known to be not dissociated,

सिद्धत्वात्। तुरीपटयोस्तु न समवायोऽयुतसिद्धत्वाभावात्। न हि तुरी पटाश्रितैवावतिष्ठते नापि पटस्तुर्याश्रितोऽतस्तयोः सम्बन्धः संयोग एव।

तदेवं तन्तुसमवेतः पटः। यत्समवेतं कार्यमुत्पद्यते तत् समवायिकारणम्। अतस्तन्तुरेव समवायिकारणं पटस्य न तु तुर्यादिः। पटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम्। एवं मृत्पिण्डोऽपि घटस्य समवायिकारणम्। घटश्च स्वगतरूपादेः ॥ ८ ॥

'घटः स्वगतरूपादेः समवायिकारणम्' इति सिद्धान्तप्रस्थापनम्।

ननु यदैव घटादयो जायन्ते तदैव तद्गतरूपादयोऽपि। अतः समानकालीनत्वाद् गुणगुणिनोः सव्येतरगोविषाणवत् कार्यकारणभाव

[that] between the shuttle and cloth on the other hand (*tu*), [is] not inherence, owing to the absence of the state of being known to be not dissociated Not indeed does the shuttle remain resorting to the cloth alone nor the cloth, for the matter of that, resorting to the shuttle [alone], hence the connection between them [is] conjunction alone [pure and simple]

Therefore thus the cloth is in intimate relation with the threads Intimate cause [is] that in inseparable [or intimate, or inherent] relation with which an effect is produced Hence the thread alone [is] the intimate cause of cloth, and not the shuttle etc And the cloth [is] the intimate cause of colour etc, belonging to itself Likewise the clod of earth [or clay] also [is] the intimate cause of the jar, and the jar, of the colour etc belonging to itself

(9) I say [says the objector]—When indeed the jar and others are produced, at the same time are produced also colour etc belonging to them Therefore, owing to the quality and [its] possessor being contemporaneous, there exists not [between them] the relation of cause and effect itself, as between the right and left horn of a cow, owing to the absence of the relation of priority and posteriority Hence, the jar and others [are] not the intimate cause of colour etc belonging to them, owing to the intimate cause

एव नास्ति पौर्वापर्याभावात्। अतो न समवायिकारणं घटादयः स्वगत-रूपादीनाम्। कारणविशेषत्वात् समवायिकारणस्य।

अत्रोच्यते। न तावद् गुणगुणिनो समानकालीनं जन्म। किंतु द्रव्यं निर्गुणमेव प्रथममुत्पद्यते पश्चात् तत्समवेता गुणा उत्पद्यन्ते। समानकालोत्पत्तौ तु गुणगुणिनोः समानसामग्रीकत्वाद् भेदो न स्यात्। कारणभेदनियतत्वात् कार्यभेदस्य। तस्मात् प्रथमे क्षणे निर्गुण एव घटो गुणेभ्यः पूर्वभावीति भवति गुणानां समवायिकारणम्। तदा कारणभेदोऽप्यस्ति। घटो हि घटं प्रति न कारणमेकस्यैव पौर्वापर्याभावात्। न हि स एव तमेव प्रति पूर्वभावी पश्चाद्भावी च। स्वगुणान् प्रति तु पूर्वभावित्वाद्भवति गुणानां समवायिकारणम्।

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being [only] a particular cause [and the rule of paurvaparya necessarily holding good in the case of a particular cause as in the case of a cause in general]

To this we reply To begin with (*tāvat*) the production of the quality and [its] possessor [is] not contemporaneous but a substance void of qualities alone is first produced, [and] afterwards the qualities inherent in it are produced But if they [the quality and its possessor] were produced at the same time [or contemporaneously], there would be no difference between the quality and its possessor, owing to the sameness of the totality of the causal agencies (*sāmagri*), for the difference between effects is determined invariably by the difference between causes. Therefore, the jar just void of qualities at the first moment becomes the intimate cause of qualities because it exists prior to the qualities And in this way (*tadā*) there would exist also the difference between the causes [The objector now suggests that there need not still be kāranabheda he is prepared to admit that ghata is the intimate cause of its qualities, perhaps ghata may still be its own cause as well! To this the siddhantin replies] The jar, for the matter of that (*hi*) [is] not the cause with reference to the jar owing to the absence of the relation of priority and posteriority in one and the same [object] Not surely [can] the same [jar] be existing before and existing after itself Owing to [its] existing before its qualities however, [it] becomes the intimate cause of [its] qualities

नन्वेवं सति प्रथमे क्षणे घटोऽचाक्षुषः स्यादरूपिद्रव्यत्वाद्वायुवत्। तद्धि हि द्रव्यं चाक्षुषं यन्महत्त्वे सत्युद्भूतरूपवत्। अद्रव्यं च स्यात् गुणाश्रयत्वाभावात्। गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यमिति हि द्रव्यलक्षणम्। सत्यम्। प्रथमे क्षणे परमसूक्ष्मो घटो यदि चक्षुषा न गृह्यते तदा का नो हानिः। न हि सगुणोत्पत्तिपक्षेऽपि निमेषावसरे घटो गृह्यते। तेन व्यवस्थितमेतत् निर्गुण एव प्रथमं घट उत्पद्यते द्वितीयादिक्षणेषु चक्षुषा गृह्यते। न च प्रथमे क्षणे गुणाश्रयत्वाभावादद्रव्यत्वापत्तिः। समवायिकारणं द्रव्यमिति द्रव्यलक्षणयोगात्। योग्यतया गुणाश्रयत्वाच्च। योग्यता च गुणात्यन्ताभावाभावः ॥ ९ ॥

असमवायिकारणनिरूपणम्।

असमवायिकारणं तदुच्यते। यत् समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नमवधृत

I say,—such being the case the jar at the first moment would be invisible owing to its being [at that time] a substance void of colour, like air For, that substance alone [is] visible, which [is] possessed of a developed colour, the dimension being large And further [the jar] would be no substance, owing to the absence of being a substratum of qualities Substance [is] the substratum of qualities—this [is] the definition of a substance [The siddhantin replies]-True [what you say] [But] if the jar at the first moment being extremely subtile, is not apprehended by the eye, what then [is] the loss for us? Not indeed, even according to the theory of the production [of the jar] with qualities, is the jar apprehended in the time of the winking of the eye So [it is] well established that the jar just void of qualities is first produced [and] apprehended by the eye during the second and following moments Again, there would not be the [undesirable] consequence that [the jar] on account of the absence of being a substratum of qualities at the first moment would be no substance, owing to the application of the [following] definition of a substance—substance [is] an intimate cause, and further (*ca*) owing to [its] being a substratum of qualities, on account of [its] capability [of being such] Capability again [is] the absence of the absolute negation of qualities

(*10*) Now the Non intimate cause is explained Non-

१ निमेषावसरे। २ गुणाश्रयत्वं गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वम्।

सामर्थ्यं तदसमवायिकारणम्। यथा तन्तुसंयोगः पटस्यासमवायिकारणम्। तन्तुसंयोगस्य गुणस्य पटसमवायिकारणेषु तन्तुषु गुणिषु समवेतत्वेन समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात् अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्वभावित्वेन पटं प्रति कारणत्वाच्च।

एवं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्यासमवायिकारणम्।

ननु पटरूपस्य पट समवायिकारणम्। तेन तद्गतस्यैव कस्यचिद्धर्मस्य पटरूपं प्रत्यसमवायिकारणत्वमुचितम्। तस्यैव समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात्। न तन्तुरूपस्य। तस्य समवायिकारणप्रत्यासत्त्यभावात्। मैवम्। तत्समवायिकारणसमवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नस्यापि परंपरया समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वात्॥ १०॥

निमित्तकारणनिरूपणम्।

निमित्तकारणं तदुच्यते। यन्न समवायिकारणं नाप्यसमवायिकार-

intimate cause [is] that which is proximate to the intimate cause and whose [causal] capacity is ascertained [or established], as for instance, the conjunction of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the cloth, for the quality, the conjunction of threads, being in intimate relation with the threads, the possessors of the quality, [and] the intimate causes of the cloth, is proximate to the intimate cause, and is the cause with reference to the cloth, being invariably antecedent [to it], and not known to be [there] for another purpose

Likewise, the colour of the threads [is] the non-intimate cause of the colour of the cloth

I say, [says the objector] the cloth [is] the intimate cause *of the colour belonging to the cloth, hence it is proper that* some quality belonging to itself [that is, to the cloth], should be the non-intimate cause with reference to the colour of the cloth, for that alone is proximate to the intimate cause, [and] not the colour of the threads, that being not proximate to the intimate cause [Do] not [say] so That which is proximate to the intimate cause of the intimate cause of that [effect] is also indirectly proximate to the intimate cause

(11) Instrumental cause is now explained —Instrumental cause [is] that which is neither the intimate cause, nor again the non intimate cause and yet [is] a cause, as for

णमथ च कारणं तन्निमित्तकारणम् । यथा वेमादिकं पटस्य निमित्त
कारणम् ॥ ११ ॥

अभावस्य निमित्तमात्रं कारणम् ।

तदेतद्भावानामेव त्रिविधं कारणम्। अभावस्य तु निमित्तमात्रं तस्य
क्वचिदप्यसमवायात् । समवायस्य तु भावद्वयधर्मत्वात् ॥ १२ ॥ ३

'अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणम्' इत्यस्य प्रमाणलक्षणस्य खण्डनम् ।

इन्द्रियसंयोगादि प्रमाणं न प्रमात्रादि ।

तदेतस्य त्रिविधस्य कारणस्य मध्ये यदेव कथमपि सातिशयं तदेव ३
करणम् । तेन व्यवस्थितमेतल्लक्षणं प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति । —

यत्त्वनधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणमिति लक्षणम् तन्न । एकस्मिन्नेव घटे
घटोऽयं घटोऽयमिति धारावाहिकज्ञानानां गृहीतग्राहिणामप्रामाण्य- ६
प्रसंगात् ।

न चान्यान्यक्षणविशिष्टविषयीकरणादनधिगतार्थगन्तृता । प्रत्यक्षेण

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instance the shuttle etc [are] the instrumental cause of the cloth.

(12) Now this three fold cause belongs to positive things [or entities] only As for negation [or absence] it has only the instrumental [cause], for there cannot be intimate relation of it anywhere, intimate relation again being a property of two positive things

(13) Whatever [cause is] in some way pre eminent amongst these three fold causes [is] itself the instrument Hence well-established [is] this definition—Proof [is] the instrument of right cognition

As regards the definition—Proof [is] that which makes known an object not known before, it [is] not [right] [For if this definition is regarded as correct], serial [or continuous] cognitions in the form 'this [is] a jar, 'this [is] a jar' with reference to one and the same jar, which apprehend something already apprehended, would not be right knowledge, which is undesirable

Neither [can] the character of making known what is not known before [be said to exist in each of the

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१ कारणद्वयधर्मत्वात् ।

सूक्ष्मकालभेदानाकलनात् । कालभेदग्रहे हि क्रियादिसंयोगान्तानां चतुर्णां यौगपद्याभिमानो न स्यात् । क्रिया क्रियातो विभागो विभागात् पूर्वसंयोगनाशस्ततश्चोत्तरसंयोगोत्पत्तिरिति ।

ननु प्रमायाः कारणानि बहूनि सन्ति प्रमातृप्रमेयादीनि तान्यपि किं करणानि उत नेति । उच्यते । सत्यपि प्रमातरि प्रमेये च प्रमानुत्पत्तेः इन्द्रियसंयोगादौ सत्यविलम्बेन प्रमोत्पत्तेः इन्द्रियसंयोगादिरेव करणम् । [प्रमायाः] साधकत्वाविशेषेऽप्यनेनैवोत्कर्षेणास्य प्रमात्रादिभ्योऽतिशयितत्वात् । अतिशयितं साधकं साधकतमम् तदेव करणमित्युक्तम् । अत इन्द्रियसंयोगादिरेव प्रमाकरणत्वात् प्रमाणं न प्रमात्रादि ॥ १३ ॥

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above serial cognitions] on the ground of referring to objects characterised by different moments successively For the comprehension of minute divisions of time [such as a moment] can not be had by direct perception. If [it were supposed that] there is the comprehension of [the minute] divisions of time, then there would not arise the apparent conception about the simultaneity of the four [actions] beginning with motion and ending with conjunction, namely, motion, disjunction through motion, destruction of the former conjunction through disjunction, and then the production of the second [or new] conjunction

I say [says the objector] there are many causes of right cognition, the knower, the object of knowledge etc [are] they also the instruments or not ? We reply —Even though the knower and the object of knowledge are present, there does not arise right cognition, [while] when there is the conjunction etc of the organ of sense [with the object], right *cognition arises without delay, [hence it follows that] only* the conjunction of organ of sense etc [is] the instrument For though the character of being the cause is the same [in the case of *Pramātr Prameya etc*] *this* [*Indriyasaṃyoga*] has superiority over the knower etc, on account of this very pre eminence [viz producing right knowledge without delay] [What is] pre-eminently effective [is] most effective [and] that same has been termed the instrument Hence the conjuction of the sense organ etc [is] owing to [its] being the most effective cause of right knowledge the proof [or means of right knowledge and] not the knower [or cognising agent] etc

प्रमाणचतुष्टयम् ।

तानि च प्रमाणानि चत्वारि । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति ॥ १४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षम् ।

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणनिरूपणम् । कदा इन्द्रियं करणम् कदा इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः करणम् कदा ज्ञानं करणम् इति विचारः ।

किं पुनः प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्कारिप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्कारिणी च प्रमा सैवोच्यते येन्द्रियजा । सा च द्विविधा सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकभेदात् । तस्याः करणं त्रिविधम् । कदाचिदिन्द्रियम् कदाचिदिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः कदाचिज्ज्ञानम् ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रियं करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकरूपा प्रमा फलम् तदेन्द्रियं करणम् । तथाहि । आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियाणां वस्तुप्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । ततोऽर्थ

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(14) And those proofs [are] four And to the same effect the Nyayasutra [I 1 3] Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Word [or Testimony] [are] the proofs

(15) What again [is] Perception? Perception [is] the instrument of direct (*saksatkari*) right cognition, and that alone is called direct right cognition which is produced by a sense-organ. It [is] again two fold, owing to the distinction of determinate [or concrete] and non-determinate [or undifferentiated or abstract] Its instrument [is] threefold, sometimes an organ of sense, sometimes the contact between sense-organ and object, [and] sometimes cognition

When again [is] a sense-organ the instrument? When right cognition of the form of non-determinate [knowledge] [is] the effect, then a sense-organ [is] the instrument To explain (*tathāhi*)—The soul is brought into contact with the mind, the mind with the sense organ, the sense-organ with the object, it being a rule that the sense-organs produce cognition [or illumination] after

संनिकृष्टेनेन्द्रियेण निर्विकल्पकं नामजात्यादियोजनाहीनं वस्तुमात्रावगाहि किंचिदिदमिति ज्ञानं जन्यते । तस्य ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियं करणं छिदाया इव परशुः । इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षोऽवान्तरव्यापारः छिदाकरणस्य परशोरिव दारुसंयोगः । निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं फलं परशोरिव छिदा ।

कदा पुनरिन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः करणम् । यदा निर्विकल्पकानन्तरं सविकल्पकं नामजात्यादियोजनात्मकं डित्थोऽयं ब्राह्मणोऽयं श्यामोऽयमिति विशेषणविशेष्यावगाहि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तदेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः करणम् । निर्विकल्पकज्ञानमवान्तरव्यापारः । सविकल्पकं ज्ञानं फलम् ।

कदा पुनर्ज्ञानं करणम् । यदोक्तसविकल्पकानन्तरं हानोपादानो-

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having come into *contact* with [*or reached*] the thing Then by the sense-organ coming in contact with the object is generated a cognition non determinate, [which is] void of the connection with name, genus, [quality, action] etc, which comprises the thing alone, [and] having the form (*iti*) 'this [is] something' Of that cognition [is] the sense-organ the instrument, as of the cutting, the axe the contact between the sense-organ and object the intervening operation, as the conjunction of the wood and the axe [which is] *the instrument of cutting, the non-determinate cognition* [*is*] *the effect, as the cutting, of the axe.*

When again [is] the contact between the sense organ and object, the instrument? When after the non-determinate [*cognition*] *is generated the determinate cognition embracing a connection with name, genus etc* [*and*] *comprising* [*the idea of*] the qualification and the qualified, [and] having the form 'this [is] Dittha,' 'this [is] a Brahmana this [is] dark-coloured,' then the contact between the sense-organ and object [is] the instrument the non-determinate cognition the intervening operation, [and] the determinate cognition the effect

When again [is] *the cognition the instrument?* When after the determinate [cognition] spoken of [above] are genera

पेक्षाबुद्धयो जायन्ते तदा निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं करणम् । सविकल्पकं ज्ञानमवान्तरव्यापारः । हानादिबुद्धयः फलम् ।[1] २८

अत्र कश्चिदाह । सविकल्पकादीनामपीन्द्रियमेव करणम् । यावन्ति त्वान्तरालिकानि संनिकर्षादीनि तानि सर्वाण्यवान्तरव्यापार इति ॥ १५ ॥ २७

षड्विध. इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष ।

इन्द्रियार्थयोस्तु य. संनिकर्ष· साक्षात्कारिप्रमाहेतुः स षड्विध एव । तद्यथा । संयोग संयुक्तसमवाय संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय. समवाय· ३ समवेतसमवायो विशेष्यविशेषणभावश्चेति ।

तत्र यदा चक्षुषा घटविषयं ज्ञान जन्यते तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं घटोऽर्थ । अनयो संनिकर्ष संयोग एवायुतसिद्ध्यभावात् । एवं ६

ted notions about rejection acceptance or indifference, then non-determinate cognition [is] the instrument determinate cognition the intervening operation, notions about rejection etc the effect

In this connection somebody says—The sense-organ it self [is] the instrument also of the determinate [notion] etc Whatsoever [are] the intervening contacts etc they [are] all the intervening operation

(16) The contact of the sense-organ and object, which [is] the cause of direct right cognition [is] six-fold only, it [is] as follows Conjunction Intimate relation with what is in conjunction, Intimate relation with what is intimately associated with what is in conjunction Intimate relation Intimate relation with what is intimately related and the Relation of qualification and the qualified

Of these, when by the eye is generated cognition having the jar for [its] object, then the eye [is] the sense-organ [and] the jar the object the contact of these two [is] only conjunction, owing to the absence of not being known to be separated Likewise, when by the mind, the internal sense organ,

१ तज्जन्यस्तज्जन्यजनकोऽवान्तरव्यापारः । यथा कुठारजन्यः कुठारदारुसंयोगः कुठारजन्यच्छिदाजनकः ।

मनसान्तरेणेन्द्रियेण यदात्मविषयकं ज्ञानं जन्यतेऽहमिति तदा मन इन्द्रियम् आत्मा अर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयोग एव ।

कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवायः संनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुरादिना घटगतरूपादिकं गृह्यते घटे श्यामं रूपमस्तीति तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं घटरूपमर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवाय एव । चक्षुःसंयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायात् । एवं मनसात्मसमवेते सुखादौ गृह्यमाणे अयमेव संनिकर्षः ।

घटगतपरिमाणादिग्रहे चतुष्टयसंनिकर्षोऽप्यधिकं कारणमिष्यते । सत्यपि संयुक्तसमवाये तदभावे दूरे परिमाणाद्यग्रहणात् । चतुष्टयसंनिकर्षो यथा । इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थावयवानाम् इन्द्रियावयविनार्थाव

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is generated cognition with regard to the soul [or, having the soul for its object], having the form 'I', then the mind [is] the sense-organ, *the soul the object, the contact of these two* [is] *only conjunction.*

When again [is] the contact, intimate relation with *what is in conjunction? When by the eye etc*, is apprehended colour etc, belonging to the jar, in the form 'There is dark colour about the jar', then the eye [is] the sense-organ, the colour of the jar, the object, the contact of these two [is] just intimate relation with what is in conjunction, owing to the colour being *in intimate relation with the jar that is in* conjunction with the eye Likewise, when by the mind are being apprehended pleasure etc that are in intimate relation with the soul, there [is] this very contact

In the case of the apprehension of the dimension etc. belonging to the jar, a four fold contact is desired as a further cause, for, even though the [contact of] intimate relation with what is *in conjunction be there, in the absence* of that [four fold contact], there is the non-apprehension of the dimension etc from a distance The fourfold contact [is] as follows—contact of the [constituent] parts of the object with the parts of the sense-organ, of the object as a whole with the sense-organ as a whole, of the

यविनः इन्द्रियावयवैरर्थावयविनः इन्द्रियावयविनार्थावयवानां
संनिकर्ष इति । १

कदा पुनः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय संनिकर्षः। यदा चक्षुषा घट-
रूपसमवेतं रूपत्वादिसामान्यं गृह्यते तदा चक्षुरिन्द्रियं रूपत्वादिसा-
मान्यमर्थः। अनयोः संनिकर्षः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय एव। यतश्चक्षु- २१
संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं तत्र रूपत्वस्य समवाय।

कदा पुनः समवायः संनिकर्षः। यदा श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण शब्दो गृह्यते तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दोऽर्थः। अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवाय एव। श्रोत्रस्याकाशात्मकत्वाच्छब्दस्य चाकाशगुणत्वाद् गुणगुणिनोश्च समवायात्। ८

कदा पुनः समवेतसमवाय संनिकर्ष। यदा शब्दसमवेत शब्दत्वादि-
सामान्यं श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यते तदा श्रोत्रमिन्द्रियं शब्दत्वादिसामान्य-

object as a whole with the parts of the sense-organ [and] of the parts of the object with the sense organ as a whole

When again [is] the contact intimate relation with what is intimately associated with what is in conjunction? When by the eye is apprehended the generality, colour ness etc. in intimate relation with the colour of the jar, then the eye [is] the sense-organ the generality colour ness etc the object, the contact between these two [is] just intimate relation with what is intimately associated with what is in conjunction For, the colour is in intimate relation with the jar which is in conjunction with the eye, and colourness has intimate relation with it [that is, the colour]

When again [is] intimate relation the contact? When by the organ of hearing is apprehended sound, then the ear [is] the sense-organ, sound the object the contact between these two [is] just intimate relation For, the ear [is] constituted of the ether and sound is a quality of the ether and there is intimate relation between the cuality and [its] possessor

When again [i?] the contact, intimate relation with what is intimately related? When by the organ of hearing

१ कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्नं नभः श्रोत्रम् ।

मर्थः । अनयोः संनिकर्षः समवेतसमवाय एव । श्रोत्रसमवेते शब्दे शब्दत्वस्य समवायात् ।

कदा पुनर्विशेषणविशेष्यभाव इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षः । यदा चक्षुषा संयुक्ते भूतले घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते इह भूतले घटो नास्तीति तदा विशेषणविशेष्यभावः संबन्धः । तदा चक्षुःसंयुक्तस्य भूतलस्य घटाद्यभावो विशेषणम् ।[1] यदा च मनःसंयुक्ते आत्मनि सुखाद्यभावो गृह्यतेऽहं सुख-रहित इति तदा मनःसंयुक्तस्यात्मनः सुखाद्यभावो विशेषणम् । यदा श्रोत्रसमवेते गकारे घत्वाभावो गृह्यते घत्वरहितो गकार इति तदा श्रोत्रसमवेतस्य गकारस्य घत्वाभावो विशेषणम् ।

तदेवं संक्षेपतः पञ्चविधसंबन्धान्यतमसंबन्धसंबद्धविशेषणविशे-

is apprehended the generality sound-ness etc in intimate relation with sound, then the ear [is] the sense-organ, the generality sound-ness etc the object The contact between these two [is] just intimate relation with what is intimately related, owing to sound ness being in intimate relation with sound which is in intimate relation with the ear.

When again [is] the contact between the sense-organ and object, the relation of the qualification and the qualified? When the absence of the jar etc, is apprehended on the ground in conjunction with the eye, in the form 'there is no jar here on the ground', then [there is] the contact, the relation of the qualification and the qualified. Then the absence of the jar etc [is] the qualification of the ground in conjunction with the eye And when the absence of pleasure etc is apprehended in the soul in conjunction with the mind, in the form 'I [am] void of pleasure,' then the absence of pleasure etc [is] the qualification of the soul in conjunction with the mind. When the absence of gha-ness is apprehended in the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear, in the form '*the ga-sound [is] void of gha-ness*', then the absence of gha ness [is] the qualification of the ga-sound in intimate relation with the ear

Thus, in short, absence [or negation] is apprehended by the sense-organ through the contact of the sense-organ and

१ भूतलं विशेष्यम् । २ सुखादि ।

ष्यभावलक्षणेनेन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेणाभाव इन्द्रियेण गृह्यते।

एवं समवायोऽपि। चक्षुःसंबद्धस्य तन्तोर्विशेषणभूतः पटसमवायो गृह्यत इह तन्तुषु पटसमवाय इति।

तदेवं षोढा संनिकर्षो वर्णितः। संग्रहश्च।

अक्षजा प्रमितिर्द्वेधा सविकल्पाविकल्पिका।
करणं त्रिविधं तस्याः संनिकर्षस्तु षड्विधः॥
घटतन्नीलनीलत्वशब्दशब्दत्वजातयः।
अभावसमवायौ च ग्राह्याः सम्बन्धषट्कतः॥ १६॥

सविकल्पक प्रत्यक्षम् इति प्रस्थापनम्।

ननु निर्विकल्पक परमार्थसत् स्वलक्षणविषय भवतु प्रत्यक्षम्। सविकल्पकं तु शब्दलिङ्गवदनुगताकारावगाहित्वात सामान्यविषयं,

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object, characterised by the relation of the qualification and the qualified, based upon any one relation of the five kinds of relation [mentioned above]

Likewise [is apprehended] intimate relation also The intimate relation of the cloth in the form of a qualification, with the threads in conjunction with the eye is apprehended, in the form 'There [is] here in the threads the intimate relation of the cloth

Thus then [is] described the contact in six ways And [there is] the summing up [as follows]—

The cognition arising through the sense organs [is] two-fold, determinate and non determinate, its instrument [is] three fold and the contact [is] six fold

The jar, its blue [colour], [the genus] blue ness, sound, the genus sound ness, absence and intimate relation are to be apprehended through the six fold contact

(17) I say [says the objector]—The non-determinate [cognition], referring as it does to an individualised object (*svalaksanam*) which really exists may be [regarded as] sense perception determinate [cognition] on the other hand refers to generality, comprising as

लिङ्गम् । यथा धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तथाहि । यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः । तस्यां गृहीतायामेव धूमोऽग्निं गमयति । अतो व्याप्तिबलेनाग्न्यनुमापकत्वाद् धूमोऽग्नेर्लिङ्गम् । तस्य तृतीयं ज्ञानं लिङ्गपरामर्शः । तथाहि । प्रथमं तावन्महानसादौ भूयो भूयो धूमं पश्यन् वह्निं पश्यति । तेन भूयोदर्शनेन धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभाविकं संबन्धमवधारयति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

यद्यपि यत्र यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वं तत्र तत्र श्यामत्वमपीति भूयोदर्शनं समानमवगम्यते तथापि मैत्रीतनयत्वश्यामत्वयोर्न स्वाभाविकः संबन्धः किंत्वौपाधिक एव । शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामस्योपाधेर्विद्यमानत्वात् । तथाहि । श्यामत्वे मैत्रीतनयत्वं न प्रयोजकं किंतु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणतिभेद एव

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tory mark [is that] which makes one comprehend an object by virtue of the invariable concomitance as for instance, smoke [is] the indicatory mark of fire To explain — Where [there is] smoke there [is] fire this companionship as a rule [is] the invariable concomitance Only when that [vyapti] is apprehended the smoke brings about the knowledge of the fire So the smoke [is] the indicatory mark of the fire, as it brings about the inference of fire, by virtue of the invariable concomitance Its third cognition [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark To explain —First, to start with, one seeing smoke again and again in the kitchen etc, sees [at the same time] fire by that frequent [or repeated] observation does one ascertain the natural connection between smoke and fire in the form 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire

Even though repeated observation in the form wherever [there is] the state of Maitri's son, there [is] also blackness can be experienced in the same way [as in where there is smoke, there is fire] still [there is] no natural relation between the state of Maitri's son and blackness but only adventitious [or accidental] owing to the existence of the limitation [or condition, *upadhi* viz] the effect [or digestion] of food such as vegetables etc To explain —Being Maitri's son [is] not the producing factor for blackness but the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc, alone [is]

कथं प्रत्यक्षम् । अर्थजस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । अर्थस्य च परमार्थसत एव तज्जनकत्वात् । स्वलक्षणं तु परमार्थसत् । न तु सामान्यम् । तस्य प्रमाणनिरस्तविधिभावस्यान्यव्यावृत्त्यात्मनस्तुच्छत्वात् । मैवम् । सामान्यस्यापि वस्तुभूतत्वात् ।

तदेव व्याख्यातं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ १७ ॥

अनुमानम् ।

लिङ्गपरामर्शः (धूमस्य हेतौ तृतीयं ज्ञानम्) अनुमानम् ।

अथ अनुमानं निरूप्यते । लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । येन ह्यनुमीयते तदनुमानम् । लिङ्गपरामर्शेन चानुमीयतेऽतो लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम् । तच्च धूमादिज्ञानम् अनुमितिं प्रति करणत्वात् । अग्न्यादिज्ञानमनुमितिः । तत्करणं धूमादिज्ञानम् ।

किं पुनर्लिङ्गं कश्च तस्य परामर्शः । उच्यते । व्याप्तिबलेनार्थगमक

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it does forms found in several objects (*anugata*), like *word* and inferential reason, how [can] it [be] sense perception? [The cognition] produced by the object alone is perception, an object too produces [it] only when it really exists An individualised object again [is] one that really exists but not the generality, because with its positive existence refuted by [all] proofs, it is unsubstantial, owing to its having *the form of the exclusion of others* [Do] not [say] so The generality also has the nature of an object

Thus then has been explained *Perception*

(18) Now is expounded Inference Inference [is] *the consideration of the indicatory mark* That [is] inference by means of which [*something*] is inferred [*Something*] is inferred by means of the consideration of the indicatory mark therefore consideration of the indicatory mark [is] inference, and it [is] the knowledge of smoke etc, being the instrument with reference to inferential cognition The knowledge of fire etc, [is] the inferential cognition, [and] the instrument thereof [is] the knowledge of smoke etc

What again [is] the indicatory mark (*lingam*) and what its consideration (*paramarsah*)? We reply The indica-

हिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिरवधार्यते । तेन धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभाविक एव संबन्धः । न त्वौपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च संबन्धो व्याप्तिं ।

तदनेन न्यायेन धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणायां महानसे यद्धूमज्ञानं ३०
तत् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादौ पक्षे यद्धूमज्ञानं तत् द्वितीयम् । ततः पूर्वगृहीतां
धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्वा तत्रैव पर्वते पुनर्धूमं परामृशति
अस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तो धूम इति । तदिदं धूमज्ञानं ३३
तृतीयम् । एतच्चावश्यमेवाभ्युपेयम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरि
त्येव स्यात् । इह तु कथमग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्मादिहापि धूमोऽस्तीति
ज्ञानमन्वेषितव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमिति प्रति करणत्वाच्चा ३६
नुमानम् । तस्मादस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ४

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is term ed] invariable concomitance

Thus, when according to this procedure (*nyāya*) the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is being apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc the subject [of the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, apprehended previously, once again one considers the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form there is here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire - this knowledge of smoke then [is] the Third and this must needs be accepted, otherwi e [the ultimate cognition] would be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire [On the strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the matter of that be existing *here* [on the mountain]? Therefore the knowledge in the form there is smoke here too" must be searched after This same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument of inferential cognition From it is produced the know ledge, the inferential cognition in the form there is fire here on the mountain '

१ व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । २ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

प्रयोजकः । प्रयोजकश्चोपाधिरित्युच्यते ।

न च धूमाग्न्यो संबन्धे कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । अस्ति चेत् योग्योऽयोग्यो वा । अयोग्यस्य शङ्कितुमशक्यत्वाद् योग्यस्य चानुपलभ्यमानत्वात् । यत्रोपाधिरस्ति तत्रोपलभ्यते । यथाग्नेर्धूमसंबन्ध आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगः । हिंसात्वस्य चाधर्मसाधनत्वेन सह संबन्धे निषिद्धत्वमुपाधि । मैत्रीतनयत्वस्य च श्यामत्वेन सह संबन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणतिभेदः । न चेह धूमाग्निसाहचर्ये कश्चिदुपाधिरस्ति । यद्यभविष्यत् तदाऽद्रक्ष्यत् । ततो दर्शनाभावान्नास्तीति तर्कसहकारिणानुपलम्भसनाथेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपाध्यभावोऽवधार्यते । तथान्त्र सति उपाध्यभावग्रहणजनितसस्कारसहकृतेन भूयोदर्शनजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेन साहचर्यग्रा

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the producing factor and the producing factor [which produces the particular effect] is termed the limitation [or condition]

But in [the case of] the relation between smoke and fire, there does not exist any limitation, if there is [one] is it capable of being perceived (*yogya*) or not capable of being perceived? It is not possible to suspect [the existence of a limitation] not capable of being perceived, and [a limitation] capable of being perceived cannot be found Where there is a limitation, there [it] is found, as for instance, in [the case of] the relation of fire with smoke, the contact with wet fuel In [the case of] the relation of 'the act of killing' with 'the state of being the producer of demerit' prohibition [by the Sastras is] the limitation and in [the case of] the relation of 'the state of Maitri s son with blackness' the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is the limitation] But here in [the case of] the association of smoke with fire exists not any limitation, if there had been [one] one would have seen [it] Therefore the absence of a limitation is ascertained by perception itself accompanied by non-observation and supported by hypothetical reasoning in the form 'it does not exist a it is not seen' And this being the case, the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is ascertained by perception itself, apprehending their association helped by the impressions produced by the apprehension of the absence of the limitation, and

हिणा प्रत्यक्षेणैव धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिरवधार्यते । तेन धूमाग्न्योः स्वाभा
विक एव संबन्धः । न त्वौपाधिकः । स्वाभाविकश्च सबन्धो व्याप्तिः ।
तदनेन न्यायेन धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तौ गृह्यमाणायां महानसे यद्धूमज्ञानं ३०
तत् प्रथमम् । पर्वतादौ पक्षे यद्धूमज्ञान तत् द्वितीयम् । ततः पूर्वगृहीतां
धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिं स्मृत्वा तत्रैव पर्वते पुनर्धूम परामृशति
अस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निना व्याप्तो धूम इति । तदिद धूमज्ञान ३३
तृतीयम् । एतच्चावश्यमेवाभ्युपेयम् । अन्यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरि
त्येव स्यात् । इह तु कथमग्निना भवितव्यम् । तस्मादिहापि धूमोऽस्तीति
ज्ञानमन्वेषितव्यम् । अयमेव लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमिति प्रति करणत्वाच्चा ३५
नुमानम् । तस्मादस्त्यत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरित्यनुमितिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । ४

helped by the impressions caused by repeated observation Therefore the relation between smoke and fire [is] only natural and not adventitious, and a natural relation [is termed] invariable concomitance

Thus, when according to this procedure (*nyaya*) the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is being apprehended, what knowledge of smoke in the kitchen [is produced] that [is] the First [knowledge of smoke] what knowledge of smoke on the mountain etc the subject [of the syllogism, is produced] that [is] the Second then having remembered the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, apprehended previously once again one considers the smoke there on the mountain itself in the form 'there is here on the mountain smoke invariably concomitant with fire - this knowledge of smoke then [is] the Third and this must needs be accepted, otherwise [the ultimate cognition] would be only 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire [On the strength of this cognition only] how could the fire for the matter of that be existing *here* [on the mountain]? Therefore the knowledge in the form there is smoke here too,' must be searched after This same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark, and [it is] inference, as it is the instrument of inferential cognition From it is produced the knowledge, the inferential cognition in the form 'there is fire here on the mountain '

१ व्याप्तिरित्युच्यते । २ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति ।

ननु कथं प्रथमं महानसे यद्धूमज्ञानं तन्नाग्निमनुमापयति । सत्यम् ।
३१ व्याप्तेरगृहीतत्वात् गृहीतायामेव व्याप्तावनुमित्युदयात् ।

अथ व्याप्तिनिश्चयोत्तरकाले महानस एवाग्निरनुमीयताम् । मैवम् ।
अग्नेर्दृष्टत्वेन संदेहस्यानुदयात् । संदिग्धश्चार्थोऽनुमीयते । यथोक्तं
२ भाष्यकृता । नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्तते किं तु संदिग्धे ।

अथ पर्वतगतमात्रस्य पुंसो यद्धूमज्ञानं तत् कथं नाग्निमनुमापयति ।
अस्ति चात्राग्निसंदेहः । साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावेन संशयस्य न्यायप्रा-
५ प्तत्वात् । सत्यम् । अगृहीतव्याप्तेरिव गृहीतविस्मृतव्याप्तेरपि पुंसोऽ-
नुमानानुदयेन व्याप्तिस्मृतेरप्यनुमितिहेतुत्वात् । धूमदर्शनाच्चोद्बुद्ध

I say [says the *objector*] how is it that which [is] the first knowledge of smoke in the kitchen, does not make [one] infer fire? True [what you say, your objection is relevant, but the answer is], because the invariable concomitance is not apprehended [at that time] and it is only when the invariable concomitance is apprehended that there can arise inferential *cognition*

Then, at a time after the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance, let the fire be inferred in the kitchen *itself*? [*Do*] *not* [*say*] *so Because as the fire is* [*actually*] seen, no doubt [about its existence] can arise And [only] a thing about which there is doubt is inferred. As is said [or laid down] by the author of the Bhāsya—

Reasoning operates neither in [the case of] an unperceived [or unknown or unheard-of] object, nor in [the case of] an object definitely ascertained, but in [the case of] an object about which there is doubt

Then, how is it that the knowledge of smoke of a man who has *simply gone to the mountain, does not* make [*him*] infer fire? There *is* indeed here doubt about the fire, owing to the absence of arguments for or against [it], doubt is reasonably produced True [what you say] Because inference cannot arise in [the case of] that man also who has *first* apprehended *but later forgotten the invariable* concomitance as in [the case of] one who has

संस्कारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस
इति। तेन धूमदर्शने जाते व्याप्तिस्मृतौ भूतायां यद्धूमज्ञानं तत् तृतीयं २८
धूमवांश्चायमिति। तदेवाग्निमनुमापयति नान्यत्। तदेवानुमानं स एव
लिङ्गपरामर्शः। तेन व्यवस्थितमेतल्लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानमिति ॥ १८ ॥

स्वार्थानुमानम् परार्थानुमानं च।

तच्चानुमानं द्विविधम्। स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति। स्वार्थं स्वप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः। तथाहि। स्वयमेव महानसादौ विशिष्टेन प्रत्यक्षेण धूमाग्न्योर्व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वतवर्तिनीमविच्छिन्नमूलामभ्रंलिहां धूमलेखां पश्यन् धूमदर्शनाच्चोद्बुद्धसं

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not apprehended the invariable concomitance and so the remembrance of the invariable concomitance also is a cause of inferential cognition And at the sight of the smoke with the [latent] impressions aroused one remembers the invariable concomitance in the form whosoever [is] possessed of smoke [is] possessed of fire as for instance the kitchen Therefore that knowledge of smoke [which takes place] when the sight of smoke has been produced and the remembrance of the invariable concomitance has taken place [is] the Third [knowledge] in the form this [i] possessed of smoke and that alone make [one] infer the [presence of] fire and none else That same [is] inference [and] that same [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark Hence this [is] well established that inference [is] the consideration of the indicatory mark

(19) And that inference [is] of two kinds—Intended for oneself and Intended for another [The inference] intended for oneself [is] the cause of one's own understanding To explain —Having just by himself apprehended by means of qualified perception the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire in the kitchen etc [a man] gone near the mountain and entertaining a doubt as regards fire present (gata) on that [mountain] [and] seeing a streak of smoke present on the mountain not cut away from [its] source and reaching [lit licking] the clouds [and]

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१ तदेव लिङ्गपरामर्शः।

स्कारो व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति। ततोऽत्रापि धूमोऽस्तीति प्रतिपद्यते। तस्मादत्र पर्वतेऽग्निरप्यस्तीति स्वयमेव प्रतिपद्यते तत् स्वार्थानुमानम्।

यत्तु कश्चित् स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत् परार्थानुमानम्।तद्यथा

१ पर्वतोऽयमग्निमान्।
धूमवत्त्वात्।
यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः।
४ तथा चायम्।
५ तस्मात् तथा। इति

अनेन वाक्येन प्रतिज्ञादिमता प्रतिपादितात् पञ्चरूपोपपन्नाल्लिङ्गात् परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते। तेनैतत् परार्थानुमानम् ॥ १९ ॥

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with the [latent] impressions aroused at the sight of the smoke remembers the invariable concomitance, namely (*iti*) 'where [there is] smoke, there [is] fire Then [he] realises that here too is smoke [and] from that he by himself realises that here on the mountain, there is fire also—That [is] inference intended for oneself

But when [a man] having himself inferred fire from smoke, employs a five membered syllogism (*vākyam*) in order to make another comprehend [the same], that [is known as] inference intended for another It [is] as follows —

This mountain [is] possessed of fire
Because [it is] possessed of smoke
Whatever [is] possessed of smoke, all that (*yah sah*) [is] possessed of fire, as the kitchen
And this [mountain] so [that is, possessed of smoke]
Therefore [it is] so [that is, possessed of fire]

From the indicatory mark endowed with the five qualifications [or characteristics] propounded by this syllogism possessed of assertion [or statement] etc, even another comprehends fire Therefore this [is] inference intended for another

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१ पञ्चावयवमनुमानवाक्यम्। २ वाक्येन प्रतिपादितात्पञ्चावयवोपपन्ना

अन्वयव्यतिरेकव्याप्तिनिरूपणम् ।

अत्र पर्वतस्याग्निमत्त्वं साध्य धूमवत्त्वं हेतु । स चान्वयव्यतिरेकी अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमत्त्वात् । तथाहि । यत्र यत्र धूमवत्त्व तत्राग्निमत्त्वं यथा महानस इत्यन्वयव्याप्ति । महानसे धूमाग्न्योरन्वयसद्भावदर्शनात् । एवं यत्राग्निर्नास्ति तत्र धूमोऽपि नास्ति यथा महाह्रद इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति । महाह्रदे धूमाग्न्योर्व्यतिरेकस्य दर्शनात् । ६ व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेस्त्वय क्रम । अन्वयव्याप्तौ यद् व्याप्य तदभावोऽत्र व्यापको यच्च व्यापक तदभावोऽत्र व्याप्य इति । तदुक्तम् ।

व्याप्यव्यापकभावो हि भावयोर्यादृगिष्यते ।
तयोरभावयोस्तस्माद्विपरीत प्रतीयते ॥

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(20) Here the posses ion of fire by the mountain [is] what is to be established the pos ession of smoke the reason (*hetuh*) That [reason] again [is] positive–negative as it is possessed of invariable concomitance [with the sadhya both] positively [or affirmatively *anvayah*] and negatively (*vyatirekah*) To explain— Wherever [there is] posse sion of smoke there [is] possession of fire as for instance, in the kitchen —this [represents] positive invariable concomitance, as the existence of the positive association of smoke and fire is seen in the kitchen Likewise 'where [there] is no fire there smoke also exists not as for instance in the big pool —this [represents] negative invariable concomitance as the negative association of smoke and fire is seen in the big pool For [the representation of] the negative invariable concomitance again this [following] procedure [or order holds good]-The absence of that which is the pervaded in the positive invariable concomitance [is] the pervader here [in the vyatirek avyāpti] and the absence of what is the pervader [in the anvayavyapti] [becomes] the pervaded here [in the vyatirekavyapti] As has been said —

What sort of relation of the pervaded and the pervader between two positive entities is admitted the reverse of that is understood [to hold good] between the negations of them

अन्वये साधनं व्याप्यं साध्यं व्यापकमिष्यते ।
साध्याभावोऽन्यथा व्याप्यो व्यापकः साधनात्ययः ॥
व्याप्यस्य वचनं पूर्वं व्यापकस्य ततः परम् ।
एवं परीक्षिता व्याप्तिः स्फुटीभवति तत्त्वतः ॥

तदेव धूमवत्त्वे हेतावन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिरस्ति ॥ २० ॥

अन्वयव्याप्तेरेव किमर्थं प्रदर्शनम् ।

यत्तु वाक्ये केवलमन्वयव्याप्तेरेव प्रदर्शनम् तदेकेनापि चरितार्थत्वात् । तत्राप्यन्वयस्यावक्रत्वात् प्रदर्शनम् । ऋजुमार्गेण सिध्यतोऽर्थस्य वक्रेण साधनायोगात् । न तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेरभावात् ।

तदेव धूमवत्त्वं हेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकी । एवमन्येऽप्यनित्यत्वादौ साध्ये

In [the case of] positive association the reason (*sadhanam*) is admitted [or desired] as the pervaded and what is to be established (*sadhya*) as the pervader in the reverse case [*anyatha* that is in vyatireka] the negation of what is to be established [is admitted] as the pervaded [and] the negation of the reason as the pervader

First the statement of the pervaded then afterwards [that] *of the pervader Thus examined the invariable* concomitance becomes explicit in it true nature

Thus then in [the case of] the reason the possession of smoke there is invariable concomitance [both] positively and negatively

(21) As regards the showing of the positive invariable concomitance only in a syllogism [it is so] because [one s] purpose is served even by one [form of vyapti] and therein again the showing of the positive association [and not of *the negative association is usually resorted to*] *owing to its* straight forward [lit not crooked simple] nature—It is not proper to accomplish [one s] object that can be achieved in a straight forward [or direct] manner indirectly [or in a round abound way]—but not on account of the non-existence of a *negative invariable concomitance*

Thus then the reason the possession of smoke [is] positive negative Likewise other reasons too such as

कृतकत्वादयो हेतवोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिणो द्रष्टव्याः[1]॥ २१ ॥

केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः ।

कश्चिद्धेतुः केवलव्यतिरेकी । यथा सात्मकत्वे साध्ये प्राणादिमत्त्वं हेतुः । यथा

जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकम् । प्राणादिमत्त्वात् ।

यत् सात्मकं न भवति तत् प्राणादिमन्न भवति यथा अयं घटः ।

न चेदं जीवच्छरीरं तथा । तस्मान्न तथेति ।

अत्र हि जीवच्छरीरस्य सात्मकत्वं साध्यं प्राणादिमत्त्वं हेतुः । स च केवलव्यतिरेकी अन्वयव्यतिरेकभावात् । तथाहि । यत् प्राणादिमत् तत् सात्मकं यथामुक इति दृष्टान्तो नास्ति । जीवच्छरीरं सर्वं पक्ष एव ।

'being a product,' when what is to be established [is] 'non-eternal nature' etc should be understood (*drastavyāh*) to be positive-negative

(22) Some [kind of] reason [is] purely negative, as for instance, the reason 'being possessed of breath etc,' when 'being possessed of the soul is what is to be established Thus—The living body [is] possessed of the soul

Because [it is] possessed of breath etc

What is not possessed of the soul is not possessed of breath etc, as this jar

And this living body [is] not [so]

Therefore [it is] not [so]

Here again, 'being possessed of the soul' [is] what is to be established of the living body, [and] 'being possessed of breath etc' [is] the reason And it [the reason is] purely negative owing to the absence [or impossibility] of a positive invariable concomitance To explain —'What [is] possessed of breath etc [is] possessed of the soul,' as X—there can be no [such] instance Everything [whatsoever is] living body [is] the subject itself

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१ यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वाद् घटवत् । यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्रानित्यत्वम् यत्रानित्यत्वाभावस्तत्र कृतकत्वाभावः । यथा गगनं ।

लक्षणमपि केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः। यथा पृथिवीलक्षणं गन्धवत्त्वम्।

विवादपदं पृथिवीति व्यवहर्तव्यम्। गन्धवत्त्वात्।

यन्न पृथिवीति व्यवह्रियते तन्न गन्धवत्। यथाप।

प्रमाणलक्षणं वा। यथा प्रमाकरणत्वम्। तथाहि।

प्रत्यक्षादिकं प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यम्।

प्रमाकरणत्वात्।

यत् प्रमाणमिति न व्यवह्रियते तन्न प्रमाकरणं यथा प्रत्यक्षाभासादि।

न पुनस्तथेदम्।

तस्मान्न तथा इति।

न पुनरन्वयः। यत् प्रमाकरणं तत् प्रमाणमिति व्यवहर्तव्यं यथामुक इत्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति। प्रमाणमात्रस्य पक्षीकृतत्वात्। अत्र च व्यवहारः साध्यो न तु प्रमाणत्वम्। तस्य प्रमाकरणत्वाद्धेतोरभेदेन

A definition also [is] a purely negative reason as for instance the definition of the earth being possessed of odour

The matter under dispute should be called earth'

Becau e [it i] posses ed of odour

What is not called earth [is] not posse sed of odour as water

Or the definition of Proof as being the instrument of right cognition To explain

Perception etc should be call d proof

Because [it is] the instrum nt of right cognition

What is not called proof [i] no the instrum nt of right cognition as fallacious s n perc ption etc

This again [i] not o

Therefore [it i] no so

But there [is] no positive association what [is] the instrument of right cognition that should be called Proof—there is no instance of positive association as for instance X the whole of proof being made the subject Here again what is to be established [is] the designation [or us of the term pramāna] and not the nature of proof for that [pramanatva] being identical with the reason [pramakaranatva] owing to its being the instrument of right cognition there

साध्याभेददोषप्रसंगात् । तदेवं केवलव्यतिरेकिणो दर्शिताः॥ २२ ॥

केवलान्वयी हेतुः ।

कश्चिदन्यो हेतुः केवलान्वयी । यथा

शब्दोऽभिधेयः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

यत् प्रमेयं तदभिधेयम् यथा घटः ।

तथा चायम् । तस्मात्तथा इति ।

अत्र शब्दस्य अभिधेयत्वं साध्यम् प्रमेयत्व हेतुः । स च केवलान्वय्येव । यदभिधेयं न भवति तत् प्रमेयमपि न भवति यथामुक इति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्ताभावात् । सर्वत्र हि प्रामाणिक पदार्थो दृष्टान्तः । स च प्रमेयश्चाभिधेयश्चेति ॥ २३ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकिहेतोः पञ्चरूपाणि ।

एतेषां चान्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिहेतूनां त्रयाणां

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would arise the fault of the identity [of the reason] with what is to be established, which is an undesirable contingency (*prasangah*)

Thus then have been shown the purely negative [reasons]

(23) Some other [kind of] reason [is] purely positive. Thus—Sound [is] nameable

Because [it is] possessed of knowability

What [is] knowable [is] nameable, as a jar.

This again [is] so.

Therefore [it is] so

Here nameability [is] what is to be established about sound, [and] knowability [is] the reason. And it [is] only purely positive. What is not nameable is not also knowable, as *for instance*, X—there is the absence of an instance of negative association. In all cases an object which can be proved [to be existent] by means of some proof, [can] alone [be] an instance and that [must be] both knowable and nameable [as a matter of course]

(24) Of these three [kinds of] reasons, the positive-

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१ विशेषोऽभिधेय-। २ प्रामाणिक एव दृष्टान्तो वक्तव्यः ।

मध्ये यो हेतुरन्वयव्यतिरेकी स पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव स्वसाध्यं साधयितुं क्षमते । न त्वेकेनापि रूपेण हीन । तानि पञ्चरूपाणि तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षे सत्त्वम् विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः अबाधितविषयत्वम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्व चेति । एतानि रूपाणि धूमवत्त्वादावन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि हेतौ विद्यन्ते तथाहि ।

१ धूमवत्त्वं पक्षस्य पर्वतस्य धर्मः पर्वते तस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ।

२ एवं सपक्षे सत्त्वं सपक्षे महानसे सद् विद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

३ एवं विपक्षान्महाह्रदाद् व्यावृत्तिस्तत्र नास्तीत्यर्थ ।

४ एवम् अबाधितविषयं च धूमवत्त्वम् । तथाहि । धूमवत्त्वस्य हेतोर्विषय

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negative, purely positive, and purely negative, the reason which [is] positive–negative *is able to establish what is to be established by it, only when endowed with the five characteristics*, but not if void of even one [of them] Those five characteristics again [are]–Being an attribute of [or present in] the subject, Being present in a similar instance, Being excluded from a dissimilar [or contrary] instance, Not having its object [or sadhya] disproved [or contradicted by a stronger proof], Not having a rival [indicatory mark which proves *the opposite of the sadhya*] These [*five*] characteristics [again] are present *in a positive–negative* reason 'to be possessed of smoke' etc To explain —

'To be possessed of smoke [*is*] 'an attribute of *the* subject', *the mountain, as it is present on the mountain*

Likewise, 'being present in a similar instance '— in a similar instance—in the kitchen–existing, is present—*this* [is] *the meaning*

Likewise, 'from a dissimilar instance,'—from *the big* pool—' being *excluded* '—*is not there*—*this* [is] *the meaning*

Similarly 'being possessed of smoke has also its object not disproved ' To explain the object of the reason '*being* possessed of smoke [is] *the quality* which is to be esta-

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१ पञ्चरूपाणि ।

साध्यधर्मस्तच्चाग्निमत्त्वं तत् केनापि प्रमाणेन न बाधितं न खण्डित मित्यर्थ ।

एवम् असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् असन् प्रतिपक्षो यस्येत्यसत्प्रतिपक्ष धूमवत्त्व हेतु[1]। तथाहि। साध्यविपरीतसाधक हेत्वन्तर प्रतिपक्ष इत्युच्यते। स च धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ नास्त्येवानुपलम्भात्।

तदेवं पञ्चरूपाणि धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ विद्यन्ते। तेनेतद्धूमवत्त्वमग्निमत्त्वस्य साधकम् ॥ १४ ॥

अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्ति पक्षधर्मता च।

अग्नेः पक्षधर्मत्व हेतो पक्षधर्मताबलात् सिध्यति। तथाहि। अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्ति पक्षधर्मता च। तत्र व्याप्त्या साध्यसामान्यस्य सिद्धि। पक्षधर्मताबलात्तु साध्यस्य पक्षसम्बन्धित्व विशेष सिध्यति।

blished and that [is] being posses ed of fire Not by any proof is that contradicted not shattered this [is] the meaning

Similarly not having a rival the reason being possessed of smoke [is one] not having a rival that is for which there is no rival [or counter balancing rea on] To explain Another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be established is called the rival [reason] and that does not to be sure exist in [the case of] the rea on to be pos^essed of smoke because it is not found out

Thus then the five characteristics exist in the reason being possessed of ^moke therefore this being po ^essed of smoke establishes the being pos essed of fire

(25) That the fire is an attribute of the subject is proved by virtue of the reason s being an attribute of the subject To explain Inference has two constituents—invariable concomitance and [the reason s] being an attribute of the subject Of them (*tatra*) by the invariable concomitance is established what is to be established in a general form by virtue of [the reason s] being an attribute of the subject is established the particular [fact viz] the connection of what i to be established with the subject From [the fact that] being possessed of smoke [is]

१ गमकम् ग्निमत्त्वस्य साधकम्।

पर्वतधर्मेण धूमवत्त्वेन वह्निरपि पर्वतसंबद्ध एवानुमीयते। अन्यथा साध्यसामान्यस्य व्याप्तिग्रहादेव सिद्धेः कृतमनुमानेन ॥ २५ ॥

केवलान्वयी तथा च केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतुः चतूरूपोपपन्नः।

यस्त्वन्योऽप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतुः स सर्वः पञ्चरूपोपपन्न एव सद्-हेतुः। अन्यथा हेत्वाभासोऽहेतुरिति यावत्। केवलान्वयी चतूरूपोपपन्न एव स्वसाध्यं साधयति। तस्य हि विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तिर्नास्ति विपक्षाभावात्।

केवलव्यतिरेकी च चतूरूपोपपन्न एव। तस्य हि सपक्षे सत्त्वं नास्ति सपक्षाभावात् ॥ २६ ॥ ✓

पक्षसपक्षविपक्षनिरूपणम्।

के पुनः पक्षसपक्षविपक्षाः। उच्यन्ते।

संदिग्धसाध्यधर्मा धर्मी पक्षः। यथा धूमानुमाने पर्वतः।

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an attribute of the mountain it is inferred that the fire also is connected with the mountain itself Otherwise, when what i to be established in a general form is establish ed from the apprehension of the invariable concomitance itself no need of [the complex process of] inference [at all]'

(26) Other positive negative reasons also all of them [are] good reasons only if endowed with the five characteristics, otherwise [they are] fallacious reasons, that is no reasons A purely positive [reason] establishes what is to be established by itself endowed only with four characteristics for there is no exclusion from a dissimilar instance in its case the dissimilar ins ance being absent [or impossible]

And a purely negative [reason is] endowed with only four characteristics for there is no presence in a similar instance in its case owing to the absence [or impossibility] of a similar instance

(27) What again [are] the subject similar instance and dissimilar instance? [They] are stated [as follows]—

Subject [is] an entity having a characteristic about which there is doubt and which is to be establi hed [or having the characteri ic of a doubted sādhya or referring to which

सपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्यधर्मा धर्मी। यथा महानसस्तत्रैव धूमानुमाने।

विपक्षस्तु निश्चितसाध्याभाववान् धर्मी। यथा तत्रैव महाह्रद इति॥ २७॥

पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः। असिद्धहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम्।

त एवमन्वयव्यतिरेकिकेवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेकिणो दर्शिताः। अतोऽन्ये हेत्वाभासाः। ते च असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदात् पञ्चैव।

तत्र लिङ्गत्वेनानिश्चितो हेतुरसिद्धः स चासिद्धस्त्रिविध आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति।

आश्रयासिद्धो यथा।

गगनारविन्दं सुरभि। अरविन्दत्वात्।
सरोजारविन्दवत्।

अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रय स च नास्त्येव।

स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा।

अनित्यः शब्दः। चाक्षुषत्वात्। घटवत्।

अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं हेतुः। स च शब्दे नास्त्येव तस्य श्रावणत्वात्।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु द्विविधः। एको व्याप्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्। अपरस्तूपाधिसद्भावात्। तत्र प्रथमो यथा।

शब्दः क्षणिकः। सत्त्वात्।
यत्सत्तत्क्षणिकं यथा जलधरपटलम्।
तथा च शब्दादिरिति[1]।

न च सत्त्वक्षणिकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिग्राहकं प्रमाणमस्ति। सोपाधिकतया

The sky lotus [is] fragrant
Because [it is possessed] of the generality of lotus
like a lake-born lotus

Here the sky lotus [is] the support and that exists not at all (*eva*)

Unproven in its own nature [is] as follows —
Sound [is] non eternal
Because of [its] visibility
like a jar

Here vis bility [is] the reason and that exists not in sound at all (*eva*) because that [sound] is audible

Unproven in invariable concomitance again [is] of two kinds One [is cau ed] by the absence of a proof apprehending the invariable concomitance the other again by the exi ence of a limitation Of them the first [is] as follows —

Sound [i] momentary
Because of [it] exi tence
Wha exi s that [ ] m mentary as the c u I mass
And s und tc [s] so

Ther [illegible] ver (*ca*) no proof apprehending the invariable c[illegible] nit t ce I ct ee i exi tence and mor entarl

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1 सत्त्वं शब्दस्य

सत्त्वस्य व्याप्यत्वासिद्धावुच्यमानायां क्षणिकत्वमन्यप्रयुक्तमित्यभ्यु-
पगतं स्यात्। २१

द्वितीया यथा।

क्रत्वन्तर्वर्तिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम्।
हिंसात्वात्। २४
क्रतुबाह्यहिंसावत्।

अत्र ह्यधर्मसाधनत्वे हिंसात्वं न प्रयोजकं किं तु निषिद्धत्वमेव।
प्रयोजकमुपाधिरिति यावत्। तथाहि। साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधना २७
व्यापक उपाधिरित्युपाधिलक्षणम्। तच्चास्ति निषिद्धत्वे। निषिद्धत्वं
हि साध्यस्याधर्मसाधनत्वस्य व्यापकम्। यतो यत्र यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं

ness If [this reason] existence were to be declared as [an illustration of] Unproven in-invariable concomitance due to the possession of a limitation [that is the second variety of Vyapyatvasiddha] momentariness would have to be considered as having been caused by something else [than existence, and would thus be as good as admitted, which would go against our own view about sattva]

The second [is] as follows —

> The killing existing inside a sacrifice [is] the means of demerit
>
> Because [it is possessed] of the nature of killing like the killing out side sacrifices.

Here again the nature of killing [is] not the producing cause for the means of demerit, but 'being prohibited [by the Sastras] alone the producing cause, is the same as the limitation To explain — Limitation [or accident is that] which, while pervading the thing to be established [that is, while being invariably present in all those places where the sādhya is present], does not pervade the reason [that is, is not invariably present with the reason]—this [is] the definition of limitation And that exists in 'being prohibited' For 'being prohibited' pervades what is to be established, [namely] the means of de-merit as wherever [there is] 'being

१ त्वस्य।

३० तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वमपीति । एवं साधनं हिंसात्वं न व्याप्नोति निषिद्धत्वम् । न हि यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं यज्ञीय पशुहिंसायां निषिद्धत्वाभावात् । तदेवं निषिद्धत्वस्योपाधेः सद्भा
३३ वात् अन्यप्रयुक्तव्याप्त्युपजीवि हिंसात्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धमेव ॥ २८ ॥

विरुद्धहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । व्योम[1]वत् ।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हि साध्यनित्यत्वविपरीतानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम् । यद् कृतकं तदनित्यमेव न नित्यमित्यतो विरुद्धं कृतकत्वमिति ॥ २९ ॥

अनैकान्तिकहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः । स द्विविधः साधारणानैकान्तिकोऽसा*

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the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited' also, and further (*evam*) the reason 'the nature of killing' does not pervade 'being prohibited' For, wherever [there is] 'the nature of killing,' there [is] not necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the absence of 'being prohibited' in [the case of] the killing of sacrificial beasts Thus then, owing to the presence of the limitation '*being prohibited*,' [*the reason*] '*the nature of killing*' depending upon the invariable concomitance caused by something else, is Unproven-in—invariable-concomitance itself

(29) Contrary [fallacious reason] [is] the reason [which is] invariably associated with [or pervaded by] the reverse of what is to be established It [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal
Because of [its] being a product
like the sky

Here being a product [*is*] pervaded by non-eternality, *the reverse of eternality* [*which is*] what is *to be established*. What [is] produced, that is non-eternal only [and] not eternal, hence [the reason] being a product [is] Contrary

(30) Inconclusive [or Discrepant fallacious reason which does not possess one extreme only, that is which does not tend to establish one thing only but also its opposite] [*is that*] which *involves the violation* (*vyabhicāra*)

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[1] आमवत् ।

धारणानैकान्तिकश्चेति । तत्र पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्तिः साधारणानैकान्तिकः । स यथा ।

शब्दो नित्यः । प्रमेयत्वात् । व्योमवत् ।

अत्र हि प्रमेयत्वं हेतुस्तच्च नित्यानित्यवृत्ति ।

सपक्षाद् विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्तो यः पक्ष एव वर्तते सोऽसाधारणानैकान्तिकः । स यथा ।

भूर्नित्या । गन्धवत्त्वात् ।

गन्धवत्त्वं हि सपक्षान्नित्याद्विपक्षाच्चानित्याद्व्यावृत्तं भूमात्रवृत्ति[1] ॥ ३० ॥

प्रकरणसमहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

प्रकरणसमस्तु स एव यस्य हेतोः साध्यविपरीतसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते । स यथा ।

[of the invariable concomitance] It [is] of two kinds [namely] too-wide (*sadhārana*) inconclusive and too narrow inconclusive Of them the too wide inconclusive [fallacious reason is that] which exists in the subject in similar instances and in dissimilar instances It [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is possessed] of knowability

like the sky

Here again knowability [is] the reason and that exists in eternal as well as non eternal [things]

The too-narrow inconclusive [fallacious reason is that] which excluded from similar instances [and] dissimilar instances exists in the subject alone It [is] as follows —

Earth [is] eternal

Because [it is] possessed of odour

Being possessed of odour again excluded from similar instances [viz] eternal [things] and from dissimilar instances [viz] non eternal [things] exists only in earth

(31) The Counter balanced [fallacious reason] again [is] that alone for which reason [there] exists another reason establishing the reverse of what is to be established. It [is] as follows —

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१ सपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तः पक्षमात्रवृत्तिः सः ।

शब्दोऽनित्यः नित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् ।
शब्दो नित्यः । अनित्यधर्मरहितत्वात् । इति ।
अयमेव सत्प्रतिपक्ष इति चोच्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

कालात्ययापदिष्टहेत्वाभासनिरूपणम् ।

पक्षे प्रमाणान्तरावधृतसाध्याभावो हेतुर्बाधितविषयः कालात्ययापदिष्ट इत्युच्यते । यथा

अग्निः अनुष्णः । कृतकत्वात् । जलवत् ।

अत्र हि कृतकत्वस्य हेतोः साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तदभावः प्रत्यक्षेणैवावधारितः । स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेणैवोष्णत्वोपलम्भात् ।

इति व्याख्यातमनुमानम् ॥ ३२ ॥

Sound [is] non-eternal
Because [it is] void of qualities of eternal [things or eternal qualities]

[and]

Sound [is] eternal
Because [it is] void of qualities of non-eternal [things or non-eternal qualities]

This same is *also (or) called 'having a rival' [or neutralised or stultified or ambiguous]*

(32) The reason where the absence [or negation] of *what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by* another [more powerful] proof and the object of which is [thus] contradicted is called the Belated [fallacious reason also annulled or contradicted or refuted [it stated or adduced when the fit time for it has passed away, or rejected owing to the lapse of proper time] As

Fire [is] not-hot
Because [it is] produced
like water

Here again what is to be established by the reason 'being produced' [i.e.] coolness its negation [viz hotness] is ascertained by perception itself hotness being experi*enced by means of the perceptive cognition of touch*

Thus has been expounded Inference

उपमानविचार ।

अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृत गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानमुपमानम् । यथा गवयमजानन्नपि नागरिको यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्य कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाच्छ्रुत्वा वन गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् यदा गोसादृश्यविशिष्ट पिण्ड पश्यति तदा तद्वाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृत गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् उपमानम् उपमितिकरणत्वात् । गोसादृश्यविशिष्ट पिण्डज्ञानानन्तरम् अयमसौ गवयशब्दवाच्य पिण्ड इति सज्ञासज्ञिसम्बन्धप्रतीतिरुपमिति । सैव फलम् ॥ ३३ ॥

उपमान प्रमाणान्तरम् ।

इद तु प्रत्यक्षानुमानासाध्यप्रमासाधकत्वात् प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानमस्ति ।

इति व्याख्यातमुपमानम् ॥ ३४ ॥

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(33) Analogy [is] the knowledge of an animal (*p ndah*) characterised by resemblance with an ox helped by the remembrance of the meaning of the directing sentence (*at desai akyam*) As when a city man although not knowing the gavaya having heard from some forest-dwelling man the sentence As an ox so the gavaya going to the forest [and] remembering the meaning of the sentence sees an animal characterised by resemblance with an ox then the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox helped by [or in collaboration with] the remembrance of the meaning of that sentence [is] analogy on account of its being the instrument of analogical cognition Analogical cognition again [is] the apprehension of the connection between a name (*sa ajna*) and the object expressed by it (*sa ajni*) in the form This animal here [i] denoted by the word gavaya after the knowledge of the animal characterised by resemblance with the ox And that same [upamiti] [is] the effect

(34) This Analogy again is an independent [or different] proof as it brings about right cognition not capable of being established by perception and inference

Thus has been expounded Analogy

शब्दः ।

शब्दविचारः । आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिनिरूपणम् ।

आप्तवाक्यं शब्दः । आप्तस्तु यथाभूतस्यार्थस्योपदेष्टा पुरुषः । वाक्यं त्वाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधिमतां पदानां समूहः ।

अत एव गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति पदानि न वाक्यम् । परस्पराकाङ्क्षाविरहात् ।

अग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यं योग्यताविरहात् । न ह्यग्निसेकयोः परस्परान्वययोग्यतास्ति । तथाहि । अग्निनेति तृतीयया सेकरूपं कार्यं प्रति करणत्वमग्नेः प्रतिपादितम् । न चाग्निः सेके करणीभवितुं योग्यः[1] । तेन न कार्यकरणसंबन्धोऽग्निसेकयोः । अयोग्यत्वात् । अतोऽग्निना सिञ्चेदिति न वाक्यम् ।

एवमेकैकशः प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चरितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि न

(35) Word [is] the sentence of one trustworthy And (*tu*) one trustworthy [is] a person who asserts things as [they] have happened And a sentence [is made of] a collection of words possessed of expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition

For this very reason (*ata eva*) 'ox, horse, man, elephant' – these words [form] no sentence, because of the absence of mutual expectancy

'[One] should sprinkle with fire – this [is] no sentence, because of the absence of compatibility [between sprinkling and fire] Not indeed is there compatibility of mutual construction [or association] between fire and sprinkling To explain By the instrumental 'by the fire' is conveyed the instrumentality of fire with reference to the effect in the form of sprinkling fire [is] not, for the matter of that (*ca*), fit to become the instrument for the sprinkling Therefore [there is] no relation of instrument and effect between fire and sprinkling, on account of incompatibility So '[one] should sprinkle with fire' – this [is] no sentence

Likewise, words such as 'bring a cow' uttered at intervals (*asata*) every third hour, one by one [form] no

१ कार्यकारणभावलक्षणसम्बन्धेऽग्निसेकयोरयोग्यत्वादतोऽग्निना .

वाक्यम् । सत्यामपि परस्पराकाङ्क्षायां सत्यामपि च परस्परान्वय योग्यतायां परस्परसान्निध्याभावात् ।

'यानि तु' साकाङ्क्षाणि योग्यतावन्ति सन्निहितानि पदानि तान्येव वाक्यम्'। यथा ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादि । यथा वा नदीतीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीति । यथा वा तान्येव गामानयेत्यादिपदान्यविलम्बितोच्चरितानि ॥ ३५ ॥

कथं पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि ।

नन्वत्रापि न पदानि साकाङ्क्षाणि किंत्वर्थाः । फलादीनामाधेयानां तीराद्याधाराकाङ्क्षितत्वात् । न च विचार्यमाणेऽर्था अपि साकाङ्क्षाः । आकाङ्क्षाया इच्छात्मकत्वेन चेतनधर्मत्वात् ।

सत्यम् । अर्थास्तावत् स्वपदश्रोतर्यन्योन्यविषयाकाङ्क्षाजनकत्वेन

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sentence Because even though mutual exp ctancy is there even though the compatibility of mutual construction is also there there is no reciprocal juxtaposition

Only those words again that are posse sed of expectancy have compatibility and are [uttered] together [or have juxtaposition] [ar] a s nt nce as for instance 'one desirous of [securing] heaven should p rform the Jyotistoma sacrifice etc or as for instance on the river bank are five fruits or as for instance the same words 'bring a cow etc uttered without any interval [or delay]

(36) I say [says the objector] Even here [it is] not the *words* [*that are*] poss sed of expectancy but the things [denoted by them] because [it is] the fruits and others that are the supported [that are] possessed of expectancy with reference to the support the bank etc Considering [the matter] still further (or) [it is] not the things either [that are] possessed of expectancy for expectancy being of the nature of desire is an attribute of sentient [objects]

True [what you say] The things for the matter of that are said to have exp ctancy owing to [them] producing expectancy between them [or for different obj cts] in the

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१ साकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिहितानि पदानि ।

६ साकाङ्क्षा इत्युच्यन्ते । तद्द्वारेण तत्प्रतिपादकानि पदान्यपि साकाङ्क्षाणीत्युपचर्यन्ते। यद्वा पदान्येवार्थान् प्रतिपाद्यार्थान्तरविषयाकाङ्क्षाजनकानीत्युपचारात् साकाङ्क्षाणि।

९ एवमर्थाः साकाङ्क्षाः परस्परान्वययोग्यास्तद्द्वारेण पदान्यपि परस्परान्वययोग्यानीत्युपचर्यन्ते। संनिहितत्वं तु पदानामेकेनैव पुंसा अविलम्बेनोच्चारितत्वम्। तच्च साक्षादेव पदेषु संभवति नार्थद्वारा।

१२ तेनायमर्थः संपन्नः। अर्थप्रतिपादनद्वारा श्रोतुः पदान्तरविषयामर्थान्तरविषयां वाकाङ्क्षां जनयतां प्रतीयमानपरस्परान्वययोग्यार्थप्रतिपादकानां संनिहितानां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम् ॥ ३६ ॥

कथं पदप्रतीतिः वाक्यप्रतीतिर्वा।

पदं च वर्णसमूहः। समूहश्चात्रैकज्ञानविषयीभावः। एवं च वर्णानां

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hearer of words denoting them, and through that agency, the words also denoting them are metaphorically described as having expectancy. Or, the words themselves [are said to be] possessed of expectancy figuratively because, after denoting [their] objects, they produce the expectancy with reference to other objects.

Similarly the objects that have expectancy [are] *compatible for mutual construction, and through that agency,* the words also are figuratively described as compatible for mutual construction. Juxtaposition, on the other hand (*tu*), [is] the uttering of words without any interval [between them or delay] by one and the same person and that is possible in the words themselves directly not through the agency of objects.

This then is the conclusion (arthah) arrived at—A sentence [is] the collection of words that produce in the hearer through the agency of denoting the objects the expectancy referring to other words or referring to other objects that denote objects compatible for mutual construction and [are so] being comprehended [and] that have juxtaposition [*that is, that are uttered without any interval between them*].

(37) A word again [is] a collection of letters [or syllables or sounds]. And a collection here [means]

क्रमवतामाशुतरविनाशित्वेनैकदानेकवर्णानुभवासंभवात् पूर्वपूर्ववर्णाननुभूयान्त्यवर्णश्रवणकाले पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेनान्त्यवर्णसंबद्धेन पदव्युत्पादनसमयग्रहानुगृहीतेन श्रोत्रेणैकदैव सदसदनेकवर्णावगाहिनी पदप्रतीतिर्जन्यते । सहकारिदार्ढ्यात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षे ह्यतीतापि पूर्वावस्था स्फुरत्येव । ततः पूर्वपूर्वपदानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृतेनान्त्यपदविषयेण श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण पदार्थप्रत्ययानुगृहीतेनानेकपदावगाहिनी वाक्यप्रतीतिः क्रियते ॥ ३७ ॥

शब्दप्रमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समानम् ।

तदिदं वाक्यमाप्तपुरुषेण प्रयुक्तं सच्छब्दनामकं प्रमाणम् । फल

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being the object of one cognition Thus, because it is impossible to comprehend many letters at one and the same time, owing to the letters coming in succession and being quickly destroyed straight away (*tara*), there is produced the comprehension of words comprising many letters, present and absent, at one and the same time by the ear, which is connected with the last letter which is helped by the impressions caused by the apprehension of the various preceding letters, at the time of the hearing of the last letter after having apprehended the various preceding letters, and which is favoured by the comprehension of the convention (*samayah*) of explaining the word owing to the intensity [or strength] of the auxiliaries, like recognition For, in the apprehension (*pratyaksa*) of recognition the former state, although past, does present *itself* Then is effected the comprehension of sentence, comprising many words, by the organ of hearing which has for its object the last word, helped by the impressions caused by the apprehension of the various preceding words, and *favoured* by the apprehension of the meaning of the words [or of the objects signified by the words]

(38) This [that is, such a] sentence, then, when put forth by a trustworthy person [is] proof called Word, its effect [is] the cognition of the meaning of the sentence And this *definition* of word-proof [is] the same for worldly

त्वस्य वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् । तच्चैतच्छब्दप्रमाणलक्षणं लोके वेदे च समानम् । लोके त्वयं विशेषो यः कश्चिदेवाप्तो भवति न सर्वः । अतः किंचिदेव लौकिकं वाक्यं प्रमाणं यदाप्तवक्तृकम् । वेदे तु परमाप्तश्रीमहेश्वरेण कृतं सर्वमेव वाक्यं प्रमाणं सर्वस्यैवाप्तवाक्यत्वात् ।

एवं वर्णितानि चत्वारि प्रमाणानि । एतेभ्योऽन्यन्न प्रमाणम् । प्रमाणस्य सतोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ॥ ३८ ॥

अर्थापत्तिर्न पृथक्प्रमाणम् ।

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति । तथाहि । पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति दृष्टे श्रुते वा रात्रिभोजनं कल्प्यते । दिवा अभुञ्जानस्य पीनत्वं रात्रिभोजनमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते । अतः पीनत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतार्थापत्तिरेव रात्रिभोजने प्रमाणम् । तच्च प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो भिन्नं

[matters] and Vedic [sacred texts] But in [the case of] the world, this [is] the distinction, some one or other only can be a trustworthy person, not everybody So, only *some worldly sentence which has for its speaker a trustworthy person [is] proof [or authoritative]*, *in [the case of]* the Vedas, on the other hand, each and every sentence composed by the most trustworthy Lord Mahesvara, [is] proof [or authoritative] the whole itself being the sentence of a trustworthy person

Thus have been expounded the four proofs Anything else than these [is] no [independent] proof, being just included in these, if it is a means of right knowledge.

(39) I say [says the objector]–Presumption [or Implication] also is an independent [or separate] proof To explain When it is heard or seen that the fat Devadatta *does not eat during the day eating by night* [*on his part*] *is presumed* Fatness is not possible without eating by night in the case of one not eating by day Hence presumption itself arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the fatness, [is] the proof for eating by night [by Devadatta] And it [is] different from perception etc,

१ शब्दलक्षणं प्रमाणं । २ परमेश्वरेण । ३ अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनात् तदुपपादकीभूतार्थान्तरकल्पनमर्थापत्तिः ।

रात्रिभोजनस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वात्। नैतत्। रात्रिभोजनस्यानुमान विषयत्वात्। तथाहि।

अयं देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते।
दिवा अभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात्।
यस्तु न रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते नासौ दिवाऽभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनः।
यथा दिवा रात्रावभुञ्जानोऽपीनः।
न चायं तथा।
तस्मान्न तथा।

इति केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेन रात्रिभोजनस्य प्रतीयमानत्वात् किमर्थमर्थापत्तिः पृथक्त्वेन कल्पनीया॥ ३९॥

न अभावाख्य पृथक्प्रमाणम्।

नन्वभावाख्यमपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति। तच्चाभावग्रहणायाङ्गीकर्णीयम्[1]। तथाहि। घटाद्यनुपलब्ध्या घटाद्यभावो निश्चीयते। अनुपल

because eating by night can not be the object of perception etc [We reply] not so because eating by night is the object of inference To explain

This Devadatta eats by night
Because [he is possessed] of fatness without eating by day
He who does not eat by night [is] not fat without eating by day as for instance [X] [who is] not fat not eating either by day or by night
And this [Devadatta is] not so
Therefore [he is] not so

—When by means of this purely negative inferance can be comprehended eating by night for what purpose should presumption be regarded separately [that is as an independent pramana]?

(40) I say [says the objector] there is a separate proof called non existence [negation absence] also And it deserves to be accepted for the apprehension of negation To explain Owing to the non apprehension of the jar, etc is ascertained the non existence of the jar etc And

[1] मैवम्।

ब्धियोपलब्धेरभाव इत्यभावप्रमाणेन घटाद्यभावो गृह्यते। नैतत्।
यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत् तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यदित्यादितर्कसहकारिणा-
६ नुपलम्भसनाथेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवाभावग्रहणात् किमभावप्रमाणेन ॥ ४० ॥

असंबद्धाभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं कथं संभवति इति विचारः।

नन्विन्द्रियाणि संबद्धार्थग्राहकाणि। तथाहि।

३ इन्द्रियाणि वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारीणि।

ज्ञानकरणत्वात्। आलोकवत्।

यद्वा चक्षुःश्रोत्रे वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारिणी।

६ वहिरिन्द्रियत्वात्। त्वगादिवत्।

त्वगादीनां तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारित्वमुभयवादिसंमतमेव।
न चेन्द्रियाभावयोः संबन्धोऽस्ति। संयोगसमवायौ हि संबन्धौ। न

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non-apprehension [means] the negation of apprehension-by this non-existence-proof is apprehended the negation of the jar etc. [We reply]-[It is] not so; when the negation is apprehended by perception itself, accompanied by non-apprehension and helped by hypothetical reasoning in the form -if the jar had been here, then [one] would have seen [it], like the ground,.what need of the non—existence-proof ?

(41) I say [says the objector]-The sense-organs cognise things which are connected [with them] To explain:

Sense-organs illumine an object after reaching it.
Because [they are] instruments of cognition.
... like light.

Or, Eye and ear illumine an object after reaching it
Because [they are] external sense-organs.
.. like the organ of touch etc.

And that the organ of touch and the like, illumine [an *object*] *after reaching* [*it*], is, to be sure, agreed to by both the partie. [or di putants]

Now there i no connection between a sen e-organ and negation Conjunction and inference are indeed [the] t

न तौ तयोः स्तः । द्रव्ययोरेव संयोग इति नियमात् अभावस्य च द्रव्यत्वाभावात् । अयुतसिद्धत्वाभावान्न समवायोऽपि[1] ।

विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च संबन्ध एव न भवति भिन्नोभयाश्रितैकत्वाभावात् । संबन्धो हि संबन्धिभ्यां भिन्नो भवति उभयसंबन्ध्याश्रितश्च एकश्च । यथा भेरीदण्डयोः संयोगः । स हि भेरीदण्डाभ्यां भिन्नस्तदुभयाश्रितश्चैकश्च । न च विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्तथा । तथाहि । दण्डपुरुषयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न ताभ्यां भिद्यते । न हि दण्डस्य विशेषणत्वमर्थान्तरं नापि पुरुषस्य विशेष्यत्वम् अर्थान्तरम् अपि तु स्वरूपमेव । अभावस्यापि विशेषणत्वात् विशेष्यत्वाच्च । न चाभावे कस्यचित् पदार्थस्य द्रव्याद्यन्यतमस्य संभवः । तस्मादभावस्य

[two] connection and there can not be those two between them [conjunction can not be there] because of the rule that conjunction [takes place] only between two substances and negation has not the nature of a substance [There is] no inherence either owing to the absence of their being known to be not separated

The relation of qualification and qualified can no be connection at all because it is not different does not subsist in both [the connected things] and is not one A connection indeed is different from the [two] connected things does subsist in both the connected things and is one as for instance the conjunction between drum and stick It indeed [is] different from drum and stick does subsist in the two [viz drum and stick] and [is] one But the relation of qualification and qualified [is] not like that To explain The relation of qualification and qualified between stick and man is not different from them The character of being a qualification of the stick [is] not a different entity nor the character of being qualified of the man a different entity but [is] just its [of the stick of the man] own nature And non existence also [is] possessed of the character of a qualification and that of the qualified In negation again there can be no possibility [of the subsistence] of any one

[1] तयोस्तु भावधर्मत्वात् ।

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स्वोपरक्तबुद्धिजनकत्वं यत् स्वरूपं तदेव विशेषणत्वं न तु तदर्थान्तरम्।

एवं व्याप्यव्यापकत्वकार्यकारणत्वादयोऽप्यूह्याः। स्वप्रतिबद्धबुद्धि
२३ जनकत्वं स्वरूपमेव हि व्यापकत्वमग्न्यादीनाम्। कारणत्वमपि कार्या
नुकृतान्वयव्यतिरेकिस्वरूपमेव हि तन्त्वादीनां न त्वर्थान्तरम्।
अभावस्यापि व्यापकत्वात् कारणत्वाच्च। न ह्यभावे सामान्यादि
२४ समवेतं।

तदेव विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न विशेषणविशेष्यस्वरूपाभ्यां भिन्नः।
नाप्युभयाश्रितः। विशेषणे विशेषणभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वात् विशेष्य
२५ भावस्याभावात्। विशेष्ये च विशेष्यभावमात्रस्य सत्त्वाद् विशेषण
भावस्याभावात्। नाप्येकः। विशेषणं च विशेष्यं च तयोर्भाव इति
द्वन्द्वात् परः श्रूयमाणो भावशब्दः प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते। तथा च

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category out of substance and others Therefore the character of *being a qualification that belongs to negation [is] nothing but its own nature the character of producing a cognition tainted by itself and [it is] not a different entity*

Similarly are to be regarded [the relations of] pervaded and pervader cause and effect and the like For the character of being a pervader of fire and others [is] but [their] very nature the character of producing a cognition [of an object] [invariably] associated with them The character of being a cause also that belongs to threads etc [is] but [their] very nature of being present and absent corresponding to the effect [being present and absent] and not a different entity And negation also is possessed of the character of the pervader and that of the cause Again there is no possibility of generality etc [subsisting] in negation

Thus then the relation of qualification and qualified [is] *not different* from the natures of the qualification and the qualified nor [is it] subsisting in both for in the qualification *exists only* the nature of the qualification [and] the absence of the nature of the qualified and in the qualified exists only the nature of the qualified [and] the absence of the nature of the qualification. Nor [is it] one The word "relation" heard [or put in] after the copulative compound [dissolved]

विशेषणभावो विशेष्यभावश्चेत्यापन्नम् । द्वावेतौ एकश्च सम्बन्धः । तस्माद्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो न सम्बन्धः । एवं व्याप्यव्यापकभावादयोऽपि । सम्बन्धशब्दप्रयोगस्तूभयनिरूपणीयत्वसाधर्म्येणोपचारात् । तथा चासम्बद्धस्याभावस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणं न सम्भवति ।

[सत्यम् । भावावच्छिन्नत्वाद् व्याप्तेः । भावं प्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं प्राप्तमेव प्रकाशयति न त्वभावमपि । अभावं प्रकाशयदिन्द्रियं विशेषणविशेष्यभावमुखेनैवेति सिद्धान्तः । असम्बद्धाभावग्रहेऽतिप्रसङ्गदोषस्तु विशेषणतयैव निरस्तः । समाप्तं परमतं ।

यत्रोभयोः समो दोषः परिहारोऽपि वा समः ।
नैकः पर्यनुयोक्तव्यस्तादृगर्थविचारणे॥ (श्लोकवार्तिक) ४१ ॥

ज्ञानस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं परतः प्रामाण्यं वा इति विचारः।

इदमिदानीं निरूप्यते । जलादिज्ञाने जाते तस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्य कश्चिज्जलादौ प्रवर्तते । कश्चित्तु संदेहादेव प्रवृत्तः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले जलादिप्रतिलम्भे सति प्रामाण्यमवधारयतीति वस्तुगतिः ।

अत्र कश्चिदाह । प्रागेव प्रामाण्यमवधार्य पुरुषः प्रवर्तते स्वत एव प्रामाण्यावधारणात् । अस्यार्थः । येनैव यज्ज्ञानं गृह्यते तेनैव तद्गतं प्रामाण्यमपि । न तु ज्ञानग्राहकादन्यज्ज्ञानधर्मस्य प्रामाण्यस्य ग्राहकम् । तेन ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वमेव स्वतस्त्वं प्रामाण्यस्य। ज्ञानं च प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव गृहीतम् । कथमन्यथा प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्य

Where the objection [*or fault is*] *equal* [*that is equally* stands applicable] to (the views of] both and the removal [or refutation thereof] also [is] the same one [party] should not be questioned [or taken to task] in a discussion of such *a matter*

(42) Here is now expounded [the following topic]- When the knowledge of water etc is produced some one *proceeds to* [*take*] *the water etc after having ascertained* the validity [or correctness] of it [the knowledge] Some one again proceeding [to take the water etc] on the strength of mere suspicion [about its presence] ascertains the validity [*of the knowledge*] when water has been *found* at a *time* after he has acted—this [is] the state of things

[Now] here some one contends —Having already beforehand *ascertained* the validity [*of the knowledge*] a man proceeds *the validity* [*of the knowledge*] being *ascertained* from [the knowledge] itself The meaning [or idea] of this [is as follows]—By the same [process] by which indeed is apprehended some knowledge [is apprehended] the validity also thereof *Other than that which makes* [*one*] *apprehend* the knowledge [is] not that which makes [one] apprehend the validity the attribute of the knowledge Hence the self-sufficiency of the validity [of knowledge] [is] nothing *but not being dependent on something different from what*

संदेहोऽपि स्यात्। अनधिगते धर्मिणि संदेहानुदयात्। तस्मात् प्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमेव ज्ञाततान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्या ज्ञाने गृहीते ज्ञानगतं प्रामाण्यमप्यर्थापत्त्यैव गृह्यते। ततः पुरुषः प्रवर्तते। न तु प्रथमं ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते ततः प्रवृत्त्युत्तरकाले फलदर्शने[1] जाते ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमवधार्यते।

अत्रोच्यते। ज्ञाततान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्या ज्ञानं गृह्यत इति यदुक्तं तदेव वयं न मृष्यामहे। तया प्रामाण्यग्रहस्तु दूरत एव। तथाहि। इदं किल परस्याभिमतम्। घटादिविषये ज्ञाने जाते मया ज्ञातोऽयं घट इति घटस्य ज्ञातता प्रतिसंधीयते। तेन ज्ञाने जाते सति ज्ञातता नाम कश्चिद्धर्मो जात इत्यनुमीयते। स च ज्ञानात्

makes [one] apprehend the knowledge As regards the knowledge, it is apprehended, to be sure, before the activity Otherwise, how could there be even the doubt about [its] validity or non-validity? Doubt can not arise as regards an object that is not apprehended Therefore, prior to the activity itself, when the knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness is apprehended the validity belonging to the knowledge also, by presumption itself, then the man moves on But not that only the knowledge is apprehended first, and afterwards the validity of the knowledge is ascertained, when the sight of the result takes place at a time after the activity [is gone through]

To this we reply —What has been said by you viz that knowledge is apprehended by means of presumption arising out of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the known-ness—this itself we would not tolerate [that is admit to be true], as regards the apprehension of the validity by it, it [is a question] still farther off [we admit that still less] To explain The following indeed [is] the view of [our] opponent When the knowledge having for [its] object, a jar etc, arises, known-ness is recognised as belonging to the jar in the form 'This jar is known by me Hence it is inferred that when the knowledge is produced, some attribute

१ फलदर्शनं।

पूर्वमजातत्वाज् ज्ञाने जाते च जातत्वादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां ज्ञानेन
२१ जन्यत इत्यवधार्यते । एवं च ज्ञानजन्योऽसौ ज्ञाततानाम धर्मो ज्ञान
मन्तरेण नोपपद्यते कारणाभावे कार्यानुदयात् । तेनार्थापत्त्या स्वका
रणं ज्ञान ज्ञाततयाक्षिप्यत इति ।

२४ न चैतद्युक्तम् । ज्ञानविषयतातिरिक्ताया ज्ञातताया अभावात् ।

ननु ज्ञानजनितज्ञातताधारत्वमेव हि घटादेर्ज्ञानविषयत्वम् ।
तथाहि । न तावत् तादात्म्येन विषयता । घटज्ञानयोस्तादात्म्या
२७ नभ्युपगमात् । तदुत्पत्त्या तु विषयत्व इन्द्रियादेरपि विषय
त्वापत्ति । इन्द्रियादेरपि तस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेः । तेनेदमनुमीयते । ज्ञानेन

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called known ness is produced, and because it [jñatatā] is not produced prior to the knowledge, and is *produced when the knowledge is produced, it is ascertained* that it is produced by knowledge, owing to the positive and negative association And likewise, this attribute called known-ness arising out of knowledge could not be possible without knowledge, owing to the non-production of the effect in the absence of the cause Therefore through presumption, is indicated knowledge, its own cause, by *known-ness.*

But this [argument of the opponent is] *not proper,* because known-ness exists not as different from the character of being the object of knowledge

I say [says the objector]—The character of being the object of knowledge, of a jar etc is the same as being the substratum of known-ness produced by the knowledge. *To* explain *The character of being the object, [it] not, for the* matter of that [produced] by identity, as identity is not admitted between the knowledge and the jar If, again, [it be held that] objectivity [is due to the fact that the cognition] [is] produced by it [the object], then the sense-organs etc would have to be regarded as being possessed of *objectivity, because that knowledge* arises from the sense-organs etc., as well Hence this is inferred —Something is produced in the jar by the knowledge.

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१ विषयत्वविशेषोऽन्यज्ञानस्य ।

घटे किंचिज्जनितं येन घट एव तस्य ज्ञानस्य विषयो नान्य इति। अतो विषयत्वान्यथानुपपत्तिप्रसूतयार्थापत्त्यैव ज्ञाततासिद्धि न तु ३०
प्रत्यक्षमात्रेण।

मैवम् । स्वभावादेव विषयत्वोपपत्ते । अर्थज्ञानयोरेतादृश
एव स्वाभाविको विशेष येनानयोर्विषयविषयिभाव । इतरथाती ३३
तानागतयोर्विषयत्वं न स्यात् । ज्ञानेन तत्र ज्ञाततजननासंभवात्
असति धर्मिणि धर्मजननायोगात् । किं च ज्ञाततायाः अपि स्वज्ञान
विषयत्वात् तत्रापि ज्ञाततान्तरप्रसंगस्तथा चानवस्था । अथ ज्ञातता ३६
न्तरमन्तरेणापि स्वभावादेव ज्ञानविषयत्वं ज्ञाततायाः । एवं चेत् तर्हि

by which th jar d nc [i c in] he bj ct of that know ledge [and] not another So i e tablished known-n ss by presumption itself arising out f t e impos ibility of other wi e accounting for the character t being an object [and] not merely by perception

[Do] not [say] so Obj ctivity can be accounted for by the very nature [of things] Such indeed [is] the natural peculiarity of object and knowledge that [there exists] between these two the relation of obj ct and po e sor of the object Otherwise there would be no character of an object in past and future [things] For it is impossible for the knowledge to produce known ness in them owing to the impossibility of the production of attributes [in a thing] when the thing [ie the possessor of attributes] is non existing Moreover as known ness also is the object of its own knowledge there also would [have to] be [admitted] another known ness which is an unde irable contingency and thus [it would lead to] endlessness [r gres um ad infinitum] Well [to obviate the anavasthadosa if you were to say] even without a different known ne s there would be the character of being an object of known ness by its very nature [then we would retort] if [that is] so then what need [is there] of [admitting] known ness in the case of [the knowledge of] the jar etc ?

१ विषयविषयिभाव स । २ ज्ञानविषयत्वासम्भवातिप्रसंग ।

घटादावपि किं ज्ञाततयेति ।

अस्तु वा ज्ञातता तथापि तन्मात्रेण ज्ञानं गम्यते । प्रामाण्यं तु कुतः। अथ ज्ञाततया ज्ञानमात्रं गृह्यते प्रामाण्यं ज्ञातताविशेषेणेत्युच्यते तर्हि ज्ञाततया ज्ञानं गृह्यते ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रमाणज्ञानाव्यभिचारिणा प्रामाण्यमिति कुत एव ज्ञानग्राहकग्राह्यता प्रामाण्यस्य। अथ केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेण प्रमाणज्ञानाव्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्येते। एवं चेदप्रामाण्येऽपि शक्यमिदं वक्तुम्। केनचिज् ज्ञातताविशेषेणाप्रमाणज्ञानाव्यभिचारिणा ज्ञानाप्रामाण्ये सहैव गृह्येते इति अप्रामाण्यमपि स्वत एव गृह्यताम्। अथैवमप्यप्रामाण्यं परतस्तर्हि प्रामाण्यमपि परत एव गृह्यताम् ज्ञानग्राहकादन्यत इत्यर्थः ।

Or, let the known-ness be [admitted to exist for the time being] still by that only is apprehended the knowledge, but whence [its] validity ? Now [if you say that] knowledge alone is apprehended by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a special known-ness then how indeed would the validity be capable of being apprehended by *the same means which would make [one] apprehend* the knowledge, in asmuch as (*its*) knowledge is apprehended by means of known-ness, [and its] validity by means of a *special known-ness which never fails (avyabhicāri) in respect* of correct knowledge ? Now [if you were to say that] by means of some special known-ness never failing in respect *of correct knowledge, are apprehended just together* [both] knowledge and [its] validity, then likewise this could be said with respect to the invalidity [of knowledge] as well —by *means of some special known-ness never failing in* respect of incorrect knowledge knowledge and [its] invalidity are apprehended just together—so let the invalidity [of *knowledge] also be apprehended from [the knowledge] itself !* Now if thus [you are prepared to admit] that non validity [arises] from other means, then let the validity also be [accepted as] apprehended by other means that is, by other than what makes [one] apprehend knowledge

ज्ञानं हि मानसप्रत्यक्षेणेव गृह्यते प्रामाण्य पुनरनुमानेन । तथाहि। जलज्ञानानन्तरं जलार्थिन· प्रवृत्तिर्द्वेधा फलवत्यफला चेति। तत्र या फलवती प्रवृत्ति· सा समर्था । तया तज्ज्ञानस्य याथार्थ्यलक्षणं ५१
प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । प्रयोगश्च ।

विवादाध्यासितं जलज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ।

समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । ५४

यन्न प्रमाणं न तत् समर्थां प्रवृत्तिं जनयति यथा प्रमाणाभासः ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेकी।

अत्र च फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकं,यज्जलज्ञानं तत् पक्ष· । तस्य प्रामाण्यं ५७
साध्यं यथार्थत्वमित्यर्थ· । न तु प्रमात्वं स्मृत्या व्यभिचारापत्तेः। हेतुस्तु समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्व फलवत्प्रवृत्तिजनकत्वमिति यावत्।

Knowledge, indeed is apprehended by means of perception by the mind itself [its] validity on the other hand, by means of inference To explain After the knowledge of water, the activity of one desirous of water [is] of two kinds—fruitful and fruitless The activity which [is] fruitful [is] the successful [or competent] one, and from that is inferred the validity characterised by being in accord with the thing of that knowledge And the syllogism [is follows]—

> The knowledge of water under dispute [is] valid
> Because it produces successful activity
> What is not valid, does not produce successful activity, as apparently valid knowledge

This [is] a purely negative [hetu]

And here, the subject [is] the knowledge of water, which produces fruitful activity What is to be established [is] its validity, that is, being in accord with its object, and not the character of being a direct cognition otherwise, there would be the violation [of the vyapti] owing to remembrance [being samarthapravrttijanaka though not a prama] And the reason [is] 'producing a successful activity,' that is producing a fruitful activity

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१ याथार्थ्यमनुमीयते । २ समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकम् ३ प्रमाकरणत्वम् ।

अनेन केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनानभ्यासदशापन्नस्य ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्येऽवबोधिते तद्दृष्टान्तेन जलप्रवृत्तेः पूर्वमपि तज्जातीयत्वेन लिङ्गेनान्वयव्यतिरेक्यनुमानेनान्यस्य ज्ञानस्याभ्यासदशापन्नस्य प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । तस्मात् परत एव प्रामाण्यं न ज्ञानग्राहकेणैव गृह्यत इति ।

चत्वार्येव प्रमाणानि युक्तिलेशोक्तिपूर्वकम् ।
केशवो बालबोधाय यथाशास्त्रमवर्णयत् ॥ ४० ॥

(२) प्रमेयम् ।

प्रमेयाणि ।

प्रमाणान्युक्तानि । अथ प्रमेयाण्युच्यन्ते । आत्मशरीरेन्द्रियार्थबुद्धि

When the validity of knowledge having no scope for previous experience, is ascertained by means of this purely negative inference, with that as an instance, is inferred, even before the activity [undertaken] for [securing] the water, the validity of other [later] knowledge having scope for previous experience, by means of a positive-negative inference, with the indicatory mark 'being of the same type' Therefore the validity is apprehended through another means alone, and not by *what makes [one] apprehend knowledge itself*

The proofs [that are] only four, Kesava has expounded, after stating in brief the arguments, and according to the treatises accepted as authority, for the understanding of beginners

(43) The proofs have been explained, now are explained the objects of cognition Soul, body, sense-organ, object, [or categories], cognition, mind, activity, defect, trans migration fruit [or result of deeds], pain, and salvation

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१ नुमानेनाभ्यासदशापन्नस्य । २ ज्ञानस्यानभ्यासदशापन्नस्य ।

मन प्रवृत्तिदोषप्रेत्यभावफलदुःखापवर्गास्तु प्रमेयमिति सूत्रम् । ३
(न्यायसूत्र १ १) ॥ ४३ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम्।

तत्रात्मत्वसामान्यवानात्मा । स च देहेन्द्रियादिव्यतिरिक्त प्रति-
शरीरं भिन्नो नित्यो विभुश्च । स च मानसप्रत्यक्ष । विप्रतिपत्तौ तु [3]
बुद्ध्यादिगुणलिङ्गकः । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादयस्तावद् गुणा । सूत्र

अनित्यत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् । रूपवत् । ६

गुणाश्च गुण्याश्रित एव । तत्र बुद्ध्यादयो न गुणा भूताना
मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । ये हि भूताना गुणास्ते न मनसा गृह्यन्ते यथा
रूपादय । नापि दिक्कालमनसा गुणा विशेषगुणत्वात् । ये हि दिशा ९

[or final liberation] [these form] the object of cognition—so [runs the Nyaya-] Sutra

(44) Of them Soul [is that] which is possessed of the generality soul-ness And it [is] distinct from body sense-organs etc, different in each body all pervading and eternal It [is] again perceptible by the mind if there be disagreement [over the manasapratyaksatva] it has qualities cognition etc as the indicatory mark (to prove by inference its existence] To explain 9

Cognition etc to start with (*tavat*) [are] qualities.

Because being non-eternal they are capable of being apprehended by one sense-organ like colour

And a quality must resort to a substance [lit possessor of qualities] Now cognition etc [can not be] the qualities of material substances on account of their being perceptible by the mind For what [are] the qualities of material substances they are not apprehended by the mind [manasapratyaksa] like colour and others not again [are they] the qualities of space time and mind owing to their being special qualities The qualities that belong to space etc —number etc [are] not special qualities,

१ मानसग्राहकवान् ।

दिग्गुणाः सख्यादयो न ते विशेषगुणा । ते हि सर्वद्रव्यसाधारणगुणा एव । बुद्ध्यादयस्तु विशेषगुणा । गुणत्वे सत्येकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् रूपवत् । अतो न दिगादिगुणाः । तस्मादेभ्योऽष्टभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो बुद्ध्यादीनां गुणानामाश्रयो वक्तव्यः । स एवात्मा । प्रयोगश्च ।

बुद्ध्यादयः पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिता ।

पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

यस्तु पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितो न भवति नासौ पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणोऽपि भवति यथा रूपादि ।

इति केवलव्यतिरेकी । अन्वयव्यतिरेकी वा । तथाहि ।

बुद्ध्यादय पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिताः ।

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they [*are*] *indeed qualities common to all substances* Cognition etc [are] on the other hand, *special qualities*, because being qualities, they are capable of being apprehended by one sense-organ like colour Hence [*they are*] not qualities belonging to space etc Therefore a substratum [or resort] for the qualities, cognition and others, distinct from these eight [substances referred to above] must be admitted [or stated] that [is] just the Soul And the syllogism [is as follows] —

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances, earth etc

Because, *not*, *subsisting in the eight substances*, *earth etc*, *they are qualities*

That again, which does not subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc is not a quality as well, not subsisting in the eight substances earth etc, like colour etc

This [is] a purely negative [hetu]

Or a positive-negative one To explain

Cognition and others subsist in a substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc

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१ गुणेत्वस्य ।

पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् । २१

यो यदनाश्रितो गुणः स तदतिरिक्ताश्रितो भवति
यथा पृथिव्याद्यनाश्रितः शब्दः पृथिव्याद्यतिरिक्ता-
काशाश्रित इति ।' २४

तदेव पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्त नवम द्रव्यमात्मा सिद्ध । स च सर्वत्र कार्योपलम्भाद्विभु । परममहत्परिमाणवानित्यर्थ । विभुत्वाच्च नित्योऽसौ व्योमवत् । सुखादीना वैचित्र्यात् प्रतिशरीर भिन्न ॥४४॥ २७

शरीरनिरूपणम् ।

तस्य भोगायतनमन्त्यावयवि शरीरम् । सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारो भोग । स च यदवच्छिन्न आत्मनि जायते तद्भोगायतन तदेव ३

Because not subsisting in the eight substances, earth etc they are qualities

That which is a quality no tsubsisting in a particular [substance] subsists in [a thing] distinct from that as for instance sound which does not subsist in earth etc subsists in the ether distinct from earth etc

Thus then [is] established the soul the ninth substance distinct from the eight substances earth etc And owing to [its] function being found everywhere it [is] all pervading that is possessed of the highest large dimension And owing to its being all pervading it [is] eternal like the sky [It i] different for each body owing to the variation of pleasure etc

(45) Body [is] the abode of *its enjoyments* [being] a final *product* [or ultimate composition] Enjoyment [is] the experience of one or other of pleasure and pain [and], that [is] the abode of enjoyment, circumscribed by which is produced in the soul that [experience] [and] that it elf [is] the body Or body [is] the substratum of [physical] activity Activity again [i] the action intended for securing and avoiding

१ तथा च सुखादय पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्ताश्रया । २ व्यवसायानुभवा ।

शरीरम् । चेष्टाश्रयो वा शरीरम् । चेष्टा तु हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्था क्रिया न स्पन्दनमात्रम् ॥ ४५ ॥

षडिन्द्रियविचारः ।

शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् इन्द्रियम् । अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियमित्युच्यमाने कालादेरपीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिति । तथापि इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्षेऽतिप्रसंगः । अत उक्तं शरीरसंयुक्तमिति । शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियमित्युच्यमाने आलोकादेरपीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगः । अत उक्तमतीन्द्रियमिति ।

तानि चेन्द्रियाणि षट् । घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि ।

तत्र गन्धोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं घ्राणम् नासाग्रवर्ति । तच्च पार्थिवं गन्धवत्त्वात् घटवत् । गन्धवत्त्वं च गन्धग्राहकत्वात् । यदिन्द्रियं

[respectively] the wholesome and unwholesome, [and] not mere motion

(46) Sense-organ [is that] which is conjoined with the body, [is] the instrument of cognition, and [is] supersensuous. *If it had been said* [*that is, if the definition had been stated* as] sense organ [is that which is] supersensuous, then there would be the undesirable contingency, that time etc also would be sense organs so it i   aid [in addition] '*instrument* of cognition' Still [even with this addition, the definition is faulty as] there would be the undesirable *contingency* of [the statement being] too-wide in [respect of] the contact between sense-organ and object, so [it] is said [in addition] 'conjoined with the body' *If it had been said, sense organ* [is that which is] conjoined with the body [and is] the *instrument* of cognition, there would be the undesirable contingency of even *light* etc, being sense-organs, so [*it*] *is said* [*in addition*] 'supersensuous'

And those *sense organs* [*are*] *six*—[*organs of*] smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and mind

Of them, the organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of odour [is] the sense of smell, residing on the tip of the nose And it [is] *earthly*, because [*it is*] *possessed of odour*, like a jar Being possessed of odour, again, [*is there*] *on*

रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यं गुणं गृह्णाति तदिन्द्रियं तद्गुणसंयुक्तं यथा चक्षुः रूपग्राहकं रूपवत्।[1]

रसोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं रसनम् जिह्वाग्रवर्ति। तच्चाप्यं रसवत्त्वात्। रसवत्त्वं च रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रसस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् लालावत्।

रूपोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं चक्षुः कृष्णताराग्रवर्ति। तच्च तैजसं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये रूपस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् प्रदीपवत्।

स्पर्शोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं त्वक् सर्वशरीरव्यापि त्वक्स्थानम्। तत्तु वायवीयं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये स्पर्शस्यैवाभिव्यञ्जकत्वात् अङ्गसंगिसलिलशैत्याभिव्यञ्जकव्यजनवातवत्।

account of its making [one] apprehend odour What quality out of the five colour etc a [particular] sense organ apprehends with that quality is conjoined that sense organ, as for instance the eye making [one] apprehend colour, [is] possessed of colour

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of taste [is] the sense of taste residing on the tip of the tongue And it [is] watery because [it is] possessed of taste Being possessed of taste again [is there] on account of its manifesting taste alone out of the five colour etc like the saliva

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of colour [is] the sense of sight [or the eye] residing on the tip of the black pupil. And it [is] of the essence of light [or luminous] on account of its manifesting colour alone out of the five, colour etc like a lamp

The organ [*which is*] the means of the apprehension of touch [*is*] the sense of touch pervading the whole of the body *having for its* location the skin And it [is] of the essence of *wind on account* of its manifesting touch alone out of the five *colour etc* like the breeze from the fan which manifests the cool *touch* of the water clinging to the body

१ गन्धग्राहकं च घ्राणम्। अतो गन्धवत्।

शब्दोपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम् । तच्च कर्णशष्कुल्यवच्छिन्न-
२१ माकाशमेव । न द्रव्यान्तरं शब्दगुणत्वात् । तदपि शब्दग्राहकत्वात् ।
यदिन्द्रियं रूपादिषु पञ्चसु मध्ये यद्गुणग्राहकं तत्तद्गुणसंयुक्तम् यथा
चक्षुरादि रूपादिग्राहकं रूपादिसंयुक्तम् । शब्दग्राहकं श्रोत्रम् अत
२४ शब्दगुणकम् ।

सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्चाणुपरिमाणम् हृदयान्तर्वर्ति ।

२५ ननु चक्षुरादीन्द्रियसद्भावे किं प्रमाणम् । उच्यते । अनुमानमेव तथाहि ।

रूपाद्युपलब्धयः करणसाध्याः । क्रियात्वात् ।
छिदिक्रियावत् ॥ ४६ ॥

The organ [which is] the means of the apprehension of sound [is] the sense of hearing [or the ear] And it [is] ether itself *limited by the tympanum [or drum] of the ear*, not another substance, on account of having sound as a quality, and that too, on account of its apprehending [or making one apprehend] the sound. What quality out of the five, colour etc, a [particular] *sense-organ manifests, with that* quality is conjoined that [sense-organ] as for instance, the eye, etc making [one] apprehend colour etc, are conjoined with colour etc The ear makes [one] apprehend sound, *therefore it has sound as a quality*

The organ [which is] the means 'of the apprehension of pleasure etc [is] the *mind* and *it* has the *dimension* of an atom residing inside the heart

I say [says the objector]-What [is the] proof for the existence of the sense-organs, sense of sight etc ? We reply— [It is] inference itself To explain

Apprehensions of colour etc are fit to be produced by an instrument
Because [*they are*] action
like the action of cutting

षट्पदार्थाः । द्रव्यनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थाः षट् पदार्थाः । ते च द्रव्य-गुण-कर्म-सामान्य-विशेष-समवायाः । प्रमाणादयो यद्यप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति तथापि प्रयोजनवशाद् भेदेन कीर्तिताः ।

तत्र समवायिकारणं द्रव्यम् । गुणाश्रयो वा द्रव्यम् । तानि च द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकालदिगात्ममनांसि नवैव ॥ ४७ ॥

पृथिवीनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र पृथिवीत्वसामान्यवती पृथिवी । काठिन्यकोमलत्वाद्यवयवसंयोगविशेषेण युक्ता । घ्राण-शरीर-मृत्पिण्डपाषाणवृक्षादिरूपा । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारवती । सा च द्विविधा नित्या अनित्या च । नित्या परमाणुरूपा । अनित्या च कार्यरूपा । द्विविधाया पृथिव्या रूपर

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(47) Objects [are] the six categories And they [are]—Substance, quality, action generality, particularity [or individuality] inherence [or intimate association] Though proof and others [mentioned in the first Nyayasutra] are comprised just under here still they have been mentioned separately for the sake of [some definite] purpose

Of them, the material [or constituent] cause [is] substance or the substratum of qualities [is] substance And those substances [are] only nine [namely] earth water, fire, wind ether, time space, soul and mind

(48) Of them, earth [is that] which is possessed of the generality, earth-ness [It is] associated with the peculiar combination of parts, [giving rise to] harshness softness etc [It is possessed] of the form of organ of smell body, lump of clay, stones, trees etc [and] is possessed of [qualities] colour, taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [or magnitude] severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness nearness, gravity [or heaviness], fluidity, [and] impression And it [is] of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal Eternal [earth is] of the form of atoms, and non-eternal [is] of the form of product [The qualities] colour, taste, odour and touch of the two-

सगन्धरसस्पर्शा अनित्याः पाकजाश्च । पाकस्तु तेजःसंयोगः । तेन पृथिव्या पूर्वरूपादयो नश्यन्त्यन्ये जन्यन्त इति पाकजाः ॥ ४८ ॥

अब्निरूपणम् ।

अप्त्वसामान्ययुक्ता आपः । रसनेन्द्रिय-शरीर सरित्समुद्रहिमकर
३ कादिरूपाः । गन्धवर्जस्नेहयुक्तपूर्वोक्तगुणवत्यः । नित्या अनित्याश्च । नित्यानां रूपादयो नित्या एव । अनित्यानाम् अनित्या एव ॥ ४९ ॥

तेजोनिरूपणम् ।

तेजस्त्वसामान्यवत् तेज । चक्षु शरीर-सवितृसुवर्णवह्निविद्युदादि
३ प्रभेदम् । रूपस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वद्रवत्वसंस्कारवत् । नित्यमनित्यं च पूर्ववत् । तच्चतुर्विधम् उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम् अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शम् अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शम् उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं

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fold earth [are] non-eternal and [are] produced by *heat* Heat [is] again the conjunction with fire [or light] Through it are destroyed the former colour etc of earth [and] others are produced—thus [they are] produced by heat

(49) Water [is that] which is possessed of the generality, water-ness [It is] of the form of organ of taste, body, rivers, oceans, snow, hail etc [It is] possessed of qualities mentioned above [as possessed by earth] except odour, and with the addition of viscidity [It is] eternal and non-eternal Colour etc of eternal [water are] eternal only, [colour etc] of non-eternal [water are] non-eternal only

(50) Fire [is that] which is possessed of the generality, fire-ness [It is] divided into organ of sight, body, the sun, gold, [terrestrial] fire lightning etc [It is] possessed of [the qualities] colour touch, number, dimension [or magnitude] severality, conjunction, disjunction remoteness, nearness fluidity and impression [It is] eternal and non eternal as above It [is] of four kinds—having [both] developed colour and developed touch, having [both] colour and touch undeveloped having undeveloped colour and developed touch, and having developed colour and undeveloped touch That having [both] developed colour and deve-

चेति। उद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा सौरादितेज पिण्डीभूत तेजो वह्न्यादिकम्। ६ सुवर्णं तु उद्भूताभिभूतरूपस्पर्शम्। अनुद्भूतरूपत्वऽचाक्षुष स्यात अनुद्भूतस्पर्शत्व त्वचा न गृह्येत। अभिभवस्तु बलवत्सजातीयेन पार्थिवरूपेण स्पर्शेन च कृत। अनुद्भूतरूपस्पर्शं यथा चक्षुरिन्द्रियम्। ८ अनुद्भूतरूपमुद्भूतस्पर्शं यथा तप्तवारिस्थ तेज। उद्भूतरूपमनुद्भूतस्पर्शं यथा प्रदीपप्रभामण्डलम्॥ ५०॥

वायुनिरूपणम्।

वायुत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् वायु त्वगिन्द्रिय शरीर प्राणवातादिप्रभेद। स्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्ववेगवान्। स च, स्पर्शानुमेय। तथाहि योऽयं वायौ वाति अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श उपलभ्यते स गुणत्वाद् गुणिनमन्तरेणानुपपद्यमानो गुणिनमनुमापयति।

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loped touch [is] as for instance the heat of the sun etc [and] fire formed in a mass—[terrestrial] fire etc Gold on the other hand has colour and touch developed but overpowered If it had undeveloped colour it would not be visible if it had undeveloped touch it could not be apprehended by the sense of touch The over powering [of the taijasa colour and touch in gold] again is effected by the colour and touch of [the particles of] earth [in it] which belong to the same kind and [are more] powerful [Fire] having [both] undeveloped colour and touch [is] as for instance the organ of sight [fire] having undeveloped colour and developed touch—as for instance the heat residing in hot [or boiling] water [fire] having developed colour and undeveloped touch—as for instance the halo of the light of a lamp

(51) Wind [is that] which is associated with [the generality] windness [It is] divided into organ of touch body vital airs breeze etc [It is] possessed of [the qualities] touch *number* dimension [or magnitude] severality conjunction disjunction remoteness nearness and velocity And it is to be inferred from touch To explain This here not hot not cold touch that is experienced [or felt] when the wind blows being a quality and impossible to be accounted

कार्यगता रूपादयः स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणगतेभ्यो रूपादिभ्यो जायन्ते। कारणगुणा हि कार्यगुणानारभन्त इति न्यायात्।

इत्थमुत्पन्नस्य कार्यद्रव्यस्य घटादेरवयवेषु नोदनादभिघाताद्वा क्रिया जायते। तया विभागः। तेनावयवद्वयारम्भकस्यासमवायिकारणीभूतस्य संयोगस्य नाशः। ततः कार्यद्रव्यस्य घटादेरवयविनो नाशः। एतेनावयव्यारम्भकासमवायिकारणनाशेन द्रव्यनाशो दर्शितः। क्वचित् समवायिकारणनाशेन द्रव्यनाशो यथा पूर्वोक्तस्यैव पृथिव्यादेः संहारे संजिहीर्षोर्महेश्वरस्य संजिहीर्षा जायते। ततो द्व्यणुकारम्भकेषु परमाणुषु क्रिया। तया विभागस्ततस्तयोः संयोगनाशे सति द्व्यणुकेषु नष्टेषु स्वाश्रयनाशात् त्र्यणुकादिनाशः। एवं

क्रमेण पृथिव्यादिनाशः। यथा वा तन्तूनां नाशे पटनाशः। तद्गतानां रूपादीनां स्वाश्रयनाशेनैव नाशः। अन्यत्र तु सत्येवाश्रये विरोधिगुणप्रादुर्भावेण विनाशः। यथा पाकेन घटादौ रूपादिनाश इति ॥ ५२ ॥

परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम् परमाणोरनारब्धत्वम् द्व्यणुकत्र्यणुकोत्पत्तिः।

किं पुनः परमाणुसद्भावे प्रमाणम्। उच्यते। यदिदं जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं सर्वतः सूक्ष्मतमं रज उपलभ्यते तत् स्वल्पपरिमाणद्रव्यारब्धं कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटवत्। तच्च द्रव्यं कार्यमेव महद्द्रव्यारम्भकस्य कार्यत्वनियमात्। तदिदं द्व्यणुकाख्यं द्रव्यं सिद्धम्। तदपि स्वल्पपरिमाणसमवायिकारणारब्धं कार्यद्रव्यत्वाद् घटवत्। यस्तु द्व्यणुकारम्भकः स एव परमाणुः। स चानारब्ध एवेति।

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thus in order [takes place] the destruction of earth etc. Or as for instance, the destruction of the cloth on the destruction of the threads, the destruction of colour etc belonging to it [takes place] through the destruction itself of their substratum In other cases, on the other hand, destruction [takes place] through the appearance of contrary qualities, even though the substratum continues to exist, as for instance, the destruction of colour etc in the jar etc through heating

(53) What again, [is] the proof for the existence of atoms ? We reply —What this [particle of] dust, the finest of all, is found existing in the rays of the sun coming from a lattice, that is produced by a substance possessing a smaller dimension [than its own], because it is a product-substance like a jar [And] that substance, in its turn (*ca*), [is] also a product, as it is a rule that what produces a substance of a large dimension is a product Thus then the substance called the binary is established And that too is produced by an intimate cause possessing a smaller dimension, because it is a product substance, like a jar. What again is the producing cause of the binary, that [is] *the atom itself and that* [is] *verily, unproduced*

ननु कार्यद्रव्यारम्भकस्य कार्यद्रव्यत्वाव्यभिचारात् तस्य कथमनारब्धत्वम्। उच्यते। अनन्तकार्यपरम्परादोषप्रसङ्गात्। तथा च सत्यनन्तकार्यद्रव्यारब्धत्वाविशेषेण मेरुसर्षपयोरपि तुल्यपरिमाणत्वप्रसङ्ग। तस्मादनारब्ध एव परमाणु।

द्व्यणुकं तु द्वाभ्यामेव परमाणुभ्यामारभ्यते। एकस्यानारम्भकत्वात् त्र्यादिकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्। त्र्यणुकं तु त्रिभिरेव द्व्यणुकैरारभ्यते। एकस्यानारम्भकत्वात्। द्वाभ्यामारम्भे कार्यगतमहत्त्वानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। कार्ये हि महत्त्वं कारणमहत्त्वाद्वा कारणबहुत्वाद्वा। तत्र प्रथमस्यासम्भवाच्चरममपेक्षितव्यम्। न च चतुरादिकल्पनायां प्रमाणमस्ति त्रिभिरेव महत्त्वारम्भोपपत्तेरिति ॥ ५३ ॥

I say [says the objector]— How can it [the atom] have the character of not being a product owing to the invariable association of the producer [or component parts] of a product substance with the nature of a product substance? We reply Because there would be the undesirable contingency of an endless series of products And in that case there would be the undesirable contingency of even [the mountain] Meru and the mustard seed having a similar dimension being equally produced by infinite product substances Therefore the atom [is] verily unproduced

A binary on the other hand is produced by two atoms only because one [atom] can not be the producer [or the component part] and there is no valid reason for admitting three etc [atoms as the arambhaka] The triad again is produced by only three binaries because one can not be the producer If two [binaries] were to produce [the triad] there would be the undesirable contingency [namely] the impossibility of accounting for the magnitude belonging to the product For the magnitude in a product [arises] from the magnitude of the cause or from the plurality of the cause [Now] here the first being impossible [as the binaries have no mahatva] the latter must be sought And there is no valid reason for admitting four etc (binaries as the cause of a triad) on account of the possibility of accounting for the production of the magnitude by three [binaries] only

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१ अन्वयव्यभिचारात्।

आकाशनिरूपणम् ।

शब्दगुणमाकाशम् । शब्दसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागवत् । एकं विभु नित्यं च । शब्दलिङ्गकं च । शब्दलिङ्गकत्वमस्य कथम् । परिशेषात् ।[1] तथाहि । शब्दस्तावद् विशेषगुणः । सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वाद् रूपादिवत् । गुणश्च गुण्याश्रित एव । न चास्य पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमात्मा च गुणी भवितुमर्हति । श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वाच्छब्दस्य । ये हि पृथिव्यादीनां गुणा न ते श्रोत्रेन्द्रियेण गृह्यन्ते यथा रूपादयः । शब्दस्तु श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न च दिक्कालमनसां गुणः । विशेषगुणत्वात् । अत एभ्योऽष्टभ्योऽतिरिक्तः शब्दगुणी एषितव्यः । स एवाकाश इति । स चैकः । भेदे प्रमाणाभावात् एकत्वेनैवोपपत्तेः । एकत्वाच्चाका-

(54) Ether [is that] which has sound for [its special] quality [It is] possessed of [the qualities] sound, number dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction. [It is] one, all pervading and eternal and has sound as the indicatory mark [to prove its existence by inference] How has it sound as the indicatory mark? Through [the rule of] elimination [or remainder, exclusion] To explain Sound, to start with, [is] a special quality, because while possessed *of a generality, it is fit to be apprehended by means of one* external sense organ of people like us [that is, ordinary people], like colour etc And a quality must subsist in a substratum Again, the four [elements] earth etc, and the soul do not deserve to be the substratum of this [quality], because sound is fit to be apprehended by the ear For what [are] the qualities of earth and others they are not apprehended by the sense of hearing as for instance, colour etc Sound, on the other hand is apprehended by the ear [Sound is] not the quality of space time and mind either, because it is a special quality Therefore a possessor of the *quality sound, distinct from these eight [substances] must* be sought And that [is] ether alone And it [is] one there being no valid reason for [admitting] divisions, and [every thing being] accounted for, by its being just one Because it is one, the generality called ether-ness does not exist in

१ प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधेऽन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् परिशिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः परिशेषः ।

-त्व नाम सामान्यमाकाशे न विद्यते। सामान्यस्यानेकवृत्तित्वात्। विभु चाकाशम् परममहत्परिमाणमित्यर्थः। सर्वत्र तत्कार्योपलब्धेः। अत एव विभुत्वान्नित्यमिति ॥ ५४ ॥

कालनिरूपणम्।

कालोऽपि दिग्विपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेयः। संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्व संयोगविभागवान्। एको नित्यो विभुश्च। कथमस्य दिग्विपरीतपरत्वा परत्वानुमेयत्वम्। उच्यते। सन्निहिते वृद्धे सन्निधानादपरत्वार्हे तद्विप रीतं परत्वं प्रतीयते। व्यवहिते यूनि व्यवधानात् परत्वार्हे तद्विपरी तमपरत्वम्। तदिदं दिक्कृतविपरीतपरत्वमपरत्वं च कार्यं सत्कारणस्य दिगादेरसंभवात् कालमेव कारणमनुमापयति।

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ether because a generality exist in more than one Ether again [is] all pervading that i having the highe t large dimension because [its] effect [or function] is apprehended everywhere For this very rea on [it is] et rnal owing to [its] all pervading nature

(55) Time also is to b in erred from the [notions of] remoteness and nearne s contrary to [those caused by] space [It is] possessed of n imber dimension severality conjunction and disjunction (It is) ne eternal and all pervading How is it to be inferred from the [notions of] remoteness and nearne s contrary to [those caused by] space? We reply In [the case of] an old man near to [us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as possessing] nearness owing to proximity [the notion of] remoteness contrary to it is apprehended [and] in [the ca e of] a youth remote [from us] and [though] fit for [being regarded as possessing] remoteness [is apprehended the notion of] near ness contrary to it Now this remoteness and nearness contrary to [that] caused by space being an effect makes [us] infer time alone as [its] cause owing to the impossibi lity of space etc being [its] cause

१ स चैकोऽपि वर्तमानातीतभविष्यत्क्रियोपाधिवशाद् वर्तमानादिव्यपदेशं लभते पुरुष इव पच्यादिक्रियोपाधिवशात् पाचकयाचकादिव्यपदेशम् । नित्यत्वविभुत्वे चास्य पूर्ववत् ॥ ५५ ॥

दिङ्निरूपणम् ।

कालविपरीतपरत्वापरत्वानुमेया दिगेका नित्या विभ्वी च ।
३ सङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागवती । सा च पूर्वादिप्रत्ययैरनुमेया । तेषामन्यनिमित्तासम्भवात् । पूर्वस्मिन् पश्चिमे वा देशे स्थितस्य वस्तुनस्तादवस्थ्यात् । सा चैकापि सवितुस्तत्तद्देशसंयोगोपाधिवशात्
६ प्राच्यादिसंज्ञां लभते ॥ ५६ ॥

आत्मनिरूपणम् ।

आत्मत्वाभिसम्बन्धवानात्मा । सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्यात् नानाभूत

And though one, it secures the appellation 'present' etc [that is 'past' and 'future'] owing to the limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) of present, past, and future actions, like a man the appellation of 'a cook,' 'a mendicant' etc *owing to the limiting adjunct of the actions, cooking etc Its eternal nature and all pervading nature* [are] as before [that is, like ether]

(56) Space *inferrable from the* [*notions of*] *remoteness and nearness contrary to* [*those caused by*] *time* [is] one eternal and all pervading [It is] *possessed of* [the qualities] number, dimension severality, conjunction and disjunction And it is to be inferred from the notions of 'east' etc owing to the impossibility of any other cause for them because a thing remains just the same whether it be in the western or eastern region And though one it secures the name 'the east' etc by virtue of the limiting adjunct of the conjunction of the sun with those particular regions

(57) Soul [*is that*] *which is associated with soul-ness* [*It is*] *indeed manifold, owing to the multiplicity* [*or variation*] *of pleasure, pain etc and it has been already*

१ पाठक । २ विभागगुण ३ प्रतिशरीर भिन्न ।

एव । स चोक्त एव । तस्य सामान्यगुणाः सङ्ख्यादयः पञ्च बुद्ध्यादयो नव विशेषगुणाः । नित्यत्वविभुत्वे पूर्ववत् ॥ ५७ ॥

मनोनिरूपणम् ।

मनस्त्वाभिसंबन्धवन्मनः । अण्वात्मसंयोग्यन्तरिन्द्रियम् । सुखाद्युपलब्धिकारणं नित्यं च सङ्ख्याद्यष्टगुणवत् । तत्संयोगेन बाह्येन्द्रियमर्थग्राहकम् । अत एव सर्वोपलब्धिसाधनम् । तच्च न प्रत्यक्षम् अपि त्वनुमानगम्यम् । तथाहि ।

> सुखाद्युपलब्धयश्चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तकरणसाध्या ।
> असत्स्वपि चक्षुरादिषु जायमानत्वात् ।[1]

यच्च तत् चक्षुराद्यतिरिक्तम् करणं तन्मनः । तच्चाणुपरिमाणम् । इति द्रव्याण्युक्तानि ॥ ५८ ॥

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described It has five general qualities number etc -and nine special qualities cognition etc Eternal nature and all-pervading nature [are in it] as above [as in space]

(58) Mind [is that] which is associated with mindness [It is] atomic having conjunction with the soul [and] an internal sense organ [It is] the cause of the apprehension of pleasure etc eternal and possessed of the eight qualities number etc Through conjunction with it the external sense organ makes [one] apprehend the object and for this very reason [it is] the means of all apprehension It again [is] not perceptible [directly] but is fit to be known by inference To explain

> Apprehensions of pleasure etc are produced by an instrument distinct from the eye etc
>
> Because [they are] being produced even when the eye etc are not present

And what is the instrument distinct from the eye etc that [is] the mind And [it is] of atomic dimension

Thus have the substances been expounded

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१ यद्यत् यद्विनैवोत्पद्यते तत्तदतिरिक्तकरणसाध्यं यथा कुठारं विनोत्पद्यमाना पचनक्रिया तदतिरिक्तवह्न्यादिकरणसाध्या ।

गुणनिरूपणम् ।

अथ गुणा उच्यन्ते । सामान्यवान् असमवायिकारणम् अस्पन्दात्मा गुणः । स च द्रव्याश्रित एव । रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसंयोगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वद्रवत्वस्नेहशब्दबुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नधर्माधर्मसंस्कारभेदाच्चतुर्विंशतिधा ॥ ५९ ॥

रूपनिरूपणम् ।

तत्र रूपं चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिव्यादित्रयवृत्ति । तच्च शुक्लाद्यनेकप्रकारकम् । पाकजं च पृथिव्याम् । तच्चानित्यं पृथिवीमात्रे । आप्यतैजसपरमाण्वोर्नित्यम् । आप्यतैजसकार्येष्वनित्यम् । शुक्लभास्वरमपाकजं तेजसि । तदेवाभास्वरमप्सु ॥ ६० ॥

रसनिरूपणम् ।

रसो रसनेन्द्रियग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिवीजलवृत्तिः । तत्र पृथिव्या

(59) Now are expounded the qualities Quality [is that] which is possessed of generality, [is] the non intimate cause, [and is] not of the nature of motion And it subsists in a substance alone [It is] of twenty-four kinds through the division into colour taste, odour, touch, number, dimension [or magnitude] severalty, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, gravity [or heaviness] *fluidity, viscidity, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain desire,* aversion activity, merit, demerit, and impression

मधुरादिषट्प्रकारो पाकजश्च । अप्सु मधुरोऽपाकजो नित्योऽनित्यश्च । ३
नित्यः परमाणुरूपास्वप्सु । कार्यरूपास्वप्स्वनित्यः ॥ ६१ ॥

गन्धनिरूपणम् ।

गन्धो घ्राणग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तिः । अनित्य एव । स द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च । जलादौ गन्धप्रतिभानं तु संयुक्तसमवायेन २ द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ६२ ॥

स्पर्शनिरूपणम् ।

स्पर्शस्त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यो विशेषगुणः । पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयवृत्तिः । स च त्रिविधः शीतोष्णानुष्णाशीतभेदात् । शीतः पयसि । उष्णस्तेजसि । अनुष्णाशीतः पृथिवीवाय्वोः । पृथिवीमात्रे ह्यनित्यः । आप्यतैजसवायवीयपरमाणुषु नित्यः । आप्यादिकार्येष्वनित्यः । एते च रूपादयश्चत्वारो महत्त्वैकार्थसमवेतत्वे सत्युद्भूता एव प्रत्यक्षाः ॥ ६३ ॥ ६

In water [it is] sweet not produced by heating eternal and non eternal [It is] eternal in water of the form of atoms [and] non eternal in water of the form of a product

(62) Odour [is] a special quality to be apprehended by the sense of smell [It] resides in earth alone [is] only non eternal It [is] of two kinds—fragrant and non fragrant The apprehension of odour in water etc is however to be understood [as caused] by intimate relation with [earth that is] conjoined [with it]

(63) Touch [is] a special quality to be apprehended by the sense of touch [It] resides in the group of four earth etc And it [is] three fold through the division into cold hot not cold not hot [It is] cold in water hot in fire not hot not cold in earth and wind [It is] again non eternal in earth only, eternal in the atoms of water fire and wind non eternal in the products of water etc These four colour etc are directly perceptible only when they are developed and are in intimate relation with an object possessed of magnitude

१ मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्तभेदात् । २ परमाणुभता ।

संख्यानिरूपणम् । द्वित्वम् अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यम् ।

संख्या एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतुः सामान्यगुणः । एकत्वादिपरार्धपर्यन्ता । तत्रैकत्वं द्विविधं नित्यानित्यभेदात् । नित्यगतं नित्यम् अनित्यगतमनित्यम् । स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणगतैकत्वजन्यं च । द्वित्वं चानित्यमेव । तच्च द्वयोः पिण्डयोरिदमेकमिदमेकमित्यपेक्षाबुद्ध्या जन्यते । तत्र द्वौ पिण्डौ समवायिकारणम् । पिण्डयोरेकत्वेऽसमवायिकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिर्निमित्तकारणम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिनाशाद् द्वित्वविनाशः । एवं त्रित्वाद्युत्पत्तिर्विज्ञेया ॥ ६४ ॥

परिमाणनिरूपणम् ।

परिमाणं मानव्यवहारासाधारणं कारणम् । तच्चतुर्विधम् । अणु महद् दीर्घं ह्रस्वं चेति । तत्र कार्यगतं परिमाणं संख्यापरिमाणप्रचययोनि ।

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(64) Number [is] a general quality the cause of the employment of words [regarding] one-ness [or the characteristic of being one] etc [It] begins with one-ness and ends with parārdha There one-ness [or conception of unity] [is] of two kinds on account of the division into *eternal* and non-eternal [It is] eternal [when] belonging to eternal *[things] non-eternal [when] belonging to non-eternal* [things] and produced by the one-ness belonging to the intimate cause of its substratum Duality on the other hand [is] non-eternal only and it is produced by the relative [and combined] notion about two objects in the form this [is] one this [is] one Here the two objects [are] the intimate cause the two unities of the two objects, the non-intimate cause [and] the relative notion the instrumental cause From the destruction of the relative *notion itself [follows] the destruction of duality* Thus the production of three ness etc is to be understood

(65) Dimension [is] the special cause of the employment of words [regarding] measurement It [is] of four kind —minute large long and short There the dimension belonging to a product is produced by number dimension or loose combination of part (*pracayah*) It [is] as follows —

तद्यथा । द्व्यणुकपरिमाणमीश्वरापेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यपरमाणुद्वित्वजनित-त्वात् संख्यायोनि । संख्याकारणकमित्यर्थः । त्र्यणुकपरिमाणं च स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणगतबहुत्वसंख्यायोनि । चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणं तु स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणपरिमाणजन्यम् । तूलपिण्डपरिमाणं तु स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणावयवानां प्रशिथिलसंयोगजन्यम् । परमाणु-परिमाणं परममहत्परिमाणं चाकाशादिगतं नित्यमेव ॥ ६५ ॥ १

पृथक्त्वनिरूपणम् ।

पृथक्त्वं पृथग्व्यवहारासाधारणं कारणम् । तच्च द्विविधम् । एक-पृथक्त्वं द्विपृथक्त्वादिकं च । तत्राद्यं नित्यगतं नित्यमनित्यगतमनि- २
त्यम् । द्विपृथक्त्वादिकं चानित्यमेव ॥ ६६ ॥

संयोगनिरूपणम् ।

संयोगः संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः । स्वाश्रयेऽव्याप्यवृत्तिश्च । स च त्रिविधः ।

The dimension of a binary is produced by number, being caused by the duality of atom produced by the relative notion of God, that is it has number for its cause The dimension of a triad again has for its cause, number [viz] plurality belonging to the intimate cause of its substratum The dimension of a quarternary etc , on the other hand, is produced by the dimension of the intimate cause of its substratum, the dimension of a mass of cotton, again, is produced by the loose combination of the component parts of the intimate cause of its substratum The dimension of an atom and the highest large dimension belonging to ether etc [are] eternal only

(66) Severalty [is] the special cause of the employment of words [such as—'This thing is] different [from that'] It [is] of two kinds, severalty in one and severalty in two etc Of them, the first belonging to eternal [things is] eternal, [and], belonging to non-eternal [things is] non-eternal Severalty in two etc [is] non-eternal only

(67) Conjunction [is] the [special] cause of the employment of words [such as 'These two things are] joined,'

१ स्वकारणावयवप्रचययोनि । प्रचयस्त्ववयवानां स्वाश्रयसमवायिकारणप्रशिथिल-संयोगः । २ नित्यमनित्यम् । अनित्ये कार्ये पृथक्त्वादिके तु द्वित्वादिवदपेक्षाबुद्धिजम् ।

अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मज संयोगजश्चेति। तत्रान्यतरकर्मजो यथा क्रियावता श्येनेन सह निष्क्रियस्य स्थाणोः संयोगः। अस्य हि श्येनक्रिया असमवायिकारणम्। उभयकर्मजो यथा सक्रिययोर्मल्लयोः संयोगः। संयोगजो यथा कारणाकारणसंयोगात् कार्याकार्यसंयोगः। यथा हस्ततरुसंयोगेन कायतरुसंयोगः॥ ६७॥

विभागनिरूपणम्।

विभागोऽपि विभक्तप्रत्ययहेतुः। संयोगपूर्वको द्वाश्रय। स च त्रिविध अन्यतरकर्मज उभयकर्मजो विभागजश्चेति। तत्र प्रथमो यथा श्येनक्रियया शैलश्येनयोर्विभाग। द्वितीयो यथा मल्लयोर्विभागः।

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has two substratums and never covers them entirely [or resides in them without pervading them altogether] It [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums], arising from the action of both, and arising from conjunction Of them, [that] arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] [is] for instance, the conjunction of the motionless post with the moving falcon, the motion of the falcon [is] its non intimate cause [That] arising from the action of both [is] for instance, the conjunction [clash] of two active [or fighting] wrestlers. [That] arising from conjunction [is] *for instance*, the conjunction of the effect [body] and what is not an effect [tree] due to the conjunction of the cause [the hand] and *what is not a cause [tree], as the conjunction of body* and tree, through the conjunction of hand and tree

(68) Disjunction again [is] the [special] cause of the notion [such as These two things are] separated [or disjointed]' [It] has a conjunction beforehand and has two substratums. And it [is] of three kinds—arising from the action of any one of the two [substratums] arising from the action of both, and arising from disjunction. *Of them the first [is] for instance* the disjunction of the mountain and the falcon, through the motion of the falcon. The second [is] for instance, the disjunction of [two]

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१ मेषयोर्मल्लयोर्वा। २ शैलस्थश्येन ।

तृतीयो यथा हस्ततरुविभागात् कायतरुविभाग ॥ ६८ ॥

परत्वापरत्वनिरूपणम् ।

परत्वापरत्वे परापरव्यवहारासाधारणकारणे । ते तु द्विविधे दिक्कृते कालकृते च ।

तत्र दिक्कृतयोरुत्पत्ति कथ्यते । एकस्यां दिश्यवस्थितयो पिण्डयोरिदमस्मात् सन्निकृष्टमितिबुद्ध्यानुगृहीतेन दिक्पिण्डसंयोगेना परत्व सन्निकृष्टे जन्यते । विप्रकृष्टबुद्ध्या तु परत्व विप्रकृष्टे जन्यते । सन्निकर्षस्तु पिण्डस्य द्रष्टु शरीरापक्षया संयुक्तसंयोगाल्पीयस्त्वम् । तद्भूयस्त्व विप्रकर्ष इति ।

कालकृतयोस्तु परत्वापरत्वयोरुत्पत्ति कथ्यते । आनियतदिगदवस्थितयोर्युवस्थविरपिण्डयोरयमस्मादल्पतरकालसंबन्धीति धिया

wrestlers the third [is] for instance the disjunction of body and tree through the disjunction of hand and tree

(69) Remoteness and nearness [are] the special causes of the employment of words [such as This thing is] remote [from or] near [to that] They again [are] of two kinds—caused by space and caused by time

Of them [now] is described the production of [remoteness and nearness] caused by space Out of two objects residing in the same quarter is produced in the nearer [object] nearness through the *conjunction* of space and object favoured by the cognition This [is] nearer than that in the farther [object] however is produced remoteness through the cognition of [its being] remote Nearness again [is] the [comparatively] smaller number of conjunctions of conjoined [things] of the object with reference to the body of the observer a larger number thereof [is] remoteness

And [now] is described the production of remoteness and nearness caused by time Out of two objects a young man and an old man sitting not in any particular direction [there arises] nearness in the young man owing to the

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१ तद्भूय । २ संबद्ध इत्यपेक्षाबुद्ध्यानुगृहीतेन कालपिण्डसंयोगेनासमवायिकारणेन ।

यूनि अपरत्वम्। अयमस्माद् बहुतरकालसम्बन्धीति धिया स्थविरे
१२ परत्वम् ॥ ६९ ॥

गुरुत्वनिरूपणम् ।

गुरुत्वम् आद्यपतनासमवायिकारणम्। पृथिवीजलवृत्ति। यथाक्रम।
३ संयोगवेगप्रयत्नाभावे सति गुरुत्वात् पतनमिति ॥ ७० ॥

द्रवत्वनिरूपणम् ।

द्रवत्वम् आद्यस्यन्दनासमवायिकारणम् । भूतेजोजलवृत्ति। भूते
३ जसोर्घृतादिसुवर्णयोरग्निसयोगेन द्रवत्व नैमित्तिकम्। जले नैसर्गिक
द्रवत्वम् ॥ ७१ ॥

स्नेहनिरूपणम् ।

स्नेहश्चिक्कणता। जलमात्रवृत्ति। कारणगुणपूर्वको गुरुत्वादिवद्
३ *यावद्द्रव्यभावी ॥ ७२ ॥*

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notion in the form This one is connected with a smaller [degree of] time than the other [and] remoteness in the old man owing to the notion in the form This one is connected with a higher [degree of] time than the other'

(70) Gravity [or heaviness weight] [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] falling [It] resides in earth and water As has been said The falling [of an object is] due to gravity in the absence of conjunction velocity or conscious effort

(71) Fluidity [is] the non intimate cause of the first [act of] flowing [It] resides in earth fire and water In earth and fire [as for instance] in ghee etc and gold etc, the fluidity due to the conjunction of fire [is] artificial [or occasioned] in water [there resides] natural fluidity

(72) Viscidity [is] greasiness [It] resides in water alone [It has the same] quality in the cause before hand [and] like gravity etc is present in the substanc as long as it lasts

शब्दविचार । कथ शब्दस्य श्रोत्रेण ग्रहणम् । कार्यशब्दनाशविचार ।

शब्द श्रोत्रग्राह्य आकाशस्य विशेषगुण । ननु कथमस्य श्रोत्रेण
ग्रहणम् । यतो भेर्यादिदेशे शब्दो जायते श्रोत्र तु पुरुषदेशेऽस्ति । ३
सत्यम् । भेरीदेशे जात शब्दो वीचीतरङ्गन्यायेन कदम्बमुकुलन्यायेन
वा सन्निहिते शब्दान्तरमारभते । स च शब्द शब्दान्तरमिति क्रमेण
श्रोत्रदेशे जातोऽन्त्य शब्द श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते । न त्वाद्यो नापि मध्यम । ६
एवं वंशे पाट्यमाने दलद्वयविभागदेशे जात शब्द शब्दान्तरारम्भ
क्रमेण श्रोत्रदेशेऽन्त्य शब्द जनयति । सोऽन्त्य शब्द श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते
नाद्यो न मध्यम । भेरीशब्दो मया श्रुत इति मतिस्तु भ्रान्तैव । ९
भेरीशब्दोत्पत्तौ भेर्याकाशसंयोगोऽसमवायिकारणम् । भेरीदण्ड

(73) Sound [is] the special quality of ether to be apprehended by the sense of hearing I say [says the objector]—How (can there arise] its apprehension by the sense of hearing? For, the sound is produced in the region of the drum etc., while the sense of hearing is in the region of the man [who hears] True [what you say] The sound arising in the region of the drum produces another sound near by after the maxim of one wave producing another wave or after the maxim of the buds of the Kadamba [tree, that come out in all directions as soon as rain begins to fall] [and] that sound in its turn [produces] another sound [and so on] in this order the last sound arising in the region of the sense of hearing is apprehended by the sense of hearing Neither the first nor the intermediate [sound] Likewise when a bamboo is being cleft asunder, the sound arising at the region of the parting of the two pieces by producing other sounds in [due [order, produces the last sound in the region of the sense of hearing that last sound is apprehended by the sense of hearing, neither the first, nor the intermediate The notion namely The sound of the drum has been heard by me [is] but simply illusory

In the [matter of the] production of the sound of the drum the conjunction of ether and drum [is] the non inti-

१ धारत्र ।

संयोगो निमित्तकारणम्[1]। एवं वंशोत्पादनाच्चटचटाशब्दोत्पत्तौ वंशदलाकाशविभागोऽसमवायिकारणम्। दलद्वयविभागो निमित्तकारणम्। इत्थमाद्यः शब्दः संयोगजो विभागजो वा। अन्त्यमध्यमशब्दास्तु शब्दासमवायिकारणका अनुकूलवातनिमित्तकारणकाः। यथोक्तम् संयोगाद्विभागाच्छब्दाच्च शब्दनिष्पत्तिरिति। (वै. सू. २.२.३१) आद्यादीनां सर्वशब्दानामाकाशमेकमेव समवायिकारणम्।

कर्मबुद्धिवत्त्रिक्षणावस्थायित्वम्। तत्राद्यमध्यमशब्दाः कार्यशब्दनाश्याः। अन्त्यस्तूपान्त्येन उपान्त्यस्त्वन्त्येन सुन्दोपसुन्दन्यायेन विनश्येते। इदं त्वयुक्तम्। उपान्त्येन त्रिक्षणावस्थायिनान्त्यस्य द्वितीयक्षणमात्रानुगामिना तृतीयक्षणे चासतान्त्यनाशजननासंभवात्।

mate cause, the conjunction of drum and stick, the instrumental cause Similarly, in the [matter of the] production of the cracking [catacata] sound, due to the cleaving of the bamboo, the disjunction of the bamboo-pieces and ether [is] *the non-intimate cause* [and] *the disjunction* of the two pieces, the instrumental cause Thus the first sound [is] produced by conjunction or produced by disjunction The last one and the intermediate sounds, on the other hand, have *the sound as the non-intimate cause* and *favourable wind* as the instrumental cause As has been said—The production of sound [takes place] from conjunction, disjunction and sound. Of all sounds, the first one etc, ether alone [is] *the one intimate cause*

[Sound] lasts for three moments [only] like action and cognition Now the first one and the intermediate sounds are destroyed by the sounds which are [their] products, *the last one, again, by the last but one and the last but one,* by the last one—[thus these two] are destroyed after the maxim of Sunda and Upasunda [that is, mutually] This [is] however, improper It is impossible for the penultimate [sound] to cause the destruction of the last [sound] as it [the penultimate sound] liable to last [only] for three moments and *accompanying only the second moment of the last [sound]* does not exist [at all] in the third moment of the last [sound] Therefore, the destruction of the last [sound]

[1] आकाशं समवायिकारणम्।

तस्माद्युपान्त्यनाशादेवान्त्यनाश इति ।

विनाशित्वं च शब्दस्यानुमानात् । तथाहि ।

अनित्यः शब्दः ।

सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् ।

घटवत् इति ।

शब्दस्यानित्यत्वं साध्यम् । अनित्यत्वं च विनाशावच्छिन्नस्वरूपत्वं न तु विनाशावच्छिन्नसत्तायोगित्वम् । प्रागभावे सत्ताहीनेऽनित्यत्वाभावप्रसंगात् । सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वं हेतु । इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादित्युच्यमाने आत्मनि व्यभिचारः स्यादत उक्तं बाह्येति । एवमपि तेनैव योगिबाह्येन्द्रियेण ग्राह्ये

[arises] *from the destruction of the penultimate* [sound] itself

The destructibility of sound, again, [follows] from inference To explain

Sound [is] non-eternal

Because while being possessed of a generality, [it is] to be apprehended by the external sense-organ of [people] like us

.. like a jar

[Here] the impermanence of sound [is] what is to be established Impermanence [means] having a nature characterised by [or liable to] destruction but not being connected with being [or existence] liable to destruction, otherwise there would be the undesirable contingency of the absence of impermanence in antecedent negation which is without being While being possessed of a generality, to be apprehended by the external sense organ of [people] like us [is] the reason If it were [only] stated 'owing to being fit to be apprehended by a sense organ' there would be the violation [of the rule] with reference to the soul [that would be comprised by the reason] therefore it has been said '*external*' [sense-organ] Even so, there would be the violation [and unwarranted extension] with respect to atoms etc that are fit to be appre-

१ सत्यस्मदादि.. बाह्येन्द्रियेति ।

परमाण्वादौ व्यभिचारः स्यादतो योगिनिरासार्थमुक्तमस्मदादीति ।

किं पुनर्योगिसद्भावे प्रमाणम् । उच्यते ।

३३ परमाणवः कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षाः । प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदिति ।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षाः स एव योगी ।

तथापि सामान्यादिना व्यभिचारोऽत उक्तं सामान्यवत्त्वे सतीति ।

३६ सामान्यादित्रयस्य निःसामान्यत्वात् ॥ ७३ ॥

बुद्धिनिरूपणम् ।

अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः । नित्या अनित्या च । ऐशी बुद्धिर्नित्या । अन्य

३ दीया त्वनित्या ॥ ७४ ॥

सुखनिरूपणम् ।

प्रीतिः सुखम् । तच्च सर्वात्मनामनुकूलवदनीयम् ॥ ७५ ॥

दुःखनिरूपणम् ।

पीडा दुःखम् । तच्च सर्वात्मना प्रतिकूलवेदनीयम् ॥ ७६ ॥

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hended by the very same external sense organ of the Yogin therefore it has been said of people] like us for the purpose of excluding the Yogin

What again [is] the proof for the existence of Yogins? We reply

Atoms must be directly perceptible to some one
Because [they are] objects of knowledge
like a jar

He to whom [they are] perceptible [is] just the Yogin Still there would be the violation with respect to generality etc therefore it has been said while being possessed of a generality the three generality etc having no generality

(74) Cognition [consists in] the illumination of an object [*It is*] *eternal and non eternal* *The cognition of* God [is] eternal other [cognition is] but non eternal

(75) Pleasure [is] joy and it [is that] which is to be experienced as favourable [or agreeable] by all

(76) Pain [is] suffering and it [is that] which is to be experienced as disagreeable by all

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१ सर्वात्मनामनुकूल । २ सर्वात्मना ।

इच्छालक्षणम् ।

रागः इच्छा ॥ ७७ ॥

द्वेषलक्षणम् ।

क्रोधो द्वेषः ॥ ७८ ॥

प्रयत्नलक्षणम् । बुद्ध्यादीनां मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वम् ।

उत्साहः प्रयत्नः ।

बुद्ध्यादयः षण् मानसप्रत्यक्षाः ॥ ७९ ॥ ३

धर्माधर्मनिरूपणम् ।

धर्माधर्मौ सुखदुःखयोरसाधारणकारणे । तौ चाप्रत्यक्षावप्यनुमीयेते । तथाहि । ३

देवदत्तस्य शरीरादिकं देवदत्तविशेषगुणजन्यम् ।

कार्यत्वे सति देवदत्तस्य भोगहेतुत्वात् ।

देवदत्तप्रयत्नजन्यवस्तुवत् । ६

यश्च शरीरादिजनक आत्मविशेषगुणः स एव धर्मोऽधर्मश्च । प्रयत्नादीनां शरीराद्यजनकत्वादिति ॥ ८० ॥

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(77) Desire [is] attachment [or passion]

(78) Aversion [is] anger [or irritation]

(79) Effort [or activity] [is] energy

The six cognition etc [are] perceptible by the mind

(80) Merit and Demerit [are] the special causes of pleasure and pain Though [they are] not for the matter of that perceptible [by the sense-organs] they can be inferred To explain

> The body etc of Devadatta must be produced by a special quality in Devadatta
>
> Because while being a product they are the cause of enjoyment
>
> like an object produced by Devadatta's effort

What is the special quality in the soul, which produces body etc, that itself [is] merit and demerit, because effort etc, could not be producing body etc

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१ तौ चाप्रत्यक्षावप्यागमगम्यावनुमानगम्यौ च ।

संस्कारविचारः ।

संस्कारस्त्रिविधो वेगो भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्च । तत्र वेग पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयमनोवृत्तिः । स च क्रियाहेतुः । भावनाख्यस्तु संस्कार आत्ममात्रवृत्तिरनुभवजन्यः स्मृतिहेतुः । स चोद्बुद्ध एव स्मृतिं जनयति । उद्बोधश्च सहकारिलाभः । सहकारिणश्च संस्कारस्य सदृशदर्शनादय । यथोक्तम् । सादृश्यादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृतिबीजस्य बोधका इति । स्थितिस्थापकस्तु स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यविशेषवृत्ति । अन्यथाभूतस्य स्वाश्रयस्य धनुरादे पुनस्तादवस्थ्यापादकः ।

एते बुद्ध्यादयोऽधर्मान्ता भावना चात्मविशेषगुणाः ।

गुणा उक्ताः ॥ ८१ ॥

कर्मविचार. ।

अविभुद्रव्यपरिमाणेन मूर्तत्वापरनाम्ना सहैकार्थसमवेतं विभागद्वारा पूर्वदेशसंयोगनाशे सत्युत्तरदेशसंयोगहेतुश्च । तच्च उत्क्षेपणापक्षेपणाकुञ्चनप्रसारणगमनभेदात् पञ्चविधम् । भ्रमणादयस्तु गमनग्रहणेनैव गृह्यन्ते ॥ ८२ ॥

सामान्यविचारः ।

अनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययहेतुः सामान्यम् । द्रव्यादित्रयवृत्ति । नित्यमेकमने-
कानुगतं च । तच्च द्विविधं परमपरं च । तत्र परं सत्ता बहुविषयत्वात् । 3
सा चानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययमात्रहेतुत्वात् सामान्यमात्रम् । अपरं द्रव्यत्वादि ।
अल्पविषयत्वात् । तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्यं सद् विशेषः[१] ।
अत्र कश्चिदाह । व्यक्तिव्यतिरिक्तं सामान्यं नास्तीति । तत्र६

essence of motion [It] resides like quality in substance alone [It] is in intimate relation with one [and the same] object, along with the non-all-pervading dimension of substance, otherwise called corporeality [or bodily form], and [is] the cause of the conjunction with a latter region, when there is the destruction of the conjunction with the former region, through the agency of disjunction It [is] again, of five kinds, owing to the division into throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion, and going Revolving etc are apprehended by the apprehension of going itself

(83) Generality [is] the cause of the notion of conformity [It] resides in the three [padarthas], substance etc [that substance, quality and action] and [is] eternal, one, and conforming to many And it [is] of two kinds—wider (*para*) and narrower (*apara*) The wider [generality is] being [or existence], owing to [its] comprising many objects. And it [that is, being] owing to [its] being the cause of merely the notion of conformity [is] pure generality The narrower [generality is] the generality of substance etc. owing to [its] comprising fewer objects It, again, owing to [its] being the cause of exclusion as well, [is] particularity, though continuing to be generality

Here some one contends—There is no [such thing as] generality distinct from the individual objects To this we

१ सामान्यविशेष ।

भ्रमः । किमालम्बना तर्हि भिन्नेषु विलक्षणेषु पिण्डेष्वेकाकारा बुद्धि र्विना सर्वानुगतमेकम् । यच्च तदालम्बनं तदेव सामान्यमिति ।

९ ननु अतद्व्यावृत्तिकृतैवैकाकारा बुद्धिरस्तु । तथाहि । सर्वेष्वेव हि गोपिण्डेषु अगोभ्योऽश्वादिभ्यो व्यावृत्तिरस्ति । तेनागोव्यावृत्तिविषय एवायमेकाकारः प्रत्ययोऽनेकेषु न तु विधिरूपगोत्वसामान्यविषय।
१२ मैवम् । विधिमुखेनैवैकाकारस्फुरणात् ॥ ८३ ॥

विशेषविचारः ।

विशेषो नित्यो नित्यद्रव्यवृत्तिः । व्यावृत्तिबुद्धिमात्रहेतुः । नित्य
३ द्रव्याणि त्वाकाशादीनि पञ्च पृथिव्यादयश्चत्वारः परमाणुरूपाः ॥८४॥

समवायविचारः ।

अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः समवायः । स चोक्त एव ॥ ८५ ॥

नन्ववयवावयविनावप्ययुतसिद्धौ तेन अनयो सबन्ध समवाय । न चेतद्युक्तम् अवयवातिरिक्तस्यावयविनोऽभावात् । परमाणव एव बह्वस्तथा तथा सनिकृष्टा घटोऽय पटोऽयमिति गृह्यन्ते । ३

अत्रोच्यते । अस्त्येक स्थूलो घट इति प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धि । न च सा परमाणुष्वनेकेष्वस्थूलेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु भवितुमर्हति । भ्रान्तेय बुद्धिरिति चेत् । न । बाधकाभावात् । ६

तदेव षट् पदार्था द्रव्यादयो वर्णिता । ते च विधिमुखप्रत्ययवेद्यत्वाद् भावरूपा एव ॥ ८६ ॥

अभावविचार ।

इदानीं निषेधमुखप्रमाणगम्योऽभाव सप्तम पदार्थ प्रतिपाद्यते । स चाभाव सक्षेपतो द्विविध । ससर्गाभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति । ३

I say [says the objector] [It has been said that] parts and the whole are also such as are known to be never separated and therefore the connection between them [is] inherence. This however [is] not proper owing to the absence of the whole as distinct from the parts. Because the atoms themselves in large numbers (*bahavah*) and brought together in particular ways are apprehended in the form: This [is] a jar. This [is] a cloth.

To this we reply. There [is] the direct [or actual] cognition in the form: There is one gross jar. And it does not deserve to exist with reference to atoms [that are] many not gross and supersensuous. If [you argue that] this cognition [is] illusory [we reply] No, owing to the absence of any contradictory [proof or knowledge].

Thus have been expounded the six categories beginning with substance. And owing to their being fit to be known by notions of a positive nature they [are] of a positive form only.

(86) Now is described the seventh category non entity [or absence negation] fit to be known by a proof negative in form. That negation again [is] in brief of two kinds—Rela

१ तथाभूता सनिकृष्टा ।

संसर्गाभावोऽपि त्रिविधः प्रागभाव· प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति।

उत्पत्ते प्राक् कारणे कार्यस्याभाव प्रागभाव । यथा तन्तुषु पटाभावः। स चानादिरुत्पत्तेरभावात्। विनाशी च कार्यस्यैव तद्विनाशरूपत्वात ।

उत्पन्नस्य कारणेऽभावः प्रध्वंसाभाव । विनाश इति यावत्। यथा भग्ने घटे कपालमालायां घटाभावः। स च मुद्गरप्रहारादिजन्य स चोत्पत्तिमानप्यविनाशी नष्टस्य कार्यस्य पुनरनुत्पत्ते ।

त्रैकालिकोऽभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव । यथा वायौ रूपाभाव ।

अन्योन्याभावस्तु तादात्म्यप्रतियोगिकोऽभाव । घट पटो न भवतीति ।

तदेवमर्था व्याख्याता ॥

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tive negation and Reciprocal [or Mutual] negation Relative *negation too [is] of three kinds*–Antecedent negation, Negation by destruction, and Absolute negation

Antecedent negation [is] the absence of the effect in the cause, before [its] production, as for instance, the absence of the cloth in the threads And it has no beginning, owing to the absence of origination, but (*ca*) has an end [or, is destructible] the effect itself having the form of its destruction

Negation by destruction [is] the absence of [the *effect] produced in [its] cause, that is, [its] destruction*, as for instance, the absence of the jar in the mass of pot-sherds, when the jar has been broken It again, is produced by the strokes of hammer [or stick] e c And it, though having an origination [or beginning] has no end an effect destroyed not being originated again

Absolute negation [is] the negation belonging to [all] the three times [past, present and future] as for instance, *the absence of colour in wind.*

Reciprocal negation, on the other hand [is] the negation which has for [its] counter-entity, con-substantiality [or identity of two objects] in the form 'A jar is not cloth.'

Thus have been expounded the objects.

ननु ज्ञानाद् ब्रह्मणो वा व्यतिरिक्ता अर्था न सन्ति। मैवम्। अर्था- १५
नामपि प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वेनाशक्यापलापत्वात् ॥ ८६ ॥

बुद्धिविचार ।

बुद्धिरुपलब्धिर्ज्ञानं प्रत्यय इत्यादिभि पर्यायशब्दैर्याभिधीयते सा
बुद्धि । अर्थप्रकाशो वा बुद्धि । सा च संक्षेपतो द्विविधा । अनुभव ३
स्मरणं च । अनुभवोऽपि द्विविधो यथार्थोऽयथार्थश्चेति ।

तत्र यथार्थोऽर्थाविसंवादी । स च प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेर्जन्यते । यथा
चक्षुरादिभिरदुष्टैर्घटादिज्ञानम् । धूमलिङ्गकमग्निज्ञानम् । गोसादृश्य- ६
दर्शनाद् गवयशब्दवाच्यताज्ञानम्। ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेते-
त्यादिवाक्याज् ज्योतिष्टोमस्य स्वर्गसाधनताज्ञानं च ।

अयथार्थस्तु अर्थव्यभिचारिप्रमाणज । स त्रिविध । संशयस्तर्को ५

I say [says the objector] There do not exist objects distinct from [or over and above] knowledge or Brahman [Do] not [say] so The objects also being established by means of direct perception etc it is impossible to deny them

(87) Cognition [is] that which is denoted by synonyms uch as knowledge apprehension cognition notion, or ognition [is] the illumination of an object And it [is], riefly, of two kinds--apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension again [is] of two kinds—true [in accord with the object] and false [not in accord with the object]

Of them *true* [apprehension] [is that] which is not inconsistent with the object [as it is] and that is produced by *proofs*, *perception* etc as for instance, the knowledge of a jar etc by means of non defective eyes etc the knowledge of fire having smoke as the indicatory mark, the knowledge of [an object] being denoted by the word gavaya, at the sight of [its] likeness to an ox, and the knowledge of [the sacrifice] Jyotistoma being the means of [securing] heaven from the sentence '*one* desirous of [securing] heaven should sacrifice, with the Jyotistoma [sacrifice]' etc

False [apprehension] on the other hand, [is] not consistent with the object [as it is] [and is] produced from what

विपर्ययश्चेति । संशयतर्कौ वक्ष्येते ।

विपर्ययस्तु अतस्मिंस्तद्ग्रहः । भ्रम इति यावत् । यथा पुरोवर्तिन्य-
१२ रजते शुक्त्यादौ रजतारोप इदं रजतमिति ।

स्मरणमपि यथार्थमयथार्थं चेति द्विविधम् । तदुभयं जागरे । स्वप्ने
तु सर्वमेव ज्ञानं स्मरणमयथार्थं च । दोषवशेन तदिति स्थाने इदमि-
१५ त्युदयात् ॥ ८७ ॥

ज्ञानं निराकारमेव ।

सर्वं च ज्ञानं निराकारमेव । न तु ज्ञानेऽर्थेन स्वस्याकारो जन्यते
३ साकारज्ञानवादनिराकरणात् । अत एव ज्ञानाकारेणार्थानुमानमपि
निरस्तम् । प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वाद् घटादेः । सर्वं ज्ञानमर्थनिरूप्यमर्थप्रति-
बद्धस्यैव तस्य मनसा निरूपणात् घटज्ञानवानहमिति । न तु ज्ञानवान-

is not a means of right knowledge It [is] of three kinds-doubt, guess [or, hypothetical reasoning] and misapprehension Doubt and guess would be explained [later]

Misapprehension [or error] [is] the apprehension [of a thing] as that which it is not, that is, illusory knowledge, as for instance, the superimposition of [the notion of] silver in the form 'this [is] silver' on the mother-of pearl etc, lying in front and [which are] not silver

Remembrance also [is] of two kinds, namely, true and false Both these [*arise*] *during the waking state* In dream on the other hand, all cognition without exception (*eva*) [is] remembrance and false [not in consonance with the object], because [there the cognition] this arises in place of 'that' owing to [some] defect

(88) All cognition is verily, formless [*It is*] *not that* by the object is produced its own form in the cognition, because the doctrine of the cognition possessing a form has been refuted For the same reason [the doctrine of] inference of the object through the form of cognition is [*to be*] *brushed aside*, because a jar etc are proved by direct perception. All cognition [is] object-determined as it is defined by the mind only when it is linked with the object, in the form '*I am possessed of the knowledge of the jar,*'

१ न त्वर्थेन जन्यते । न । २ घटज्ञानवानहमित्येतन्मात्रं गम्यते ।

ह्मित्येतावन्मात्रं ज्ञायते ॥ ८८ ॥

मनोलक्षणम् ।

अन्तरिन्द्रियं मनः । तच्चोक्तमेव ॥ ८९ ॥

प्रवृत्तिविचारः ।

प्रवृत्तिर्धर्माधर्ममयी वागादिक्रिया । तस्याः जगद्व्यवहारसाधकत्वात् ॥ ९० ॥

दोषलक्षणम् ।

दोषा रागद्वेषमोहाः । रागः इच्छा । द्वेषो मन्युः क्रोध इति यावत् । मोहो मिथ्याज्ञानं विपर्यय इति यावत् ॥ ९१ ॥

प्रेत्यभावनिरूपणम् ।

पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः । स चात्मनः अपूर्वदेहादिसंघातलाभः ॥ ९२ ॥

फललक्षणम् ।

फलं पुनर्भोगः सुखदुःखान्यतरसाक्षात्कारः ॥ ९३ ॥

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and not only this much namely I am possessed of knowledge is known.

(89) Mind [is] the internal sense-organ. And that has been already (*eva*) explained.

(90) Activity consisting of merit and demerit [is] the operation of tongue etc because it brings about [all] transactions in the world

(91) Defects [are] *attachment aversion* and *infatuation* Attachment [is] desire aversion [is] irritation that is anger infatuation [is] wrong knowledge that is misapprehension

(92) Transmigration [or] existence after death [lit departing from here] [is] Rebirth And it [is] the acquisition of the aggregate of a new body etc

(93) Fruit again [is] enjoyment the experience of one or the other of pleasure and pain

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१ वागादि । २ पूर्वदेहनिवृत्तिरपूर्व । ३ स तु सुखदुःखानुभव ।

दु खलक्षणम् ।

पीडा दु खम् । तच्चोक्तमेव ॥ ९४ ॥

अपवर्गविचार ।

मोक्षोऽपवर्ग । स चैकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नस्य दु खस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्ति । एकविंशतिप्रभेदास्तु शरीर षडिन्द्रियाणि षड्विषया षड्बुद्धय सुख दु ख चेति गौणमुख्यभेदात् । सुख दु खमेव दु खानुषङ्गित्वात् । अनुषङ्गोऽविनाभाव । स चायमुपचारो मधुनि विषसयुक्ते मधुनोऽपि विषपक्षनिक्षेपवत् ।

स पुनरपवर्ग कथ भवति । उच्यते । शास्त्राद्विदितसमस्तपदार्थतत्त्वस्य विषयदोषदर्शनेन विरक्तस्य मुमुक्षोर्ध्यायिनो ध्यानपरिपाकवशात् साक्षात्कृतात्मन क्लेशहीनस्य निष्कामकर्मानुष्ठानादनागतधर्माधर्मावनर्जयत पूर्वोपात्त च धर्माधर्मप्रचय योगर्धिप्रभावाद्

(94) Pain [is] suffering and that has been already explained

(95) Salvation [is] release [or emancipation] And it [is] the absolute cessation of pain divided into twenty one varieties *The twenty one varieties being the primary* and secondary divisions [are] —body, six sense-organs six objects of senses six cognitions [obtained through the six sense-organs] pleasure and pain Pleasure [is] pain itself *being linked up with pain* *Being linked up* [means] *not being without* And this [is] just a metaphorical application as when honey is mixed with poison honey also steps on to the side of poison

How again does that salvation take place? We reply — In [the case of a person] who has realised the true nature of all categories through [the study of] authoritative textbooks who has become disgusted [with the world] at the sight of the defects in the objects [of senses] [and hence] has become desirous of release [from Samsara] who has taken to meditation who has directly perceived the soul by virtue of the maturity [or perfection] of [his] meditation, who has been free from the afflictions who has not been

१ योगाभ्यासप्रभावाद् ।

विदित्वा समाहृत्य भुञ्जानस्य पूर्वकर्मनिवृत्तौ वर्तमानशरीरापगमेऽपूर्वशरीरारम्भाभावाच्छरीराद्येकविंशतिदुःखसंबन्धो न भवति कारणाभावात् । सेयमेकविंशतिप्रभेदभिन्नदुःखहानिर्मोक्ष । सोऽपवर्ग ॥ १५ ॥

(३) संशयः ।

एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानार्थावमर्शः संशयः । स च त्रिविधं ।

तत्रैको विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मज । यथा स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो २ वेति । एकस्मिन्नेव हि पुरोवर्तिनि द्रव्ये स्थाणुत्वनिश्चायक वक्रकोटरादिकं पुरुषत्वनिश्चायकं च शिर पाण्यादिक विशेषमपश्यत स्थाणुपुरुषयो समानधर्ममूर्ध्वत्वादिकं च पश्यत पुरुषस्य भवति संशय' किमयं ६

acquiring any further merit or demerit owing to the performance of acts in a disinterested manner [or without a desire for the fruit], who having known by the power of efficacious Yoga, the mass of merit and demerit acquired before, has been enjoying [the fruit] thereof together, there does not exist [any longer] on account of the absence of [any] cause, connection with the twenty one sorts of pain, body, etc owing to the absence of the production of a new body, on the departure of the present body when the previous actions have become extinct This the cessation of pain differentiated owing to twenty-one divisions, [is] release [and] that, [is] salvation

(06) Doubt [is] the consideration of many contradictory things with reference to one [and the same] object And it [is] of three kinds

The first [is that which is] caused by common qualities, when the distinguishing features (*viśesah*) are not observed, as for instance '[it may be] the trunk or a man' When referring to one and the same substance near at hand [lit lying in front] a person does not see the distinguishing features, crookedness nests etc that would settle the nature of a trunk, and head, hand etc that would settle the nature of a man, but only sees the common quality between the trunk

१ इदानीं संशयमाह । २ विशेषादर्शने सति समानधर्मदर्शनजो विप्रतिपत्तिजोऽसाधारणधर्मजश्चेति ।

स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ।

द्वितीयस्तु संशयो विशेषादर्शने सति विप्रतिपत्तिजः । स यथा । शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति । तथाहि । एको ब्रूते शब्दो नित्य इति । अपरो ब्रूते शब्दोऽनित्य इति । तयोर्विप्रतिपत्त्या मध्यस्थस्य पुंसो विशेषमपश्यतो भवति संशयः किमयं शब्दो नित्य उतानित्य इति ।

तृतीयोऽसाधारणधर्मजस्तु संशयः । यथा नित्यादनित्याच्च व्यावृत्तेन भूमात्रासाधारणेन गन्धवत्त्वेन विशेषमपश्यतो भुवि नित्यत्वानित्यत्वसंशयः । तथाहि । सकलनित्यव्यावृत्तेन गन्धवत्त्वेन योगाद्भूः किमनित्या उत सकलानित्यव्यावृत्तेन तेनैव योगान्नित्येति संशयः ॥ ९६ ॥

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and the man, tallness etc. there arises in him the doubt, namely, 'Is this a trunk or a man?'

The second [sort of] doubt, again [is that which is] caused by difference of opinion, when the distinguishing features are not observed. It [is] as follows — Whether sound [is] eternal or non eternal To explain One says, sound [is] eternal, another says, sound [is] non-eternal Owing to the difference of opinion between them, in a neutral person not seeing any particularity [of sound, which would settle the question one way or the other] arises the *doubt*— '[Is] this sound eternal or non-eternal?'

The third [*sort of*] *doubt* [*is*] again [*that which is*] caused by a property peculiar [to the thing in question] as for instance, the doubt whether earth is eternal or non eternal in one not seeing any particularity [indicative *either of nityatva or anityatva*] *owing to* [*the quality*] being possessed of odour, which, excluded from eternal and non-eternal [things], is peculiar to earth alone To explain Doubt [arises] thus—Is earth non-eternal owing to [its] connection with 'being possessed of odour' which is excluded from all eternal [things] or is it eternal, owing to [its] connection with the same which is excluded *from all non-eternal* [*things*]?

(४) प्रयोजनम् ।

प्रयोजननिरूपणम् ।

येन प्रयुक्तः पुरुष प्रवर्तते तत् प्रयोजनम् । तच्च सुखदुःखावाप्ति-[3]
हानी । तदर्थो हि प्रवृत्ति सर्वस्य ॥ ९७ ॥

(५) दृष्टान्तः ।

दृष्टान्तनिरूपणम् ।

वादिप्रतिवादिनोः संप्रतिपत्तिविषयोऽर्थो दृष्टान्तः । स द्विविधः ।[3]
एकः साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो यथा धूमवत्त्वस्य हेतोर्महानसम् । द्वितीयस्तु
वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः । यथा तस्यैव हेतोर्महाह्रद इति ॥ ९८ ॥

(६) सिद्धान्तः ।

सिद्धान्तनिरूपणम् ।

प्रामाणिकत्वेनाभ्युपगतोऽर्थः सिद्धान्त । स चतुर्धा सर्वतन्त्रप्रति-[3]
तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तभेदात् ।

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(97) Motive [is] that, prompted by which a man acts And it [is] attainment and abandonment [respectively] of pleasure and pain The activity of every body is indeed intended for that

(98) Instance [is] a topic with regard to which there is agreement between both the disputants [the objector and the siddhantin] It [is] of two kinds One [is] an instance by similarity, as for instance, the kitchen, for the 'reason' 'being possessed of smoke' The other, again, [is] an instance by dissimilarity, as for instance, the big pool, for the same 'reason'

(99) *Tenet* [is] a matter which has been admitted as authorised [or proved by means of regular proofs] It [is] of four kinds, being divided *into*—tenet admitted by all systems, admitted by related systems, following from the matter in question, provisional admission

तत्र सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्तो यथा धर्मिमात्रसद्भाव । द्वितीयो यथा नैयायिकस्य मते मनस इन्द्रियत्वम् । तद्धि समानतन्त्रे वैशेषिके सिद्धम् । तृतीयो यथा क्षित्यादिकर्तृसिद्धौ कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथा जैमिनीयस्य शब्दनित्यानित्यत्वविचारे भवतु तावच्छब्दो गुण इति ॥ ९९ ॥

(७) अवयवाः ।

अवयवनिरूपणम् ।

परार्थानुमानवाक्यस्यैकदेशा अवयवाः । ते च प्रतिज्ञादयः पञ्च । तथा च न्यायसूत्रम् । प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवा इति ।

तत्र साध्यधर्मविशिष्टधर्मिप्रतिपादकं वचनं प्रतिज्ञा । यथा पर्वतोऽयं वह्निमानिति ।

Of these, the tenet admitted by all systems [is] as for instance, the existence of an entity as such. The second [is] as for instance–according to the view of the Naiyayikas, the mind is a sense-organ and that is proved in the related Vaiśesika system The third [is] as for instance, the omniscience of the creator, when the creator for the earth etc is established The fourth [is] as for instance, during the consideration as to whether [sound is] eternal or non-eternal [the admission] of a follower of Jaimini ' let then sound be a quality '

(100) Members [of the syllogism] [are] the parts of a sentence [constituting a syllogism] in an inference for the sake of another And they [are] five, statement etc To the same effect [is] the Nyāya-sutra ' Statement [or assertion of the proposition to be proved] reason, illustration, application and conclusion [are] the members. ' [1 1 32]

Of these, Assertion [is] the statement propounding the subject as qualified by the attribute that is to be established, as for instance, This mountain [is] possessed of fire '

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१ अनुमान ।

तृतीयान्तं पञ्चम्यन्तं वा लिङ्गप्रतिपादकं वचनं हेतुः। यथा धूमवत्त्वेन धूमवत्त्वादिति वा।

सव्याप्तिकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम्। यथा यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इति।

पक्षे लिङ्गोपसंहारवचनमुपनयः। यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवांश्चायमिति तथा चायमिति वा।

पक्षे साध्योपसंहारवचनं निगमनम्। यथा तस्मादग्निमानिति तस्मात् तथेति वा।

एते च प्रतिज्ञादयः पञ्चानुमानवाक्यस्यावयवा इव अवयवा न तु समवायिकारणं शब्दस्याकाशसमवेतत्वादिति॥ १०० ॥

(८) तर्कः।

तर्कविचार।

तर्कोऽनिष्टप्रसंगः। स च भिन्नव्याप्तिकयोर्धर्मयोर्व्याप्याङ्गीकारेण

Reason [is] the statement laying down the indicatory mark, either in the instrumental or in the ablative [case] as for instance ' by being possessed of smoke or from being possessed of smoke '

Illustration [or example] [is] the statement of the instance, along with the invariable concomitance as for instance ' Whosoever [is] possessed of smoke [is] possessed of fire, as for instance, the kitchen

Application [is] the statement of the summing up of [the presence of] the indicatory mark in the subject, as for instance, ' And this [is] possessed of smoke pervaded by fire ' or ' And this [is] so '

Conclusion [is] the statement of the summing up of [the presence of] what is to be established in the subject, as for instance, "Therefore [it is] possessed of fire ' or ' Therefore [it is] so '

These five, assertion etc, members of the syllogism [are] as though members [or parts] but not the intimate cause of [of the syllogism], because sound [of which the syllogism is formed] is in intimate relation with ether

(101) Hypothetical reasoning [is the imposition of] an

अनिष्टव्यापकप्रसञ्जनरूपः[1]।

स चायं तर्कः प्रमाणानामनुग्राहकः। तथाहि। पर्वतोऽयं साग्निरुतानग्निरितिसंदेहानन्तरं यदि कश्चिन्मन्यतानग्निरयमिति तदा तं प्रति यद्ययमनग्निरभविष्यत् तदानग्निमत्त्वादधूमोऽप्यभविष्यदित्यधूमवत्त्वप्रसञ्जनं क्रियते। स एष प्रसङ्गस्तर्क इत्युच्यते। अयं चानुमानस्य विषयशोधकः प्रवर्तमानस्य धूमवत्त्वलिङ्गकानुमानस्य विषयमग्निमनुजानाति। अनग्निमत्त्वस्य प्रतिक्षेपात्। अतोऽनुमानस्य भवत्यनुग्राहक इति।

अत्र कश्चिदाह। तर्कः संशय एवान्तर्भवतीति। तन्न। एककोटिविषयत्वात् तर्कस्य ॥ १०१ ॥

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undesirable contingency [on the opponent] And it [is] of the form of the contingency of [admitting] the undesirable more extensive [or pervader] by admitting [for a moment] the less extensive [or pervaded] out of two attributes between which invariable concomitance has been established

And this hypothetical reasoning favours [or helps other] proofs To explain If after the doubt whether this mountain [is] with fire or without fire some one were to opine that *it is without fire then is made on him the imposition of the* undesirable contingency of [the mountain] being not possessed of smoke in the form If this [mountain] had been without fire then on account of being without fire it would have been without smoke also This above [imposition of an] undesirable consequence is called Hypothetical reasoning And it serves to clarify the conclusion of the inference and supports fire the object of the inference which is launched, having *being possessed of smoke* as the indicatory mark because not being possessed of fire is refuted [or denied] Therefore it favours the inference

Here some one says [or objects] Hypothetical reasoning is included in doubt itself [We reply] It [is] not [so], for hypothetical reasoning refers to only one end [or alternative while doubt refers to two]

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१ यथा यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत् तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यतेति २ अयं च साध्यरूपाऽर्थो वर्तमानस्य तर्कस्य विषयः। नाग्निमत्त्वस्य

(९) निर्णयः ।

निर्णयनिरूपणम् ।

निर्णयोऽवधारणज्ञानम् । तच्च प्रमाणानां फलम् ॥ १०२ ॥

(१०) वादः ।

वादनिरूपणम् ।

तत्त्वबुभुत्सोः कथा वादः । स चाष्टनिग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । ते च
न्यूनाधिकापसिद्धान्ता हेत्वाभासपञ्चकं चेत्यष्टौ निग्रहाः ॥ १०३ ॥

(११) जल्पः ।

जल्पनिरूपणम् ।

उभयसाधनवती विजिगीषुकथा जल्पः । स च यथासम्भवं सर्वनि
ग्रहाणामधिकरणम् । परपक्षे दूषिते स्वपक्षस्थापनप्रयोगाव
सानश्च ॥ १०४ ॥

(१२) वितण्डा ।

वितण्डानिरूपणम् ।

स्वपक्षस्थापनाहीना वितण्डा । सा च परपक्षदूषणमात्रप

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(102) Conclusion [is] definite knowledge and it [is] the result [or fruit] of proofs.

(103) Discussion [is] the talk of one [with another] desirous of arriving at the truth. And it [is] the abode of eight grounds of confutation [or clinchers rebukes] The eight clinchers again [are] —deficiency redundancy deviation from a tenet and the five fallacious reasons

(104) Wrangling [is] the talk of [disputants] who are desirous of victory [over each other] containing arguments supporting both [the sides] And it [is] the abode of all clinchers according to circumstances And it concludes with the [statement of a] syllogism establishing one s own view after the view of the opponent has been demolished [or proved to be faulty]

(105) Cavilling [is vitaṇḍākatha] void of the establishment of one s own view And [it] concludes merely with the

र्यवसाना। नास्य वैतण्डिकस्य स्थाप्यः पक्षोऽस्ति।

कथा तु नानावक्तृकपूर्वोत्तरपक्षप्रतिपादकवाक्यसंदर्भः॥ १०५॥

(१३) हेत्वाभासाः।

हेत्वाभासाः। असिद्धिविचारः।

उक्तानां पक्षधर्मत्वादिरूपाणां मध्ये येन केनापि रूपेण हीना अहेतवः। तेऽपि कतिपयहेतुरूपयोगाद्धेतुवदाभासमाना हेत्वाभासाः। ते चासिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिकप्रकरणसमकालात्ययापदिष्टभेदात् पञ्चैव। अत्रोदयनेन व्याप्तस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मतया प्रतीतिः सिद्धिस्तदभावोऽसिद्धिरित्यसिद्धिलक्षणमुक्तम्। तच्च यद्यपि विरुद्धादिष्वपि संभवतीति सांकर्यं प्रतीयते तथापि यथा न सांकर्यं तथोच्यते। यो हि यत्र साधने दोषः पुरः परिस्फुरति समर्थश्च दुष्टज्ञप्तौ स एव दुष्टज्ञप्ति-

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demolishing of the opponent's view There is no view of his own, that is to be established, for a cavilling person.

Talk [or interlocution, disquisition] again, [is] a consistent group of sentences, setting forth the two sides of a question, for and against uttered by various persons

(106) The non reasons [are those] lacking in some characteristic or other, out of the characteristics 'being an attribute of the subject' etc, that have been mentioned [above] They [are] also [called] fallacious reasons, looking like reasons owing to [their] connection with some characteristics of a reason And they [are] only five, on account of the [following] division,—the Unproven [or Futile, Uncertain], the Contrary, the Inconclusive [or Non-cogent] the Counter balanced [or Neutralised] and the Belated [or Annulled]

Here, Udayana has stated the definition of 'non-proven nature as the absence of proven nature' [or reality, which is] the apprehension of the reason pervaded [by the sadhya] as being the attribute of the subject Now though [some] confusion is felt as this [definition of *asiddhi*] *is possible even in* [*fallacious reasons*] 'the Contrary' etc, still it is explained [below] how there could be no confusion—That defect alone which flashes up prominently [or first] in a reason and which is

रको दूषणमिति यावत् नान्य इति । तेनैव पुरोवस्फूर्तिकेन दुष्टो
पितायां कथापर्यवसाने जाते तदुपजीविनोऽन्यस्यानुपयोगात् । १२
या च सति यत्र विरोध साध्यविपर्यय-व्याप्त्याख्यो दुष्टज्ञप्तिकारक
र एव विरुद्धो हेत्वाभास । एवं यत्र व्यभिचारादयस्तथाभूतास्तेऽ-
कान्तिकादयः । यत्र पुनर्व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताविशिष्टहेतुस्वरूपज्ञप्त्य १५
भावेन पूर्वोक्ता असिद्ध्यादयो दुष्टज्ञप्तिकारका दूषणानीति यावत्
तथाभूत सोऽसिद्ध ॥ १०६ ॥

आश्रयासिद्धविचार ।

स च त्रिविध आश्रयासिद्धस्वरूपासिद्धव्याप्यत्वासिद्धभेदात् । ३
तत्र यस्य हेतोराश्रयो नावगम्यते स आश्रयासिद्ध । यथा

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capable of producing the fallacious cognition is the cause of the fallacious cognition that is a flaw and none else And when by means of that alone which has flashed forth prominently, has been apprehended the fallacy and [consequently] the discussion has come to an end it is no use pointing out another [defect] depending upon that Under these circumstances that alone [is] the Contrary fallacious reason where the contradiction namely the invariable concomitance with the reverse of what is to be established, causes the fallacious apprehension Similarly where 5
[there flash forth] violation [of the invariable concomitance] etc of that nature [the fallacies are] the Inconclusive etc And where the un proven nature etc mentioned above through the absence of cognition of the nature of the reason characterised by invariable concomitance and being an attribute of the subject [are] the cause of the fallacious cognition that is [are] flaws that [fallacy is] the Unproven thus circumstanced

(107) And it [is] of three kinds on account of the [following] division—Unproven in the support [or subject], Unproven in [its] own nature and Unproven in invariable-concomitance

Of them *Unproven in the support* [is] that reason the support of which is not known as for instance

गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत् ।

अत्र हि गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः । स च नास्त्येव ।

अयमप्याश्रयासिद्धः ।

घटोऽनित्यः । कार्यत्वात् । पटवदिति ।

नन्वाश्रयस्य सत्त्वात् कार्यत्वादिति हेतुर्नाश्रयासिद्धः । सिद्धसाधकस्तु स्यात् । सिद्धस्य घटानित्यत्वस्य साधनात् । मैवम् । न हि स्वरूपेण कश्चिदाश्रयो भवत्यनुमानस्य किं तु संदिग्धधर्मवत्त्वेन । तथा चोक्तं भाष्ये नानुपलब्धे न निर्णीतेऽर्थे न्यायः प्रवर्ततेऽपि तु संदिग्धे । न च घटेऽनित्यत्वसंदेहोऽस्ति । अनित्यत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात् ।

The sky-lotus [is] fragrant
Because [it is possessed] of the generality of lotus,
like a lake-born lotus

Here, the sky-lotus [is] the support and that exists not at all (*eva*)

This [the following] also is Unproven-in the support
The jar [is] non eternal
Because [it is] a product
like the cloth.

I say [says the objector]-The reason 'Because [it is] a product [is] not unproven in the-support, owing to the *existence of the support* [*the jar*], [*it*] *might* however be [an instance of] proving what is [already] established, owing to [its] proving the non eternal nature of the jar, that is [already] established [We reply]-[Do] not [say] so For, nothing by its own nature becomes the support [or subject] in an inference, but only by being possessed of an attribute about which there is doubt To the same effect, has been said in the Bhasya [of Vatsyayana]—Reasoning operates neither in the case of an unperceived [or unknown or unheard-of] object, nor in the case of an object definitely ascertained but in the case of an object about which there is doubt There is to be sure, no doubt about the non eternal nature of the jar, the non eternal nature being definitely ascertained Therefore, though the jar exists in its own nature still owing to the absence of doubt

तेन यद्यपि स्वरूपेण घटो विद्यते तथाप्यनित्यत्वसंदेहाभावासाश्रया श्रय इत्याश्रयासिद्धत्वादहेतु ॥ १०७ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धविचार । भागासिद्ध स्वरूपासिद्ध एव ।

स्वरूपासिद्धस्तु स उच्यते यो हेतुराश्रये नैवावगम्यते । यथा

सामान्यमनित्यम् । कृतकत्वात् ।

कृतकत्वं हेतुराश्रये सामान्ये नास्त्येव । भागासिद्धोऽपि स्वरूप सिद्ध एव । यथा

पृथिव्यादयश्चत्वारः परमाणवो नित्या । गन्धवत्त्वात् । इति ।

गन्धवत्त्वं हि पक्षीकृतेषु सर्वेषु नास्ति पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तित्वात् । अत एव भागे स्वरूपासिद्धः ॥ १०८ ॥

स्वरूपासिद्धभेदविचार ।

तथा विशेषणासिद्धविशेष्यासिद्धासमर्थविशेषणासिद्धासमर्थवि-

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about [its] non eternal nature it can not be the support so [the hetu karyatva is] no reason owing to its being unproven-in the support

(108) That reason is called Unproven in-its-own-nature, which is not at all known [to exist] in the support, as for instance,

Generality [is] non eternal

Because [it is] a product

[Here] the reason 'Being a product' exi ts not at all in [its] support, generality The partially unproven also [is] unproven in-its own-nature itself, as for instance,

The four, earth etc [of the form of] atoms [are] eternal

Because [they are] possessed of odour

[Here] indeed 'being possessed of odour' exists not in all [atoms] that are made the subject [of the syllogism] on account of its residing in earth alone. Therefore indeed [it is] unproven in its own nature with regard to a part [of the subject]

(109) Similarly [there are the following sub-] divisions of Unproven-in-its-own-nature—Unproven-in-the-qualification, Unproven—in—the-object Unproven—in—impotent-

शेष्यासिद्धादयः स्वरूपासिद्धभेदाः ।

तत्र विशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । द्रव्यत्वे सत्यस्पर्शवत्त्वात् ।

अत्र हि द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वं हेतुर्नास्पर्शवत्त्वमात्रम् । शब्दे च द्रव्यत्वं विशेषणं नास्ति गुणत्वादतो विशेषणासिद्धः । न चासति विशेषणे द्रव्यत्वे तद्विशिष्टमस्पर्शवत्त्वमस्ति । विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात् । यथा दण्डमात्राभावे पुरुषाभावे वा दण्डविशिष्टस्य पुरुषस्याभावः । तेन सत्यप्यस्पर्शवत्त्वे द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टस्य हेतोरभावात् स्वरूपासिद्धत्वम् ।

विशेष्यासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः । अस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात् ।

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qualification, Unproven-in-impotent—object, and others. Of them Unproven-in-the-qualification [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because being a substance, [it is] not possessed of touch

Here, again 'not being possessed of touch, characterised by being a substance' [is]the reason [and] not 'being possessed of touch' only Now (*ca*) the qualification 'being a substance' exists not in sound, on account of [sound] being a quality, hence [*the hetu is*] *unproven-in-the—qualification*. Not indeed, in the absence of the qualification 'being a substance,' can exist 'not being possessed of touch' characterised [or qualified] by it, because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence of [the object] characterised [*by it*] also as for instance in the *absence* of the stick alone or in the absence of the man, is there the absence of the man qualified by the stick Therefore even though 'not being possessed of touch' is there [there is] *the* nature of the unproven-in-its-own-nature owing to [in this case] the absence of the reason as qualified by 'being a substance'

Unproven-in-the-object [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is] a substance, without being possessed of touch

अत्रापि विशिष्टो हेतुः। न च विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टं स्वरूपमस्ति। विशिष्टश्च हेतुर्नास्त्येव।

असमर्थविशेषणासिद्धो यथा

शब्दो नित्यः। गुणत्वे सत्यकारणकत्वात्।

अत्र हि विशेषणस्य गुणत्वस्य न किंचित् सामर्थ्यमस्ति। विशेष्यस्याकारणकत्वस्यैव नित्यत्वसाधने सामर्थ्यात्। अतोऽसमर्थविशेषणता। स्वरूपासिद्धत्वं तु विशेषणाभावे विशिष्टस्याप्यभावात्। ननु विशेषणं गुणत्वं तच्च शब्देऽस्त्येव तत् कथं विशेषणाभाव। सत्यम् अस्त्येव गुणत्वम्। किं तु न तद्विशेषणम्। तदेव हि हेतोर्विशेषणं भवति यदन्यव्यवच्छेदेन प्रयोजनवत्। गुणत्व तु निष्प्रयोजनमतोऽसमर्थमित्युक्तमेव।

Here also there [is] a qualified reason Not indeed in the absence of the object can there be [its] qualified form So the qualified reason exists not at all

Unproven-in impotent qualification [is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal

Because, being a quality, [it] has no cause

Here, again, the qualification 'being a quality' has no potency whatsoever, the qualified 'having no cause' alone, being potent to prove the eternal nature [of sound] Therefore, [there is] the impotency of the qualification, the character of unproven-in-its-own-nature, [is] again [there], because in the absence of the qualification, is there the absence also of the object characterised [by it] I say [says the objector]—The qualification [is] 'being a quality,' and it, to be sure, exists in sound, so how [can you say that there is] the absence of the qualification? We reply—True [what you say] there is, undoubtedly (*eva*), 'being a quality' [in sound], but that [is] not a qualification For that alone becomes a qualification of the reason, which serves the purpose in so far as it excludes others, while, it has been already said that 'being a quality' serves no purpose [and] so, [is] impotent

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१ अतोऽसमर्थविशेषण स्वरूपासिद्ध। विशेषणाभावे।

असमर्थविशेष्यो यथा तत्रैव तद्वैपरीत्येन प्रयोग । तथाहि ।

शब्दा नित्य । अकारणकत्वे सति गुणत्वात् ।

२७ अत्र तु विशेषणमात्रस्यैव नित्यत्वसाधने समर्थत्वाद् विशेष्यम समर्थम् । स्वरूपासिद्धत्व तु विशेष्याभावे विशिष्टाभावाद् विशिष्टस्य च हेतुत्वेनोपादानात् । शेष पूर्ववत् ॥ १०९ ॥

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धविचार ।

व्याप्यत्वासिद्धस्तु स एव यत्र हेतोर्व्याप्तिर्नावगम्यते । स द्विविध ।

एक साध्येनासहचरित । अपरस्तु सोपाधिकसाध्यसम्बन्धी[1] ।

तत्र प्रथमो यथा

यत् सत् तद् क्षणिकम् यथा जलधर ।

६ सश्च विवादास्पदीभूत शब्दादिरिति ।

अत्र शब्दादि पक्षस्तस्य क्षणिकत्व साध्य सत्त्वं हेतु । न चास्य

Unproven in impotent object [is] as for instance in the same [matter] the syllogism by the reverse To explain

Sound [is] eternal

Because [it is] a quality without having a cause

Here again only the qualification alone being potent to prove the eternal nature the object [or the qualified is] impotent [There is] again the character of unproven in its-own nature because in the absence of the object is the absence of the [something] qualifi d and [something] qualified has been accepted as the reason The rest as before

(110) Unproven in invariable-concomitance again [is] that alone where the invariable concomitance is not apprehended from the reason *It [is] of two kinds* —The one [is that] which is not concomitant with what is to be established the other again [is that] which is connected with what is to be established by means of an adventitious circumstance.

Of them the first [is] as follows —

What exists is momentary as for instance the cloud.

And sound etc that form the matter under dispute exist.

Here sound etc [are] the subject momentariness what is to be established and existence the reason And there

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१ सोपाधिकतया साध्यसम्बन्ध ।

रेतो' क्षणिकत्वेन सह व्याप्तौ प्रमाणमस्ति ।

इदानीमुपाधिसहितो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धः प्रदर्श्यते । तद्यथा

स श्याम । मैत्रीतनयत्वात् ।

परिदृश्यमानमैत्रीतनयस्तोमवत् ।

अत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वेन श्यामत्वं साध्यते । न च मैत्रीतनयत्वं श्यामत्वे प्रयोजकं किं तु शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम एवात्र प्रयोजक । प्रयोजकश्चोपाधिरुच्यते । अतो मैत्रीतनयत्वस्य श्यामत्वेन सम्बन्धे शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम स्योपाधि । यथा वा अग्नेर्धूमसम्बन्ध आर्द्रेन्धनसयोग । अत स्योपाधिसम्बन्धाद् व्याप्तिर्नास्तीति व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽय मैत्रीतनयत्वादिर्हेतु ।

तथा परोऽपि व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध । यथा

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is no proof for the invariable concomitance of this reason with momentariness

Now is illustrated the unproven in invariable concomitance, accompanied by a limitation It [is] as follows —

He [is] black

Because [he is] a son of Maitri

like the group of Maitri s sons that are being seen

Here being black is established by means of being a son of Maitri Not indeed is being a son of Maitri the producing factor in respect of being black but the [peculiar] effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is] the producing factor And the producing factor [which produces the particular effect] is termed the limitation (or condition) Therefore in [the case of]the relation of the state of Maitri s son with blackness the peculiar effect of food such as vegetables etc alone [is] the limitation Or in the [case of the] relation of fire with smoke the contact with wet fuel [is] the limitation So therefore this reason being Maitri s son etc [is] unproven in invariable-concomitance because there is no invariable concomitance owing to [its] connection with the limitation

Similarly another also [is] unproven in invariable-concomitance [It is] as follows —

क्रत्वन्तर्वर्तिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम्। हिंसात्वात्।
क्रतुबाह्यहिंसावत्।

२१ अत्रापि न हिंसात्वमधर्मप्रयोजकं किं तु निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिरिति
पूर्ववदुपाधिसद्भावाद् व्याप्यत्वासिद्धोऽयं हिंसात्वं हेतुः।

ननु साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापको यः स उपाधिरित्यु
२४ पाधिलक्षणम्। तच्च निषिद्धत्वे नास्ति। तत् कथं निषिद्धत्वमुपाधि
रिति। मैवम्। निषिद्धत्वेऽप्युपाधिलक्षणस्य विद्यमानत्वात्। तथाहि।
साध्यस्य अधर्मजनकत्वस्य व्यापकं निषिद्धत्वम्। यत्र यत्राधर्म
२७ साधनत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति निषिद्धत्वस्य विद्यमानत्वात्।
न च यत्र यत्र हिंसात्व तत्र तत्रावश्यं निषिद्धत्वं क्रत्वङ्गहिंसाया

The killing existing inside a sacrifice [is] the means of demerit
Because [it] has the nature of killing
like the killing outside sacrifices

Here also, the nature of killing' is not the producing cause of demerit but 'being prohibited' [by the Sastras] [which is] the limitation and so this reason 'the nature of killing owing to the existence of the limitation, as before [is] unproven in-invariable-concomitance

I say [says the objector]-Limitation [or accident is that] which while pervading the thing to be established [that is while being invariably present in all those places where the sadhya is present] does not pervade the reason [that is, is not invariably present with the reason] this [is] the definition of limitation And that exists not in [that is, is not applicable to] 'being prohibited' So, how can 'being prohibited be the limitation? [We reply—Do] not [say] so, because the definition of limitation is applicable to [lit present in] 'being prohibited.' To explain 'Being prohibited pervades what is to be established [namely] 'being the producer of demerit' Wherever [there is] 'being the means of demerit' there surely [is] 'being prohibited'-thus 'being prohibited' does exist But not wherever [there is] 'the nature of killing' there [is] necessarily 'being prohibited,' on account of the violation [of the vyāpti] with respect to

व्यभिचारात् । अस्ति हि क्रत्वङ्गहिंसायां हिंसात्वं न तु निषिद्ध-
त्वमिति । ३०

तदेवं त्रिविधोऽसिद्धो दर्शितः ॥ ११० ॥

विरुद्धविचार ।

संप्रति विरुद्धः कथ्यते । साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्ध । यथा
शब्दो नित्य । कृतकत्वात् । ३

अत्र हि नित्यत्वं साध्यं तद्विपर्ययेण ह्यनित्यत्वेन कृतकत्वं
व्याप्तम् । यतो यद्यत् कृतकं तत्तत् खल्वनित्यमेव । अतः साध्य-
विपर्ययव्याप्तत्वात् कृतकत्वं हेतुर्विरुद्धः ॥ १११ ॥ ६

अनैकान्तिकविचार ।

साध्यसंशयहेतुरनैकान्तिक सव्यभिचार इति चोच्यते। स द्विविधः।
साधारणानैकान्तिकोऽसाधारणानैकान्तिकश्चेति । ३

तत्र प्रथम पक्षसपक्षविपक्षवृत्ति । यथा

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the killing [which forms] a part of the sacrifice For, there is the nature of killing in the killing [which forms] a part of the sacrifice but there exists not being prohibited there

Thus has been pointed out the Unproven of three kinds.

(111) Now is described the [fallacious reason] Contrary Contrary [is] the reason [which is] invariably associated with [or pervaded by] the reverse of what is to be established. [It is] as follows —

Sound [is] eternal
Because of [its] being a product

Here again eternal nature [is] what is to be established, [and] being a product [the reason is] pervaded by non-eternality, the reverse of it [the sadhya] because whatever [is] a product, all that indeed [is] non-eternal only Therefore, the reason being a product owing to [its] being pervaded by the reverse of what is to be established [is] the Contrary

(112) That reason which produces doubt about what is to be established [is] called the Inconclusive or the Discrepant It [is] of two kinds namely, too-wide Inconclusive, and too narrow Inconclusive

Of them the first [is that [which exists in the subject, in similar instances, and in dissimilar instances [It is] as follows —

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१ कृतकत्वं हेतु ।

शब्दो नित्यः । प्रमेयत्वात् ।

अत्र प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः पक्षे[1] शब्दे सपक्षे नित्ये व्योमादौ विपक्षे चानित्ये घटादौ विद्यते। सर्वस्यैव प्रमेयत्वात्। तस्मात् प्रमेयत्वं हेतुः साधारणानैकान्तिकः।

असाधारणानैकान्तिकश्च स एव यः सपक्षविपक्षाभ्याम् व्यावृत्तः पक्ष एव वर्तते। यथा

भूर्नित्या। गन्धवत्त्वात्।

अत्र हि गन्धवत्त्वं हेतुः। स च सपक्षान्नित्याद्व्योमादेर्विपक्षाच्चानित्याज्जलादेर्व्यावृत्तो गन्धवत्त्वस्य पृथिवीमात्रवृत्तित्वादिति।

व्यभिचारस्तु लक्ष्यते। संभवत्सपक्षविपक्षस्य[2] हेतोः सपक्षवृत्तित्वे सति विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिरेव नियमो गमकत्वात्। तस्य च साध्यविपरी

Sound [is] eternal
Because [it is possessed] of knowability

Here, the reason, 'knowability' exists in the subject, sound, in similar instances, eternal [things such as] sky etc, and in dissimilar instances, non eternal [things, such as] a jar etc, because every thing without exception is knowable. Therefore, the reason, 'knowability' [is] too-wide Inconclusive

The too narrow Inconclusive, again, [is] that alone which, excluded from similar instances [and] dissimilar instances, exists in the subject alone. [It is] as follows:—

Earth [is] eternal
Because [it is] possessed of odour

Here again, 'being possessed of odour' [is] the reason. And it [is] excluded from similar instances, eternal [things, such as] sky etc, and from dissimilar instances, non-eternal [things, such as] water etc, because 'being possessed of odour' exists only in earth

Violation is now defined. The rule [is] that in the case of a reason for which [both] similar instances and dissimilar instances are possible, there should be exclusion only from dissimilar instances, while there is presence in similar instances,

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१ पक्षे वर्तमानः सपक्षे नित्ये विपक्षे चानित्ये वर्तते। २ निरूमासम्भवात् सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ते. हेतोः।

साध्याभावस्य तन्नियमाभावो व्यभिचारः । स च द्वेधा संभवति सपक्षविपक्षयोर्वृत्तौ ताभ्यां व्यावृत्तौ च ॥ ११२ ॥

प्रकरणसमविचारः ।

यस्य प्रतिपक्षभूतं हेत्वन्तरं विद्यते स प्रकरणसमः । स एव सत्प्रतिपक्ष इति चोच्यते । तद्यथा

शब्दोऽनित्यो नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः ।

शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः । इति ।

अत्र हि साध्यविपरीतसाधकं समानबलमनुमानान्तरं प्रतिपक्ष इत्युच्यते । यः पुनरतुल्यबलो न स प्रतिपक्षः । तथाहि ।

विपरीतसाधकानुमानं त्रिविधं भवति । उपजीव्यमुपजीवकमनुभयं चेति ।

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as [then it] enables [us] to arrive at a conclusion The absence of that rule [in the case of a reason] not pervaded by the reverse of what is to be established [is] violation And it is possible in two ways— when [the reason] exists in [both] similar instances and dissimilar instances [and] when [it is] excluded from both [these]

(113) That [reason] which has another reason which has become a rival [is] the Ambiguous [or Neutralised or Stultified] The same is also called the Counter balanced [or possessed of a rival] It [is] as follows—

Sound [is] non-eternal
Because of [our] not finding [in it] qualities of eternal [things]

[and]

Sound [is] eternal
Because of [our] not finding [in it] non eternal qualities

Here again, another inference of equal efficacy, proving the reverse of what is to be established is called ' a rival ' But that [hetu] which is not of equal efficacy [is] not ' a rival ' To explain —

An inference proving the reverse [of the sādhya] is of three kinds —that on which is dependent [the other inference, that is, the strong one], that which depends on the

तत्राद्यं बाधकं बलवत्त्वात्। यथा अनित्यः परमाणुर्मूर्तत्वाद्
घटवदित्यस्य परमाणुसाधकानुमानं नित्यत्वं साधयदपि न प्रतिपक्षः।
१२ किं तु बाधकमेवोपजीव्यत्वात्। तच्च धर्मिग्राहकत्वात्। न हि प्रमाणे
नागृह्यमाणे धर्मिणि परमाणावनित्यत्वानुमानमिदं सम्भवति। आश्रया
सिद्धेः। अतोऽनेनानुमानेन परमाणुग्राहकस्य प्रामाण्यमप्यनुज्ञातम्।
१५ अन्यथा अस्योदयासम्भवात्। तस्मादुपजीव्यं बाधकमेव।

उपजीवकं तु दुर्बलत्वाद्बाध्यम्। यथा इदमेवानित्यत्वानुमानम्।

तृतीयं तु सत्प्रतिपक्षं समबलत्वात्॥ ११३॥

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other [that is the weak one] and that which [is] neither

Of them the first [is] stultifying [or *rendering nugatory*] *on account of* [*its*] being *strong* as for instance

An atom [is] non eternal
Because [it is] possessed of corporeality [or *tangible* form]
like a jar

—this inference establishing [the existence of] the atom though proving [its] eternal nature is not [to be *regarded* as] the rival of this [the above inference] but [it is] the stultifying [reason] itself because on it depends [the above inference] and that such because it makes [us] apprehend *the* object [namely the atom] Surely this inference [intended *to* prove] the non eternal nature is not possible with respect *to the object* the atom which is not *apprehended by means of* a proof owing to the character of unproven in-support [in that case] Therefore by this inference is admitted the validity as well of that which makes [us] apprehend the atom otherwise it [itself] could not arise Therefore that on which *depends* the other [is] the stultifying itself

That which depends on the other [is] on the other hand the stultified on account of its weakness as for instance this *same inference* [*intended to prove*] *the non eternal* nature

The third [kind] again [is] one having a rival being of equal strength

कालात्ययापदिष्टविचारः। लक्षणदोषविचारः।

यस्य प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेन पक्षे साध्याभावः परिच्छिन्नः स कालात्ययापदिष्टः। स एव बाधितविषय इत्युच्यते। यथा

अग्निरनुष्णः। कृतकत्वात्। जलवत्।

अत्र कृतकत्वं हेतुः। तस्य च यत् साध्यमनुष्णत्वं तस्याभावः प्रत्यक्षेणैव परिच्छिन्नः। त्वगिन्द्रियेणाग्नेरुष्णत्वपरिच्छेदात्।

तथा परोऽपि कालात्ययापदिष्टः। यथा घटस्य क्षणिकत्वे साध्ये प्रागुक्तं सत्त्वं हेतुः। तस्यापि च यत् साध्यं क्षणिकत्वं तस्याभावोऽक्षणिकत्वं प्रत्यभिज्ञानप्रत्यक्षेण परिच्छिन्नम्। स एवायं घटो यो मया पूर्वमुपलब्ध इति प्रत्यभिज्ञया पूर्वानुभवजनितसंस्कारसहकृते-

(114) That [reason] where the absence [or negation] of what is to be established is ascertained in the subject by [a more powerful] proof, perception etc [is called] the Belated [lit stated or adduced when the fit time for it has passed away, or rejected owing to the lapse of proper time] The same is called [the reason] the object of which is contradicted [or refuted, annulled], as for instance,

Fire [is] not-hot.
Because [it is] produced
like water

Here, 'being produced' [is] the reason That which is to be established by it [viz.] coolness, the negation of that has been ascertained by perception itself, because by the sense of touch, is fire ascertained to be possessed of hot-ness

Similarly another [sort of reason] also [is] the Belated, as for instance, when *the transitoriness of the* jar is to be established, the reason 'being existent' mentioned above In the case of that [reason] also, that which is to be established, [namely] momentariness, the negation of that, [namely] *non-momentariness is ascertained by* perception leading to recollection. This [is] the same jar which had been apprehended by me before—by recollection in this form arising *from the sense-organ helped by* impressions produced by former apprehension, is ascertained

१ प्रत्यभिज्ञालक्षादिलक्षणेन।

न्द्रियप्रभवया पूर्वापरकालाकलनया घटस्य स्थायित्वपरिच्छेदादिति।

एते चासिद्धादयः पञ्च हेत्वाभासा यथाकथंचित् पक्षधर्मत्वाद्यन्यतमरूपहीनत्वादहेतवः स्वसाध्यं न साधयन्तीति।

येऽपि लक्षणस्य केवलव्यतिरेकिहेतोस्त्रयो दोषा अव्याप्त्यतिव्याप्त्यसंभवास्तेऽप्यत्रैवान्तर्भवन्ति न तु ते पञ्चभ्योऽधिकाः। तथाहि।

अतिव्याप्तिर्व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः। विपक्षमात्रादव्यावृत्तत्वात् सोपाधिकत्वाच्च। यथा गोलक्षणस्य पशुत्वस्य। गोत्वे हि सास्नादिमत्त्वम् प्रयोजकं न तु पशुत्वम्।

तथा अव्याप्तिर्भागासिद्धत्वम्। यथा गोलक्षणस्य शाबलेयत्वस्य।

एवमसंभवोऽपि स्वरूपासिद्धिः। यथा गोलक्षणस्यैकशफत्वस्येति॥ ११४॥

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the continuing [or permanence] of the jar, through the consideration of former and later time

These five fallacious reasons Unproven etc [are] no [valid] reasons because they do not prove what is to be established by them, owing to [their] being void of some one of the characteristics, 'being an attribute of the subject' etc in some way or other

The three faults also of definition [which is] a purely negative reason [namely] being too narrow being too wide and being impossible, are comprised here too, they are not indeed (*tu*) over and above the five To explain

Being too wide [is] being unproven in invariable-concomitance, on account of [the hetu] not being excluded from all (*mātra*) dissimilar instances or on account of [its] being possessed of a limitation, as for instance 'being a beast' [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow For being possessed of a dew lap etc is the producing cause with respect to cowness but not 'being a beast'

In the same way, being too narrow [is] being partly-unproven as for instance [the hetu] being variegated' [as] the peculiar attribute of a cow

Likewise being impossible too [is] being unproven-in its-own nature, as for instance, [the hetu] having undivided hoofs '[as] the peculiar attribute of a cow

१ कालावगाहिन्या। २ यथायथम्।

(१४) छलम् ।

छलविचारः ।

अभिप्रायान्तरेण प्रयुक्तस्य शब्दस्यार्थान्तरं परिकल्प्य दूषणाभिधानं छलम् । यथा नवकम्बलोऽयं देवदत्त इति वाक्ये नूतनाभिप्रायेण प्रयुक्तस्य नवशब्दस्यार्थान्तरमाशङ्क्य कश्चिद् दूषयति । नास्य नव कम्बलाः सन्ति दरिद्रत्वात् । न ह्यस्य द्वयमपि संभाव्यते कुतो नवेति । स च वादी *छलवादितया ज्ञायते* ॥ ११५ ॥

(१५) जातयः ।

जातिनिरूपणम् ।

असदुत्तरं जातिः । सा चोत्कर्षसमापकर्षसमादिभेदेन बहुविधा । विस्तरभिया नेह कृत्स्नोच्यते ।

तत्राव्याप्तेन दृष्टान्तगतधर्मेण पक्षे अव्यापकधर्मस्यापादनम्

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(115) Perversion [is] the pointing out of defect after having [*deliberately*] imagined another sense for a word which has been used [by the opponent] to convey a different idea. [It is] as follows In the sentence This Devadatta has a new blanket, 'some one taking for granted another sense for the word ' nava used to convey the idea of new ' *finds fault* [*with it as follows*]—*He has no nine* blankets, because he is poor , surely not even two could he possibly have, how [then] nine ? Such a disputant is known as one who uses perversion *in discussions*

(116) *Futility* [*is*] *futile rejoinder It* [*is*] *manifold* [*having twenty four varieties*] through the division into Utkarsasama Apakarsasamā etc [It] is not fully (*kṛtsnā*) dealt with here, for fear of *prolixity*

There, Utkarsasama [*variety of*] *futility* [*is*] *the attributing of a non pervading attribute to the subject, on the strength of the attribute belonging to an instance, which is*

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१ म प्रवक्र । २ जीवत ।

उत्कर्षसमा जा ः। यथा

शब्दोऽनित्यः। कृतकत्वात्। घटवत्।

इत्युक्ते कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना तद्वदेव शब्दः सावयवोऽपि स्यात्।

अपकर्षसमा तु दृष्टान्तगतेन धर्मेणाव्याप्तेनाव्यापकस्य धर्माभावस्यापादनम्। यथा पूर्वस्मिन् प्रयोगे कश्चिदेवमाह यदि कृतकत्वेन हेतुना घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्यः स्यात् तर्हि तेनैव हेतुना घटवदेव हि शब्दः श्रावणोऽपि न स्यात्। न हि घटः श्रावण इति ॥ ११६ ॥

(१६) निग्रहस्थानानि।

निग्रहस्थाननिरूपणम्।

पराजयहेतुर्निग्रहस्थानम्। तच्च न्यूनाधिकापसिद्धान्तार्थान्तर-

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not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for instance, when it is stated,

Sound [is] non-eternal
Because [it is] produced
like a jar

some one would argue thus—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be non eternal like a jar, then by means of the same reason, exactly like it [the jar], would *sound be possessed of parts also*

Apakarsasamā [variety of] futility [is] the attributing of the negation of a non pervading attribute, on the *strength of the attribute belonging to an instance*, which is not invariably concomitant [with the hetu] As for instance, referring to the former syllogism, some one thus argues—If through the reason 'being produced' sound would be *non*-eternal, like a jar, then by means of the same reason, like the jar itself, sound would not be audible as well For, surely the jar [is] not audible

(117) Occasion for reproof [is] what leads to defeat An though it [is] of various kinds, on account of the division into deficiency, redundancy, deviation from a tenet, a new object

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१ पूर्वस्मिन्नेवानुमाने।

प्रतिभामतानुज्ञाविरोधादिभेदाद्बहुविधमपि विस्तरभयान्नेह कृत्स्नमुच्यते ।

यद्विवक्षितार्थे किंचिदूनं तन्न्यूनम् । विवक्षितार्थे किंचिदधिकं तदधिकम् । सिद्धान्तादपध्वंसोऽपसिद्धान्तः । प्रकृतेनानभिसम्बन्धार्थवचनमर्थान्तरम् । उत्तरापरिस्फूर्तिरप्रतिभा । पराभिमतस्यार्थस्य स्वप्रतिकूलस्य स्वयमेवाभ्यनुज्ञानं स्वीकारो मतानुज्ञा । इष्टार्थभङ्गो विरोधः ।

इहात्यन्तमुपयुक्तानां स्वरूपभेदेन भूयो भूयः प्रतिपादनम् । यदनतिप्रयोजनं तदलक्षणमदोषाय । एतावतैव बालव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धिः ॥११७॥

इति श्रीकेशवमिश्रविरचिता तर्कभाषा समाप्ता ।

[or digression], fatuity consent [to the opponent's view] [self-] contradiction etc [it] is not fully dealt with here for fear of prolixity

That [is] deficiency when in a matter intended to be set forth something [is] wanting that [is] redundancy when in a matter intended to be set forth something [is] more [than required] deviation from a tenet [is] backing out of the tenet digression [is] the statement of an object not connected with the matter in hand fatuity [is] absence of inspiration to give an answer [to the opponent] consent to the view [is] approval acceptance of one's own accord of the matter sponsored by the opponent and opposed to one's own view contradiction [is] rejecting the desired view

Here [in this treatise] there is treatment again and again of most useful [or important matters] in their nature and varieties that what is not most serviceable is not defined, is no fault By so much only is accomplished the training of beginners

End of the Exposition of Reasoning
composed by Kesavamisra

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1 रूपभेदानां प्रतिपादनमनतिप्रयोजनानां चालक्षणं न दोषाय ।

Notes

(1) It is a curious, and altogether inexplicable fact that Kesavamisra begins his work without any Mangalasloka, against the established practice among Sanskrit writers not to begin a work without a verse or verses in honour of some deity, preceptor etc

Sanskrit writers are very touchy on the question of the efficacy of such Mangala verses and cases where the Mangala has failed to be effective are often explained away in a very fantastic manner! Thus, in the case of a work which has been successfully brought to an end even in the absence of a Mangala verse, it is argued that the writer must have paid his homage to the gods in his mind or in some other way (ग्रन्थाद् बहिः), and if a work is left unfinished even though the Mangala is there, it is pointed out that the non-completion of the work was probably due to some other potent Dosas in the writer!! But no word is to be uttered against the efficacy of the Mangala as such! Read the following comments of the Tarka dipika about the efficacy and necessity of the Mangala, which are so often quoted ननु मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वं नास्ति । मङ्गले कृतेऽपि कादम्बर्यादौ समाप्त्यदर्शनात् मङ्गलाभावेऽपि किरणावल्यादौ समाप्तिदर्शनादन्वयव्यतिरेकव्यभिचारादिति चेन्न । कादम्बर्यादौ विघ्नबाहुल्यात् समाप्त्यभावः । किरणावल्यादौ तु ग्रन्थाद्बहिरेव मङ्गलं कृतमतो न व्यभिचारः । ननु मङ्गलस्य कर्तव्यत्वे किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । न । शिष्टाचारानुमितश्रुतेरेव प्रमाणत्वात् । तथाहि । मङ्गलं वेदबोधितकर्तव्यताकम् अलौकिकाविगीतशिष्टाचारविषयत्वात् । दर्शादिवत् । भोजनादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय अलौकिकेति । रात्रिश्राद्धादौ व्यभिचारवारणायाविगीतेति । शिष्टपदं स्पष्टार्थम् । न कुर्यान्निष्फलं कर्म इति जलताडनादेरपि निषिद्धत्वादिति ॥


बालोऽपि—बाल here means a beginner, one who has not studied the न्यायशास्त्र, but has studied व्याकरण, काव्य etc and is thus fit to comprehend the न्यायशास्त्र, for instance, the Intermediate Arts or B A student! ग्रहणधारणपटुर्बालः न तु स्तनन्धयः । अधीतव्याकरणकाव्यकोशोऽनधीतन्यायशास्त्रः । Kesavamisra says that his work is mainly intended for beginners who would not be able to grasp the more ponderous and difficult treatises on न्यायशास्त्र. He has no idea what ever of trying conclusions with the great masters of न्यायशास्त्र His is a very humble mission, that of initiating the beginner into the vast domain of न्यायशास्त्र अधीतं श्रुतं-श्रुत lit hearing, study Kesavamisra means to say that he has tried to make the subject so easy to understand that even a beginner who is lazy by nature, need not work very hard to master it संक्षिप्तयुक्त्यन्वित may be explained in a number of ways—(1) संक्षिप्ता च युक्त्यन्विता च (युक्ति-arguments, reasoning), (2) संक्षिप्तयुक्तिभिः अन्विता (where संक्षिप्त goes with युक्ति), (3) संक्षिप्तयुक्ति च अन्विता च (अन्विता consistent); (4) संक्षिप्तयुक्ति as an adv, and अन्वित as voc singular (O wise

one) तर्कभाषा—तर्क्यन्ते प्रतिपाद्यन्ते इति तर्काः प्रमाणादिषोडशपदार्थाः (in explaining तर्कसंग्रह, the Dipika explains तर्क as द्रव्यादिसप्तपदार्थाः) ते भाष्यन्ते अनया इति or तर्काणां भाषा (exposition) and then metaphorically, the work *containing such an exposition or* तर्क might simply mean 'logical reasoning' In section 101, तर्क is used in the sense of argument by reductio-ad-absurdum method


(2) प्रमाणप्रमेय —This is the first sūtra of the Nyayasutras *of* Gautama Aksapada the traditional founder of the Nyaya system (see Introduction) The sixteen padarthas or topics mentioned therein are expounded in detail, one by one in the text Though Kesavamisra *belongs to the Syncretist school and so tries to reconcile the two* systems,—Nyaya and Vaisesika,—it is clear that he is by inclination a Naiyayika, from the fact that he begins his work, by quoting the Nyayasutra On the other hand Sivaditya (the author of the Saptapadarthi) Annambhatta (the author of the Tarkasamgraha) *also* of the Syncretist school, are Vaisesikas and so begin their *works* by quoting the padarthas *or categories from the* Vaisesikasutra (Line 2)—तत्त्वज्ञानात् —It is a characteristic of the Hindus that all their activities are directed towards the one goal of securing Salvation, and all systems are agreed that Moksa can come only from Jnana (though they differ as to the nature of this Jnana and the means of securing it) A modern student would naturally be puzzled to know *that the study of logic or physics is to secure salvation for him* (see section 9?, where the author tells what Moksa is and how it is secured) (Line 3)—निःश्रेयस निरतिशयं श्रेयः अस्मात्—beyond which there is no further good the highest bliss salvation (Line 4)—पदार्थ—The word is used here in the sense of 'a topic In section 47, it is used in its technical *sense of categories or knowable things which are six or seven, according* to the Vaisesikas

लक्षण is usually translated as 'definition' This is *not strictly correct*, लक्षण does not point out the thing to be defined but to the differentia or the peculiar characteristic possessed by the thing alone and which is not common (असाधारण) to others लक्षण thus more accurately means 'differentia', but as the word 'definition is more easily understandable, and as the Nyaya and Vaiseṣika writers themselves are often loose in their use of this term (see section 9, line 16, where गुणाश्रय is said to be द्रव्यलक्षणम्, instead of गुणाश्रयत्वम्), we have generally *translated* लक्षण *as 'definition' unless the context requires the more* accurate sense It is obvious that an accurate definition must refer only to the लक्ष्य it must neither refer to things which have no right to be included therein, nor exclude things that deserve to be included In other words a definition must not be too wide or too narrow. Section 114 mentions the three faults to which a definition is liable, viz अव्याप्ति (being too narrow), अतिव्याप्ति (being too wide) and असम्भव (impossibility)

An illustration would make this *clear* Suppose, *we* want to define a cow and पशुत्व is proposed as the लक्षण Now as the cow is a पशु, it undoubtedly possesses पशुत्व but पशुत्व is also found in horses buffaloes, etc which are all पशुs but not cows Thus the लक्षण, पशुत्व, is too wide, possessing the दोष of अतिव्याप्ति




If we give कपिलत्व as the लक्षण, it would be seen that the definition becomes अव्याप्त or too narrow as all cows that are not कपिल would be *thereby excluded*



(कपिलत्व may also be regarded as अतिव्याप्त on the ground that कपिलत्व belongs to objects other than cows, but what strikes us here most is the अव्याप्ति Secondly, अतिव्याप्ति strictly speaking implies that the लक्षण covers the लक्ष्य completely and *in addition* extends *to other objects Here कपिलत्व does not cover the* whole of the लक्ष्य at all, hence it is properly a case of अव्याप्ति)

If the लक्षण is एकशफत्व (having one hoof that is, undivided hoof), the दोष is असम्भव, as *all cows without exception* have no एकशफत्व




सास्नादिमत्त्व is a correct definition of गो as सास्ना (dew lap) is possessed by a cow and cow alone Or to take a more familiar instance If we define 'a *college student* as '*one who is studying in the Vernacular fourth standard*' the definition has obviously the fault of असम्भव, if the definition is amended as 'who visits the cinema-shows, there is the fault of अतिव्याप्ति, as there are thousands other than college students who visit the cinema shows, the definition 'a college student is a University student who plays cricket' is अव्याप्त as those who play other games are excluded thereby A correct definition would be—A college-student is one who after passing the entrance examination to the University, pursues his higher studies in an institution recognised *for that purpose (Some cynic may find fault* with this definition also, on the ground that there are some students who join a college, without the slightest intention of pursuing any studies whatsoever !) (Line 8)—तेन Because उद्देश is already made in the first sutra so only लक्षण and परीक्षा are now to be dealt with

(4) प्रमाण—means of right knowledge, proof प्रमाण is the लक्ष्य (what is to be defined) and प्रमाकरण (*strictly speaking* प्रमाकरणत्व which is an emendation made in one manuscript) the लक्षण (Line 4)—ननु introduces the objector s point of view Here the objector is not finding fault with the definition itself, but only wants some further *information*, with a view to have a complete picture of the matter in question A कारण always suggests some कार्य or फल, so he wants to know what the फल of प्रमाकरण would be (Line 5) —सत्यम्—(इति अङ्गीकारे) that is, the siddhantin accepts the objector s view point in so-

far as it goes, but he would not accept that as going against his fundamental stand point (the definition of प्रमाण here)

(5) Keśavamiśra is now examining the definition प्रमाकरण Naturally he first wants to expound fully the two words in the definition, प्रमा and करण (The student would be able to understand this section properly, only when he reads sections 67, 96, and 101, where most of the terms occurring here, are explained in detail) The following table would make the idea in this section clear



That is, all cognition is first divided into अनुभव and स्मृति, अनुभव is further divided into right अनुभव and wrong अनुभव (In section 67, we are told that स्वप्नज्ञान is always अयथार्थ) and wrong अनुभव is further sub-divided into संशय (*doubt*), विपर्यय (*error or misapprehension*) and तर्क

(Line 1)–उच्यते–अस्माभिः is understood, it is usually translated as 'we reply' प्रमा is defined as यथार्थानुभव, and the author now shows how each and every word in the definition is significant (that is what constitutes the परीक्षा of the definition)

If we drop the word यथार्थ, and define प्रमा as only अनुभव, *then the* definition would be अतिव्याप्त as it would include संशय, विपर्यय etc which are wrong knowledge So to exclude them, यथार्थ must be put in the definition

If we drop अनुभव and read the definition as यथार्थ (ज्ञानम्) *only*, then the definition would be अतिव्याप्त, as it would extend to स्मृति, the word अनुभव thus excludes स्मृति.

यथार्थ *–correct, grasping the object as it is* प्रमा *or* यथार्थानुभव *is de*fined as तद्वति तत्प्रकारक, रजते इदं रजतम् is a यथार्थानुभव, for it amounts to रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यकत्वे सति रजतत्वप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्. In this ज्ञान, रजत is the विशेष्य

which being possessed of रजतत्व (विशेषण), is known to have the same रजत as the प्रकार or characteristic If we know the रजतत्ववद्विशेष्यरजत as possessed of the characteristic शुक्तित्व, it would be wrong knowledge यथार्थघटज्ञान would be घटत्ववद्घटविशेष्यक and also घटत्वप्रकारक, a wrong घटज्ञान would be घटत्ववद्घटविशेष्यक but पटत्वप्रकारक Thus whether a cognition is right or wrong would depend upon what kind of प्रकार it is associated with The thing which is the object of cognition and the form in which it is cognised need not necessarily be related to each other by the विशेष्यविशेषणसम्बन्ध (as in the case of प्रमा, इदं रजतम्) The सप्तमी (in तद्वति) is not विशेष्यविशेषणभाव or the आधाराधेयभाव, but rather अवच्छिन्नत्व By admitting अवच्छिन्नत्वे सप्तमी, we can show the ज्ञान, घटे घटत्वम् as प्रमा घटे घटत्वम् can be put in the form of तद्वति तत्प्रकारक thus—घटवति घटत्वे घटप्रकारक अनुभव There घटत्व is the विशेष्य the object of cognition, (while in अयं घट , घट is the विशेष्य and घटत्व the विशेषण) and घट the विशेषण or प्रकार Putting it more elaborately, the ज्ञान would be घटवद्घटत्वविशेष्यक and घटप्रकारक But the difficulty is घट is not found in घटत्व (घटत्व is found in घट) Therefore if we take the सप्तमी to be आधाराधेयार्थे, the cognition घटे घटत्व which is undoubtedly प्रमा, would be अप्रमा The answer is, we should interpret the सप्तमी to be अवच्छिन्नार्थे, so that the cognition would be घटावच्छिन्नघटत्वविशेष्यक which is a correct statement In cases where two or more things are cognised together, it is essential that each thing should be cognised with its *correct* प्रकार, *it would not do to have an aggregate knowledge of such* things Thus if we are cognising रङ्ग and रजत, we must not have the knowledge of the two any how, we must know रजत as possessed of रजतत्वावच्छिन्नत्व and रङ्ग as possessed of रङ्गत्वावच्छिन्नत्व Then only we shall have यथार्थ प्रमा

स्मृति is defined as ज्ञातविषय ज्ञानम् Remembrance is a cognition referring to something which had been already known before (under different circumstances) Kesavamisra does not elsewhere define स्मृति as such *Hence the reading* ज्ञातविषय ज्ञान *seems to have been inserted* here to make up for the deficiency (संस्कारमात्रजन्य ज्ञानम् is another definition of स्मृति For संस्कार, see section 51 below here भावनाख्यसंस्कार is meant संस्कार means the impressions formed when we see a thing) *If the* definition were simple ज्ञान स्मृति (that is, if we drop ज्ञातविषय) it would extend to घटप्रत्यक्ष as well The definition is however still faulty, as it would extend to प्रत्यभिज्ञा (recognition) According to the ancient Naiyayikas, प्रत्यभिज्ञा is caused by संस्कारजनितत्वात्स्मृति and not by संस्कार, (स्मृतिं संस्कारं च प्रति अनुभवस्य जनकत्वं तथैव जन्यत्वम् इति प्राचां मतम् । नवीनानां मते तु अनुभवस्य ज्ञानत्वेन जनकत्वम्) Others say that स्मृति is मनोजन्या and not संस्कारजन्या.

(6) (Line 3)—ननु The objector complains that he is being fooled by the siddhāntin who, instead of explaining the thing properly, is merely furnishing him with synonyms which are equally unintelligible, and throw no further light on the matter Thus करणम् = साधकतमम् = अतिशयितं साधकम् = प्रकृष्टं कारणम्, so साधकम् was explained as कारणम्, but this is hardly helpful in understanding the nature of करण The siddhāntin appreciates the point of view of the objector and defines करण in detail *The reading साधकतमं कारणं is faulty as it comes into* conflict with the passage साधकं कारणमिति पर्याय, for then साधक and कारण do not become पर्याय, साधक would be a विशेषण of कारण

A कारण must satisfy three conditions —

(1) It must be antecedent to the कार्य, that is, it must exist before the कार्य is produced

This seems to be an obvious condition If we go to a potter's house when the potter is engaged in producing a jar, we shall come across a number of objects that exist prior to the jar that is to come into existence, such as clay, wheel, stick, the potter's house Mrs Potter, the ass etc. But all these could not be regarded as the cause of घट (*We leave out of count what are called the साधारणकारण*s, which must exist before any thing that is produced, namely ईश्वर तज्ज्ञानेच्छाकृतय प्रागभाव काल दिक् अदृष्टम् (धर्माधर्मौ) प्रतिबन्धकसामान्याभाव in addition, according to some) So some other condition must be satisfied, which is—

(2) *That the antecedence of the कारण to the कार्य must be invariable*

This would exclude many of the above non-essential things Thus Mrs Potter, the potter's house, the donkey, etc all are eliminated For, in the manufacture of a jar, the potter may not use the ass to *bring the amount of earth required for it*, he could have used a cart *for that purpose, and so on*

Still some superfluous things do remain, so there is the third and most important condition, namely,

(3) *The कारण must not be अन्यथासिद्ध* A कारण is अन्यथासिद्ध (*proved or known to be otherwise or intended for another purpose* that is, remote, not *directly connected or essential*) when *it is* proved that it is only *remotely or indirectly* connected with the cause, it may have नियतपूर्वभाव, but it is connected with the कार्य, *only through the real* कारण *and not on its own merits*

The Tarkadipika describes the three varieties of अन्यथासिद्धि in detail —

(1) तन्तुs are known to be the cause of पट But can we say that तन्तुरूप and तन्तुत्व (which are invariably antecedent to पट, because they are in समवाय *relation with the तन्तुs) are the cause of पट?* The answer is no Because तन्तुरूप and तन्तुत्व are अन्यथासिद्ध No doubt तन्तुरूप and तन्तुत्व are intimately related to the तन्तुs but they are related to the कार्य पट *only through the तन्तुs and not directly* Hence they cannot be the कारण of पट (येन सहैव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तेन तद् अन्यथासिद्धम्। यथा तन्तुना तन्तुरूपं च पटं प्रति। दीपिका यथा तन्तुना may be elaborated thus—येन तन्तुना सहैव यस्य तन्तुरूपस्य यं पटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं पटं प्रति तेन तन्तुना तद् तन्तुरूपम् अन्यथासिद्धम्।)

(2) The potter has obviously नियतपूर्वभाव to the घट manufactured by him But what about the potter's father? He has also नियतपूर्वभाव, for without the Senior potter, *the Junior potter* would not have been born But the नियतपूर्वभाव of the Senior potter is only indirect Only on knowing that the Senior potter has नियतपूर्वभाव with reference *to the Junior potter,* we understand his नियतपूर्वभाव *to the* घट *His* presence for the production of the घट is not certainly essential The Senior potter may have been gathered to his fathers years before the घट came to be produced (अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञाते एव यस्य यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं प्रति तद् अन्यथासिद्धम्। दीपिका अन्यं कुलालं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वे ज्ञाते एव यस्य कुलालपितुः यं घटं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वमवगम्यते तं घटं प्रति स कुलालपिता अन्यथासिद्धः।)

(3) When the effect is capable of being produced by certain causes that are invariably antecedent to it, other things that *come there incidentally or in addition along with those* कारणs, *are* अन्यथासिद्ध Thus the रासभ which is only incidentally connected with the production of a particular घट is अन्यथासिद्ध (We have seen above that रासभ is ruled out of order by the word नियत in the definition So this variety of अन्यथासिद्धि is not necessary to exclude रासभ Some however argue that नियत excludes रासभत्व in general which means any conveyance for bringing the earth, or any similar incidental thing, while this variety of अन्यथासिद्धि excludes a रासभ in the case of a particular घट) Or to take another instance When a jar is baked, it changes its रूप and गन्ध Before the new रूप and गन्ध are produced, there are in the jar पाक, गन्धप्रागभाव and रूपप्रागभाव Now for the production of the गन्ध, पाक and गन्धप्रागभाव are absolutely necessary, but रूपप्रागभाव *is not* It is true that रूपप्रागभाव exists along with the गन्धप्रागभाव, but it is not *necessary to produce* गन्ध *It is necessary to produce* रूप *Therefore* रूपप्रागभाव is अन्यथासिद्ध with reference to the production of गन्ध (अन्यथा

क्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववर्तिनैव कार्यसंभवे तत्सहभूतमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा पाकजस्थले गन्धं प्रति रूपप्राग-भावस्य । दीपिका It must be confessed that this is not a very happy instance For गन्धप्रागभाव is only the साधारण cause of गन्ध like ईश्वर, आकाश etc) Thus a कारण is अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्ववृत्ति

Some regard अन्यथासिद्धि to be five-fold

(1) यत्कार्यं प्रति कारणस्य पूर्ववृत्तित्वं येन रूपेण गृह्यते तत्कार्यं प्रति तद्रूपमन्यथा-सिद्धम् । यथा घटं प्रति दण्डत्वम् ।

(2) यस्य स्वातन्त्र्येणान्वयव्यतिरेकौ न स्तः किंतु स्वकारणमादायान्वयव्यतिरेकौ गृह्येते तदन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटं प्रति दण्डरूपम् । These two correspond to the 1st variety in the Dipika

(3) अन्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं गृहीत्वैव यस्य यत्कार्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं गृह्यते तस्य तत्कार्यं प्रति अन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटादिकं प्रत्याकाशस्य ।

(4) यत्कार्यजनकं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं गृहीत्वैव यस्य यत्कार्यं प्रति पूर्ववृत्तित्वं गृह्यते तस्य तत्कार्यं प्रत्यन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटं प्रति कुलालपितुः । Varieties 3 and 4 correspond to the second variety of the Dipika

(5) अवश्यक्लृप्तनियतपूर्ववृत्तिन एव कार्यसंभवे तद्भिन्नमन्यथासिद्धम् । यथा घटादिकं प्रति रासभादीति । This corresponds to the 3rd variety of the Dipika

परे तु अत्र अवश्यक्लृप्तत्वं लघुनियतपूर्ववर्तित्वं बोध्यम् । तेन पाकजगन्धोत्पत्तिं प्रति अवश्यक्लृप्तपूर्ववर्तिना पाकजरूपप्रागभावस्य कारणत्वनिरासे गन्धप्रागभावस्यान्यथासिद्धत्वनिरासः-श्रेयान् । एतेषु पञ्चस्वन्यथासिद्धेषु पञ्चममावश्यकम् । अन्येषां चतुर्णामनेन पञ्चमान्यथासिद्धेनैव संग्रहादिति बोध्यम् । (न्यायकोश pp 42-43)

The problem of causality is one of the most important problems in philosophy From a common sense point of view, the view about कारण given above, seems to be sound enough But it has got a number *of serious flaws* Thus, *according to the Naiyayikas*, the कार्य is absolutely a new thing produced, in समवाय *relation* with the कारण But how can we say that घट is an altogether different thing from मृत्तिका ? Simply because घट has a different form and shape, form मृत्तिका, it cannot be regarded as different from मृत्तिका Surely Devadatta standing is not altogether different from Devadatta sitting or Devadatta lying down It would be more correct to say therefore, that the कार्य is a mere transformation (परिणाम) of the कारण, or to go *one step further, an illusory change* (विवर्त) of the कारण, etc The Naiyāyikas are असत्कार्यवादिनः (The Bauddhas *say that* सत् comes out of nothing, the नैयायिकs in saying उत्पत्तेः पूर्वमविद्यमानं कार्यं सत कारणाज्जायते practically regard the कार्यव्यापार as not being based upon सत्, hence they are called अर्धवैनाशिकs The Advaitavedantins regard व्यावहारिक सत् as the कार्य of सत्, according to the Samkhyas the कार्य is पारमार्थिक सत्. Both the Vedantins and the Sāmkhyas are सत्कार्यवादिनः, the

Advaitavedantins are rather सत्कार्यवादिन्s) Sankarācarya attacks the असत्कार्यवाद in his Vedāntasutrabhāṣya (II 1 18) mercilessly *There cannot be any* कार्यव्यापार so essential *to the production of the* कार्य if the कार्य does not exist before If the व्यापार belongs to मृत्तिका, then we should say that मृत्तिका is being produced and not the घट which ought to exist throughout the whole व्यापार If घट is a wholly new thing produced, why should not पट be produced from मृत्तिका, because पट is equally a wholly new thing etc (The student is recommended to read the Sankarabhāṣya passage in this connection)

(Line 12)—कार्यानुकूला ,अन्वय-presence, व्यतिरेक absence *The objector* suggests a simpler definition A कारण is that whose presence and absence are invariably followed by the presence and absence of the कार्य Thus if मृत्तिका is present, घट is present, if मृत्तिका is absent, घट is absent Hence we conclude that मृत्तिका is the cause of घट The siddhantin's objection to this definition is that it could not apply in the case of all pervading objects, which being eternal can never cease to exist For instance we know that आकाश is the cause of शब्द, but the definition proposed by the objector would not do in this case We can say, If आकाश is present शब्द is present but we cannot say (or visualise) 'If आकाश is absent शब्द is absent for आकाश can never be absent The definition thus is faulty when applied to विभु objects otherwise it is all right

(7) समवायिकारणम्—*the material cause or the* उपादानकारण *out of* which the कार्य is made यत्समवेतम्—यस्मिन् समवायेन सम्बद्धं सत् कार्यम् उत्पद्यते, that being in समवाय relation with which the effect is produced तन्तुs are *the* समवायिकारण *of* पट *which is in* समवाय *relation with the* तन्तुs (अवयवावयविनोः सम्बन्धः), similarly मृत्तिका is the समवायिकारण of घट and पट of पटरूप (गुणगुणिनोः सम्बन्धः) A द्रव्य can alone be the समवायिकारण

(8) अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः समवायः -समवाय is explained by the Vaiseṣika sutras as इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः । That by which we are able to say of the cause and the effect that the one is in the other is समवाय. *Thus that the* पट (कार्य) *is in the* तन्तुs (कारण) is due *to the* समवाय relation From this it is clear that the Vaiseṣikasutras admitted the समवाय relation in order to account for the very close relationship *of cause and effect only But later on the sphere of* समवाय *was* extended to other close relations also that could not be regarded as mere संयोग which is an अनित्य relation Thus Kesavamisra explains समवाय as अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः । अयुतसिद्ध means 'proved to be not joined (if यु means to join) or 'proved to be not separated (if यु means to separate) that is things that are always together until one of them

is destroyed The नित्यत्व of the समवाय is to be understood only in a secondary or relative sense समवाय is नित्य as long as one of the things where it inheres is not destroyed The five pairs of अयुतसिद्ध things are (1) अवयवावयविनौ, तन्तुs and पट, (2) गुणगुणिनौ, घट and शुक्लगुण in a white घट, (3) क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ a moving cow, (4) जातिव्यक्ती, घट and घटत्व, (5) विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये, विशेषs and the परमाणुs Now the समवाय between तन्तु and पट, or घट and घटत्व is not mere accidental like the relation संयोग between हस्त and पुस्तक. The हस्तपुस्तकसंयोग can vanish away even though हस्त and पुस्तक remain in tact, but the relation between घट and घटत्व vanishes only when घट is destroyed Thus समवाय is different from संयोग The original कार्यकारणयो समवाय admitted by Kanada is to be included in the first division, that of अवयवावयविनौ It is clear that Kanada s intention in admitting समवाय was to explain the theory of causation only His followers however wanted to make समवाय more comprehensive so as to admit of all cases of very close relationship The followers of Prabhakara and the modern Naiyayikas regard *समवाय to be नाना and also अनित्य* The *Naiyayikas regard समवाय as* प्रत्यक्ष (समवायप्रत्यक्ष प्रति इन्द्रियसम्बद्धविशेषणतासन्निकर्षो हेतु । इह कपाले घटसमवाय इति प्रत्यक्ष विशेषणत सन्निकर्षेणैव भवति ।) According to the Vaisesikas समवाय is अतीन्द्रिय and only अनुमेय (समवायोऽतीन्द्रिय चेतनान्यत्वे सति असमवेतभावत्वात् मनोवत् आकाशादिवद्वा) The relation between two objects can be perceived only if both those objects are perceived, we cannot perceive घटाकाशसंयोग, for आकाश is *not प्रत्यक्ष Some of the आश्रयs of समवाय,* viz परमाणुs are not प्रत्यक्ष (but the opponent might retort by saying that such cases may be treated as exceptions or that they are प्रत्यक्ष to the Yogins) समवाय has no जाति, for there is the बाधक, असम्बन्ध Only द्रव्य, गुण and कर्म can be in समवाय relation with others (even if समवायs are held to be many there is still this असम्बन्धत्व) Again समवाय is a peculiar kind of relation and so must be regarded as one only *If समवाय is taken to be produced by some समवायिकारण like other objects (with which it is in the समवाय relation)* we shall have to postulate the existence of another समवाय and thus there would be अनवस्था The Vedantins and the Sāmkhyas do not regard समवाय as a पदार्थान्तर, for according to them the relation between the five अयुतसिद्ध pairs is nothing but स्वरूप or तादात्म्यसम्बन्ध If समवाय is able to connect itself with the two objects which are intimately connected with each other, without the assistance of another समवाय, what need is there of the समवाय relation itself? Why should we not be satisfied with the स्वरूपसम्बन्ध between, say, घट and घटत्व, the तन्तु and the पट? Sankaracarya in his Bhāṣya on II 2–17 launches a fierce attack on the समवाय relation showing how the supposition is

absurd and unnecessary (The passage is too long to be quoted here, but the student would do well to read the same carefully)

(Line 6)—For जाति and विशेष, see sections 83 and 84 below

(Line 10)—विनश्यत्ता this statement is made to explain what विनश्यदवस्था (referred to in line 8) is, (it being understood that there is no प्रतिबन्धक factor)

(9) It was said in the last section (lines 16-18) that घट is the intimate cause of घटरूप and घट is the intimate cause of घटरूप (the सम्बन्ध between गुण and गुणिन् being समवाय) The objector now wants *to point out that this could not be the case*

OBJECTOR

घट cannot even be the cause, much less the समवायिकारण of घटरूप because *both* घट *and* घटरूप *are* produced at the same time and it is a patent fact that there must be पौर्वापर्य between कारण and कार्य (कारण must be antecedent to कार्य) In the absence of पौर्वापर्य, no कार्यकारणभाव can exist There can be no कार्यकारणभाव between the left horn and the right horn of a cow, as both the horns are produced simultaneously

SIDDHĀNTIN

Our reply to your objection is of the मूले कुठारः type We do *not* accept your statement that घट and घटरूप are produced at the same time Our position is this घट is first produced and it remains without any qualities for *the first moment, and then the* qualities are produced in intimate relation with it

This is exactly as it should be, for that ensures different effects being produced from different causes

Cause Effect
मृत्तिका——घट
घट———घटरूप

If घट and घटरूप were produced at the same time, there would *be* no difference between them, the *cause* मृत्तिका *being the same for* both of them Perhaps you might say that घट might be accepted as the cause of both घट and घटरूप (if मृत्तिका cannot be their cause), but this would be still more absurd, as घट can not be its own cause, there being no पौर्वापर्य

If we accept the position that a द्रव्य is निर्गुण at the first moment, a serious complication arise viz

(1) घट at the first moment would not be visible, for the rule is that a द्रव्य having a developed colour and touch can alone be visible

(2) घट could not at that moment be called even द्रव्य (for you define द्रव्य as a substratum of qualities and घट at that time has no qualities at all)

(1) What harm is there if घट at the first moment is invisible Even if we suppose that घट along with the qualities is produced at the first moment, it can be visible only at the second moment (for during the first moment the घट comes into existence and one moment is required for our eye to come into contact with it)

According to our view the situation would be

1st moment—निर्गुण घट
2nd ,, सगुण घट
3rd चाक्षुष

According to you घट would be चाक्षुष at the second moment This is no fundamental difference

( ) When we say that a द्रव्य is गुणाश्रय we do not mean that a द्रव्य is always possessed of qualities as a matter of course We simply mean that it has the *capacity of being a substratum of qualities* It does not matter in the least if at a particular time, it is not actually possessed of qualities

If you are still not satisfied, we present you with another definition of द्रव्य, that it is a समवायिकारण which does apply in the case of निर्गुण घट as well [Perhap the objector might retort that a निर्गुण घट can not be समवायिकारण either, *at the first moment* for there are no qualities at that time But this


[would be hyper-critical We call मृत्तिका the cause of घट in the sense that given the necessary auxiliaries, it produces घट]

(Line 15)—महत्त्वे सति-महत्त्व magnitude, any dimension between अणुपरिमाण and त्रिसरेणुपरिमाण (both of which are not चाक्षुष) is महत्त्व which is necessary to make an object चाक्षुष उद्भूतरूप is also essential for that purpose (Line 21)—For गुणवत्त्व there is another (and perhaps a better) reading गुणाश्रयत्व गुणात्यन्ताभावानधिकरणत्वम् (because it is गुणाश्रयत्व (referred to by the objector in his definition of द्रव्य in line 16) that deserves to be explained and not योग्यता)—being a substratum of qualities *means not being the abode of the absolute absence* (like शशशृङ्ग) of qualities that is the absence of qualities is not there for all time If the qualities are not there now they would be coming into existence later on This does not affect the position of a द्रव्य as a द्रव्य

(10) असमवायिकारणम्—This is admitted only by the Naiyayikas, in order to connect कार्य and कारण which are regarded as distinct The Vedantins and others admit only two कारणs, उपादान and निमित्त The असमवायिकारण can only be a गुण or क्रिया, it can never be a द्रव्य The name असमवायिकारण which literally means not a समवायिकारण and hence would refer to the निमित्तकारण as well, is to be understood in a special sense to denote a कारण which is प्रत्यासन्न to the समवायिकारण The प्रत्यासत्ति may be direct or परम्परया असमवायिकारण is thus *two fold It* is described in the Tarkasamgraha as

(1) which has an intimate relation (समवाय) with a thing with *which the* कार्य *also is intimately related* कार्येण सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणम् (कार्येण पटेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे तन्तौ समवेतं तन्तुसंयोग पटस्य कार्यस्य असमवायिकारणम्।) thus तन्तुसंयोग is in intimate relation with तन्तु with which the कार्य पट is also intimately related Therefore तन्तुसंयोग is the असमवायिकारण of पट

(2) that which is in intimate relation with a thing with which the समवायिकारण of the कार्य is also intimately related—*कारणेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे समवेतत्वे सति यत्कारणम् (पटरूपस्य कार्यस्य समवायिकारणेन पटेन सह एकस्मिन्नर्थे* तन्तौ समवेतं तन्तुरूपं पटरूपस्य असमवायिकारणम्) thus तन्तुरूप is in intimate relation with तन्तु with which पट the समवायिकारण of the कार्य पटरूप is also intimately related Therefore तन्तुरूप is the असमवायिकारण of पटरूप The following diagrams would make this clear



The first असमवायिकारणता is called लघ्वी (लघुप्रतिपत्तिकत्वात्) and the second गुर्वी (गुरुप्रतिपत्तिकत्वात्)

(11) निमित्तकारणम्—All causes (satisfying the definition of कारण properly) other than the समवायि and the असमवायि कारणs are classed as निमित्तकारणs तुरी, वेम etc are the निमित्तकारणs of पट, and दण्ड, चक्र, etc of घट. समवायिकारण and निमित्तकारण correspond respectively to the material cause and the efficient cause of Aristotle The formal cause of Aristotle is the सामान्य, the Naiyayikas have nothing similar to his final cause

(12) अभावस्य=प्रध्वंसाभावस्य, for the other kinds of अभावs can not be produced (see section 86) समवायस्य तु भावद्वयधर्मत्वात्—This sentence tells us why अभाव can not stand in समवाय relation to anything and furnishes a reason for the statement made in the last sentence A conjectural reading here is कारणद्वयधर्मत्वात्. Since समवाय is a characteristic feature of both समवायि and असमवायि कारणs, as shown above, अभाव which does not possess that characteristic, viz the समवाय relation, can not obviously have those कारणs

(13) करणम्—the most potent cause, प्रकृष्ट कारणम् करण is the सातिशयकारण among the three causes, समवायि, असमवायि and निमित्त. According to the ancients, this सातिशयकारण must be व्यापारवत् (व्यापार is defined as तज्जन्यत्वे सति तज्जन्यजनक the operation which is itself produced by the cause and which in turn produces the effect produced by the cause. Thus the axe fells a tree *Here* छेदनक्रिया *is the* कार्य *of the* परशु But unless the व्यापार viz परशुदारुसंयोग takes place, the छेदनक्रिया would not take place परशुदारुसंयोग is जन्य of परशु and is itself the जनक of छेदनक्रिया which is also the जन्य of परशु) Thus करण is a potent operative cause The moderns describe करण as फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न (which is most proximate to the effect, without whose appearance the effect would

not be produced) or यद्विलम्बादकुर्वत्कार्यानुत्पादः According to the moderns therefore चरमसंयोग itself would be the करण

In section 14, Kesavamisra describes इन्द्रिय, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष and ज्ञान as करणs under different circumstances He therefore does not stick to any one view in particular What could be strikingly regarded as a potent cause, should be regarded as the करण, according to him

(Line 3)—ननु The author now shows how the definition of प्रमाण as अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ is wrong

OBJECTOR

By means of a Pramana we cognise something which we had not known before, so why should not Pramana be defined as अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ ?

SIDDHANTIN

If we accept your definition of a Pramana, a series of cognitions about the same jar, for instance, in the form of 'this is a jar' 'this is a jar' would be invalid, which is manifestly absurd, so your definition is wrong The first knowledge of the घट would be valid, but the knowledge of the घट at the second, third, fourth moments etc is invalid as it is a *knowledge of the घट already apprehended* For according to you Pramana makes known things not apprehended before

OBJECTOR

In the case of a series of cognitions about the same jar, we might argue that घट 1 is different from घट 2, घट 2 from घट 3 etc, so that every time we do apprehend something not apprehended before, so our definition is correct

SIDDHANTIN

Your supposition is vitiated by actual experience Who has ever been able to cognise such minute divisions of cognitions representing the jar in successive moments ?

OBJECTOR

We see no objection why we should not be taken to cognise the minute divisions of time

SIDDHANTIN

Our actual experience is otherwise We feel that we cognise one *single whole movement* (strictly speaking this is an inaccurate apprehension, but that is another matter) and *not four different actions comprising* ı

It is better always to be guided by facts and so we reject your definition

(Line 6)—धारावाहिकज्ञान–cognition in the form of धारा or series, serial or continuous cognitions This is postulated, because the supposition is that *no cognition lasts for more than one moment* This is so akin to the Buddhist doctrine सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम् That is why the Naiyāyikas are called अर्धवैनाशिकाः (*Line 8*)—अत्राह , *the objector* suggests that घट 1 (घट at the first moment of cognition) may be regarded as *different from* घट 2, घट 2 *from* घट 3 *and so forth* (Line 10)—यौगपद्याभिमान–This shows that the कालभेद is not comprehended क्रिया (*this is dropped in Paranjpe s edition perhaps rightly* It seems to be an explanation by some copyist of the expression क्रियादिक्रमग्रहणासम्) Let us see what happens when Devadatta is *on the move* We say that he has taken one step, but that one step is really made up of four *operations* —(1) *There is first* क्रिया *or* movement in his foot (2) then there is disjunction of the foot from the ground where it was placed through this movement, (3) as a result of that there is the destruction of the former conjunction of the foot with the ground, (4) and lastly the production of the conjunction of the foot with *the next spot* *It would perhaps* appear that (2) क्रियातो विभाग and (3) पूर्वसंयोगनाश are not different, but *according to the Vaiseṣikas, they are different* (*Annambhatta, in his* Tarkasaṃgraha defines विभाग as संयोगनाशको गुणः) (Line 14)–अविकल्पेन प्रमोत्पत्ते —This *is in accordance* with the view of the moderns about करण (viz फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं करणम् see above)

(14) The Vaiseṣikas admit only two independent Pramanas, प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान, the Naiyayikas admit four

(15) प्रत्यक्षम्—the means of direct perception and प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is ज्ञान produced by the contact of the sense organs with the *objects of knowledge* The Nyayasutras define it as इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकम् (*अव्यपदेश्यम् is निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम्* *अव्यभिचारि–भ्रमभिन्नम्*, and व्यवसायात्मकम्–सविकल्पकम्) प्रत्यक्षम् is derived as अक्षमक्षं प्रति यो वर्तते इति (अक्षाणि इन्द्रियाणि घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि षट्) The definition in the text of course only applies to the जन्यप्रत्यक्ष and not to the प्रत्यक्ष of ईश्वर, which is नित्य प्रत्यक्ष is thus produced —(आत्मन्—मनस्—इन्द्रियम्—अर्थ) Ātman is connected with Manas, Manas with Indriyas and Indriyas with Artha, thus there are three सन्निकर्ष of which the first two are common to other प्रमाs as well, only the last is peculiar to प्रत्यक्ष निर्विकल्पक is निष्प्रकारकं ज्ञानं (विशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धानवगाहि ज्ञानम् अविशिष्टवस्तुविषयम्) that is, where no notice is taken of the relation of the विशेष्य and its qualifying attributes, knowledge in the form इदं किंचित् The निर्विकल्पकज्ञान is thus वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रग्रहणम् The Bauddhas regard निर्विकल्पकज्ञान alone as प्रमाण

The existence of निर्विकल्पकज्ञान is proved by अनुमान (ननु निर्विकल्पके किं प्रमाणमिति चेन्न। गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञानं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् दण्डीति ज्ञानवदित्यनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वात्। विशेषणज्ञानस्यापि सविकल्पकत्वेऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गान्निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः—दीपिका) सविकल्पक—having विकल्प or प्रकारता constituted of जाति, गुण, क्रिया and संज्ञा according to the well-known dictum of the Mahabhasyakara चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः *Read the following from* Kavyaprakasa II in this connection, गौः शुक्लश्चलो डित्थ इत्यादौ चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः इति महाभाष्यकारः। उपाधिश्च द्विविधः। वस्तुधर्मो वक्तृयदृच्छासन्निवेशितश्च। वस्तुधर्मोऽपि द्विविधः। सिद्धः साध्यश्च। सिद्धोऽपि द्विविधः। पदार्थस्य प्राणप्रदो विशेषाधानहेतुश्च। तत्राद्यो जातिः। उक्तं हि वाक्यपदीये न हि गौः स्वरूपेण गौर्नाप्यगौः गोत्वाभिसम्बन्धात्तु गौः इति। द्वितीयो गुणः। शुक्लादिना हि लब्धसत्ताकं वस्तु विशिष्यते। साध्यः पूर्वापरीभूतावयवः क्रियारूपः॥—all these are explained in the text further on. The सविकल्पकज्ञान about गौ would be गोत्वजातिमान् शुक्लगुणवान् चलनक्रियावान् डित्थनामा पदार्थः. It is thus नामजात्यादिविशेषणविशेष्यसम्बन्धावगाहि ज्ञानम्. According to the Vedantins ज्ञातृज्ञेयभेदादिमज्ज्ञानम् is सविकल्पक. प्रत्यक्ष is also divided into नित्य and अनित्य, the latter being further divided into लौकिक and अलौकिक, लौकिक is sixfold, घ्राणज, रासन, चाक्षुष, स्पार्शन, श्रौत and मानस. अलौकिक is three-fold, सामान्यलक्षण, ज्ञानलक्षण and योगज. *Out of the sense-organs (including mind) that are* षट्संख्यकानि चक्षुस् त्वक् and मनस् are द्रव्यग्राहक, the rest are द्रव्याग्राहक. The इन्द्रियs are the करण of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान according to Annambhatta. Another view is सुखादिद्रव्यगुणकर्मादिप्रत्यक्षे इन्द्रियमेव करणम्। विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगः इन्द्रियमनःसंयोगो वा व्यापारः। द्रव्यगुणकर्म प्रत्यक्षं फलम्। (न्यायकोश P. 542)

(Line 8)—कदा पुनरिन्द्रियं करणम्—

(1) (करणम्) इन्द्रियम् (चक्षु) ——— अर्थ (घट) ——— फलम् (निर्विकल्पकज्ञान)
इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष (अवान्तरव्यापार)

(2) , परशु ——— वृक्ष ——— फलम् (छिदा)
परशुवृक्षसंयोग (अवान्तरव्यापार)

(Line 16)—(1) (करणम्) इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष ——— फलम्
निर्विकल्पकज्ञानम् (सविकल्पकज्ञानम्)
(अवान्तरव्यापार)

(Line 21) —(1) (करणम्) निर्विकल्पक ज्ञानम् ——— फलम्
सविकल्पकज्ञानम् हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्धयः
(अवान्तरव्यापार)

(Line 10)—वस्तु प्राप्य   वस्तुना सार्धं वस्तुपरिच्छेदकं ज्ञानं जनयन्तीति इति। अथवा वस्तु पदार्थं प्राप्य सन्निकृष्य ज्ञानं करोति इति। The Naiyayika has held that senses produce cognition only after coming into contact with the object. The sense of sight is actually supposed to travel over to the object and to come into contact with it before it is seen. (Line 11)—नामजात्यादि—नाम जाति, गुण and क्रिया (Line 21 —

हानोपादानो , after perceiving an object in all its bearings, we might think of having it or rejecting it or we might choose to remain indifferent about it The reading तज्जन्यसन्निकर्ष etc explains what व्यापार is. If it is genuine, it ought to come with propriety in line 13, where the अवान्तरव्यापार is first mentioned See notes on section 6 for व्यापार (Line 25)—अत्र कश्चिदाह-The objector suggests that it would be simpler to regard इन्द्रिय as the करण in all cases, and whatever intervenes between the करण (इन्द्रिय) and the फल is the intermediate operation Thus according to this view, when the फल is हानादिबुद्धय, the position would be

अवान्तरव्यापार


करणम् (इन्द्रियम्)————————————————फलम्
चक्षु [(1) इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष (2) निर्विकल्पक ज्ञानम् (हानादिबुद्धय)
(3) सविकल्पक ज्ञानम्]

Kesavamisra simply refers to this view, he neither accepts it nor rejects it


(16) The इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष which is the cause of प्रत्यक्षज्ञान is six fold, that is, taking into consideration the peculiar nature of the various इन्द्रियs, and of अभाव (which can not be the direct object of perception) we find that the इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष takes place in six ways श्रोत्र (which is nothing but आकाश circumscribed by the cavity of the ear) can perceive only शब्द with which it can have only समवाय relation (as शब्द is the peculiar गुण of आकाश) संयोग is not at all possible (समवेत समवाय is possible in the perception of शब्दत्व) In the case of other इन्द्रियs, as they can have संयोग relation with their object, संयोग, संयुक्तसमवाय and संयुक्तसमवेतसमवाय सन्निकर्षs are possible (for the perception respectively of घट, घटत्व, and घटरूपत्व by the eye) The following diagrams would make this clear

(१) A चक्षु ——संयोग——घट (१) संयोग
B मन —— ,, ——आत्मा

घट (आत्मा)



(२) संयुक्तसमवाय



The sixth सन्निकर्ष is necessary for the perception of अभाव, and of समवाय also, according to the Naiyayikas as expressed in the form इह कपाले घटसमवाय, the Vaisesikas, on the other hand regard समवाय as अनुमेय only How can we perceive घटाभाव? If there had been समवाय between घट and घटाभाव, there would have been no difficulty in the matter But neither संयोग nor समवाय can exist between घट and घटाभाव, hence we must find a round about way of perceiving घटाभाव We leave aside घटाभाव and concentrate our attention on the भूतल where the घट would have been if it had been existing Thus in perceiving घटाभाव, we as a matter of fact are expected to perceive भूतल (the विशेष्य) characterised by (the विशेषण) घटाभाव घटाभाववत् भूतलम् is the nature of our perception भूतल is of course संयुक्त with the eye To be quite accurate the सन्निकर्ष *should be called* संयुक्तविशेषणविशेष्यभाव *According to the* Tarkadipika the perception can be expressed as भूतले घटाभाव also Here घटाभाव becomes the विशेष्य and भूतले the विशेषण Though ultimately the idea is the same, this view is not correct as घटाभाव there becomes the विशेष्य which obviously it can not be The Dipika also incidentally remarks that this way of perceiving अभाव dispenses with the अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण which is recognised by some as an independent प्रमाण (एतेनानुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरं निरस्तम्। यद्यत्र घटोऽभविष्यत्तर्हि भूतलमिवाद्रक्ष्यत्। इत्यत्राभावज्ञानस्य तर्कितप्रतियोगिसत्त्वविरोध्यनुपलब्धिसहकृतेनेन्द्रियेणैवाभावज्ञानोपपत्तौ अनुपलब्धेः प्रमाणान्तरासम्भवात्। अधिकरणज्ञानार्थमपेक्षणीयेन्द्रियस्यैव करणत्वोपपत्तावनुपलब्धेः करणत्वस्यायुक्तत्वात्।) See also notes on sections *40* and *41* (Line *14*)—चक्षुःसन्निकर्ष The necessity of this four-fold contact in the case of the perception of

the dimension of an object is proved on the ground that the perception of the dimension depends on the perception of each single constituent part of the object, as well as of the object as a whole This however is not the case in the perception of the colour For, if we saw only one side of an object, we should be able to perceive what its colour is If we are very near the object, we might be able to perceive its dimension without the additional four-fold contact, but this contact is absolutely necessary, when the object is at a distance (Line 24)—The reading घर्णशष्कुल्य is unnecessary here It is in its right place in section 46 (Line 34)—मन सयुक्त , the सुखाद्यभाव is perceived in the form सुखाद्यभाववत् मन (Line 36)—the घटाद्यभाव is perceived in the form घटाद्यभाववान् गगन (Line 38)—पञ्चविध the संनिकर्ष which gives us the प्रत्यक्ष of अभाव is the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव (or विशेषणता) संनिकर्ष, and as this विशेषणता is based upon any one of the five relations mentioned before, it is of five kinds These may be stated as follows —

(1) चक्षु सयुक्ते भूतले घटाद्यभावप्रत्यक्षे संयुक्तविशेषणता, in the form घटाभाववत् भूतलम्

(2) चक्षु सयुक्त घटसमवेतरूपे रसाद्यभावप्रत्यक्षे सयुक्तसमवेतविशेषणता in the form, रसाभाववत् घटरूपम्

(3) चक्षु सयुक्तघटसमवेतरूपसमवेतरूपत्वसाम ये रसत्वाद्यभावप्रत्यक्षे सयुक्तसमवेतसमवेतविशेषणता in the form रसत्वाभाववत् घटरूपत्वम्

(4) श्रोत्रसमवेतगकारे घकाराद्यभावप्रत्यक्षे समवेतविशेषणता in the form घकाराभाववान् गकार

(5) श्रोत्रसमवेतगकारसमवेतगत्वसामान्ये घत्वाद्यभावप्रत्यक्षे समवेतसमवेतविशेषणता in the form घत्वाभाववत् गत्वम्

विशेषणविशेष्यभावविशेषणता which would be the possible sixth variety for the perception of घटाभाव on घटाभाव is apparently not admitted as after all it is only a double विशेषणतासंनिकर्ष

(Line 40)—एव समवायोऽपि , the rule is येनेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्गत सामान्यम्, तद्गत समवाय, तद्गत अभावश्च गृह्यते ।

(Line 45)—The verse घटतत्स्थित etc is dropped in some manuscripts

(17)—ननु निर्विकल्पक This is an objection set forth by one who is a follower of the Buddhistic system of philosophy According to the Bauddhas, everything that exists is momentary, यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकम्. Now सामान्य or generality is नित्य according to the Naiyayikas, but according to the objector, सामान्य is असत्, because it follows from यद् सत् तद् क्षणिकम्, that यत्र क्षणिकत्वाभाव (that is, नित्यत्व) तत् असत् Secondly सामान्य is absolutely of no use, it is तुच्छ, having no positive nature

For according to the Bauddhas गोत्व (the सामान्य in गो) does not tell us anything about गो, but is useful only in enabling us *to exclude what is not* गो It has therefore *only a negative nature* The objector puts forward his objection, taking for granted that it is proved that (1) सामान्य is not वस्तुभूत and (2) it serves no useful purpose

The objector says —I can understand that the निर्विकल्पकज्ञान in the form इदं किंचित् can be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण, for there the sense of sight comes into contact with the घट व्यक्ति But how can we have सविकल्पक ज्ञान by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण ? For according to you, सविकल्पकज्ञान is नामजात्यादियोजनात्मक The सविकल्पकज्ञान about घट would be घटत्ववान् (नीलगुणवान् etc) पदार्थ Now I have shown above that the सामान्य is not वस्तुभूत Hence the घटत्वसामान्य which is not वस्तुभूत can not produce any ज्ञान at all So *no सविकल्पकज्ञान can be had, it can never be had by प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण at any* rate

Kesavamisra summarily dismisses the objection by asserting that सामान्य is वस्तुभूत and it is silly to argue that whatever exists is क्षणिक (see section 83 for the nature of सामान्य)

(Line 1)—स्वलक्षणम् is the व्यक्ति, that which possesses a peculiar characteristic of its own, that which is specially individualised (Line 3)—शब्द लिङ्गवत् अनुगताकारावगाहित्वात्–लिङ्ग (indicatory mark) is explained in detail in section 18, and शब्द (Word, Testimony) in section 30 सामान्य is by its very nature अनुगताकारावगाहि, as it resides in all objects belonging to the same class (see section 83) शब्दज्ञान is also अनुगताकारावगाहि, as it necessarily involves the ज्ञान of different objects possessed of सामान्य etc लिङ्गज्ञान likewise is impossible without the knowledge of सामान्य existing in the different व्यक्तिs belonging to the same class

(18) The author now starts on the treatment of अनुमान, which forms perhaps the most important topic in the न्याय system Sections 18–32 deal with अनुमान and should be carefully studied by the *student*

अनुमिति means the cognition or, to borrow a term from western logic, the judgment, which we arrive at by means of inference and अनुमान represents inference or the process by which this cognition is obtained Thus अनुमान is naturally the *special cause or instrument* of अनुमिति Again अनुमिति is described as परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानम् From this it follows that अनुमान which produces अनुमिति, is the same as परामर्श परामर्श, or लिङ्गपरामर्श is defined as लिङ्गस्य तृतीय ज्ञानम् In order to understand this, we must take a concrete instance of an अनुमान and learn the meaning of a few technical terms

The classical instance of an अनुमान, like the celebrated illustration of Socrates and his mortality in western logic, is that in which we infer the presence of fire on a mountain by observing smoke issuing from it. This is expressed as follows पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्र वह्निः । अयं पर्वतः वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् । तस्मादयं पर्वतः वह्निमान्. Here the mountain about which we want to prove something, viz वह्निमत्त्व in this case, is known as पक्ष or the subject. वह्नि, which is the thing that we want to establish or prove, is called साध्य. धूम is designated साधन or लिङ्ग or the indicatory mark because it is on account of this smoke that we are able to prove वह्नि on the mountain. Smoke proves the presence of fire on the mountain, because there is invariable concomitance or association between smoke and fire. Wherever there is smoke, there fire is necessarily found. This invariable association of smoke with fire is known as व्याप्ति.

व्याप्ति is one of the most important terms in Sanskrit Nyāya and long and elaborate discussions are carried on regarding its nature and definition. Our author has perhaps given the simplest definition of this difficult word, when he says that व्याप्ति is साहचर्यनियम or invariability of association or concomitance. व्याप्ति thus possesses two elements viz साहचर्य and नियम or नियतत्वम्. *Some explain* साहचर्य as समानाधिकरण्य or possession of the same abode. Wherever smoke is found, there fire is also present. We have noted this phenomenon by actually observing several smoky places such as the kitchen, the chimney and the steam-engine. Thus we know that between smoke and fire साहचर्य or सामानाधिकरण्य exists. But is this association नियत or invariable? नियतत्व or invariability is the same as व्यभिचाराभाव or the absence of the violation of their association. If a single instance could be found where there is smoke, but no fire, the साहचर्य between smoke and fire would be violated or व्यभिचरित. And as no such contrary instance is available, व्याप्ति exists between smoke and fire and is expressed by the sentence यत्र यत्र धूमः तत्र तत्र वह्निः. Now let us take the converse of this proposition viz यत्र यत्र वह्निः तत्र तत्र धूमः and see whether व्याप्ति exists between वह्नि and धूम. Here we find that in a large number of cases such as the kitchen and the cigarette which that fellow is smoking fire is associated with smoke. Thus there is general association or साहचर्य between fire and smoke. But this association is not invariable, because contrary instances where fire is present without smoke are found. For example, in a red-hot ball of iron or in a lighted electric bulb, there is fire, but no smoke. Hence the साहचर्य between वह्नि and धूम is not नियत and consequently no व्याप्ति exists between fire and smoke.

In the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र धूम तत्र तत्र वह्नि' धूम which is the साधन and वह्नि which is the साध्य are known as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively The meaning of these two terms must be clearly understood व्याप्य and व्यापक as their grammatical formation shows, are relative terms व्यापक means that which pervades or is more extensive and is opposed to व्याप्य which signifies that which is pervaded by or included in the व्यापक or which is less extensive than the व्यापक वह्नि is व्यापक with reference to धूम, because besides being present in all those cases where धूम is present वह्नि is found in others where धूम is not present viz the red hot ball of iron or the lighted electric bulb धूम is thus pervaded by वह्नि and is consequently known as व्याप्य It will thus be seen that wherever the less extensive is present, the more extensive is bound to be there Hence all those conclusions which are based on a व्याप्य साधन are correct In fact the सप्तपदार्थी defines साधन and साध्य as व्याप्य and व्यापक respectively

It should be noted that though व्यापक and व्याप्य are translated as more extensive and less extensive, the terms more extensive and less extensive mean *occurring in greater and less number of cases respectively* A field of ten acres is certainly more extensive than others which extend over five acres only But a ten acre field is *not* व्यापक with reference to a five-acre one, as the meaning of the term व्यापक in this Sastra is concerned For it does not occur in greater number of cases To explain A five-acre field is present wherever fields extending from five to nine acres are present, besides being present in all those cases where a ten acre field is found Thus in the terminology of न्याय a five-acre field is व्यापक with reference to a ten acre *field*, which becomes व्याप्य *To take another illustration The* number 10, though numerically greater than 5 is only व्याप्य with reference to 5 because 5, being present in all those cases where 10 is present is in addition found in the numbers 5 to 9 and hence is व्यापक with reference to 10 It will thus be seen that व्यापक or the more extensive means that which is found in a greater number of cases than its व्याप्य and व्याप्य signifies that which occurs in a less number of cases than its व्यापक

We have seen above that व्याप्य and व्यापक stand for साधन and साध्य respectively But this does not mean that in every instance the साधन should be such as is found in a less number of cases and the साध्य such as is present in a greater number For sometimes the साध्य and साधन may be co-extensive or such as occur in an equal number of cases For example in the अनुमान घटो द्रव्यम् । गुणाश्रयत्वात् , गुणाश्रयत्व which is the

साधन or व्याप्य is found in exactly the same number of cases as द्रव्यत्व For, no case where द्रव्यत्व exists without गुणाश्रयत्व can be conceived Thus to be more accurate व्यापक or साध्य means that which is not found in a less number of cases than the व्याप्य or साधन Similarly व्याप्य or साधन means that which is *not found in a greater number of cases* than the व्यापक or साध्य

We are now in a position to understand the author's statement in section 20, अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च । (अनुमान consists of two parts viz व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता) On account of व्याप्ति we understand in a general way that wherever the साधन, that is smoke, is present, the साध्य, that is, fire *is also found* साधनस्य पक्षधर्मता *or the fact that the* साधन is an attribute of the present पक्ष viz the mountain tells us that fire must also be *present on this mountain* Thus for a valid अनुमान or परामर्श both these parts are necessary

The necessity of these two constituents of परामर्श can be easily proved Take the case 'शब्दः अनित्यः प्रमेयत्वात्' This is not a valid अनुमान, *because though* पक्षधर्मता *is present here,* that is, though प्रमेयत्व resides in शब्द there is no व्याप्ति between प्रमेयत्व and अनित्यत्व We cannot say यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम् because though प्रमेयत्व and अनित्यत्व may be सहचर in such objects as घट *and* पट, प्रमेयत्व *is not accompanied by* अनित्यत्व in such substances as आकाश, काल, दिक् आत्मन्, and मनस्, which *are* all नित्य. On the other hand in 'शब्दः नित्यः अमूर्तद्रव्यत्वात्', we have a correct व्याप्ति but no पक्षधर्मता यत्र यत्र अमूर्तद्रव्यत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम् is a correct proposition But अमूर्तद्रव्यत्व does not reside in शब्द, because शब्द is a गुण *It will thus be seen that for a proper* परामर्श or अनुमान both व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता are necessary The सप्तपदार्थी defines अनुमान as 'व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मताविशिष्टलिङ्गज्ञानम् '

(Line 10)—तस्य (धूमस्य लिङ्गस्य) तृतीय ज्ञानं लिङ्गपरामर्शः—It is the *third* ज्ञान of the indicatory mark धूम, that is the instrument of अनुमिति Thus first there is—

(1) The knowledge of धूम in the kitchen when by means of भूयोदर्शन, the observer is *in a position to understand* the *invariable* concomitance between धूम and अग्नि This is the *First* ज्ञान

No inferential cognition about अग्नि *can arise from this* ज्ञान, as the व्याप्ति between धूम and अग्नि is not yet apprehended, it is only after the व्याप्ति is apprehended that अनुमिति can arise

It might be argued that we might wait for the apprehension of the व्याप्ति, and after the व्याप्ति is apprehended, proceed to draw inference about fire, *from the first* धूमज्ञान *in the kitchen itself*

The answer to this argument is simple enough —*There can be no inference about fire in the kitchen itself* For we actually see fire there and inference has scope only when there is doubt about something

(2) The *second* धूमज्ञान is the knowledge of धूम on the mountain

It is true that when we have this second धूमज्ञान, the व्याप्ति is already *ascertained* and *there is also doubt about the presence of fire* on the mountain, but this second धूमज्ञान also does not enable us to have अनुमिति, because there must be व्याप्तिस्मरण before अनुमिति can take place

(3) The *third* धूमज्ञान arises after the व्याप्ति originally apprehended in the kitchen, is remembered

And *it is this third* धूमज्ञान that produces the अनुमिति *and it is the* करण thereof, according to the modern view of करण viz it must be फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न

Some regard लिङ्ग or लिङ्गज्ञान as अनुमितिकरण These people hold करण to be 'व्यापारवत् असाधारणं कारणम्' and as लिङ्गपरामर्श is immediately followed by अनुमिति, लिङ्गपरामर्श if regarded as अनुमितिकरण, would not be व्यापारवत् Hence they consider लिङ्ग to be *अनुमितिकरण* Now लिङ्ग or लिङ्गज्ञान is followed by the व्यापार viz परामर्श, which in its turn is followed by अनुमिति So लिङ्ग is व्यापारवत् and thus the करण of अनुमिति Kesavamisra evidently held, in the case of अनुमान at any rate, that करण is 'फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणम्' लिङ्गपरामर्श is फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्न, because it is immediately and invariably followed by the फल viz अनुमिति Hence it is the करण of अनुमिति

तर्कदीपिका points out that if mere लिङ्ग or लिङ्गज्ञान is regarded as *अनुमितिकरण, even past or future लिङ्ग would lead to अनुमिति Thus the* smoke that we saw on the mountain yesterday would enable us to infer the presence of fire to-day But this is absurd Therefore mere लिङ्गज्ञान is not enough पक्षधर्मता is also necessary

परामर्श, as we saw before, contains two elements व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता Why should we not regard these two severally as the करणs of अनुमिति? Why should we invent a new complex term such as परामर्श and regard it as the one करण of अनुमिति? दीपिका answers these questions by saying that to regard व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता severally as the two करणs of अनुमिति involves गौरव So it is better to consider परामर्श which contains these two ideas, as the one करण of अनुमिति Read 'ननु व्याप्तिस्मृतिपक्षधर्मताज्ञानाभ्यामेव अनुमित्युत्पत्तेः व्याप्तिविशिष्टलिङ्गपरामर्शः किमर्थमङ्गीकर्तव्य इति चेन्न। वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति शाब्दपरामर्शस्थले विशिष्टपरामर्शस्य आवश्यकतया लाघवेन सर्वत्र परामर्शस्यैव करणत्वात्। लिङ्गं न करणम्। अतीतादौ व्यभिचारात्।'

(Line 14)—यद्यपि यत्र यत्र The author now sounds a note of warning that sometimes mere भूयोदर्शन is likely to deceive us in making us believe that there is व्याप्ति between two objects, when as a matter of fact, there is no व्याप्ति between them We should of course avail ourselves of भूयोदर्शन, but we must at the same time be sure that there is स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध Thus we see fire and smoke together a number of times, but considering the matter further, we find there cannot be व्याप्ति between fire and smoke, for fire is not the प्रयोजक of smoke, but आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग, hence the सम्बन्ध between fire and smoke is not स्वाभाविक, but सोपाधिक Likewise the सम्बन्ध between याज्ञिकी हिंसा and अधर्मसाधनत्व is not स्वाभाविक, because निषिद्धत्व is the प्रयोजक of अधर्मसाधनत्व and not merely हिंसात्व, मैत्रीतनयत्व is not the प्रयोजक of श्यामत्व, but शाकाद्यन्नपरिणतिभेद, hence there can be no व्याप्ति or स्वाभाविकसम्बन्ध between मैत्रीतनयत्व and श्यामत्व (See section 28. This whole passage (lines 14-29) should be read along with section 28, after the student has mastered sections 19-27)

(Line 42)—नानुपलब्धे , quoted from Vatsyayana's Bhasya, this is once again quoted in section 107

(19) This section describes the two kinds of inference known as स्वार्थ and परार्थ When we want to infer something for our own benefit, we go through the process more or less mentally without caring to express in so many words the various stages through which our mind passes. But when we desire to make another comprehend the conclusion that we have formed we must state in definite terms the various stages by which we reach that conclusion This is the distinction between these two kinds of inference Thus, while in स्वार्थानुमान emphasis is laid on the sense, in परार्थानुमान word is more important The सप्तपदार्थी defines them as follows 'स्वार्थमशब्दम् । परार्थं शब्दजन्यम् ।' स्वार्थानुमान is informal, परार्थानुमान is formal and must be expressed by the use of a regular syllogism The न्यायबोधिनी defines them as 'न्यायाप्रयोज्यम्' and 'न्यायप्रयोज्यम्' respectively, where न्याय means a formal syllogism Other definitions of these two kinds of अनुमान are 'परार्थानुमानं शब्दजन्यम् । स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकमेव ।' 'पञ्चावयवेन वाक्येन स्वनिश्चितार्थप्रतिपादनं परार्थानुमानम् ।'

It will be noticed that परार्थानुमान follows and is based on स्वार्थानुमान For, unless we ourselves are sure of a certain conclusion we are not likely to proceed to convince another of it Kesavamisra thus describes the process of स्वार्थानुमान Having repeatedly observed in places such as the kitchen that smoke is accompanied by fire, we realise the invariable concomitance between the two We then approach a

mountain and wonder if it has fire on it Then we see smoke thereon and remember the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire that we have already realised After this the cognition that the mountain is possessed of smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire dawns on us This cognition, as we saw before, is nothing but अनुमान or लिङ्गपरामर्श, which at once leads to the conclusion that the mountain is possessed of fire Such is the process of inference for one elf —It will be noticed that the various stages through which a स्वार्थानुमान passes are भूयोदर्शन, व्याप्तिग्रहण, पर्वतसमीपगमन, संदेह, धूमदर्शन and व्याप्तिस्मरण After this is produced the लिङ्गपरामर्श which is immediately followed by the अनुमिति

(Line २) – अविच्छिन्नमूलात् – This eschews the possibility of smoke being imported there from outside

(Line ९)–यत्तु परार्थानुमान consists in the use of a regular five-membered Sanskrit syllogism for the purpose of making another understand the presence of fire on the mountain after one has inferred it for oneself The five sentences beginning with 'पर्वतो वह्निमान्' represent the five members of a Sanskrit न्याय or syllogism stated in the proper form The five membered syllogism when formally stated enables even another to infer the presence of fire on the mountain

It will be noticed that the Sanskrit अनुमान includes in it to a certain extent what in western logic is known as Induction This latter consists in the observation of several particular cases and inferring therefrom a general conclusion which will be found to be true in a subsequent case resembling those that we have already observed If we were to remember the way in which we arrive at a व्याप्ति in a Sanskrit अनुमान, we would find that we do so by following the Inductive method For a व्याप्ति is based on भूयोदर्शन or the repeated observation of particular cases Thus the Sanskrit अनुमान is a mixture of Induction and Deduction It must at the same time be admitted that Sanskrit logicians did not develop Induction as an independent process

This division of अनुमान into स्वार्थ and परार्थ is not known to Gautama and Kanada, who were respectively the founders of the Nyaya and the Vaiseshika systems It is however mentioned in the Bhashya of Prasastapada on the Sutras of Kanada and is consequently fairly old —Gautama divides अनुमान into three kinds viz पूर्ववत्, शेषवत् and सामान्यतो दृष्ट This is the oldest division available पूर्ववत् अनुमान is that where from the cause we infer the effect, as when we infer that a shower of rain would fall when clouds threaten in the sky शेषवत् is

the opposite of this viz when we infer the cause from the effect Thus when we see a river in floods, we infer that there must have been rains somewhere up in its course All other cases of inference which are not from the cause to the effect or vice versa fall under the heading of सामान्यतो दृष्ट Thus, if after seeing a person in one place we find him in another some time later, we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval We see the sun in the morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening We therefore infer आदित्यस्य गमनम् from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived Read 'अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववच्छेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च (न्यायसूत्र I 1 5) यत्र कारणेन कार्यमनुमीयते तत् पूर्ववत् । पूर्वं कारणं पूर्ववत् = कारणलिङ्गकम् । यथा मेघोन्नत्या भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति अनुमानम् । यत्र कार्येण कारणमनुमीयते तच्छेषवत् । शेषं कार्यं तल्लिङ्गकं शेषवत् । यथा नदीवृद्ध्या वृष्ट्यनुमानम् । कार्यकारणभिन्नलिङ्गकं सामान्यतो दृष्टम् । यथा, व्रज्यापूर्वकमन्यत्र दृष्टस्यान्यत्र दर्शनमिति, तथा चादित्यस्य, तस्मादस्ति अप्रत्यक्षाप्यादित्यस्य व्रज्या इति अनुमानम् ।

(Line 16)–वाक्येन प्रतिज्ञादिमता–the syllogism containing the five members प्रतिज्ञा etc It is strange that our author who does not mind repetition, should not even give the names of the five members, here They are given and explained in section 100 below The five members are प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरणम्, उपनय and निगमनम् The न्यायबोधिनी defines them as follows 'साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा । लिङ्गस्य पञ्चम्यन्तत्वेन वचनं हेतुः । व्याप्तिप्रतिपादकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम् । परामर्शप्रतिपादकवचनमुपनयः । लिङ्गस्य व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताप्रतिपादकसाध्यवत्त्वेन पक्षवचनं निगमनम् । (i) प्रतिज्ञा consists in the statement of the proposition that we want to prove e g पर्वतो वह्निमान् Here we assert that the साध्य viz वह्नि is possessed by the पक्ष viz पर्वत (ii) हेतु consists in stating that the indicatory mark is an attribute of the पक्ष, that is, is present on it e g धूमवत्त्वात् It should be noted that a distinction is here made between लिङ्ग and हेतु, though the two words are often used as synonyms लिङ्ग is the actual indicatory mark and हेतु is the statement that this indicatory mark is present on the subject (iii) उदाहरणम् consists of two parts viz व्याप्ति or the statement of the invariable concomitance between the लिङ्ग and साध्य and an instance to illustrate it e g यो यो धूमवान् स स वह्निमान् यथा महानस । (iv) उपनय, lit bringing near, is the application of the general statement embodied in the व्याप्ति to the case under discussion 'तथा च अयम्' is the technical form in which उपनय is expressed तथा means वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् and अयं means पर्वत This is nothing but the परामर्श as we have it in section 18 (v) निगमनम् or conclusion is the re-statement of the proposition, which forms the

प्रतिज्ञा as proved by the हेतु given. Its technical form is 'तस्मात् तथा', where तस्मात् = धूमवत्त्वात् and तथा = वह्निमान्.

These five members occur by the same names in Gautama's sutras. Read प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा । उदाहरणसाधर्म्यात् साध्यसाधनं हेतुः । तथा वैधर्म्यात् । साध्यसाधर्म्यात् तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम् । तद्विपर्ययाद्वा विपरीतम् । उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तथेति वा साध्यस्योपनयः । हेत्वपदेशात् प्रतिज्ञायाः पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् । न्यायसूत्र I 1 32–39

We have already seen that the third member of the syllogism viz उदाहरणम् consists of व्याप्ति and दृष्टान्त. It is difficult to see how the term उदाहरणम् can include व्याप्ति in addition to an example which is the proper meaning of that term. The explanation is that originally उदाहरण consisted of an example only. But in course of time the importance of the general proposition on which the whole process of inference depended came to be realised and a place had to be found *for it in the formal syllogism* with the result that the व्याप्ति *was* included under उदाहरणम्. If we look to Gautama's sutras we find that according to him the syllogism runs as follows: पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूमवत्त्वात् । यथा महानसम् । धूमवांश्चायम् । तस्मात् तथा । Gautama's scheme had no place for the statement of the व्याप्ति. This is also proved if we understand that the word तथा is naturally construed as a co-relative of यथा when we drop the व्याप्ति: यथा महानसः धूमवान् तथा अयं पर्वतः धूमवान्—this is how the उदाहरण and उपनय were to be originally understood. But when व्याप्ति came to be added, तथा received a new sense, which has already been noted above.

• The Vaisesikas also admit a five-membered syllogism, but they have different names for the various members except the first. Their names are प्रतिज्ञा, अपदेश (mark), निदर्शनम् अनुसन्धानम् (retrospection) and प्रत्याम्नाय (re-assertion).

The five membered syllogism is the normal one in Sanskrit and is accepted by all Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas. Vatsyayana in his Bhasya however notes that some logicians who apparently flourished even before Gautama, add five more and make the syllogism to consist of ten members. These five are जिज्ञासा (the desire to know), संशय (*the doubt*), शक्यप्राप्ति (*the belief in the possibility of a* solution), प्रयोजन (the purpose in view in attaining the conclusion) and संशयव्युदास (the removal of doubt). As विश्वनाथ points out in his वृत्ति, these five are not regular members of a न्याय or syllogism, *but* only help us in attaining the knowledge arising from the syllogism and as such cannot be regarded न्यायावयव. Read 'दशावयवान् एके नैयायिका वाक्ये सञ्चक्षते । जिज्ञासा संशयः शक्यप्राप्तिः प्रयोजनं संशयव्युदास इति ।' वात्स्यायन's भाष्य

on न्यायसूत्र I 1 32, 'एतेषां च न न्यायावयवत्वं न्यायाघटकत्वात्। न वा न्यायजन्यधीघटकत्वेनैव अवयवत्वम्। अतिप्रसंगात् प्रयोजनाभावाच्च।' विश्वनाथ's वृत्ति on the same

The five membered syllogism is *not however universally* accepted The Vedantins accept only three members viz प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and उदाहरण, or उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन ('अवयवाश्च त्रय एव प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणरूपा उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनरूपा वा न तु पञ्च। अवयवत्रयेणैव व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतोपदर्शनसम्भवेन अधिकावयवद्वयस्य व्यर्थत्वात्' वेदान्तपरिभाषा) The Mimansakas also admit three viz प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and उदाहरण, or हेतु, उदाहरण and उपनय The Bauddhas on the other hand are satisfied with only two viz उदाहरण and उपनय, or प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु where व्याप्ति and दृष्टान्त are included under हेतु

Students *of logic* will be interested in *comparing the five* membered न्याय of Gautama with the three-membered syllogism of Aristotle *and the modern European logicians It would appear at first* sight that either some members in Gautama's Nyaya are superfluous *or* that the syllogism *of Aristotle is defective But a closer* examination will show that *neither of these alternatives is true* Both the Gautamian Nyāya and the *Aristotelian syllogism* lead *to* valid conclusions So there is nothing essentially wrong with either But while Aristotle gives us the absolutely *necessary parts of an inference*, Gautama's Nyaya has the form of a dialogue between two disputants *For example*, the प्रतिज्ञा is nothing but a dogmatic *statement* of what you want to prove made with a view to excite opposition When therefore the opponent questions the validity of your statement, you give your reason which constitutes the हेतु The opponent then asks what connection there is between the हेतु and the साध्य, *to* which you reply by enunciating the व्याप्ति And thus the dispute goes on So *from the point of view of the form which Gautama wanted his Nyāya* to assume and of the purpose which he had in view viz to convince an opponent of the truth of the conclusion *that one has reached, all* the five members were necessary But looked at from the point of absolute necessity, the first two members *of Gautama's Nyaya can* be safely dispensed with, for they are repeated in the fifth and the fourth member respectively *This in fact* has actually been done by a section of the Vedantins, who admit only उदाहरण, उपनय and निगमन, which correspond exactly *with the three members of the Aristotelian* syllogism

Comparison of the Sanskrit Nyaya with the western syllogism tells us that साध्य corresponds *with the major term*, पक्ष with *the minor* term and लिङ्ग with the middle term Similarly उदाहरण minus the दृष्टान्त represents *the major premise*, उपनय the minor *premise and* निगमन the conclusion In converting a Sanskrit Nyaya into a western syllogism

what we should do is to ignore प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु and the दृष्टान्त of the उदाहरण Thus the usual अनुमान about the eternal smoking mountain may thus be converted into a correct syllogism (a Universal Affirmative in *Barbara*) as follows

(प्रतिज्ञा) पर्वतो वह्निमान् । To be omitted
(हेतु) धूमवत्त्वात् । To be omitted
(उदाहरणम्) यो यो धूमवान् स स वह्निमान् यथा महानस } = Whatever is smoky is fiery , All smoky is fiery
(उपनय) अयं पर्वत वह्निव्याप्यधूमवान् = This mountain is smoky
(निगमनम्) तस्मादयं पर्वतो वह्निमान् = This mountain is fiery

Similarly the hackneyed illustration of western logic about Socrates' mortality can thus be turned into a Sanskrit Nyaya

(Major premiss) All men are mortal = सर्वे मनुष्या मर्त्याः or यत्र यत्र मनुष्यत्वं तत्र तत्र मर्त्यत्वम् । Add to this a दृष्टान्त such as यथा पेरिक्लिसे and this major premiss becomes a correct उदाहरणम्.

(Minor premiss) Socrates is a man = सॉक्रेटिस मनुष्य or सॉक्रेटिस मर्त्यत्वव्याप्यमनुष्यत्ववान् (उपनय)

(Conclusion) Socrates is mortal = तस्मात् सॉक्रेटिस मर्त्य or मर्त्यत्ववान्। (निगमनम्)

In order to make this conversion complete we have to add प्रतिज्ञा and हेतु, thus सॉक्रेटिस मर्त्य । मनुष्यत्वात् । And the western syllogism becomes a correct Sanskrit Nyaya

(Line 16)—पञ्चरूपोपपन्नात् See section 24, for the five characteristics of a good अन्वय The reading पञ्चावयवोपपन्नात् is not good, as the characteristics of a लिङ्ग are usually spoken of as रूप and not अवयव An अनुमानवाक्य is पञ्चावयव, but a लिङ्ग or हेतु (अन्वयव्यतिरेकि) is पञ्चरूप

(20–23) These sections deal with the three fold division of लिङ्ग which is based on the nature of the व्याप्ति in which it figures व्याप्ति or the invariable concomitance between the लिङ्ग or साधन and साध्य, through the force of which the लिङ्ग enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways positive and negative When we say that a certain thing (such as fire) invariably follows the presence of another (such as smoke), we state the व्याप्ति positively (अन्वय) Thus ' यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः । यथा महानसे । ' is an instance of अन्वयव्याप्ति It is so called because अन्वय or the presence of *smoke* and fire is here seen in the kitchen On the other hand when we declare that a certain thing (such as *fire*) being absent in a certain

place, another thing (such as smoke) is also absent from it, we state the व्याप्ति negatively (व्यतिरेकेण) Thus 'यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभावः तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः । यथा ह्रदे ।' is an instance of व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति It is so called because व्यतिरेक or the absence of smoke and fire is here observed in the pool It will be noticed that these two kinds of व्याप्ति are just two different ways of expressing the same fact viz the invariable association between smoke and fire For, to say that smoke is invariably associated with fire is the same thing as to say that fire being absent, smoke is also absent The अन्वयव्याप्ति can consequently be turned into the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति by what in western logic is known as obverted conversion. For example,

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्र वह्निः = 'All smoky is fiery'
By obversion, = No smoky is not-fiery
By conversion, = 'No not-fiery is smoky', that is, 'All not fiery is not-smoky
= यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभावः तत्र तत्र धूमाभावः ।

It will be noticed that the absence of the व्याप्य (i e the साधन धूम) in the अन्वयव्याप्ति becomes the व्यापक (and hence the साध्य) in the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति (viz धूमाभाव), similarly the absence of the व्यापक (i e the साध्य अग्नि) in the अन्वयव्याप्ति becomes the व्याप्य (and hence the साधन) in the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति (viz वह्न्यभाव)

The अन्वयव्याप्ति and the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति being thus two different ways of expressing the same phenomenon of the invariable concomitance between साधन and साध्य, it would appear that every साधन or लिङ्ग could have these two व्याप्तिs But this is not actually the case For the rule is that the व्याप्ति is not complete unless it has a corresponding दृष्टान्त or example Now it may so happen that a लिङ्ग may have an example for both the अन्वय and व्यतिरेक व्याप्ति, when it is called अन्वयव्यतिरेकि Another will find an example for only the अन्वयव्याप्ति and none for the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, when it is known as केवलान्वयि A third will possess an example for only the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति and none for the अन्वयव्याप्ति, and it is then designated केवलव्यतिरेकि

Thus (i) धूमवत्त्व with reference to the साध्य वह्नि is an अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग, because both kinds of व्याप्ति complete with examples are possible with regard to it Another example of an अन्वयव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग is कृतकत्व when अनित्यत्व is साध्य e g शब्दोऽनित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वं यथा घटः । यत्र यत्र अनित्यत्वाभावस्तत्र तत्र कृतकत्वाभावो यथा गगने । (ii) An example of केवलान्वयि लिङ्ग is प्रमेयत्व or knowability when अभिधेयत्व or nameability is the साध्य, e g घटः अभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् । यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्र

अभिधेयत्वे यथा घटे । यत्र यत्र अभिधेयत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र प्रमेयत्वाभाव यथा— Here we cannot find any example for the व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति, because everything under the sun is knowable and hence nameable The peculiarity of the केवलान्वयि लिङ्ग lies in this that here the साध्य and साधन belong to everything in existence, so that no entity which is characterised by the साध्याभाव and the साधनाभाव can be thought of (iii) An example of केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग is गन्धवत्त्व when इतरभेद is साध्य, e g पृथिवी इतरभिन्ना गन्धवत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र गन्धवत्त्व तत्र तत्र इतरभिन्नत्व यथा— । यत्र यत्र इतरभिन्नत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र गन्धवत्त्वाभाव यथा जले । Here we notice that no example is found for the अन्वयव्याप्ति, for everything which has गन्ध is पृथिवी and is thus included in the पक्ष The peculiarity of the केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग is that here the साध्य and the साधन are co-extensive with the पक्ष, so that no entity, other than पक्ष, where they reside, can be found In this case we find that पृथिवी, पृथिवीतरभेद (which by the way means nothing but पृथिवी) and गन्धवत्त्व are all equally extensive Another example of केवलव्यतिरेकि लिङ्ग is as follows जीवच्छरीर सात्मक प्राणादिमत्त्वात् । यत्र यत्र प्राणादिमत्त्व तत्र तत्र सात्मकत्व यथा— । यत्र यत्र सात्मकत्वाभाव तत्र तत्र प्राणादिमत्त्वाभाव यथा घटे । Here we notice that no example for the अन्वयव्याप्ति is available, for everything which is possessed of vital airs etc and has a soul is included in the पक्ष viz जीवच्छरीर (a living body) Similarly the पक्ष जीवच्छरीर, the साध्य सात्मकत्व and the साधन प्राणादिमत्त्व are all co extensive

(21) The author tells us here why it is usual to give an instance of अन्वयव्याप्ति only, even in the case of an अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतु The reason is —*There is no point in giving both positive and negative instances,* when our purpose is served by an instance of one type only, and therein we prefer the अन्वय instance to the व्यतिरेक one, because an अन्वय instance is more easily understandable, being more straightforward *The reading यथा शब्दोऽनित्य etc does not come in with propriety* after the remark एवम् मे दृष्टव्या, which suggests that the argument is over

(22) (Line 22)—अत्र च व्यवहार साध्य The author draws our attention to the fact (which we are likely to over look) that the साध्य in the argument *in question is प्रमाणमिति व्यवहार and not प्रमाणम्* For, if the syllogism is प्रत्यक्षादिक प्रमाणम् । प्रमाकरणत्वात्, the position would be that the साध्य (प्रमाण) would be the same as the हेतु (प्रमाकरण=प्रमाण) and naturally no inference is possible if the हेतु and साध्य are one, if *the साध्य is प्रमाणमिति व्यवहार, it is different from the हेतु, प्रमाकरण,* and there would be no difficulty

(24) In this section, Kesavamisra mentions the characteristics of a valid reason They are five viz (1) पक्षधर्मत्वम् being present in

the पक्ष The valid reason, smoke, for example, is present in the subject, mountain (ii) सपक्षे सत्त्वम् being present in a similar instance e g the smoke is present in the kitchen (iii) विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति being absent from a dissimilar instance e g the smoke is absent from the great pool (iv) अबाधितविषयत्वम् not having its object or साध्य disproved by a stronger proof Thus if we were to argue 'अग्निरनुष्णः द्रव्यत्वात् जलवत्,' the विषय or साध्य viz अग्नेरनुष्णत्वम् would be बाधित or disproved by a stronger proof viz प्रत्यक्ष or direct perception, which tells us that fire is hot So the हेतु द्रव्यत्व is not अबाधितविषय and consequently cannot be a सद्धेतु Smoke however does not possess its साध्य वह्निमत्त्व disproved in this manner and hence it is a valid reason (v) असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् not having a rival reason which proves the opposite of its साध्य For example, शब्दः नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्. Here the सामान्य शब्दत्व is श्रावण or audible because of the rule 'येनेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्गतं सामान्यं, तद्गतः समवायः, तद्गतोऽभावश्च गृह्यते ' It is also नित्य So श्रावणत्व would seem to prove the eternality of sound But we find there is a rival reason which proves just the opposite of what श्रावणत्व seems to prove Thus one may with equal force argue 'शब्दः अनित्यः कार्यत्वात् घटवत् Therefore the हेतु श्रावणत्व is said to be सत्प्रतिपक्ष inasmuch as it has an equally powerful rival viz कार्यत्व which proves the opposite of its साध्य In the case of the smoke however there is no such rival and it is a valid reason consequently

These are then the five characteristics which a valid reason must possess and if a reason is deficient in one or more of these, it is fallacious It will be noticed that these five characteristics are found in an अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतु only, such as धूम in the stock example is A केवलान्वयी and a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु cannot by their very nature have विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति and सपक्षे सत्त्वम् respectively, because in their case a विपक्ष and सपक्ष do not exist

(25) See section 18 above

(26) हेत्वाभास —See section 28 below A केवलान्वयी हेतु is valid though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षे सत्त्वम्, अबाधितविषयत्वम् and असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् (विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति is impossible)

A केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु is valid, though possessed of only the following four characteristics, पक्षधर्मत्वम्, विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति, अबाधितविषयत्वम् and असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम् (सपक्षे सत्त्व is impossible)

(27) In this section the author is defining the terms पक्ष, सपक्ष and विपक्ष पक्ष is that with reference to which the thing to be proved is doubtful A simpler definition of पक्ष is सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् Thus in the usual illustration of the smoky mountain the साध्य is वह्निमत्त्व As

वह्निमत्त्व is not definitely known to be possessed by the mountain i e as it is doubtful with regard to the mountain, therefore we proceed to establish it by means of a formal syllogism *Hence* पर्वत is a पक्ष — An objection is here raised In the case of a परार्थानुमान where after ascertaining the presence of the fire on the mountain for ourselves, we proceed to convince another of that fact, the mountain is not सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्, because we know for certain that it is fiery It is thus निश्चितसाध्यवान् *How can the mountain then be a* पक्ष *in this case ?* The obvious answer to this is that though the mountain may be निश्चितसाध्यवान् *to us*, it is certainly सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् to the man to whom we are proving its वह्निमत्त्व Hence it is a पक्ष all right There is also a pedantic answer to the above objection According to this पक्षता is *defined afresh as* ' *सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्टसिद्ध्यभावः* (*सिषाधयिषाविरहविशिष्ट* सिद्ध्यभाव ।) ' i e in order that a thing should be a पक्ष, it should possess the absence of definite knowledge (सिद्धेः अभाव which by the way is nothing but सन्दिग्धसाध्यवत्त्वम्) characterised by the absence of a desire to prove Now in the case objected to viz where we want to prove the वह्निमत्त्व of the mountain to another after having ascertained it for ourselves, there is certainly no सिद्ध्यभाव with regard to the mountain, as we know definitely that *it is possessed of fire* But this सिद्ध्यभाव, which is absent, is not characterized by सिषाधयिषाविरह, since we possess सिषाधयिषा or desire to prove Therefore the mountain is a पक्ष inspite of our definite knowledge What the new definition of पक्षता means is that in order to constitute a पक्ष there should either be *सिद्ध्यभाव* or *सिषाधयिषा* Thus in the present case though सिद्ध्यभाव does not exist inasmuch as we possess definite knowledge, the mountain can be a पक्ष because there is सिषाधयिषा

सपक्ष and *विपक्ष are easily understood* सपक्ष *or a similar instance* is that which is definitely known to possess the साध्य It forms the दृष्टान्त to the अन्वयव्याप्ति which along with it is included under उदाहरण The kitchen is the सपक्ष in the case under discussion For both parties agree that the kitchen is possessed of fire and a सपक्ष or a दृष्टान्त should be such as is acceptable to both the parties to a dispute —विपक्ष or a dissimilar instance is the opposite of सपक्ष It is that which is definitely known not to possess the साध्य महाह्रद which as everybody knows does not possess fire is the विपक्ष in the present case विपक्ष *constitutes the* दृष्टान्त *in the* व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति

(28) The author now proceeds to treat of हेत्वाभास The word हेत्वाभास is used in two senses First it means a fallacious reason (हेतुवदाभासन्ते इति हेत्वाभासा दुष्टहेतव इत्यर्थः । न्यायबोधिनी ॥ हेतुलक्षणरहिता हेतुवदवभासमाना

हेत्वाभासा । p 30, foot note) and it is in this sense that our author has used the word Secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious (हेतो आभास दोष इत्यर्थः) The five *defects* which underlie the five fallacious reasons enumerated by our author are असिद्धि, विरोध, व्यभिचार, प्रतिपक्ष and बाध —An objection is here raised What is the use of learning about हेत्वाभास or fallacious marks ? If one knows what a valid mark is, that is quite enough The answer is that the knowledge of fallacious marks is necessary in order to detect fallacies in the arguments of our opponents and to avoid using such invalid reasons in our own

हेत्वाभास is also defined as 'अहेतवो हेतुवदाभासमानाः' i e a reason which is deficient in one or more of its members or characteristics (of a valid reason mentioned in section 24 above)

The first हेत्वाभास is असिद्ध or unproven असिद्ध हेतु is that which is void of सिद्धि and सिद्धि is defined as 'व्याप्तस्य हेतोः पक्षधर्मतया प्रतीतिः' (see P 104, line 6) Now we know that this is nothing but परामर्श सिद्धि like परामर्श, thus consists of two elements, पक्षधर्मता and व्याप्ति and a हेतु which is deficient in one of these is असिद्ध A हेतु may lack पक्षधर्मता in two ways viz (i) when the पक्ष has no existence at all in the world of realities In this case the हेतु is known as आश्रयासिद्ध because it has no substratum or support to reside in (ii) When the हेतु is not actually present in the पक्ष This is known as स्वरूपासिद्ध, because the हेतु is in its own nature unproven in the पक्ष The third variety of असिद्ध is (iii) व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, because it lacks व्याप्ति which is the second requisite of सिद्धि

(1) An instance of आश्रयासिद्ध is 'गगनारविन्दं सुरभि अरविन्दत्वात् । सरोजारविन्दवत्' Here we find that the पक्ष, viz a sky-lotus, simply does not exist, because it is only an imaginary thing आश्रयासिद्ध thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid हेतु viz पक्षधर्मत्वम् Another illustration of आश्रयासिद्ध is 'वन्ध्यापुत्रः शूरः पुत्रत्वात् । कौसल्यापुत्रवत्'

Under आश्रयासिद्ध is also included the reasoning which is known as सिद्धसाधन or establishing a thing which is already well known, e g 'चन्द्रबिम्बं वर्तुलं वर्तुलत्वात्' That the orb of the moon is round is not questioned by anybody and need not consequently be proved This reasoning falls under आश्रयासिद्ध, because the orb of the moon, though actually existing unlike the sky lotus, is not a पक्ष in the technical sense of 'सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्' For about 'चन्द्रमण्डलस्य वर्तुलत्वम्' there is no सन्देह whatsoever in the mind of any one It is only in this sense that the आश्रय viz पक्ष does not exist in the case of सिद्धसाधन Another illustration of सिद्धसाधन is 'देवदत्तो हस्तपादादिमान् हस्तपादादिमत्तया दृश्यमानत्वात्'—It

should be noted that the stock example of western logic about Socrates and his mortality will fall under आश्रयासिद्ध, because Socrates cannot be considered as पक्ष, as his mortality is not a subject of doubt to any one

(ii) स्वरूपासिद्ध is instanced by 'शब्दोऽनित्य चाक्षुषत्वात् घटवत्.' Here चाक्षुषत्व or visibility is not found in the पक्ष शब्द at all चाक्षुषत्व is पक्षे स्वरूपेण असिद्ध or unproven in the subject in its own nature This हेत्वाभास also lacks पक्षधर्मत्व Other illustrations are 'ह्रदो द्रव्य धूमवत्त्वात् पर्वतवत् ।' 'अयं पशुः विषाणित्वात् बलीवर्दवत् ।' 'आत्मा अनित्य कृतकत्वात् घटवत् ।' 'घट नित्य विभुत्वात् व्योमवत् ।'

(iii) व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध is the third and last variety of असिद्ध *It is explained as* व्याप्यत्वं (हेतो वह्नेः साध्येन धूमेन व्याप्यत्वम्) *असिद्ध यस्मिन् in which the* व्याप्यत्व *of the reason is not established i e in which the reason is* not व्याप्य or invariably associated with the साध्य In a valid व्याप्ति (यत्र यत्र धूम, तत्र तत्र वह्नि) the हेतु (धूम) is व्याप्य or pervaded by the साध्य (वह्नि) If in an argument we find that the हेतु is not for some reason साध्यव्याप्य then that हेतु will fall under व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध Take the case 'पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात्' Here धूम is साध्य and वह्नि is हेतु The व्याप्ति is stated as 'यत्र यत्र वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम' Now we find that the हेतु वह्नि is not व्याप्य or less extensive, as a valid हेतु should be, with regard to the साध्य धूम For fire is found in more places than smoke Fire is present in all places where smoke is present and is in addition found in certain others where smoke exists not viz a red hot ball of iron or a burning electric bulb So in the above instance the व्याप्यत्व of the हेतु वह्नि is असिद्ध Consequently the हेतु वह्नि in the syllogism 'पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात्' is a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु Here we find that the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति *is violated For the* विपक्ष *in this case is* वह्नितप्ताय गोलक *or* ज्वलद् विद्युद्गोल *where* धूमाभाव *is definitely known to be present.* But the हेतु वह्नि is not absent from these Hence the violation of विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति

A व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेतु, as *instanced in* 'पर्वतो धूमवान् वह्निमत्त्वात्' *involves the* violation of व्याप्ति, because the हेतु वह्नि is not धूमव्याप्य or invariably associated with धूम The reason why this is so is that धूम is not naturally or by its own nature associated with वह्नि We find however that in most cases धूम is associated with वह्नि But this association is due to an extraneous factor viz आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग Only when fire is in contact with wet fuel, it will be invariably associated with smoke Thus in order that the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र वह्नि तत्र तत्र धूम' should be valid, or in order that the हेतु वह्नि in this case should be a sound one and not a हेत्वाभास, *we must add to the* व्याप्ति *a qualification viz* आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे सति Thus

only when it is forbidden Thus निषिद्धत्व is the उपाधि in this case. निषिद्धत्व is found in all those places where the साध्य viz अधर्मसाधनत्व is found for निषिद्धत्व is the cause of अधर्म Hence निषिद्धत्व is साध्यव्यापक. Further, निषिद्धत्व is not present wherever the साधन हिंसा is present, for slaughter in sacrifice is not only not निषिद्ध, but is actually विहित or enjoined So निषिद्धत्व is साधनाव्यापक Both the characteristics of उपाधि being thus present in it, निषिद्धत्व is a proper उपाधि and the हेतु हिंसात्व is consequently व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध or सोपाधिक —It will be noticed that the reason हिंसात्व lacks विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति, because विपक्षे अधर्मसाधनत्वाभाववति यज्ञपशुमारणे हिंसात्वसत्त्वात्

Another somewhat interesting example of the same हेत्वाभास is 'गर्भस्थः मित्रातनयः श्यामः मित्रातनयत्वात् । इतरतनयवत् ' There was a lady of the name मित्रा who had a few dark-complexioned sons (and one or two fair ones) When Mitra conceived once more, a student of logic argued in the above manner and tried to prove that the son in the womb would also be dark But the argument is not correct For we find that मित्रातनयत्व is not the cause of श्यामत्व श्यामत्व is caused in her sons because Mitra used to eat only vegetables and no ghee at the time when these dark sons were born (According to the eugenics of the Naiyayikas, darkness of complexion is the result of the mother's partaking of vegetables only If the mother ate ample ghee, she would have fair children Persons interested should note this !) Hence शाकपाकजत्व is the उपाधि in this case 'यत्र यत्र श्यामत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकपाकजत्वम्'—thus शाकपाकजत्व is साध्यव्यापक Further, we cannot say 'यत्र यत्र मित्रातनयत्वं तत्र तत्र सर्वत्र शाकपाकजत्वम्' For when her fair sons were born, she was subsisting on ghee शाकपाकजत्व is thus साधनाव्यापक Both the characteristics are thus found to be present in शाकपाकजत्व which consequently is a proper उपाधि

In all these cases we have seen that the हेत्वाभास व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध involves the असिद्धि or non-establishment of व्याप्ति, because there is an उपाधि which vitiates it. The असिद्धि of व्याप्ति arises in two other ways also viz. (i) when there is no valid means of ascertaining the व्याप्ति and (ii) when the व्याप्ति is inherently impossible An example of (i) is शब्दः क्षणिकः सत्त्वात् । यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं यथा जलधरः । This argument is based on the theory of the Buddhists who believe in the momentariness of all existing things To the Naiyāyikas no such entity as momentariness exists, because they believe that even the most transient object lasts for at least three moments, the moment of its production, the moment of its destruction and the moment that intervenes between these two. So there is no प्रमाण that can grasp the invariable concomitance

between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व and consequently the व्याप्ति is असिद्ध. Kesavamisra mentions this variety only and remarks that शब्दः क्षणिकः सत्त्वात् must not be regarded as an instance of सोपाधिक व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, for that would mean that we are prepared to admit the व्याप्ति between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व, under certain conditions, and that there is a प्रयोजक (other than सत्) for क्षणिकत्व All this is tantamount to saying that क्षणिकत्व is a proved entity which it cannot be for an entity must remain for at least three moments (ii) is illustrated by 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् काञ्चनमयधूमात् ' Here we note that though ordinary धूम is वह्निव्याप्य, काञ्चनमयधूम is not so In fact no such thing as काञ्चनमयधूम exists The व्याप्ति therefore is असिद्ध and the हेतु काञ्चनमय धूम becomes व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध —It will be noticed that this variety can be included under the first by saying that there is no प्रमाण which can grasp the व्याप्ति between काञ्चनमयधूम and वह्नि

The above discussion will give the student a fairly correct idea of सोपाधिक व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध which of all the fallacious reasons is a bit difficult to understand The characteristics of उपाधि viz साध्यव्यापकत्व and साधनाव्यापकत्व are best remembered by having a concrete instance of उपाधि such as आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग always in view Further elaboration of उपाधि is unnecessary for a bala for whom this treatise is intended We however quote the following passage wherein Annambhatta mentions and illustrates four varieties of उपाधि Read 'उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः । केवलसाध्यव्यापकः, पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः, साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः, उदासीनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकश्चेति । अत्र आद्रेन्धनसंयोगः । द्वितीयो यथा वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादिति । अत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम् । तृतीयो यथा-ध्वंसो विनाशी जन्यत्वादिति । अत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । चतुर्थो यथ-प्रागभावो विनाशी प्रमेयत्वादिति । अत्र जन्यत्वावच्छिन्नानित्यत्वव्यापकं भावत्वम् । ' दीपिका

We have seen that all cases of सोपाधिक व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध involve the violation of the third characteristic of a valid reason viz विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध thus resembles साधारण अनैकान्तिक (पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात्) which also lacks विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति (see section 30) The two must therefore be distinguished The difference between the two is mainly based on what strikes one in each of them as prominent Thus while in साधारण अनैकान्तिक strikingness lies in the too wide character of the reason which, being consequently present in the विपक्ष, violates the concomitance, in व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध it is the presence of the उपाधि which vitiates the concomitance, that strikes one as prominent. In साधारण अनैकान्तिक the fact that the हेतु is associated with the साध्याभाव is more prominent. In व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand what strikes us more is the fact that the साध्य is not due to the हेतु, but to some extrane-

ous factor There is another and more subtle point of distinction between the two, based on the nature of the व्याप्ति. In साधारण अनैकान्तिक the व्याप्ति is recognised as being positively व्यभिचरित or violated owing to the presence of the हेतु in the विपक्ष In व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand the व्याप्ति cannot be grasped at all owing to the presence of the उपाधि Thus while the one is positively defective, the other is only negatively so व्यभिचार is a positive defect, असिद्धि represents only the negative side of the concomitance साधारण अनैकान्तिक is easily noticed owing to its positive character व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध on the other hand may easily pass undetected owing to the difficulty of locating the उपाधि.

It may be noted *en passant* that a view prevails among Naiyayikas which refuses to recognise व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध as a हेत्वाभास For, they argue that if we keep the उपाधि in mind, it is quite possible to draw a correct conclusion from what is regarded as a व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध हेत्वाभास Thus 'पर्वतो धूमवान् आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे सति वह्निमत्त्वात्' is a correct nyaya In the case of other fallacious reasons on the other hand no matter what you do, you will not be able to draw a correct conclusion For example, the साधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु in 'पर्वतो वह्निमान् प्रमेयत्वात्' cannot be rectified by the addition of a qualification or something of the kind सोपाधिकव्याप्यत्वासिद्ध thus stands on a different footing from the other hetvabhasas The *answer to this view is that for a proper syllogism an absolutely* universal concomitance unfettered by any condition is necessary In the above example the व्याप्ति 'यत्र यत्र आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोगे सति वह्निः तत्र तत्र धूम' is no doubt true But it will not do for a proper nyaya because it is conditioned by the उपाधि आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग

(29) This section deals with the हेत्वाभास विरुद्ध or contrary A valid हेतु is साध्यव्याप्त i e invariably associated with the साध्य धूम for example is वह्निव्याप्त i e wherever धूम is found, वह्नि is also found A विरुद्ध हेतु is just the opposite *of this i e it is साध्याभावव्याप्त This means* that instead of tending to prove its proper साध्य, it proves exactly the opposite Hence it is significantly called विरुद्ध or contrary For example, in 'शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वात्' we find that the हेतु कृतकत्व, far from being the व्याप्य of नित्यत्व, is the व्याप्य of नित्यत्वाभाव Thus we cannot say, 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम्' But we can legitimately assert 'यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वाभावः or अनित्यत्वं यथा घटे' It will be noticed that the विरुद्ध हेतु कृतकत्व is present in the पक्ष शब्द, but is not found in a सपक्ष (*i e any eternal thing such as* आकाश), *nor is it absent from* a विपक्ष (i e any non-eternal thing such as घट) Consequently it lacks सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति The सप्तपदार्थी defines विरुद्ध as '*पक्षविपक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वं विरुद्धत्वम्*' *गौतम's definition is* '*सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी* विरुद्धः न्या सू. I ii 6

विरुद्ध must be distinguished from साधारण अनैकान्तिक Both resemble in so far as both tend to prove the साध्याभाव But (1) while साधारण अनैकान्तिक can prove the साध्याभाव *in addition to* the साध्य owing to its being too wide, विरुद्ध proves the साध्याभाव only on account of its being the व्याप्य with regard to it (2) Secondly, while साधारण अनैकान्तिक is present in the विपक्ष in addition to the सपक्ष, विरुद्ध, though present in the विपक्ष, is never present in the सपक्ष विपक्षे सत्त्व is common to both But साधारण अनैकान्तिक has सपक्षे सत्त्व also, which विरुद्ध lacks

विरुद्ध need not be distinguished from असाधारण (and अनुपसंहारी, this is not admitted by Kesavamisra, the Tarkasamgraha admits it) अनैकान्तिक because there is not much of a striking resemblance between these But one may, if one likes, say that विरुद्ध resembles असाधारण अनैकान्तिक in so far as both lack सपक्षे सत्त्वम् But (1) while असाधारण अनैकान्तिक is not present in the सपक्ष because it is confided to the पक्ष only, विरुद्ध is not found in the सपक्ष because it is associated with साध्याभाव (2) Secondly, while असाधारण अनैकान्तिक does not tend to prove anything, neither the साध्य nor the साध्याभाव, on account of its too narrow character, विरुद्ध distinctly proves the साध्याभाव

[Similarly विरुद्ध may be said to resemble अनुपसंहारी अनैकान्तिक in so far as both lack सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति But (1) while अनुपसंहारी lacks these because there can be no सपक्ष and विपक्ष at all विरुद्ध is deficient in them because it is not present in सपक्ष and is not absent from विपक्ष, though सपक्ष and विपक्ष exist in its case (2) Secondly, अनुपसंहारी cannot prove anything, because there is no complete व्याप्ति for it विरुद्ध on the other hand proves the साध्याभाव]

(30) This section treats of the अनैकान्तिक fallacy अनैकान्तिक is explained as सव्यभिचार सव्यभिचार means that which involves the व्यभिचार or violation of the व्याप्ति or the invariable concomitance between the साधन and साध्य It will be noticed that in each of the two varieties of अनैकान्तिक, the व्याप्ति cannot be correctly stated The term अनैकान्तिक is significant and explains the general nature of this fallacious reason It means 'not ऐकान्तिक (एक अन्त यस्य नत्) or that which does not possess only one extreme, i e that which does tend to prove not only one thing, but also its opposite ' अनैकान्तिक thus means inconclusive The Tarkasamgraha calls this fallacy सव्यभिचार

अनैकान्तिक has two varieties, साधारण and असाधारण (1) साधारण or too wide is that सव्यभिचार or discrepant reason which exists in a place that is possessed of the negation of the साध्य or the thing to be established An illustration of साधारण अनैकान्तिक is पर्वतो वह्निमान्

प्रमेयत्वात् महानसवत् Here we find that the reason प्रमेयत्व is found even in a place which is possessed of the negation of the साध्य A pool is possessed of वह्निमत्त्वाभाव, but it is प्रमेय all the same Consequently प्रमेयत्व is an invalid or fallacious reason It will be noticed that the reason प्रमेयत्व involves the violation of the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति —The व्यभिचार or violation of the व्याप्ति that is involved in this fallacious reason is thus explained यत्र यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्र तत्र वह्निमत्त्वम् is the nature of the व्याप्ति here प्रमेयत्व is साधन and वह्निमत्त्व is साध्य Now we know that in a correct व्याप्ति the साधन should be व्याप्य or less extensive and the साध्य व्यापक or more extensive But the साधन प्रमेयत्व is not व्याप्य in this case In fact प्रमेयत्व is perhaps the *most* व्यापक *thing that we can ever conceive* Thus the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित or violated in the case of this हेतु viz प्रमेयत्व which consequently becomes a हेत्वाभास —This variety of अनैकान्तिक is called साधारण *or too wide* because the हेतु is *not restricted to* पक्ष and सपक्ष but extends to विपक्ष as well The मलपद्दीपिका defines this kind of हेत्वाभास as पक्षत्रयवृत्तित्वम् '—In the illustration of साधारण अनैकान्तिक given in *the text* शब्दो नित्यः प्रमेयत्वात् व्योमवत् ' the हेतु प्रमेयत्व is *found not only* in the सपक्ष viz व्योम but also in the विपक्ष viz any अनित्य thing such as घट It is thus पक्षत्रयवृत्ति

A साधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु should be distinguished from a valid केवलान्वयी हेतु as instanced in घटः अभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् Both resemble in so far as both lack the third characteristic of a valid हेतु viz विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति But the difference between them is three fold (1) A केवलान्वयी हेतु does not possess the characteristic विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति, because there is no विपक्ष at all A साधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand possesses a विपक्ष, from which however it is not absent owing to its defective nature (2) In the case of a केवलान्वयी हेतु the अन्वयव्याप्ति is quite sound, while with a साधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु the व्याप्ति involves व्यभिचार and is thus defective (3) The peculiarity of a केवलान्वयी हेतु is as we saw before that the साध्य (अभिधेयत्व) and साधन (प्रमेयत्व) belong to everything in existence This however is not so in the case of a साधारण अनैकान्तिक Here the साध्य वह्निमत्त्व cannot *be said to belong to all things*, though the साधन प्रमेयत्व is all-extending

(ii) *The second variety of* अनैकान्तिक *is* असाधारण *or too narrow* This consists in the हेतु being present in the पक्ष only It is thus too narrow since it does not extend to सपक्ष where it should really be found The example is शब्दः नित्यः शब्दत्वात् Here सपक्ष are constituted by नित्य things such as आकाश, काल, दिक् and आत्मन् विपक्ष are represented by अनित्य *objects such as* घट, पट, कुम्भ *Now we find that the* हेतु शब्दत्व *is absent* from all these नित्य things which are सपक्ष as well as from all the अनित्य

things which are the विपक्ष It exists only in the पक्ष viz शब्द Hence शब्दत्व is असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु Here the second characteristic of a valid हेतु viz सपक्षे सत्त्वम् is violated The व्यभिचार consists in this that the व्याप्ति ' यत्र यत्र शब्दत्वं तत्र तत्र नित्यत्वम् ' is not correct For between the साधन शब्दत्व and the साध्य नित्यत्व, व्याप्यव्यापकभाव does not exist In fact there is no connection whatsoever between शब्दत्व and नित्यत्व -In the illustration of the असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु given in the text, ' पृथिवी नित्या गन्धवत्त्वात् ' we notice that the हेतु गन्धवत्त्व is absent from all नित्य and अनित्य things which form the सपक्ष and विपक्ष respectively

The असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु must be distinguished from a valid केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु, from which also the characteristic सपक्षे सत्त्वम् is absent An instance of the latter as we saw before, is जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकं प्राणादिमत्त्वात् Here also we find that the हेतु प्राणादिमत्त्व is पक्षमात्रवृत्ति and that it is not possessed of the characteristic सपक्षे सत्त्वम् But the difference between the two is as follows (1) For a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु the characteristic सपक्षे सत्त्वम् is not possible, because there is no सपक्ष at all In the case of an असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand सपक्षs certainly exist But the हेतु is not found in them on account of its defective nature (2) The व्याप्ति in the case of a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु is sound, though it is stated negatively In the case of an असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand, the व्याप्ति involves व्यभिचार or the violation of the invariable association of the साधन and the साध्य (3) In the case of a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु the साध्य, साधन and पक्ष are all equally extensive Thus सात्मकत्व, प्राणादिमत्त्व and जीवच्छरीर are all equally extensive In the case of an असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु on the other hand this is not so For we can easily see that नित्यत्व, शब्दत्व and शब्द are not of equal extent

The समन्वयार्थी designates the असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु by the term अनध्यवसित and defines it as ' साध्यासाधकत्वे सति पक्षमात्रवृत्तित्वमनध्यवसितत्वम् ' This is a better definition than our author's, for the expression साध्यासाधकत्वे सति serves to exclude a valid केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु from falling within the definition of अनध्यवसित Both a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु and an अनध्यवसित or असाधारण अनैकान्तिक हेतु are पक्षमात्रवृत्ति But while a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु is साध्यसाधक on account of the correct व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति with which it is connected, an अनध्यवसित is साध्यासाधक or cannot prove the साध्य owing to its defective nature Our author's definition of an असाधारण अनैकान्तिक will include a valid केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु as there is nothing in it to exclude the same The definition is thus defective to that extent

{ A third variety of अनैकान्तिक, अनुपसंहारी or non exclusive, is given in the Tarkasamgraha This consists in the reason being void of a similar or dissimilar instance This can only happen when every-

thing in existence is included in the पक्ष itself, so that nothing is left out that can be considered a सपक्ष or विपक्ष An example of अनुपसंहारि अनैकान्तिक हेतु is 'सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वात्' *As 'सर्वम्' which includes every*thing forms the पक्ष, no similar or dissimilar instance can be thought of. Thus the peculiarity of this हेत्वाभास is that its पक्ष includes everything It will be noticed that both सपक्षे सत्त्वम् and विपक्षाद् व्यावृत्ति are wanting *here The व्यभिचार consists in the fact that the व्याप्ति is* incomplete in the absence of a positive or negative instance Another example of this हेत्वाभास can well be 'सर्वं नित्यं प्रमेयत्वात्'—उपसंहारिन् means that which withdraws or withholds, that which excludes, exclusive अनुपसंहारी consequently means non exclusive This हेत्वाभास is so called because it does not exclude anything from its पक्ष i e it includes everything in it so that nothing remains for being regarded as सपक्ष or विपक्ष

(31) प्रकरणसम or सत्प्रतिपक्ष or counter balanced is easily understood *It is that reason for which there exists* another reason proving the opposite of its साध्य Another example is 'शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्' and 'शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वात् घटवत्' Here we note that while श्रावणत्व seems to prove the नित्यत्व of शब्द, कार्यत्व proves the opposite viz अनित्यत्व with equal force So श्रावणत्व has a well matched rival (सन् प्रतिपक्षः यस्य) and is therefore rightly known as सत्प्रतिपक्ष In order to make the definition clearer and more accurate we should add तुल्यबल *before* हेत्वन्तरम् This हेत्वाभास *violates* the fifth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्

गौतम designates this हेत्वाभास by the term प्रकरणसम which has been adopted by the तर्कभाषा and सप्तपदार्थी (It is called सत्प्रतिपक्ष in the Tarkasamgraha) प्रकरण means an argument and प्रकरणसम is explained as प्रकरणेन समः or प्रकरणमनतिक्रान्तः i e a reason which is like an argument i e which does not go beyond the argument This means that the प्रकरणसम हेतु *does not carry* the argument any step further, but leaves it where it was, as it cannot prove definitely either this or that

प्रकरणसम must be distinguished from विरुद्ध In both we find that साध्याभाव is proved Thus they resemble each other But (1) while विरुद्ध itself proves the साध्याभाव, प्रकरणसम does not do so itself, but has another powerful rival which does it प्रकरणसम is consequently rendered inconclusive (2) Secondly, *in विरुद्ध only the साध्याभाव is proved*, in प्रकरणसम, on the other hand, the साध्य is proved by the हेतु proper, but there is also another हेतु which proves the साध्याभाव

(32) The fifth and the last hetvabhasa is कालात्ययापदिष्ट or बाधित, which consists in having the negation of its साध्य already ascertained

by another proof Its example is 'अग्निरनुष्णः द्रव्यत्वात् or कृतकत्वात् जलवत्' Now we know by the perceptive cognition of touch that fire is hot and as प्रत्यक्ष is a stronger proof than अनुमान उष्णत्व which we know through it, contradicts or annuls the अनुष्णत्व that is intended to be proved by the reason द्रव्यत्व or कृतकत्व Hence द्रव्यत्व or कृतकत्व is a कालात्ययापदिष्ट हेतु Here the fourth characteristic of a valid हेतु viz अबाधितविषयत्वम् is violated —In order to make the definition of कालात्ययापदिष्ट clearer and more accurate we should add बलवत्तरेण before प्रमाणान्तरेण

कालात्ययापदिष्ट must be distinguished from प्रकरणसम Both resemble in so far as in both the साध्याभाव is established by another प्रमाण But (i) while in प्रकरणसम the other प्रमाण which proves the साध्याभाव is another हेतु of equal strength (as indicated by the term प्रतिपक्ष) in कालात्ययापदिष्ट the प्रमाणान्तर proving the साध्याभाव is much stronger and is usually प्रत्यक्ष This is also indicated by the term कालात्ययापदिष्ट for only a stronger प्रमाणान्तर can annul or contradict the first (ii) Secondly in प्रकरणसम the first साध्य is merely rendered doubtful by the existence of another reason which proves its opposite In कालात्ययापदिष्ट on the other hand the more powerful प्रमाणान्तर completely disproves the साध्य which consequently is rendered fal e

कालात्ययापदिष्ट is the term which is adopted by the सप्तपदार्थी al o for this हेतु the Tarkasamgraha calls it बाधित कालात्ययापदिष्ट means that which is stated after the proper time for it has passed away A हेतु is to be stated when the साध्य is doubtful In the case of a बाधित or कालात्ययापदिष्ट हेतु the साध्याभाव (अनुष्णत्व) is long known So the हेतु द्रव्यत्व or कृतकत्व comes a day too late Hence the name कालात्ययापदिष्ट

Kesavamisra follows Gautama in mentioning five fallacious rea.ons Gautama s names for three of them are however different His five hetvabhasas are सव्यभिचार (=अनैकान्तिक) विरुद्ध प्रकरणसम साध्यसम (=असिद्ध) and कालातीत (=बाधित) See न्यायसूत्र I ii 4 These are the five hetvabhasas which the Naiyayikas the followers of Gautama, admit —The सप्तपदार्थी however enumerates six viz असिद्ध विरुद्ध अनैकान्तिक अनध्यवसित कालात्ययापदिष्ट and प्रकरणसम But the अनैकान्तिक and अनध्यवसित are nothing but the साधारण and असाधारण अनैकान्तिक respectively of our author So the number comes to five ultimately —The Vaise sikas the followers of Kasyapa or Kanada on the other hand admit only three hetvabhasas viz अनपदिष्ट or सन्दिग्ध विरुद्ध and असिद्ध ('विरुद्धासिद्धसन्दिग्धमलिङ्गं काश्यपोऽब्रवीत्) and this represents one of the principal points of distinction between the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas

(33) Now we proceed to the third kind of proof viz उपमान Kesavamisra has followed Gautama in admitting four प्रमाणs See

न्यायसूत्र I 1 3 'प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि' The Vaisesikas do not recognise उपमान and शब्द as independent प्रमाणs They include them under अनुमान

उपमान is the instrument of उपमिति or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it For producing this उपमिति, knowledge of similarity is necessary Therefore उपमान is सादृश्यज्ञान A man does not know the meaning of the word गवय *He is told by a forester,* who often has opportunities of seeing gavayas in the forest, that a 'gavaya' is like an ox 'यथा गौ तथा गवय' or 'गोसदृशो गवय' is what the forester tells him This sentence is known as अतिदेशवाक्य or directing sentence — अतिदेश technically means extended application, application by analogy or by transference of attributes The sentence 'गोसदृशो गवय' directs the transference of the attributes of the known animal गो *to* the unknown animal गवय and is hence *known as* अतिदेशवाक्य —Now this ignorant fellow goes to the forest after having heard this directing sentence and sees an animal resembling an ox Then he recollects the directing sentence after which the cognition 'असौ गवयशब्दवाच्य' arises in him This cognition is known as उपमिति

It will thus be seen that for the production of उपमिति two previous cognitions are necessary viz अतिदेशवाक्यार्थज्ञान obtained *from some authoritative person* and सादृश्यज्ञान *obtained by actual observation* Of these सादृश्यज्ञान is the करण of उपमिति and is therefore called उपमान अतिदेशवाक्यार्थ is recollected after the सादृश्यज्ञान and this recollection helps the सादृश्यज्ञान to produce the उपमिति So the stages in the rise of उपमिति are सादृश्यज्ञान–अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरण—उपमिति As the अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरण *comes between the* करण सादृश्यज्ञान *and the* कार्य उपमिति, *it is known as* अवान्तरव्यापार or intermediate or accessory mental operation It will be seen from this that the view about करण that Kesavamisra takes here is 'व्यापारवद् असाधारण कारणं करणम्' But in asserting 'लिङ्गपरामर्श एव अनुमितिकरणम्' in section 16 our author relied on 'फलायोगव्यवच्छिन्नं कारणं करणम्'

The purpose of उपमान is to obtain knowledge of something unknown by its similarity to something known We know a certain term (संज्ञा) such as गवय But we have never seen the object denoted by that term (संज्ञि) This means we have not obtained the knowledge of the connection existing between that term and its object This knowledge, it is argued cannot be produced by प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान Hence उपमान is admitted as an independent Pramana to account for its production Read 'सब उप पत्तिरुप्र (निश्चयज्ञान) मनसा मनीषा गृह्य) प्रत्यादि-रसन्य सादृश्यमत्र विद्ध ॥ कुसुमाञ्जलि of उदयनाचार्य

We have seen above that उपमिति or the knowledge of the connection between a term and the object denoted by it or the knowledge of something unknown from something which is known, is produced by सादृश्यज्ञान But this is not, it is pointed out, the *only way* of producing उपमिति We sometimes get the knowledge of an unknown entity by learning about its special characteristic For example we know what a rhinoceros is when we are told that it has a horn adorning its nose Then again we sometimes come to know an object by merely learning that it has certain characteristics not found in some entity that we are familiar with Thus a camel might be recognised by us if we were to know that it does not possess a level back and short neck like a horse These two cases are also included under उपमिति by considering the expression सादृश्यज्ञान in the text to be merely an उपलक्षण Read ' त्रैधमुपमानम् (i) सादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् । यथा गोसादृश्यविशिष्टः गवयः । (ii) असाधारणधर्मविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् । यथा नासिकाविलसदेकशृङ्गः खड्गः । (iii) वैधर्म्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानम् । यथा उष्ट्रः न अश्ववत् समानपृष्ठः ह्रस्वग्रीवश्च ।

(34) The passage इत्यु (line 2) is dropped in some manuscripts

(35) Sections 35-38 deal with the last of the four proofs, namely, शब्द Just as we obtain *correct knowledge from* perception inference and analogy, in the same way we get correct knowledge from word But such word must have been spoken by a trustworthy person and a trustworthy person is he who asserts things as they are i e the truth (यथाभूतार्थस्य वक्ता) It will thus be seen that the authoritativeness of word as regards the knowledge which it gives rise to is ultimately based *on* truth However trustworthy a man may be supposed to be *if he does not* state what is exactly the truth he ceases to be आप्त and his word will have no value

A sentence is formed by a group or *collection of* words [A word is defined as शक्त or possessed of the power of expressing its conventional meaning - शक्तं पदम् । अस्मात् पदादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इतीश्वरसङ्केतः शक्तिः । ' तर्कसंग्रह । Explain शक्तम् as शक्तं शक्तिः । नपुंसके भावे क्तः । शक्तं शक्तिः अस्य अस्ति इति शक्तं पदम् । अर्शआदित्वाद् ' शक्ति is the convention of God that a certain meaning is to be understood from a certain word Here we get the Naiyayikas' philosophy regarding the origin of the expressive power of words Words convey a meaning because God has willed that they should do so शक्ति is the same as अभिधा or the expressive power of words which denotes their conventional meaning

Here a doubt arises What about words like डित्थ डवित्थ देवदत्त and यज्ञदत्त to which meaning is assigned by the संकेत or will of human

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beings? All proper nouns fall under this class, for the meaning which they convey depends not on the will of God but on that of individuals. *To escape from this difficulty the moderns define* शक्ति as इच्छामात्रम्. Thus in the case of proper nouns it is human will, and in the case of other words divine will that *give* them their conventional meaning. Others stick to the old definition of 'ईश्वरसंकेत' and account for the expressive power of proper nouns by saying that men, in designating certain individuals by such names as डित्थ etc., are really impelled by God and hence even proper nouns have ultimately divine will as their source.]

वाक्य was defined as a collection of words. But in order that this collection of words should be able to convey authoritative meaning it must be possessed of three characteristics viz आकाङ्क्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि. आकाङ्क्षा or expectancy is defined in the Tarkasamgraha as पदान्तरस्य अन्यपदस्य व्यतिरेकेण अभावेन प्रयुक्तम् (कस्यचित् पदस्य) अन्वयाननुभावकत्वम् अन्वितप्रतीत्यजनकत्वम्. आकाङ्क्षा thus means the inability of a word to convey a connected meaning (अन्वय) in the absence of another word. Read '*पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तम् अन्वयबोधाजनकत्वं न तु इतरसमभिव्याहृतत्वमात्रम् आकाङ्क्षा*' न्यायकोशे. Words are said to be साकाङ्क्ष when the expectancy created by one is satisfied by another. Thus the words 'देवदत्त ग्रामं गच्छति' are possessed of expectancy, because as soon as देवदत्त is uttered a desire to know something about him ('किं तस्य') arises in us and that desire is satisfied by the words ग्रामं गच्छति. But disconnected words like गौ अश्व पुरुष हस्ती are निराकाङ्क्ष, because they do not mutually fulfil the expectancy created by each. Therefore such a group of words, though forming a sentence technically, since it is a पदसमूह, is not authoritative because it lacks आकाङ्क्षा.

The second requisite of an authoritative sentence is योग्यता or compatibility defined as बाधाभाव or absence of contradiction. This means the meanings of the various words constituting a sentence must be compatible or consistent and not contradict one another. Take the sentence आम्रफलं पिबति. The mango fruit is not a thing to be drunk. There is therefore बाध or contradiction between आम्रफल and पान. The sentence आम्रफलं पिबति thus does not possess योग्यता and is consequently unauthoritative. Similarly अग्निना सिञ्चति lacks योग्यता, because fire is incompatible with the action of sprinkling.

Expectancy and compatibility are not enough to make a sentence authoritative. It must have सन्निधि or juxtaposition as well. Juxtaposition means uttering words without undue interval between them. Thus in order that the sentence देवदत्त ग्रामं गच्छति should be authorita-

tive, you must utter the words one after another without long delay between them If on the other hand you pronounce देवदत्त now, ग्रामम् three hours hence and गच्छति another three hours later, the three words would not form a sentence proper owing to the absence of सन्निधि between them and so would not be authoritative Read in this connection the following 'वाक्यं स्याद् योग्यताकाङ्क्षासत्तियुक्तः पदोच्चयः ॥ योग्यता पदार्थानां परस्परसम्बन्धे बाधाभावः । पदोच्चयस्यैतदभावेऽपि वाक्यत्वे 'वह्निना सिञ्चति' इत्यादि अपि वाक्यं स्यात् । आकाङ्क्षा प्रतीतिपर्यवसानविरहः । स च श्रोतुर्जिज्ञासारूपः । निराकाङ्क्षस्य वाक्यत्वे 'गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्ती' इत्यादीनामपि वाक्यत्वं स्यात् । आसत्तिर्बुद्ध्यविच्छेदः । बुद्धिविच्छेदेऽपि वाक्यत्वे इदानीमुच्चारितस्य देवदत्तशब्दस्य दिनान्तरोच्चारितेन गच्छतीति पदेन सङ्गतिः स्यात् । अत्र आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतयोरात्मार्थधर्मत्वेऽपि पदोच्चयधर्मत्वमुपचारात् ।' साहित्यदर्पण

(36) The matter discussed in this section may be thus summarised Expectancy, compatibility and juxtaposition are declared to be the characteristics of words But expectancy is really an attribute of the human soul and compatibility a feature not of words, but of the meaning denoted by words When the word देवदत्त is uttered, it is we who entertain expectancy to know something about देवदत्त Similarly incompatibility exists not between the words अग्निना and सिञ्चति, but between the senses conveyed by those words Juxtaposition alone belongs properly to words How can we then speak of expectancy and compatibility as the characteristics of शब्दसमूह ? The answer is that आकाङ्क्षा and योग्यता, though primarily the attributes of आत्मन् and अर्थ, are said to be शब्दसमूहधर्म only metaphorically

The objector says—आकाङ्क्षा can not certainly belong to the words When we utter the sentence नद्यास्तीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्ति, the *word* फल has no आकाङ्क्षा for the *word* तीर The *sense* of the word फल may have आकाङ्क्षा for the *sense* of the word तीर But strictly speaking, आकाङ्क्षा can not belong to the sense either, आकाङ्क्षा, being of the nature of इच्छा, is an attribute of the soul

The siddhāntin replies—(1) आकाङ्क्षा should be regarded as primarily belonging to अर्थs, as they create it in the mind of the hearer, and secondarily to the words as being expressive of *those* अर्थs, or (2) आकाङ्क्षा primarily *belongs to* the soul and secondarily to the words, and also to the things expressed by them Words primarily signify अर्थs and afterwards give rise to आकाङ्क्षा with reference to other अर्थs That is why they are metaphorically called साकाङ्क्ष

(Line 9)—स्वमर्थं साकाङ्क्षा It would be better if we drop साकाङ्क्षा, because the author is now dealing with योग्यता and has finished with the discussion about आकाङ्क्षा or construe एवं साकाङ्क्षा अर्थाः

अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनात् तदुपपादकीभूतार्थान्तरकल्पनम् अर्थापत्तिः, gives a not too clear explanation of अर्थापत्ति Presumption is the postulating of something to account for some fact which can not be accounted for otherwise Read the following from न्यायकोश—अर्थस्य आपत्तिः, or अर्थस्य आपत्तिः यस्मात् इति फलकारणयोरुभयोरपि तिङ्घयोगो भवति । सा चार्थापत्तिर्द्विविधा दृष्टार्थापत्तिः श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्चेति । तत्र दृष्टार्थपरिकल्पना इदं रजतमिति पुरोवर्तिनि प्रतिपन्नस्य रजतस्य नेदं रजतमिति तत्रैव निषिध्यमानत्वं सत्यत्वे सति अनुपपन्नमिति रजतस्य मिथ्यात्वं कल्पयति । श्रुतार्थापत्तिर्यथा श्रूयमाणवाक्यस्य स्वार्थानुपपत्तिमुखेनार्थान्तरकल्पनं सा । यथा तरति शोकमात्मविदित्यत्र श्रुतस्य शोकशब्दवाच्यबन्धजातस्य ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वानुपपत्त्या बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वं कल्प्यते । श्रुतार्थापत्तिश्च द्विविधा—अभिधानानुपपत्तिरभिहितानुपपत्तिश्च । तत्र यत्र वाक्यैकदेशश्रवणे अन्वयाभिधानानुपपत्त्या अन्वयाभिधानोपयोगि पदान्तरं कल्प्यते तत्राभिधानानुपपत्तिः । यथा द्वारमित्यत्र पिधेहीत्यध्याहारः । अभिहितानुपपत्तिस्तु यत्र वाक्यावगतोऽर्थोऽनुपपन्नत्वेन ज्ञातः सन्नर्थान्तरं कल्पयति तत्र द्रष्टव्या । यथा स्वर्गकामो ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेतेत्यत्र क्षणिकतया अवगतज्योतिष्टोमस्य स्वर्गसाधनत्वानुपपत्त्या मध्यवर्त्यपूर्वं कल्प्यते । (P 79) Vatsyayana explains it as वाक्यार्थसम्प्रत्ययेनानभिहितस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यनीकभावाद्ग्रहणमर्थापत्तिः । यत्राभिधीयमानेऽर्थे योऽन्योऽर्थः प्रसज्यते सोऽर्थापत्तिः । यथा मेघेष्वसत्सु वृष्टिर्न भवतीति । किमत्र प्रसज्यते । सत्सु भवतीति । Presumption is chiefly admitted by the Mimamsakas, though some Vedantins also accept it दृष्टार्थापत्ति or Direct Presumption, admitted by प्राभाकरमीमांसक, occurs when a man, observing *the fatness of Devadatta, who, he had noted, does not dine* by day, concludes in his mind that he must be having his meals by night भाट्टमीमांसक, the followers of कुमारिलभट्ट, admit श्रुतार्थापत्ति One hears 'पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते' From this, one presumes in so many words 'देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते' This is श्रुतार्थापत्ति The difference between the two is not material One is based upon observation and does not require the presumption to be expressed in so many words The other is founded upon report and requires that the presumption should be stated in a verbal form

The हेतु to prove the रात्रिभोजन on the part of Devadatta is a केवलव्यतिरेकी हेतु Thus

> अयं देवदत्तो रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते । (प्रतिज्ञा)
> दिवा अभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनत्वात् । (हेतु)
> यः न रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते स दिवा अभुञ्जानत्वे सति न पीनः (व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति)

We can have a दृष्टान्त of यज्ञदत्त who neither eats by day, nor by night Thus रात्रिभोजन can be proved by केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान, and there is no necessity of admitting अर्थापत्ति as an independent Pramana

The अन्वयव्याप्ति for the हेतु would be in the following form, यः दिवा अभुञ्जानत्वे सति पीनः स रात्रौ भुङ्क्ते Now it is quite possible that we might get here a सपक्ष यज्ञदत्त who, we have ascertained, is fat and does not eat by day, but eats by night But the opponent wants to prove the

(2) सम्बन्ध is of two kinds —(a) संयोग and (b) समवाय

(a) संयोग can exist only between द्रव्यs or substances. अभाव is no द्रव्य, therefore there can be no संयोग with reference to अभाव

(b) समवाय exists between अयुतसिद्ध objects and अभाव does not figure in any of the five pairs of अयुतसिद्ध objects Therefore there can not be समवाय either

(3) As regards the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव, it is no सम्बन्ध at all it is a mere figment of the imagination of the opponent. A सम्बन्ध to be regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions—

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (मौलिदण्डसंयोग is different from मौलि and दण्ड)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (मौलिदण्डसंयोग depends upon both मौलि and दण्ड)

(c) And it must be one (मौलिदण्डसंयोग is एक)

विशेषणविशेष्यभाव does not satisfy any one of these conditions Thus, take the instance of दण्डपुरुष (दण्डविशिष्ट पुरुष where दण्ड is the विशेषण and पुरुष is the विशेष्य)—

(a) दण्डपुरुषभाव is *not* different from दण्ड and पुरुष The विशेषणत्व of दण्ड is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of पुरुष is not a different object but his own nature

Similarly in घटाभाववत् भूतलम्, घटाभाव is the विशेषण, but its विशेषणत्व is not a different object, but its own nature, in भूतले घटाभाव, घटाभाव is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature अभाव also is not possessed of सामान्य etc, which would have enabled us to think of its सम्बन्ध with something else

So विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not different from विशेषण and विशेष्य

(b) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not उभयाश्रित for in the विशेषण, there is only विशेषणभाव, and no विशेष्यभाव, and in the विशेष्य, there is only विशेष्यभाव and no विशेषणभाव

(c) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is *not* एक, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेषणभाव and (2) विशेष्यभाव

This proves that विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is no सम्बन्ध

(4) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is only metaphorically called सम्बन्ध, so the use of the expression सम्बन्ध with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

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(a) संयोग can exist only between द्रव्यs or substances अभाव is no द्रव्य, therefore there can be no संयोग with reference to अभाव

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(3) As regards the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव it is no सम्बन्ध at all it is a mere figment of the imagination of the opponent A सम्बन्ध *to be* regarded as such, must satisfy three conditions—

(a) It must be different from the objects it connects (पुरुषदण्डसंयोग is different from पुरुष and दण्ड)

(b) It must depend upon both the objects it connects (पुरुषदण्डसंयोग depends upon both पुरुष and दण्ड)

(c) And it must be one (पुरुषदण्डसंयोग is एक)

विशेषणविशेष्यभाव does not satisfy any one of these conditions Thus, take the instance of दण्डपुरुष (दण्डविशिष्ट पुरुष where दण्ड is the विशेषण and पुरुष is the विशेष्य)—

(a) दण्डपुरुषभाव is not different from दण्ड and पुरुष The विशेषणत्व of दण्ड is not a different object but its own nature, so the विशेष्यत्व of पुरुष is not a different object but his own nature

Similarly in घटाभाववत् भूतलम्, घटाभाव is the विशेषण, but its विशेषणत्व is not a different object but its own nature, in भूतले घटाभावः, घटाभाव is the विशेष्य, but its विशेष्यत्व is not a different object, but its own nature अभाव also is not possessed of संयुक्तत्व etc, which would have enabled us to think of its सम्बन्ध with something else

So विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not different from विशेषण and विशेष्य

(b) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is not उभयाश्रित for in the विशेषण there is only विशेषणभाव, and no विशेष्यभाव and in the विशेष्य, there *is only* विशेष्यभाव and no विशेषणभाव

(c) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is *not* एक, for the compound expression, when analysed gives us the idea of two things (1) विशेषणभाव and (2) विशेष्यभाव

This proves that विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is no सम्बन्ध

(4) विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is only metaphorically called सम्बन्ध, so the use of the expression सम्बन्ध with reference to it, should not be regarded as an

argument in favour of its being a सम्बन्ध The reason why विशेषणविशेष्यभाव is figuratively called सम्बन्ध is this —Just as in the case of भेरीदण्डसंयोग, the सम्बन्ध implies the cognition of both भेरी and दण्ड, so in the case of दण्डपुरुष also, the knowledge of both दण्ड and पुरुष is necessary That is all

(c) As regards the so-called सम्बन्ध, व्याप्यव्यापकभाव, कार्यकारणभाव etc it is easy to show that they are not सम्बन्धs but the natures of the objects concerned viewed in a particular light Thus—

(a) In यत्र धूम तत्र वह्नि, वह्नि is the व्यापक, and the व्यापकत्व of वह्नि is but its own nature capable of producing the cognition of धूम invariably associated with it Likewise in यत्र वह्न्यभाव तत्र धूमाभाव, धूमाभाव is the व्यापक and the व्यापकत्व of धूमाभाव is but its own nature and not a different thing

(b) तन्तुs are the cause of पट, but this कारणत्व of the तन्तुs is nothing but their very nature of being present or absent, when the effect पट is present or absent

Likewise कारणत्व belongs to घटप्रागभाव (which is considered to be one of the causes of the production of the घट), but this कारणत्व of घटप्रागभाव is nothing but its very nature, and not a different thing

The व्याप्यव्यापकभाव or the कार्यकारणभाव with reference to अभाव can not be explained away in any other manner, as अभाव can not possess सामान्य etc Therefore व्यापकत्व and कारणत्व which belong to अभाव, are not different from अभाव But they represent its very nature in a particular aspect

All this shows that it is impossible to cognise अभाव by means of the sense-organ which could not have any contact with it

The siddhantin replies —Your dissertation on the nature of सम्बन्ध etc is a very learned one no doubt but unfortunately all your arguments are beside the point for they are based upon the unwarranted supposition that *all cognition* by प्रत्यक्ष is caused by the contact of the sense-organ with the object As a matter of fact, *the* सम्बद्धार्थग्राहकत्व *of the sense-organs refers to* भावपदार्थs *only It is unreasonable to argue that there should be the same rule obtaining in* the case of both भाव and अभाव, other kinds of objects, other methods of perception What is true of भाव objects need not be true of अभाव also So because भाव objects are perceived by sense organs coming into contact with them there is no earthly reason why अभाव also should be perceived exactly in the same way We hold that अभाव is perceived by the sense-organ by means of the विशेषणविशेष्यभाव सन्निकर्ष

It might be argued that if the sense organ is not सम्बद्धार्थग्राहक in the case of अभाव, it would cogni e anything and everything If चक्षु can perceive घटाभाव with which it is not connected, why should not चक्षु then perceive at the same time पटाभाव, अश्वाभाव etc which are all un connected with it ? To this objection, our answer would be as follows —In the first place the objector is treating the matter lightly, which we strongly depreiate For though there is no ordinary सम्बन्ध between the sen e organ and अभाव, there is the विशेषणता which ordains that only a particular अभाव should be perceived and not any and every अभाव Secondly, the objector, in his malicious enthusiasm, has overlooked the fact that the same fault with which he is charging us, obtains in the ca e of his reasoning al o For we ask the objector who wants to admit अभाव as a separate प्रमाण, ' How is it that घटाभाव, for example is cognised by your अभाव प्रमाण only in a particular place ? ' His answer per force has to be ' Because that particular place is qualified by that घटाभाव ' So the objector is required to admit विशेषणता, howsoever unwillingly It is unnecessary to pursue the matter further, for when a fault together with its removal is common to the arguments of both the disputants, none of the disputants should be hackled about it This is the general rule about the conduct of debates Tho e who live in glass houses should not throw stones at others

(Line 9)—चक्षुः श्रोत्रे etc , this syllogism is given because the first syllogism इन्द्रियाणि वस्तुप्राप्य प्रकाशकारीणि । ज्ञानकरणत्वात् । आत्मवत् । may not be regarded as quite conclusive Because the objector might argue that शरीर is also in a way ज्ञानकरण (the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय can not function without शरीर) and still शरीर does not come into contact with घट for घटप्रत्यक्ष No objection can be taken by the objector to the second syllogism, चक्षुःश्रोत्रे वस्तु प्राप्य प्रकाशकारिणी बाह्येन्द्रियत्वात् । त्वगादिवत् । for both the हेतु and the दृष्टान्त are acceptable to him

(Line 38)—यत्रोभयोः etc is taken from the श्लोकवार्तिक of कुमारिलभट्ट (circa 8th century, a commentator on शाबरभाष्य)

(42) This section deals with the very important question whether cognition has स्वतः प्रामाण्य or परतः प्रामाण्य This a very interesting topic, though rather abstruse, and the student should study this question very carefully and remember the pros and cons thereof

The controversy arises in this way —I perceive water at a distance, the same agency which enables me to perceive the water, enables me to apprehend the validity (प्रामाण्य) of that perception, and *then on knowing that my cognition is valid, I proceed afterwards to bring*

th t w te This is as it should be, for if I knew that my cognition had no validity (that i, what I had perceived was not water, but merely mirage) I certainly would not take the trouble of going to that place for water Thus the validity of any cognition must be taken to be produced by the same agency which produces that cognition The validity does not depend upon any other factor; in other words ज्ञान has स्वत प्रामाण्य

The other view is that ज्ञान has परत प्रामाण्य The चक्षुरिन्द्रिय enables m *to p rceive the water and the cognition of water takes place by* means of मानसप्रत्यक्ष I then repair to the place, if I find water there I infer that my cognition is valid, if I do not find water there, I *infer that my cognition is invalid Thus cognition is due to* मानसप्रत्यक्ष but *its t li lit is du to* अनुमान In other words ज्ञान has परत प्रामाण्य

Kesavamisra holds the second view and controverts the arguments put forth by the opponent who believes in the स्वत प्रामाण्य of ज्ञान

OBJECTOR	SIDDHĀNTIN
When I secure the knowledge of घट, my cognition is घट ज्ञान, from which one can infer that the घट ज्ञातता (known ness) is produced in the घट A घट that is not known has not this ज्ञातता So that घटज्ञान is the cause, and ज्ञातता is the effect And as ज्ञातता cannot be accounted for otherwise by presumption we conclude that its कारण ज्ञान must have been there Hence, *even before* a man proceeds to bring water, by अर्थापत्ति is proved the जलज्ञान as the ज्ञातता of the जल cannot be accounted for otherwise, and by means of the अर्थापत्ति *itself* the validity of that knowledge is apprehended	1 We challenge your statement that ज्ञान is apprehended by अर्थापत्ति on account of the impossibility of otherwise accounting for ज्ञातता For, what is ज्ञातता after all? ज्ञातता is not a new attribute *created* in the object ज्ञातता (known ness) is not over and above ज्ञानविषयता (being the object of knowledge, being cognised)
ज्ञानविषयता *for the matter of that,* is nothing but being the abode of ज्ञानता produced by ज्ञान (So you can not get rid of ज्ञान so easily	2 You are all wrong You are unnecessarily making a simple thing difficult to understand The distinction between अर्थ

by simply asserting that it is ज्ञानविषयता) You possibly cannot explain this ज्ञानविषयता in any other way

(a) ज्ञानविषयता cannot be due to तादात्म्य or identity, घट and ज्ञान are not known to be identical

(b) ज्ञानविषयता of घट cannot be due to the fact that घट causes that knowledge for in that case the sense organs also could be called ज्ञानविषय, because they too produce the knowledge

So we infer that there must be something produced in the घट by the ज्ञान, which also makes the घट ज्ञानविषय Thus owing to the impossibility of accounting for the ज्ञानविषयत्व of घट otherwise the existence of ज्ञातता is established by अर्थापत्ति.

In order to avoid the अनवस्थादोष I say that the ज्ञातता does not require another ज्ञातता to make it ज्ञानविषय, it becomes ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

4 I hold that ज्ञान only is apprehended by ज्ञातता, and its validity is apprehended by a ज्ञाततविशेष invariably associated with validity

(object) and ज्ञान (knowledge) is a natural one and it is patent to every one If ज्ञान were to produce ज्ञातता in the actual object, we can never have any knowledge of past and future objects for ज्ञातता can not be produced in objects that do not exist

Again let us suppose that ज्ञातता is produced, but how is this ज्ञातता to be known? घटज्ञान produces ज्ञातता in the घट so ज्ञातताज्ञान must produce another ज्ञातता in ज्ञातता this ज्ञातता1 produces ज्ञातता 2 and so on Where is this series to end? There would thus be the fault of endlessness which cuts at the root of all your argument

3 If you are prepared to allow that ज्ञातता can become ज्ञानविषय through its very nature why do you want this ज्ञातता in the case of घट itself Let घट also be admitted to be ज्ञानविषय by its very nature

Granting for argument's sake just to satisfy you that ज्ञातता is there then by ज्ञातता ज्ञान is apprehended but how is the validity of the ज्ञान apprehended by that ज्ञातता?

4 In saying this, you are giving your position away Does this not mean that ज्ञान and its validity are *not* apprehended by the same agency? You are condemned out

of your own mouth For now your position is —

(1) ज्ञान is apprehended by ज्ञातता

(2) ज्ञानप्रामाण्य is apprehended by *ज्ञातताविशेष*

ज्ञातता and ज्ञातताविशेष are obviously two different agencies

5 I shall amend my statement and say that both *ज्ञान and* ज्ञानप्रामाण्य are apprehended just together by ज्ञातताविशेष which is invariably associated with valid knowledge.

5 If we accept this absurd statement, we might as well give up our studies of Nyaya, fallacies etc, and say that ज्ञान and its invalidity also are apprehended just together by a ज्ञातताविशेष *invariably* associated with wrong knowledge So that let the invalidity *of knowledge be self-established!*

6 This would never do The अप्रामाण्य of ज्ञान is apprehended by means other than the ज्ञान—this can never be disputed

6 If we are agreed about the परतः अप्रामाण्यम् of ज्ञान, you have per *force to admit the* परतः प्रामाण्यम् *of* ज्ञान *as well*

ज्ञान is apprehended by मानसप्रत्यक्ष and its प्रामाण्य by अनुमान The अनुमान can be put in the following केवलव्यतिरेकि form, विवादास्पदीभूतं ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् । यन्न प्रमाणं न तत् समर्थां प्रवृत्तिं जनयति यथा प्रमाणाभास । There cannot be अन्वयव्याप्ति, as when we are *going to prove the* साध्य *for the* first time, there cannot obviously be a सपक्षदृष्टान्त

(Line 58)—न तु प्रमात्वं स्मृत्या व्यभिचारात् —The author wants to make it quite clear what the साध्य is in the above syllogism प्रामाण्यम् is the साध्य, but the word *प्रमाण used in the syllogism is ambiguous* प्रामाण्यम् might either mean correctness (याथार्थ्यम्) or the character of being a right knowledge (प्रमात्वम्) It is not the प्रमात्व of the ज्ञान in question that he wants to establish For if that were so, his व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति in यन्न प्रमाणं (= प्रमा) ... जनयति would be found violated in the *case of remembrance For, we often find that remembrance,* though not a प्रमा, (as remembrance is different *from* यथार्थानुभव *which* is प्रमा see section 5) is समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनक The reading प्रमाकरणत्व for प्रमात्वं does not appear to be satisfactory प्रमाण does mean प्रमाकरण, so प्रमात्व could be understood in the sense of प्रमाकरणत्व But as the प्रमाणs *are sufficiently well known no one is likely to regard* ज्ञान *as the* प्रमाकरण in its technical sense But whether the ज्ञान is प्रमा (*right*

cognition) or not, may well be a matter for dispute Hence प्रमत्वम् seems to be the right reading

(Line 60)-अपि केवलव्यतिरेकिणानुमानेन अनभ्यासदशापन्नस्य , अभ्यास-repetition, अनभ्यासदशा—unrepeated state, situation at the beginning The idea is as follows —When we are trying to find out the validity of the जलज्ञान for the first time, we shall have to make use of the केवलव्यतिरेक्यनुमान, but when the inference is once drawn, we can utilise the knowledge thus gained for the purpose of adducing a सपक्षदृष्टान्त, when we are drawing an inference in a similar case later n (अभ्यासदशापन्न), so that the हेतु समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्व could then be अन्वयव्यतिरेकी, the अन्वयव्याप्ति being stated in the form यद् समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकम् तत् प्रमाणं यथा प्रथमगृहीतं जलज्ञानम् And on the strength of such समानजातीय ज्ञान, we can draw the inference even before the प्रवृत्ति The reading which refers the केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान to the अभ्यासदशा and अन्वयव्यतिरेकि अनुमान to अनभ्यासदशा seems to miss the point altogether in the argument in question Dr Jha translates अभ्यासदशापन्न as 'after it has become rightly effective by giving rise to fruitful exertion It is doubtful if अभ्यासदशापन्न could possibly have that sense

(Line 65)—चत्वार्येव—As a true Naiyayika, Kesavamisra once again asserts that there are only four Pramanas, neither more or less

(43)—आत्मशरीर Following Gautama, Kesavamisra mentions आत्मन् etc as the प्रमेय Of these आत्मन् and मनस् are mentioned again under द्रव्य in section 47, and बुद्धि under गुण (section 74), so that there is a lot of over lapping and consequent absence of proper arrangement

(44) and (57)—आत्मन्—ज्ञानाधिकरणम् (the substratum of knowledge) is another definition In section 57 the definition is given as आत्मत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् and not as आत्मत्वसामान्यवान् Apparently the author felt that after all आत्मन् may be rightly regarded as one, as the Vedantins say, but जीव owing to the उपाधि If Ātman is one, there can be no सामान्य for it To make allowance for this view, the definition is also given as आत्मत्वाभिसम्बन्धवान् The Tarkasamgraha adds—स द्विविध परमात्मा जीवात्मा च । तत्रेश्वर सर्वज्ञ परमात्मैक एव । The way in which these definitions are explained by commentators shows that by आत्मन् is to be understood जीवात्मन् (आत्मत्व is explained as समवेत ज्ञानेच्छाद्यमित्त्वम्) The Vaiseṣikasūtras do not mention ईश्वर, probably because they were concerned with the exposition of द्रव्य that all would understand It is almost shocking to see the परमात्मन् (who is सर्वज्ञ सर्व सर्वशक्तिमान् सर्वव्यापी) dubbed as a द्रव्य and placed on the same level with जीवात्मन् who is different from परमात्मन् in many respects, only on the

ground that both are ज्ञानाधिकरण सुखाद्याश्रयत्व or इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञान नि are जीवलक्षणम् The Naiyayikas regard जीव as मानसप्रत्यक्ष (अहं सुखी अहं दुःखी इत्यादि मानसप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात्)

(Line 3)—विविविवनी According to the Vaiseṣikas जीव is *not* मानसप्रत्यक्ष, for in अहं सुखी what is प्रत्यक्ष is not अहमि यात्मतत्त्वम् but अहं सुख इत्याकारकम् According to them जीव is अनुमेय from the लिङ्ग प्राणापानादिनिमेषोन्मेषजीवनमनोगतीन्द्रियान्तरविकाराः सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नाश्च Kanada also says इन्द्रियार्थप्रसिद्धिरिन्द्रियार्थेभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्य हेतु , so the अनुमान ज्ञानादयः साक्षात्कारी द्रव्याश्रित गुणत्वात् रूपवत् or बुद्ध्यादय पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रिता पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति गुणत्वात् । यस्तु पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रितो न भवति नासौ पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितो गुणो भवति यथा रूपादि , *prove the existence of* जीवात्मन् *The Jiva'man is different* for different bodies which explains why there is सुखदुःखवैचित्र्य in the case of animates He is all-pervading, and so नित्य Jivatman cannot be atomic, for in that case there would not be सर्वाङ्गीणसुखानुभव in the whole of the body He is not मध्यमपरिमाण, for then he would be अनित्य and there would be कृतनाशाकृताभ्यागमप्रसङ्ग The Samkhyas, Pātanjalas and the Advaitavedantins regard like the Naiyayikas and the Vaiseṣikas, Jiva as विभु The followers of Ramanuja and Madhva regard Jiva to be *a omic* The Madhyamikas (Bauddhas) regard Jiva to be मध्यमपरिमाणरूप and the Jainas देहपरिमाणरूप The materialists regard body or the sense organs as the Ātman, others regard the vital air mind, Buddhi etc as the Ātman (*Read the following from the Vedantasara in this connection,* आत्मा वै जायते पुत्र इत्यादिश्रुतेः स्वस्मिन्निव स्वपुत्रेऽपि प्रेमदर्शनात् पुत्रे पुष्टे नष्टे चाहमेव पुष्टो नष्टश्चेत्याद्यनुभवाच्च पुत्र आत्मेति वदति । चार्वाकस्तु स वा एष पुरुषोऽन्नरसमय इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्रदीप्तगृहात् स्वपुत्रं परित्यज्यापि स्वस्य निर्गमदर्शनात् स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्च स्थूलशरीरमात्मेति वदति । अपरश्चार्वाकः ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापतिं पितरमेत्योचुः इत्यादिश्रुतेरिन्द्रियाणामभावे शरीरचलनाभावात् काणोऽहं बधिरोऽहमित्याद्यनुभवाच्चेन्द्रियाण्यात्मेति वदति । अपरश्चार्वाकः अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः इत्यादिश्रुतेः प्राणाभावे इन्द्रियादिचलनायोगात् अहमशनायावानहं पिपासावानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च प्राण आत्मेति वदति । अन्यस्तु चार्वाकः अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः इत्यादिश्रुतेः मनसि सुप्ते प्राणादेरभावात् अहं सङ्कल्पवानहं विकल्पवानित्याद्यनुभवाच्च मन आत्मेति वदति । बौद्धस्तु अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः इत्यादिश्रुतेः कर्तुरभावे करणस्य शक्त्यभावात् अहं कर्ताहं भोक्तेत्याद्यनुभवाच्च बुद्धिरात्मेति वदति । प्राभाकरतार्किकौ तु अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः इत्यादिश्रुतेः बुद्ध्यादीनामज्ञाने लयदर्शनादहमज्ञोऽहमज्ञानीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानमात्मेति वदतः । भाट्टस्तु प्रज्ञानघन एवानन्दमयः इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ प्रकाशाप्रकाशसद्भावात् मामहं न जानामीत्याद्यनुभवाच्चाज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यमात्मेति वदति । अपरो बौद्धः असदेवेदमग्र आसीत् इत्यादिश्रुतेः सुषुप्तौ सर्वाभावात् अहं सुषुप्तौ नासमित्युत्थितस्य स्वाभावपरामर्शविषयानुभवाच्च शून्यमात्मेति वदति । एतेषां पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वमुच्यते । एतैरतिप्राकृतवादिभिरुक्तेषु श्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासेषु पूर्वपूर्वोक्तश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासानामुत्तरोत्तरश्रुतियुक्त्यनुभवाभासैरात्मत्वबाधदर्शनात् पुत्रादीनामनात्मत्वं स्पष्टमेव ।)

प्रत्यक्षं तु न निष्पन्नाधिकरणम् He is not प्रत्यक्ष as he has no रूप, he cannot be perceived by the mind as he is different from सुखदुःख etc

The existence of ईश्वर can be inferred only thus—क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत्। (also क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कार्यं सकर्तृकमिति च। लिङ्गमाधाय सद्भावे कणादाद्याः समक्षते॥ and कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः। वाक्यात् संख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविदव्ययः॥, सर्वादिर्व्यवहारप्रवर्तकतया ... मानम्) A घट does require a potter to fashion itself, similarly this huge world could not have come into existence without an intelligent creator viz ईश्वर This argument seems to be satisfactory from a common sense point of view but it can easily be shown to be fallacious First why did the कारुणिक ईश्वर create evil in this world (if evil is said to be due to the धर्माधर्म of the जीवs, we have to admit that the world is अनादि)? Again, what is the relation between ईश्वर and the other नित्य objects like आत्मन्, आकाश etc ? Are they independent of ईश्वर Does every कार्य necessarily presuppose an intelligent agent and so on This problem has survived the ingenuity of philosophers of all times and no satisfactory solution is yet found Sankaracarya of course regards ईश्वर, the world etc as merely phenomenal, only निर्गुण Brahman being real Some Naiyayikas believe ईश्वर to be possessed of a body Others regard परमाणुs, आकाश, जीवs etc as the body of ईश्वर (followers of Ramanuja hold this view)

(Line 6)—बुद्ध्यादय etc Kesavamisra first shows that बुद्धि etc are गुणs, and then they are विशेषगुणs which cannot have the eight द्रव्यs, पृथिवी etc (in section 47, nine द्रव्यs are mentioned, the eight द्रव्यs, पृथ्वी etc are those nine minus the Ātman) as their substratum So there must be a separate ninth द्रव्य which could be the substratum, and that is Ātman. This is proved by inference, by a केवलव्यतिरेकि अनुमान or अन्वयव्यतिरेकि अनुमान बुद्ध्यादय —the nine qualities बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्माधर्मौ, and संस्कार (भावना) These are गुणs because they are अनित्यत्वे सति एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य This लक्षण of गुण consists of two parts अनित्यत्व and एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्व, both these ingredients are necessary If अनित्यत्व is dropped, रूपत्व which is ग्राह्य by the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय would be a गुण But रूपत्व is really a जाति So अनित्यत्वे सति excludes it, for as a जाति, रूपत्व is eternal Similarly if अनित्यत्व alone constituted the definition of गुण, घट, पट, etc would be गुणs because they are non eternal So to exclude घट, पट, etc we put in एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य (but with all this घट, पट, etc would not be excluded, for they are एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य, the definition ought to be amended by *reading* एकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य *for* एकेन्द्रियग्राह्य, for घट, पट etc are *not* एकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य, they are चक्षुर्ग्राह्य as well as स्पर्शग्राह्य Still the definition remains objectionable all the same For संख्या which is a गुण is *not* एकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य, being capable of perception by both the *sense of* sight and the sense of touch Again, the author himself would tell us later that the

qualities residing on the atoms are eternal; so there is no propriety in putting अनित्यत्वे सति in the definition ?)

(Line 9)—विशेषगुणवत्—A विशेषगुण is that which resides in one substance only at one time, *e g* सुख, दुःख etc A general quality is that which resides in two or more substances jointly, *e g* संख्या, संयोग etc

(45)—शरीर is the body, residing in which the आत्मन् enjoys the विषयs (चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् । गौतम). It is so called because it dies away *every moment* (शीर्यते इति, प्रतिक्षणं शीर्यमाणं देहः शरीरम्) *According to the* Vaisesikas the human शरीर is पार्थिव only and not पाञ्चभौतिक or constituted of three elements as the Vedantins say शरीर is two fold, योनिजम् (शुक्रशोणितसन्निपातजन्यम्) and अयोनिजम् (शुक्रशोणितसन्निपातानपेक्षम्, for instance, the bodies of मनु, दुर्वासस् and others) योनिज पार्थिवशरीर is two fold, जरायुजम् (मानवपशुमृगाणाम्) अण्डजं च (पक्षिसरीसृपाणाम्), अयोनिज पार्थिवशरीर is three-fold, स्वेदजम् (क्षुद्रजन्तूनां यूकामशकादीनाम्) उद्भिज्जम् (इन्द्रगोपमण्डूकप्रभृतीनाम्) and अदृष्टविशेषजन्यम् Though the Ātman is विभु, the उपाधि of the शरीर causes the सुखदुःखादिवैचित्र्य in different persons The *expression* अन्त्यावयवि is put in to exclude hands and feet etc which are भोगायतन, but they are not the अन्त्यावयवि, for they themselves are the अवयवs of the body But the body is not the अवयव of any thing else

(46)—इन्द्रिय is the means by which knowledge is secured, sense-organs (भोगसाधनानि इन्द्रियाणि) *The sense organ comes into contact with* the object of sense and carries the impressions to the mind which in its turn takes them to the Ātman who thus is enabled to have the knowledge required (आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते । मन इन्द्रियेण । इन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियाणां वस्तुप्राप्यप्रकाशकारित्वम् ।) The Tarka Dipika defines इन्द्रिय *as* शब्देतरोद्भूतविशेषगुणानाश्रयत्वे सति ज्ञानकारणमनःसंयोगाश्रयत्वम् । मनस् is sometimes called an अन्तरिन्द्रियम्. The बहिरिन्द्रियs (ज्ञानेन्द्रियs) are five घ्राणम्, रसनम्, चक्षुः, श्रोत्रम् , and त्वक्. Some admit ten इन्द्रियs, five ज्ञानेन्द्रियs and five कर्मेन्द्रियs (वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि) इन्द्रियs are super sensuous, that is, they cannot be perceived by the sense-organs The tip of the nose is not the घ्राणेन्द्रिय, but the abode of the imperceptible sense of smell

The propriety of each word in the definition शरीरसंयुक्तं ज्ञानकरणम् अतीन्द्रियम् is *as follows* —

(1) If we drop शरीरसंयुक्त and ज्ञानकरणम्, दिक्, काल, etc would be इन्द्रियs, for they are अतीन्द्रिय But दिक्, काल etc are साधारणकारणs of ज्ञान, and not करण (which is असाधारण and साधकतम) To exclude दिक्, काल etc we put in ज्ञानकरणम्

(2) If we drop *शरीरसंयुक्तम् and अतीन्द्रियम्, इन्द्रियार्थसंनिकर्ष* would be इन्द्रिय, so to exclude it शरीरसंयुक्त is put in

(3) If we drop अतीन्द्रियम्, आलोक (light) which is both शरीरसंयुक्त and ज्ञानकरण, would be इन्द्रिय, so to exclude it, अतीन्द्रियम् is put in

(Line 10)—रूपादिषु पञ्चसु— रूप and others are – रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द (Line 20)—कर्णशष्कुल्य ,श्रोत्र is nothing but आकाश circumscribed by the उपाधि, namely the cavity of the ear (Line 27)—अनुमानमेव– As the इन्द्रियs are supersensuous, they are not प्रत्यक्ष, their existence can only be inferred

(47)—द्रव्यगुण , these are the six पदार्थs admitted by the Vaiseṣikas and also अभाव (referred to in section 86) Though the sixteen पदार्थs mentioned at the beginning can be shown to be not different from these six, they are mentioned separately for a definite प्रयोजन, which is to write a manual where the tenets of both the Naiyayikas and the Vaiseṣikas are given and reconciled as far as possible

पदार्थ —पदाभिधेय , which can be expressed by a word, an object , the word is here clearly used in the sense of a category According to the Vaiseṣikas all things in this world together with all notions about their relationship with one another can be classed under seven independent heads or categories Aristotle mentions the following ten categories (which can be very easily merged into the seven Padarthas of the Vaiseṣikas) (1) Substance (द्रव्य) (2) Quantity, (3) Quality (गुण) (4) Relation, (5) Place (6) Time (7) Posture, (8) Property, (9) Activity (कर्मन्) and (10) Passivity According to the Vaiseṣikas, Place and Time are included under द्रव्य Relation is either a गुण (संयोग) or a पदार्थ (समवाय) Quantity and Property are गुणs, Passivity is merely the absence of activity The Vaiseṣikasutras mention only six पदार्थs excluding the अभाव, which must have been added later on in order to make the classification complete as the notion of अभाव was too important to be ignored (Sankaracarya in his Bhasya on II 2-17 refers to only six पदार्थs, अपि च वैशेषिकास्तन्त्रार्थभूतान् षट्पदार्थान् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायाख्यान् अत्यन्तभिन्नान् भिन्नलक्षणानभ्युपगच्छन्ति ।) The Nyayasutras mention sixteen पदार्थs (here पदार्थ obviously means merely a topic for discussion) which are very important in the eyes of a controversialist Followers of different दर्शनs postulate their own पदार्थs. दर्शनभेदेन मतभेदेन च पदार्था न नियताः । तथाहि विषयतावच्छेदकत्व प्रतियोगित्वादि कारणं शक्तिसंख्यात्वाद्यपि अतिरिक्ता एव पदार्था इत्येकदेशिन आहुः । चिदचित् इति द्वौ पदार्थौ इति मायावादिनो वेदान्तिन आहुः । चिदचिदीश्वरभेदेन त्रय पदार्था इति रामानुजीयाः । स्वतन्त्रपरतन्त्रभेदेन द्वौ पदार्थौ इति माध्वाः । पतिपशुपाशभेदेन त्रय पदार्था इति शैवा माहेश्वरा आहुः । (न्यायकोश P 461) It is possible to imagine how the Vaiseṣikas arrived at the seven पदार्थs Let us take the case of any object, say the cow We want to find out what possible different notions about

the cow can be thought of. The cow as a whole is a (1) द्रव्य. It has, say a white colour (the whiteness is something distinct from and still associated with it) which is a (2) गुण. The cow moves, this action of moving which can be called a गुण in the making, is distinct from गुण and is a (3) कर्मन्. There does exist something common to different cows which enables us to recognise them as cows, this is obviously a notion different from that of गुण or कर्मन् and is the (4) सामान्य. *That we are able to distinguish one individual cow from* another must be due to some particularity in the individual cow itself, this is the (5) विशेष. Now there must be some special relation existing *between the* गोद्रव्य *and the* गुणक्रियासामान्यविशेष belonging to that गोद्रव्य and forming a part and parcel of itself, this is the (6) समवाय. Adding the notion of negation to these six, we arrive at the seven पदार्थs. It is not intended to suggest that each and every द्रव्य can have the remaining पदार्थs in intimate relation with it. आकाश being only one cannot have सामान्य, as we shall see later on. The Vaiseṣikas *only try* to show how the seven पदार्थs exhaust all possible *notions of and about knowable or nameable objects in the Universe* and they may be said to have *fairly* succeeded in their attempt.

According to some, संख्या and सादृश्य are also पदार्थs. The Tarkabhāṣā regards संख्या as a गुण and सादृश्य is nothing but तद्भिन्नत्वे सति तद्गतभूयोधर्मवत्त्वम् as the Saptapadārthī remarks. Some regard शक्ति as a different पदार्थ. Fire does not burn, if you hold the मणि in your hand in the absence of the मणि, fire possesses दाहशक्ति, so we must recognise this शक्ति as something distinct from the fire. It is however unnecessary to regard शक्ति as a different पदार्थ, for such शक्ति is after all द्रव्यगुणस्वरूप and nothing more, which manifests itself only under certain conditions. Similarly आधेयशक्ति or स्वत्व need not be regarded as a पदार्थान्तर (ननु करतलाग्निसंयोग सत्त्वेऽपि प्रतिबन्धके सति दाहानुत्पत्तेः शक्तिः पदार्थान्तरमिति चेन्न। प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्य यावत्कार्य कारणत्वेन शक्तेरनुपयोगात् कल्पनागौरवेण शक्तिपदार्थत्वात्। ननु भस्मादिना प्रोक्षणेन शुद्धिः दर्शनादाधेयशक्तिरङ्गीकार्येति चेन्न। भस्मादिसंयोगसमानकालीनाशुद्धिध्वंसप्रागभावाभ्यां तत्तद्धर्म-सहितभस्मादिसंयोगस्य शुद्धिपदार्थत्वात्। स्वत्वमपि न पदार्थान्तरम्। यथेष्टविनियोगयोग्यत्वस्य स्वत्वरूपत्वात्। तदत्र चोदक च प्रतिग्रहादिजन्यत्वमेवेति। तर्कदीपिका) Thus there are only seven पदार्थs.

(Line 3)—प्रमाणादयो पदार्था एतेष्वेवान्तर्भवन्ति. It is possible to show with a little exercise of ingenuity that all the sixteen different padarthas of Gautama can be included under one or other of the categories of the Vaiseṣikas. But the attempt appears to us *to be singularly fatuous. However read the following from the* न्यायकोश *pp. 463–464*. 'एषु सप्तसु पदार्थेषु गौतमोक्ताः षोडशार्थाः (पदार्थाः) एव अन्तर्भवन्ति इत्यम्। प्रमाणादि द्रव्ये-

देशेऽन्तर्भावः । आत्मनि ज्ञानादिगुणे । प्रमेयस्यात्मशरीरेन्द्रियादेरपि द्रव्ये । अर्थस्य गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दस्वरूपस्य गुणे । बुद्धेर्गुणे । मनसो द्रव्ये । प्रवृत्तेर्गुणे । दोषाणामिच्छाद्वेषमिथ्याज्ञानस्वरूपाणां रागद्वेषमोहपदाभिधेयानां गुणे । प्रेत्यभावस्य मरणानन्तरजन्मनो गुणे । सुखदुःखसंवेदनस्वरूपस्य मुख्यफलस्य गुणे । गौणमुख्यस्य शरीरजन्ममात्रस्वरूपफलस्य द्रव्यादिषु । पीडालक्षणस्य दुःखस्य गुणे । अपवर्गस्यात्यन्तिकदुःखसम्बन्धस्याभावे । संशयस्य गुणे । साध्यत्वेनेच्छाविषयात्मकस्य प्रयोजनस्य यथायथं द्रव्यादिषु । साध्यसाधनोभयवत्त्वेनाभिमतविषयस्य दृष्टान्तस्य यथायथं द्रव्यादिषु । तन्त्राभ्युपगमसिद्धार्थत्वस्य सिद्धान्तस्य द्रव्यादिषु । शब्दस्वरूपप्रतिज्ञाद्यन्यतमस्वरूपाणामवयवानां गुणे । व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोपस्य तर्कस्य गुणे । निर्णयस्य गुणे । तत्त्वबुभुत्सुकथारूपवादस्य गुणे । विजिगीषुकथारूपजल्पस्य गुणे । स्वपक्षस्थापनाहीनकथारूपवितण्डाया गुणे । अनात्मनि नित्यत्वादेः साध्यसाधनाभिमतविषयस्वरूपाणां हेत्वाभासानां यथायथं द्रव्यादिषु । छलस्य गुणे । असदुत्तरस्य जातेर्गुणे । पराजयहेतुस्वरूपनिग्रहस्थानानां यथायथं द्रव्यादिष्वन्तर्भावः । तथा हि । प्रतिज्ञाहानेरभिमतनिवृत्तेः । प्रतिज्ञान्तरस्य गुणे । प्रतिज्ञाविरोधस्य गुणे । प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासस्याभावे । हेत्वन्तरस्य गुणे । अर्थान्तरस्य गुणे । निरर्थकस्य गुणे । अविज्ञातार्थस्य गुणे । अपार्थकस्य गुणे । अप्राप्तकालस्य गुणे । न्यूनस्य गुणे । अधिकस्य गुणे । पुनरुक्तस्य गुणे । अननुभाषणस्याभावे । अज्ञानस्याभावे । अप्रतिभाया अभावे । विक्षेपस्याभावे । मतानुज्ञाया गुणे । पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणस्याभावे । निरनुयोज्यानुयोगस्य गुणे । अपसिद्धान्तस्याभावे । हेत्वाभासानां द्रव्यादिषु अन्तर्भाव इति ।

The term padārtha as understood by the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyayikas possesses totally different meanings According to the Vaiśeṣikas padārthas represent those broad classes under which all things in the universe that can be known and named are to be included The interest of the Naiyayikas lay mainly in disquisition and their padārthas represent the topics which may well stand for the headings of chapters of a handbook of logic and dialectics While the padārthas of the Vaiśeṣikas are metaphysical, those of the Naiyayikas are dialectical The attempt to equate them is like putting square pegs in round holes

(Line 5)—The Tarka-Dīpikā says द्रव्यत्वजातिमत्त्वं गुणवत्त्वं वा द्रव्यसामान्यलक्षणम् । The Vaiśeṣikasūtras give क्रियागुणवत् समवायिकारणमिति as the द्रव्यलक्षण It is extremely difficult to give any satisfactory definition of द्रव्य That which is possessed of द्रव्यत्व is द्रव्य—this definition is the most correct one, for the द्रव्यत्वजाति can only be possessed by a द्रव्य (for, a जाति is the very essence of a thing, something that makes a thing what it is), but it is at the same time perfectly useless from a practical point of view The Naiyayikas however are often enamoured of such definitions क्रियागुणवत् is a sound द्रव्यलक्षण, for only a द्रव्य can be possessed of क्रिया or गुण, but it is objected to on the ground that it would not apply to द्रव्य at the first moment owing to the dictum उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं निष्क्रियं च तिष्ठति The definition should therefore be गुणसमानाधिकरणसत्ताभिन्नजातिमत् The लक्षण समवायिकारणम् is correct, because only a द्रव्य can be a समवायिकारण or material cause, but it

would be rejected by those who do not admit the existence of the समवाय relation which is the special creation of the Vaisesikas and again this definition also would not extend to a द्रव्य at the first moment In the definition गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यम्, it has been already remarked that गुणाश्रय means 'capable of being a substratum of qualities'

The nine द्रव्यs mentioned, consist of the five well known elements and काल and दिक्, two most well-known notions which we can hardly do without, and आत्मन् and मनस् The inclusion of आत्मन् among the द्रव्यs is bound to make a Vedantist shudder, but the Vaisesikas had, it appears no option but to regard it as a द्रव्य or mere substance नवैव—the propriety of एव is that it is not necessary to recognise darkness and gold as additional द्रव्यs as is done by the Samkhyas and the Mimansakas respectively Those who regard तमस् as an additional द्रव्य argue as follows —We have the प्रतीति, शुक्लो गौ चलति and we recognise गो as a द्रव्य, now we have a similar प्रतीति नीलं तमः चलति showing that तमस् has both रूप (which is a गुण) and क्रिया—and a द्रव्य is known to be क्रियागुणवत्—so, तमस् must be a द्रव्य It can not be included in आकाश, काल, दिक्, आत्मन् and मनस्, because these five have no रूप it cannot be वायु, as it has no स्पर्श and is not always moving like वायु, it is not तेजस्, as it has no hot touch and does not give any light it is not जल as it has no cool touch and has a नीलरूप, while जल has शुक्लरूप it is not पृथ्वी, as it has no गन्ध and is स्पर्शरहित, while पृथ्वी has गन्ध and स्पर्श Therefore we must recognise तमस् as the tenth द्रव्य This is refuted as follows तमस् is not a द्रव्य having रूप as the opponent says, for we find that all द्रव्यs having रूप in this world require the presence of light, for being perceived Such is not the case with तमस् Besides the प्रतीति नीलं तमश्चलति which is made so much of by the opponent, is a misapprehension The तमस् does not really move and it itself is नीलरूप imposed on something else It has no positive existence it is merely the absence of प्रौढप्रकाश Gold is nothing but तेजस्, if we grant the contention of the opponent, it may at best come under पृथ्वी but it is not necessary to regard it as a separate द्रव्य (see section 50 below)

(48) पृथिवी is defined as गन्धवती which expression is to be taken to mean गन्धसमवायिकारणम्, otherwise जल and देश could also be said to be गन्धवत् गन्ध is a विशेषगुण of पृथिवी and so the definition is correct The Vaisesikasutras say रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शवती पृथिवी According to the Bauddhas (सर्वं सत् क्षणिकम्) द्रव्यs are उत्पन्नविनष्ट, so the definition गन्धवती would not apply to पृथिवी which would be निर्गुण at the first moment (according to the dictum प्रथम द्रव्य निर्गुणमेवोत्पद्यत एवमन्यमपरता गणा उपयान्ते) the definition should therefore be modified as गन्धसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकजा-

विमती We find गन्ध in water sometimes, but it really belongs to the पृथिवी portion that has somehow found its way into it In certain stones गन्ध is not perceived but it is there all the same, only it is not उद्भूत or manifest Thus a thing having गन्ध (उद्भूत or अनुद्भूत) is पृथिवी. The objector finds fault with this definition, saying it is possible to find a thing where different conflicting गन्धs neutralise one another, with the result that the thing would be odourless The objection is ruled out as it is possible to perceive the different गन्धs belonging to the parts of the thing (Line 5)-नित्यानित्या—नित्यत्व स्वसमानाधिकरणध्वंसाप्रतियोगित्वम् । स्वसमानाधिकरणध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वमनित्यत्वम् । (तर्कदीपिका) परमाणुरूपा—जालसूर्यमरीचिस्थं यत्सूक्ष्मं दृश्यते रजः । तस्य षष्ठतमो भागः परमाणुः स उच्यते ॥ परमाणु is the atom which has no parts, and is eternal It is the smallest part of a जन्यद्रव्य, is possessed of क्रिया and is अतीन्द्रिय See sections 52-53 for a detailed exposition of the atomic theory (Line 3)-प्राणशरीर , this three fold division into शरीर, इन्द्रिय and विषय, which obtains in the case of आप, तेजस् and वायु also, is in accordance with the Vaiseṣikasūtra (IV 2-1) तत् पुनः पृथिव्यादिकार्यद्रव्यं त्रिविधं शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञम्

(49) आप —The Vaiseṣikasutras describe आप as रूपरसस्पर्शवत्य द्रवाः स्निग्धा शीतस्पर्श is the special गुण of water We speak of a slab of stone as being cool, but the coolness really belongs to the watery element in the slab हिमकरकाs are water solidified शरीर वरुणलोके-वरुण is the lord of ocean in the Puranas For the sake of symmetry some शरीर has to be spoken of in connection with water, so the तर्कभाषा speaks of अप्शरीर in the वरुणलोक, a fact which we have to take on trust This अप्शरीर can be a भोगायतन with the help of some पार्थिव parts (तस्य च शरीरस्य पार्थिवावयवोपष्टम्भात्भोगक्षमत्वम्)

(50) तेजस्—It is रूपस्पर्शवत् (Vaiseṣikasutra), possessed of भास्वरत्व and उष्णस्पर्श In the case of hot water, the heat is due to the तेजस् element The तर्कसंग्रह says विषयस्तु चतुर्विधः —भौमदिव्योदर्याकरजभेदात् (भौम तेज fire is पार्थिवमात्रेन्धन (consuming earthly substances alone), दिव्यम् (सौरचान्द्रविद्युद्वडवानलादि) is अबिन्धनम् (consuming water) औदर्यम् (जाठरानल the digestive fire, only metaphorically so called) is पार्थिवजलोभयेन्धनम्, and आकरजम् (सुवर्णप्रभृतिभास्वरमाकरसंभवम्) is अनन्धवेन्धन तेज) Gold and similar shining metals in the mines were regarded as तजस्, as unlike earthly substances, they could not be changed into vapour by the application of excessive heat by the chemists of old times Some regard gold to be a mixture of पृथिवी and तजस (सुवर्ण पार्थिवम् तैजस चेति द्विविधं वस्तु । तत्र तैजसम् अग्निसंयोगानुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणम् । पार्थिवं तु अद्रुत पीतद्रव्यवत् इति । वस्तुत इत पार्थिवमेव सुवर्णम् न तु तैजसमिति । न्यायकोश p 341) The Vaiseṣikas and Naiyayikas regard सुवर्ण positively as तैजस. For, सुवर्ण

obviously cannot be वायु, आकाश, काल दिक्, आत्मन् or मनस् as it has रूप It cannot be जल as its द्रवत्व is not natural It is not पार्थिव as its liquidity is not destroyed even by excessive heat, though there is no प्रतिबन्धक cause (we find that the liquidity of घृत is not destroyed if we pour water into it, there जल acts as a प्रतिबन्धक, but in the case of सुवर्ण no such प्रतिबन्धक exists, hence if सुवर्ण were पार्थिव it ought to have lost its द्रवत्व, as it does not lose its द्रवत्व and get changed into vapour, it must not be पार्थिव) Therefore it must be तैजस्, the only remaining substance (ननु सुवर्णं पार्थिवं पीतत्वाद् गुरुत्वाद्धरिद्रादिवदिति चेन्न । अत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सति घृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशदर्शनेन, जलमध्यस्थघृतादौ द्रवत्वनाशादर्शनेन, असति प्रतिबन्धके पार्थिवद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशाग्निसंयोगयोः कार्यकारणभावावधारणात् । सुवर्णस्याप्यत्यन्तानलसंयोगे सत्यनुच्छिद्यमानद्रवत्वाधिकरणत्वेन पार्थिवत्वानुपपत्तेः । तस्मात्पीतद्रव्यद्रवत्वनाशप्रतिबन्धकतया द्रवद्रव्यान्तरसिद्धौ नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वाधिकरणतया जलाद्भिन्नत्वे रूपवत्तया वाय्वादिभिन्नत्वात् तैजसत्वसिद्धिः । तत्रोष्णस्पर्शभास्वररूपयोरुपलम्भः पार्थिवरूपस्पर्शाभ्यां प्रतिबन्धादनुपपत्तिः । तस्मात्सुवर्णं तैजसमिति सिद्धम् । तर्कदीपिका) The उष्णस्पर्श and भास्वररूप (which सुवर्ण ought to have, if it is तैजस्) are not noticed as they are overpowered by the पीतरूप etc of the पार्थिव factors in it

The above argument to show that सुवर्ण is तैजस् can easily be shown to be fallacious First it is not true that gold cannot be changed into vapour (as modern chemists would tell us), secondly, one is not convinced that there is no प्रतिबन्धक cause in this case (it may not be जल, it may be the very स्वरूप of सुवर्ण), and thirdly, it is wrong to assert that every पार्थिव substance must as a rule be capable of being converted into vapour Owing to the very shining nature of सुवर्ण and other metals, the Vaisesikas were tempted into regarding them as तैजस The तैजस शरीर is found in आदित्यलोक

(51) वायु—रूपरहितस्पर्शवान् । (आकाशादौ अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय स्पर्शवानिति । पृथिव्यादौ अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय रूपरहितेति । तर्कदीपिका) or अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवान् (why Kesavamisra says वायुः नीरूपस्पर्शवान् instead of अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्शवान् is not clear) Kesavamisra following the ancients says that वायु is not प्रत्यक्ष but only स्पर्शानुमेय Thus when wind is blowing, we experience a not-hot-not-cold touch which being a गुण must have a substratum for it This अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श can not have for its substratum आकाश, काल दिक् and आत्मन् (which are विभु, and so the touch would be found everywhere, if it belonged to any one of them), nor मनस् (which being atomic can only have an अतीन्द्रियस्पर्श), nor जल (which has शीतस्पर्श), nor तैजस् (which has उष्णस्पर्श), nor पृथिवी (because in the case of a पार्थिव object, an उद्भूत or manifest touch is invariably associated with उद्भूतरूप. A table for instance has a manifest touch and also a manifest रूप but वायु has no रूप), hence a substance different from all these must be the substratum of अनुष्णा-

शीतस्पर्श and it is वायु (Read also the following from the दीपिका, ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वाद्घटवदिति चेन्न । उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्योपाधित्वात् । यत्र द्रव्यत्वे सति बहिरिन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति घटादौ साध्यव्यापकत्वम् । यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वं नास्ति इति पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वम् । न चैवं ... इष्टत्वात् । तस्मात् स्पर्शादिलिङ्गकानुमेयत्वम् ।) The moderns as well as the Mimāṁsakas however hold that वायु is प्रत्यक्ष as we actually experience the touch of वायु प्राण is nothing but वायु and is of various kinds owing to स्थानभेद (हृदादिस्थानभेदेनाभिभेदात् मुखनासिकादिक्रियाभेदाच्च । प्राणापानादि इति प्राण (मुखनासिकाभ्यां निष्क्रमणप्रवेशनात्) गुदेऽपान (मलादीनामधो नयनात्) समानो (आहारेषु पाकार्थं वह्नेः समुन्नयनात्) नाभिसंस्थित । उदान (ऊर्ध्वं नयनात्) कण्ठदेशस्थो व्यान (नाडीभेदात्) सर्वशरीरग ॥ The five प्राणs are also named differently as follows, उद्गारे नाग आख्यात कूर्म उन्मीलने स्मृत । कृकर क्षुत्करो ज्ञेयो देवदत्तो विजृम्भणे ॥ न जहाति मृतं चापि सर्वव्यापी धनंजय ॥) The वायुशरीर is found in वायुलोक.

(52) The author now describes the उत्पत्तिविनाशक्रम of कार्यरूपपृथिव्यादिचतुष्टय, and introduces to the reader the well known atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. We find in this world that a thing is made up of its parts, the parts are made up of their own individual parts and so forth Dividing these parts further and further we come to the smallest visible part (of the size of the particle of dust in the sun's rays coming through the window) which may be called a त्र्यणुक whose parts are the द्व्यणुक, (made up of three द्व्यणुकs, or three परमाणुs) The द्व्यणुक is made up of two परमाणुs which have no parts For we must stop in this process of dividing, otherwise there would be अनवस्था (no exception can be taken to this reasoning of the Vaiśeṣikas, a modern scientist no doubt would be able to see even a millionth part of the particle of dust in the sun's ray, with his powerful microscope. but even he must come to a point when further division is impossible) To Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, these atoms were the be all and the end all of life and he is reported to have died with 'Pīlavaḥ Pīlavaḥ (पीलु means an atom) on his lips' God (the Vaiśeṣikas are not atheists, though Kaṇāda does not expressly refer to God in his sutras) wills there should be action in the atoms and two atoms coming together form a द्व्यणुक, (here the परमाणुs are the समवायिकारण, परमाणुसंयोग the असमवायिकारण and अदृष्ट the निमित्तकारण) three द्व्यणुकs (there is some difference of opinion as regards these details, but it may be ignored here) form a त्र्यणुक, four त्र्यणुकs form a चतुरणुक and in this way, gross earth, gross water, gross tejas, and gross vāyu are formed The atoms have their own विशेषs and can therefore be distinguished from one another At the time of प्रलय, when God wills that the creation should be destroyed, the परमाणुs begin to move away from one another The two परमाणुs that had formed the द्व्यणुक move

away (thus there is the destruction of the परमाणुसंयोग which is the असमवायिकारण of द्व्यणुक) and the द्व्यणुक is no more the destruction of the द्व्यणुकs (which are the समवायिकारण of the त्र्यणुक) causes the destruction of the त्र्यणुक and so on According to the traditionists द्व्यणुक is destroyed by the असमवायिकारणनाश, and all further creation is destroyed by the समवायिकारणनाश (This is the view referred to in the passage beginning with क्वचित् in line 15) The moderns hold that all द्रव्यनाश is caused by the असमवायिकारणनाश (This is the view of Kesavamisra). The ordinary प्रलय causes सर्वकार्यद्रव्यध्वंस while the महाप्रलय causes सर्वभावकार्यध्वंस It would be seen that the order of विनाश given above is the same as the order of उत्पत्ति Now this is quite absurd and opposed to all common sense The विनाशक्रम should be exactly the reverse of the उत्पत्तिक्रम you gradually commence undoing the thing as finally formed at the time of destroying it A घट is first broken into कपालs, then these कपालs are further broken into smaller bits and ultimately we go to the द्व्यणुक One does not start at the द्व्यणुक, and supposing one did start like that where would the remaining घट stand when the द्व्यणुक is destroyed? It might be said that it would topple down like a *house of cards* all of a sudden but this way of destruction is opposed to all experience (Sankaracarya in his Bhasya on the Vedantasutras (II 3 14) says विपर्ययेण तु प्रलयक्रमोऽत उत्पत्तिक्रमाद् भवितुमर्हति तथा हि लोके दृश्यते येन क्रमेण सोपानमारूढस्ततो विपरीतेन क्रमेणावरोहतीति।) *The modern Naiyayikas by favouring* the असमवायिकारणनाश throughout seem to hold the common sense view about the विनाशक्रम

The Vaisesika theory of atoms resembles considerably the atomic theory of Greek philosophers Democritus believed in atoms possessing size movement etc The Vaisesika atoms are possessed of rupa etc in addition Empedocles and Anaxagoras like Kanada regarded mind also as atomic Sankaracarya (see his Bhasya on the Vedanta sutras II 2 11, 15) denounces this atomic theory with all his philosophical acumen showing how the first kriya in atoms is impossible, how the atoms cannot possibly be possessed of visesas etc

The qualities रूप etc of a product are produced by the qualities of the कारण, *and they are destroyed either by the destruction of* their substratum or by the appearance of contrary qualities, due to heat etc

(53) The existence of atoms is proved by अनुमान Everything that is a कार्यद्रव्य is necessarily produced by a द्रव्य of lesser magnitude and that महद्द्रव्यारम्भक is a कार्य in its turn so proceeding in this way we come to the त्र्यणुक (the smallest component part) and the त्र्यणुक is composed of still smaller parts which are called परमाणुs which are

अनारब्ध (Line 9)— ननु परमाणु —The objector says — How can you say that the atom is not a product, because if you said so, the general rule that a component of a product must itself be a product, would be violated ?—This is answered by saying that if an atom were regarded as a product, there would result an endless series of products. And in that case, the mountain Meru (or Sumeru) and a mustard seed would come to be regarded as of similar dimension *being equally the products of infinite component parts*. So this series of component parts must stop somewhere. The product where it stops, is the परमाणु.

The Meru (or Sumeru) is a fabulous golden mountain, the highest of all mountains, round which the sun and the stars are supposed to revolve.

(Line 13)—The author now shows how द्व्यणुक is composed of two atoms only, and the त्र्यणुक of three द्व्यणुकs only.

द्व्यणुक is composed of two atoms only. One atom cannot obviously produce a द्व्यणुक; there is no reason to suppose that three atoms are required for that purpose. So two atoms may be regarded as sufficient to produce a द्व्यणुक. The परिमाण of a द्व्यणुक is अणुत्व (and ह्रस्वत्व), the परिमाण of a त्र्यणुक is महत्त्व (and दीर्घत्व) as the त्र्यणुक is the smallest thing visible. The परिमाण of an अणु is said to be पारिमाण्डल्य.

(Line 14)—त्र्यणुकम्. The question is what is the minimum number of द्व्यणुकs required to produce the dimension in a त्र्यणुक. It must be remembered that the dimension of a त्र्यणुक is of an altogether different nature from that of a द्व्यणुक. The महत् dimension in a कार्य is either produced from the महत् dimension of the कारण or the number of the producing factors (or from प्रचयविशेष: कारणबहुत्वात्, कारणमहत्त्वात्, प्रचयविशेषाच्च महत्—Vaiśeṣikasūtra VII 1 9) as circumstances permit. Now

(1) One द्व्यणुक cannot obviously produce a त्र्यणुक.

(2) Two द्व्यणुकs cannot produce a त्र्यणुक either. For the महत् dimension in a त्र्यणुक cannot be produced by the अणु dimension of the द्व्यणुक, which is of a different nature. Thus the dimension of a द्व्यणुक is अणु, the dimension of two द्व्यणुकs would be अणुतर, instead of महत्. So we fall back upon the कारणबहुत्व for the production of the dimension of a त्र्यणुक. The द्व्यणुकs have to be बहु to produce a त्र्यणुक.

(3) बहु means any number greater than two. So we fix upon three (which is the minimum number to make up बहु) as the number of द्व्यणुकs required to produce a त्र्यणुक.

(54) शब्दगुणम्—शब्द is the विशेषगुण of आकाश, to emphasise this, the word गुण is used in the definition (अत्र गुणपदमाकाशे शब्द एव विशेषगुण इति द्योतनाय न त्वतिव्याप्तिवारणाय । समवायेन शब्दत्वमात्रस्य सम्यक्त्वात्—पदकृत्यदीपिनी) Other definitions of आकाश are शब्दसमवायिकारणम्, संयोगाजन्यजन्यविशेषगुणसमानाधिकरणविशेषाधिकरणम् By inference we are able to prove the existence of आकाश which being विभु is अतीन्द्रिय, शब्द पृथिव्याद्यष्टद्रव्यातिरिक्तद्रव्याश्रित अष्टद्रव्यानाश्रितत्वे सति समवायिकारणत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा रूपम् । It can be easily shown that शब्द cannot have the eight द्रव्यs, पृथिवी and others, as its substratum, so a ninth द्रव्य आकाश must be supposed to exist Others prove the existence of आकाश by arguing that stars and other heavenly bodies must have a resort which is आकाश According to the Samkhyas निष्क्रमणादिकर्म is आकाशानुमापक (Line 10) भेदे प्रमाणाभावात्, the divisions घटाकाश, पटाकाश etc are due to the उपाधिs विभु–सर्वमूर्तद्रव्यसंयोगित्वम् विभुत्वम्, । मूर्तत्व परिच्छिन्नपरिमाणवत्त्वं क्रियावत्त्वं वा । (तर्कदीपिका) नित्यम्–because all विभु things are necessarily eternal The reading प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे परिशेष gives a more or less cumbrous definition of परिशेष—When it is denied that a thing resides in certain objects out of a number of objects in which it is sure to reside, it follows that it must reside in the remainder on account of the impossibility of its remaining anywhere else The conclusion thus arrived at, is called परिशेष (Line 4)-साधारणत्वे सति प्राह्यत्व is the definition of a विशेषगुण—रूपादावौ व्यभिचार वारयितुं सत्यन्तम् । एकेन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वं चैकेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्यत्वम् । नान घटादौ व्यभिचार । आत्मनि व्यभिचार वारयितुं ग्राह्यति । (गोवर्धन) अस्मदादि is put in to exclude yogins who are possessed of miraculous powers

(55) काल –Time (अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतुः कालः ... परत्वापरत्वासमवायिकारणाधारः परत्वापरत्वानधिकरण काल ।) अतीतादिव्यवहारहेतु (the definition in the तर्कसंग्रह) cannot be regarded as a definition of काल, it only expresses in a popular manner the idea about time हेतु must be taken here to mean 'a special cause,' for all our cognitions are based upon *conceptions of time and space* विभुत्वे सति दिगसमवेतपरत्वासमवायिकारणाधिकरणम् would be a technically correct but *practically useless definition of* काल एक —*The three-fold nature of* काल, past, present and future, is due to उपाधिs According to the Samkhyas काल is to be included in आकाश, others regard काल as identical with ईश्वर the different क्षणs being different from him According to the Naiyayikas काल is अतीन्द्रिय, the followers of Prabhakara regard it as षडिन्द्रियवेद्य

(56) दिक्–space, other definitions of दिक् are–अकालत्वे सत्यविशेषगुणा महती, विभुत्वे सति दैशिकपरत्वापरत्वासमवायिकारणसंयोगाश्रयत्वादुपाधिरूप दिक्त्वम्, ... दिक् Space is the cause of the notion of दैशिक nearness or distance (दूरान्तिकादिधीहेतु) काल is नियतक्रियासम्बन्धक, that is, its divisions are fixed (what is present

time for one is al o present time for another living at that time) but दिक् is अनियतेापाधुस्थायिका (for an object which is to the right of one, may be to the left of another person, or of himself if he turns about) Strictly speaking, there is no nece sity of admitting both आकाश and दिक् as द्रव्य. Why should not आकाश be regarded as capable of showing direction in addition to its being समवेत with शब्द? The Vaiseṣikas apparently admitted both as आकाश could not be ignored being one of the five well known elements and दिक् could not be ignored as the notion of space is as old as the hills आकाश is one of the five material elements, has a special quality शब्द and thus has an objective existence, while दिक् is not an element has no special quality is the साधारण cau e of all effects does the work of showing direction and is to be perceived by the mind. एका—Though one दिक् owing to उपाधिभेद is regarded as four fold (प्राची प्रतीची उदीची and दक्षिणा the four main quarters) or ten fold (प्राची आग्नेयी प्रतीची उदीची आग्नेयी नैऋती वायवी ऐशानी the four by quarters, ऊर्ध्व and अध these are also named ऐन्द्रवायवैवरुणादि as माहेन्द्री, वैश्वानरी याम्या नैऋती वारुणी वाय य सा्मयी ऐशानी, ब्राह्मी and नागी) or eleven fold (with the addition of रौद्री)

(57) See section 44 above सत्यादय — सत्य परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग and विभाग

(58) मनस्-मन्यते अनेन इति मन, स्पर्शरहित व सति क्रियावत्त्व मनस लक्षणम् It is not clear why the author says न स्वाभिसन्निकृष्ट instead of मनस्त्व सामान्यवत्. Though the all-pervading Atman is always in contact with the various इन्द्रियार्थs, we do not have their ज्ञान always (for instance, in deep sleep) this shows that there must be some other factor essential for the production of ज्ञान and that is मनस् (आत्मेन्द्रिय यस नैकट्ये ज्ञानस्य भावो भावश्च मनसः लिङ्गम्) मनस् acts as a sort of clearing office for the various impressions for which the sense-organs are responsible If there had been no मनस्, there would have been simultaneous knowledge through the various sense organs, which is not the case (युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्ति मनसो लिङ्गम्) म स् is नि य as there is no प्रमाण to believe that it is possessed of parts It is different for different bodies for in this way alone we can account for different cognitions in different individuals As regards its size, it is atomic It cannot be मध्यमपरिमाण, for in that case it would be अनित्य As it is नि य, it can either be विभु or अणुपरिमाण (for विभु and अणुपरिमाण things are always नित्य) We shall now show why मनस् can not be विभु It has already been mentioned that according to the Vaiseṣikas, आत्मन् comes into contact with मनस् (आत्मा मनसा सयुज्यते) before any cognition can be had Ātman is definitely known to be विभु, in order to make a contact between आत्मन् and मनस् possible, मनस् must

not be विभु, for how can there be a contact between two all-pervading things? मनस् therefore must be taken to be अणु, so that आत्ममनःसंयोग, the असमवायिकारण of ज्ञान may exist. If we admit the संयोग of two विभु things, then आत्मन् and मनस् would always be connected together and there would be no सुषुप्ति (where मनस् lies low and there is a cessation of knowledge). If on the other hand, मनस् is taken to be अणुपरिमाण, सुषुप्ति becomes possible when the atomic मनस् enters the पुरीतत् vein (somewhere near the heart) where the आत्ममनःसंयोग comes to an end. Cognition arises when मनस् comes out of the पुरीतत् vein. This is obviously a very weak argument of the Vaisesikas. For, if Ātman is विभु, how can we assert that आत्ममनःसंयोग ceases in the पुरीतत् vein? The all-pervading आत्मन् cannot surely be prevented from entering the पुरीतत् vein. The cessation of knowledge is due to the absence of इन्द्रियमनःसंयोग, rather than of आत्ममनःसंयोग. But in that case there ought to be cessation of knowledge in dreams where also there is no इन्द्रियमनःसंयोग. Thus there is difficulty both ways. At any rate, the Vaisesikas are right in arguing that there could not be any contact between two विभु things and so all things considered मनस् should be taken to be atomic in size. मनस् is the internal sense-organ. It is not प्रत्यक्ष, but अनुमेय. The Mimaṁsakas regard मनस् to be विभु and the Vedantins take it to be मध्यमपरिमाण ...

(Line 3)—सङ्ख्यादष्टगुणवत्–The eight qualities are सङ्ख्या, अणुपरिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग, विभाग, परत्वम्, अपरत्वम्, and वेग. Others say, परापरत्वसङ्ख्याद्या पञ्च वेगश्च मानसे.

(59) गुणs are twenty-four. A गुण is पदार्थस्य विशेषाधानहेतुः सिद्धवस्तुधर्मः (Kavyaprakasa II). The Tarka-Dipikā defines गुण as द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति सामान्यवान् (we shall see later how सामान्य can only reside in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्, so the expression द्रव्यकर्मभिन्नत्वे सति excludes द्रव्य and कर्मन् and the definition applies to गुण only) or गुणत्वजातिमान्. The Vaisesikasūtras say द्रव्याश्रय्यगुणवान् (having द्रव्य as its substratum and having no qualities, for if गुण were to be possessed of गुणs there would be अनवस्था) संयोगविभागेष्वकारणमनपेक्ष (this expression excludes कर्मन् which is also द्रव्याश्रयि and अगुणवत्, for क्रिया is the cause of संयोग and विभाग) इति गुणलक्षणम्. The sūtras give only seventeen Gunas, रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शाः सङ्ख्याः परिमाणानि पृथक्त्वं संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे इच्छाद्वेषौ प्रयत्नाश्च गुणाः। According to the commentators the च in प्रयत्नाश्च is meant to imply the seven गुरुत्व, द्रवत्व, स्नेह, शब्द, धर्म, अधर्म and संस्कार that are not expressly mentioned by name. Some add to the list the following:—लघुत्व (which is but गुरुत्वाभाव), मृदुत्व and कठिनत्व (which are but अवयवसंयोगविशेष) and मन्दत्व (which is but वत्वादत्वाभाव), but it is not necessary

to recognise them as separate गुण and the number of गुणs may be said to be twenty-four only Of these संस्कार is three-fold (वेग भावना स्थितिस्थापकश्चेति) and द्रवत्व two-fold (सांसिद्धिक and नैमित्तिक). These twenty-four Guṇas can be classified in various ways Thus (न्यायकोश, p 263)

(I) (i) मूर्तगुणा —रूपम्, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, परत्वम्, अपरत्वम्, गुरुत्वम्, द्रवत्वम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिस्थापक (11)

(ii) अमूर्तगुणा —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म, भावना and शब्द (10)

(iii) मूर्तामूर्तगुणा —संख्या, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग and विभाग (5)

(II) (i) अनेकाश्रिता —संयोग, विभाग, द्वित्वादिका संख्या, द्विपृथक्त्वादय,

(ii) एकाश्रिता —तद्भिन्ना शिष्टा ।

(III) (i) विशेषगुणा —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न, धर्म, अधर्म, रूपम्, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श, स्नेह, सांसिद्धिक-द्रवत्वम्, भावना and शब्द (16) बुद्ध्यादिषट्क स्पर्शान्ता स्नेह सांसिद्धिको द्रव । अदृष्टभावनाशब्दा अमी वैशेषिका गुणा ।

(ii) सामान्यगुणा —संख्या, परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग, विभाग, परत्वम्, अपरत्वम्, नैमित्तिकद्रवत्वम्, गुरुत्वम् and वेग (10) संख्यादिरपरत्वान्तो द्रवो नैमित्तिकस्तथा । गुरुत्ववेगौ सामान्यगुणा एते प्रकीर्तिता ॥

(IV) (i) द्वीन्द्रियग्राह्या —संख्या परिमाणम्, पृथक्त्वम्, संयोग, विभाग, परत्वम्, अपरत्वम्, द्रवत्वम्, स्नेह, वेग and स्थितिस्थापक (11)

(ii) बाह्यैकेन्द्रियग्राह्या —रूपम्, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द (5)

(iii) अतीन्द्रियगुणा —गुरुत्वम्, धर्म, अधर्म and भावना (4)

(iv) अन्तरिन्द्रियगुणा —बुद्धि, सुखम्, दुःखम्, इच्छा, द्वेष, प्रयत्न (6)

(V) (i) अकारणगुणोत्पन्ना —बुद्ध्यादिषट्कम्, भावना and शब्द (10)

(ii) कारणगुणोत्पन्ना —अपाकजा रूपरसगन्धा, अनुष्ण स्पर्श, अपाकजं द्रवत्वम्, स्नेहवेगगुरुत्वैकत्वानि, पृथक्त्वम्, परिमाणम् and स्थितिस्थापक

For further interesting details about the characteristics of different गुणs, see न्यायकोश. A मूर्तगुण is one which resides in a मूर्त or corporeal substance A सामान्यगुण can exist in two or more द्रव्यs at one and the same time, while a विशेषगुण can exist in one द्रव्य only at one time The भाषापरिच्छेद gives in the following verses how the various गुणs exist in the nine द्रव्यs स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगाख्यसंस्कारो मरुतो गुणा । अष्टौ स्पर्शाद्या रूपं द्रवो वेगश्च तेजसि ॥ स्पर्शादयोऽष्टौ वेगश्च गुरुत्वं च द्रवत्वकम् । रूपं रसस्तथा स्नेहो वारिण्येते चतुर्दश ॥ स्नेहहीना गन्धयुता क्षितावेते चतुर्दश । बुद्ध्यादिषट्क संख्यादिपञ्चकं भावना तथा ॥ धर्माधर्मौ गुणा एत आत्मन स्युश्चतुर्दश । संख्यादिपञ्चक कालदिशो शब्दश्च ते च खे ॥ संख्याद्य

पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि नाडदि चेश्चे । पादपस्त्वक्त्वपायो पञ्च चेतश्च मनस ॥ The Advaitavedantins regard the गुण as being अभिन्न from द्रव्य


(60) रूपम्—With this section Kesavamisra commences the *लक्षणपरीक्षा of the गुणs* रूपम् is usually defined as चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुण —The word मात्र in the definition is necessary to exclude सङ्ख्या which is चक्षुर्ग्राह्य but not चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्य as it can be perceived by the त्वगिन्द्रिय as well If the definition had been only चक्षुर्ग्राह्य, it would extend to रूपत्व as well *for it is a well-known rule that* येनेन्द्रियेण यद्गृह्यते तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्गतं सामान्य तद्गत समवाय तद्गत अभावश्च गृह्यत So to exclude रूपत्व we put in गुण Still the definition चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो गुण is not correct *for* प्रभाभित्तिसंयोग would be covered by it, to exclude that the definition should be amended as चक्षुर्ग्राह्यजातिमान् गुण or चक्षुर्मात्रग्राह्यो विशेषगुण (सङ्ख्या or संयोग is not a विशेषगुण, if we say विशेषगुण, then the word मात्र is not necessary for excluding सङ्ख्या but is necessary *for excluding* अन्यमात्रग्राह्यविशेषगुण) अनेकप्रकारम् शुक्लनीलपीतरक्तहरितकपिशचित्रभेदात् सप्तविधम् चित्ररूप is objected to by some The objector says it is not necessary to admit चित्ररूप at all, रूप should be only six-fold For what after all is चित्ररूप? It is a mixture of different colours When we have perceived the different colours, we surely have the idea of चित्ररूप To this argument the siddhantin gives the following reply —It is a rule that the रूप of an object must cover the whole of the object and then we shall be able to perceive that object by means of this व्याप्यवृत्ति रूप Take the case of a piece of cloth which has, say, four colours, white, red, yellow and green Now the white colour would enable us to perceive only that portion which is covered by it, similar is the case with the other colours If we do not admit चित्ररूप as a distinct रूप we shall perceive only different portions covered up by the different colours and would not have *any idea of the* पट *as a whole* In other words the पट as a whole (not the पट as made up of different portions) would not be perceived at all If to avoid this difficulty, we say that a thing is perceived not because it is possessed of रूप (of course उद्भूत) but because it is in intimate union with things that are possessed of रूप (a चित्रपट is in intimate union with its parts that are individually possessed of different colours, and so ought to be perceived, according to the change suggested), the चित्रपट can be perceived without the admission of a चित्ररूप But what is gained by this change which involves गौरव and which makes matters unnecessarily complicated? Is it not simpler to admit चित्ररूप and have done with the whole problem? The परमाणुगतरूप is not प्रत्यक्ष For the चाक्षुषप्रत्यक्ष of रूप, four factors are necessary—महत्परिमाण (hence परमाणुरूप *is not* प्रत्यक्ष), उद्भूतत्वम् (the चक्षुर्वृत्तिशुक्लरूप being अनुद्भूत is not प्रत्यक्ष), अनभिभूतत्वम्

(वैश्वानरत्व being overpowered by पार्थिवत्व is not seen) and स्पर्श (रस is not perceived as it has no रूप)

(61) रस — रस्यते आस्वाद्यते इति Kesavamisra says रसनेन्द्रियग्राह्य and not रसनेन्द्रियमात्रग्राह्य as रसनेन्द्रिय perceives रस only and no other गुण मधुर — Any other रस apprehended in जल is due to some adventitious पार्थिव element षड्विधः — मधुराम्ललवणकटुकषायतिक्तभेदात् (this expression is put in the text itself by some But as the author has not mentioned the divisions of रूप in the text, it is more likely that he should not mention the divisions of रस also in the text)

(62) गन्ध — घ्राणेन्द्रिय perceives only गन्धगुण, hence मात्र is not necessary in the definition गन्ध is also divided into सुरभि and असुरभि It is spoken of as द्विविध as well इत्थं चित्रगन्धस्य मतोऽस्ति ... गन्धो द्विविधः सुरभिरसुरभिश्च is by संयुक्तसमवाय thus—

घ्राण



संयुक्तसमवाय ।

(63) स्पर्श — Here मात्र is necessary in the definition to exclude संख्या संख्या etc which are perceived by the sense of touch as well as by the eye The पृथिवीस्पर्श is two fold कठिन and सुकुमार that of वायु is twelve fold, स्पर्श इति ... ... The Vaiseṣikas admit only चित्ररूप (some do admit चित्ररस as well), but there is no valid reason why चित्रगन्ध and चित्ररस should not be admitted To say that we are able to perceive the different गन्धs or रसs separately respectively in the case of चित्रगन्ध or चित्ररस, without losing sight of the fact that they form one united whole is hardly convincing

रूप, रस, गन्ध and स्पर्श belonging to the atoms of आप, तेजस and वायु are नित्य those belonging to the products (द्व्यणुक and others) of आप, तेजस and वायु are अनित्य In the case of पृथिवी (atoms as well as products) the four गुणs are पाकज and hence अनित्य only पाकज—पाक means the application of heat ... We find that a jar when baked changes its colour, smell etc This change is brought about by पाक in the case of पृथिवी only The

Naiyāyikas and the Vaisesikas hold quite different views as to *how these* पाकजगुणाः *are produced* The Vaisesikas are called पीलु-(पीलवः परमाणवः) पाकवादिनः, because they hold that it is the परमाणुs that are baked. Thus *the application of heat causes a commotion* in the atoms which become separated, and their contact—the non-intimate cause—being *destroyed,* the products द्व्यणुक etc *are* destroyed The whole black jar is destroyed and the atoms become baked and a new रूप (redness), गन्ध etc are created in them Then these परमाणुs with the new qualities come together to form द्व्यणुक etc and ultimately the new red jar is produced The पीलुपाकवादिनः maintain that fire can not penetrate into the thick jar to create a new रूप which must be supposed to be created by the रूप of the परमाणुs which alone are fit to be operated upon by fire It is easy to see the flaws in the above argument Where does the घट stay when the परमाणुs get separated ? If a new घट is created, how are we to account for the fact that we continue to recognise the घट to be the same old one though somewhat changed ? The Vaisesikas do try to answer these objections, but their answers are dogmatic and unconvincing The Naiyayikas are पिठरपाकवादिनः (पिठर means कार्यकारणसमुदाय , अवयवावयवि-समुदाय) and take a more sensible view of the matter Their view is as follows —The jar is सच्छिद्र, hence fire can easily penetrate into it The old jar is not destroyed, but fire acts upon the parts of the jar, right up to the परमाणुs, and changes their रूप Thus as the old घट for all practical purposes remains in tact, we are able to recognise it

(Line 5)—एते च रूपादयः . महत्त्वेन सह एकार्थे घटादिरूपे समवेताः What this sentence means is that these four qualities must be developed (or manifested) and must inhere in an object possessed of magnitude, in order to become directly perceptible The sentence is intended to show that these qualities, when they belong to atoms, and the तैजस colour of the sense of sight, are not perceived, because, in the former case, they reside in objects that do not possess magnitude, and in the latter case, the colour is अनुद्भूत (unmanifested or undeveloped)

(64) संख्या—एकत्वादिव्यवहारहेतु *is hardly a definition of* संख्या हेतु *is* used here in the sense of असाधारणकारण The Mimāṁsakas regarded संख्या as a *separate* पदार्थ संख्या *is perceived by* त्वक् *as well as by* चक्षु It is thus a सामान्यगुण एकत्व belonging to नित्य is said to be नित्य, and द्वित्वादिक is अनित्य *everywhere From the passage* द्वित्व अन्यते *it is clear* that Kesavamisra had clearly grasped the nature of duality etc which *are merely* phenomenal, being based upon अपेक्षाबुद्धि Unity alone is real and eternal, everything else is mere relative Thus the

idea of two can be grasped when we understand one twice, it has no independent existence All numbers can be shown to be based upon एकत्व which alone has no relative existence, *pace* Dr Einstein अपेक्षाबुद्धि-अनेकैकत्वबुद्धिर्या सापेक्षा बुद्धिरुच्यते-the notion which refers to many unities is called relative notion When we see two things, the idea of their duality does not at once arise in our mind We first apprehend the two things separately in the form 'this is one, this is one.' (इदमेकम्, इदमेकम्) This notion which refers to many unities is called अपेक्षाबुद्धि. It is this combined notion of two unities that produces the conception of duality and then we realise the things as being two The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas hold different views regarding the nature of द्वित्व, the former hold that it is अपेक्षाबुद्धिव्यंग्य, and the latter अपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्य.

(65) परिमाणम्-परिमाणत्वजातिमत्. मानव्यवहार-हस्तवितस्त्यादिव्यवहार or मानपरिमिति तस्य यो व्यवहार इदं महत् इदम् अणु इत्याद्याकारकः। विभुपरिमाण is परममहत्, the परिमाण of an अणु is अणुत्व and that of a परमाणु is पारिमाण्डल्य नित्यगत परिमाण is नित्य, अनित्यगतपरिमाण is अनित्य अनित्यपरिमाण is three fold, सङ्ख्याजन्यम्, परिमाणजन्यं प्रचयजन्यं च। तत्राद्यम् परमाणुद्वित्वजन्यं द्व्यणुके। द्व्यणुत्वबहुत्वजन्यं च त्र्यणुके। द्वितीयं कपालपरिमाणजन्यं घटपरिमाणम्। तृतीयम् तूलावयवसंयोगजन्यं तूलपिण्डपरिमाणम्। The Samkhyas and the Vedantins do not regard दीर्घत्व and ह्रस्वत्व as separate परिमाणs

(66) पृथक्त्वम्-अपोद्धारव्यवहारकारणम्-The Mimansakas regard पृथक्त्व as identical with अन्योन्याभाव पृथक्त्व is different from अन्योन्याभाव, as the latter simply says that one thing is not another, but the former positively says that one thing is distinct from another अन्योन्याभाव may tell us that घट is not घटत्व and *vice versa*, but पृथक्त्व would say that घट is distinct from घटत्व. The notions conveyed by अन्योन्याभाव and पृथक्त्व are different

(67) संयोग —संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतु, the तर्कदीपिका says that the expression असाधारणहेतु should be used to exclude the साधारणकारणs (these are eight, ईश्वर तज्ज्ञानेच्छाकृतयः प्रागभाव काल दिक् अदृष्टम् (धर्माधर्मौ), प्रतिबन्धकाभाव-अभाव in addition, according to some) The relation between two युतसिद्धs (the relation between the अयुतसिद्धs is समवाय) is संयोग संयोग is कर्मज and संयोगज, कर्मज again is two fold (i) अन्यतरकर्मज, the contact between a vulture and a mountain, (ii) उभयकर्मज, the contact between two wrestlers or rams संयोगज is अवयवसंयोगजन्य, हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगात् कायपुस्तकसंयोग (this might arise from one, two or many अवयवs) संयोग is अव्याप्यवृत्ति (that is, residing only in a part of the thing, not covering up the whole object) or स्वात्यन्ताभावसमानाधिकरण (having the same abode as that of its absolute negation)

(68) विभाग — विभक्तप्रत्ययासाधारणकारणम् would be a better definition, emphasizing the positive nature of विभाग Some do not regard विभाग as a separate गुण, calling it merely संयोगनाश Like संयोग, विभाग is कर्मज (अन्यतरकर्मज ,—श्येनशैलयोर्विभाग , उभयकर्मज ,—मेषयोर्विभाग) and विभागज (कारणमात्रविभागजन्य ,—कपालद्वयविभागात् कपालघटदेशविभाग , कारणाकारणविभागजन्य —हस्तपुस्तकविभागात् कायपुस्तकविभाग) The Naiyayikas do not recognise this विभागजविभाग, the Vaisesikas do

(69) परत्वापरत्व—दिक्कृतपरत्वापरत्व resides in मूर्तद्रव्यs, कालकृतपरत्वापरत्व in जन्यद्रव्यs स्थविरत्व is परत्व with reference to time, विप्रकृष्टत्व is परत्व with reference to space

(70) गुरुत्व—आद्य in the definition is put in to exclude वेग which is the असमवायिकारण of द्वितीयपतन पतनम्—अधोदेशसंयोगानुकूलो व्यापार । The Vaisesikas obviously were ignorant of the notion of gravity, but they evidently knew that the initial पतन was not caused by वेग etc , and accounted for it by postulating the existence of the गुरुत्व quality गुरुत्व is अतीन्द्रिय Some Naiyayikas consider it to be a स्पर्शविशेष संयोगवेग , the Vaisesikasūtra is संयोगाभावे गुरुत्वात् पतनम् (V 1 7)—The conjunction of the fruit and the stalk, the velocity of an arrow, and the conscious effort of the bird prevent the fruit, the arrow and the bird respectively from falling, and in their absence the falling is due to gravity

(71) द्रवत्वम्—वेग would be the असमवायिकारण of द्वितीयस्यन्दन नैसर्गिकम् natural not caused by अग्न्यादिसंयोग In hail and snow there is नैसर्गिक (or सांसिद्धिक) द्रवत्व only lying low owing to excessive cold नैमित्तिक due to तेजःसंयोग

(72) स्नेह —स्नेहत्वजातिमान् गुण , it is the विशेषगुण of water स्नेह is two-fold प्रकृष्टस्नेह and अप्रकृष्टस्नेह , the *former is found in oily* substances

(73) शब्द —शब्द resides in आकाश only and is perceived by only श्रोत्र It exists only for three moments and is अनित्य According to the Samkhyas and Vedantins, शब्द resides in all the five elements According to our author शब्द is three-fold (1) संयोगज , भेरीदण्डसंयोगजन्य (2) विभागज , यथा वंशे पाट्यमाने दलद्वयविभागजन्यश्चटचटाशब्द (3) शब्दज , भेर्यादिदेशमारभ्य श्रोत्रपर्यन्त द्वितीयादिशब्दा According to others these three varieties constitute the ध्वन्यात्मकशब्द which should be distinguished from वर्णात्मक शब्द (संस्कृतभाषादिरूप अकारादिवर्णलक्षण) Another division of शब्द is (I) बुद्धिहेतुक which is sub-divided into (i) स्वाभाविक वर्णविशेषानभिव्यञ्जको हर्षितरुदितादिरूप , (ii) काल्पनिक —(1) भाषादिशब्द , (2) गीतादि , (3) वर्णात्मक and (II) अबुद्धिहेतुक मेघादिशब्द वर्णात्मकशब्द is also further sub-divided

into संयुक्त and विभक्त The शब्दजशब्द is admitted in order to account for the perception of शब्द produced at a distance A drum is sounded at a distance, how are we able to hear the sound? The चक्षुरिन्द्रिय is able to perceive a jar by actually going to and coming into contact with it But the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय cannot go to the distant sound, for the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is nothing but आकाश conditioned by the cavity of the ear, and if the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय leaves its resort, it would be no better than ordinary आकाश So if the mountain does not go to Mahomet, Mahomet must go to the mountain The distant sound must go to the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय in order that it might be perceived There are two views as to how this sound reaches the ear One view (which follows the वीचीतरङ्गन्याय) is as follow — The first शब्द of the drum produces a second शब्द (which is दशदिगव-च्छिन्न) this second शब्द produces a similar third शब्द and so on till it reaches the ear, just as one wave in the sea produces another wave which in turn produces a third wave and so on till the shore is reached Another view (following the कदम्बमुकुलन्याय) says that just as the buds of the Kadamba tree blossom forth all of a sudden the first शब्द produces not one sound, but ten sounds in the ten directions which themselves ultimately reach the ear without producing similar sounds According to the first view what the ear actually perceives is only a similar शब्द, which may even be thousand times removed from the first शब्द while according to the second view it appears that we are able to hear just the second शब्द The analogy of the वीचितरङ्ग shows that the Naiyayikas were dimly aware of the modern theory of sound being carried away by waves of air particles Their view about the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय being आकाश circumscribed by the ear-cavity is of course crude, modern science tells us that the श्रोत्रेन्द्रिय is the tympanum in the ear

(Line 17)—क्रमशुद्धिवत् बोधिनी points out that शब्द exists for four moments तत्रावस्थायिशब्दः Let us suppose that a particular भेरीदण्डसंयोग has produced 100 शब्दs before the sound is heard by the ear (भेरीदण्डसंयोग–शब्द$_1$–शब्द$_2$–शब्द$_3$ शब्द$_{50}$ शब्द$_{98}$ शब्द$_{99}$–शब्द$_{100}$–श्रोत्र) The objector says that शब्द$_3$ destroys शब्द$_1$, शब्द$_4$ destroys शब्द$_2$ and so forth till the 99th शब्द; the 99th शब्द and 100th शब्द mutually destroy each other, that is the 99th शब्द destroys the 100th and the 100th शब्द destroys the 99th like सुन्दोपसुन्द (सुन्द and उपसुन्द were two demon-brothers who loved each other most and together proved a terror to the gods and to the world Brahmadeva, in order to create dissension between them, created the most lovely Apsaras Tilottama and sent her to them Both of them fell in love with her, grew jealous on her account and ultimately killed each other) The author points out that the objector's view is wrong as it is physically

impossible for both the 99th and 100th शब्द्s to exist till they are destroyed together For a शब्द can exist only for three moments When the 99th शब्द is in its third moment, ready to be destroyed, the 100th शब्द being in its second moment of existence, has yet one more moment to live and can not be destroyed for one more moment The 100th शब्द can not be destroyed in its third moment by the 99th शब्द which cannot be in existence at that time So we shall have to suppose that the 100th शब्द is destroyed *by the destruction of the 99th* शब्द and not by the 99th शब्द (According to some, शब्द exists for two moments only and not three, but this does not affect the main argument)

(Line 22)—विनाशित्व च The destructibility of शब्द can be proved by the following syllogism—शब्द अनित्य । सामान्यवत्त्वे सति अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रिय ग्राह्यत्वात् । घटवत् । (Incidentally, अनित्यत्व is explained as 'having a nature liable to destruction' and not 'having भावरूप (or सत्तायोग) liable to destruction For, if अनित्यत्व meant having भावरूप liable to destruction' प्रागभाव which is acknowledged to be अनित्य by all would not be अनित्य, as प्रागभाव has अभावरूप and so the definition would not be applicable to it But प्रागभाव has *a nature liable to destruction*, hence the definition विनाशावच्छिन्नस्वरूपत्वम् would cover it) The author now points out how each and every word in the हेतु सामान्यवत्त्वे is significant *If* the हेतु is *simply* इन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य इन्द्रियग्राह्य स स अनित्य,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as आत्मन् is इन्द्रियग्राह्य (mind which cognises Ātman is also an इन्द्रिय, the internal sense organ), but नित्य So we must amend the हेतु

If the हेतु is बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्, the व्याप्ति would be

य य बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्य स स अनित्य,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, as परमाणुs are बाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्य (by the yogins), but नित्य So the हेतु requires still further emendation [this is rather hypercritical *for in all our arguments, we tacitly rule out of order all extraordinary or supernatural considerations*]

If the हेतु *is* अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात् *the व्याप्ति would be*

य य अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्य स स अनित्य,

but this व्याप्ति is wrong, for सामान्य is अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्य (according to the rule येनेन्द्रियेण यद् गृह्यते etc see section 60 above) but नित्य So we add सामान्यवत्त्वे सति this effectually shuts out सामान्य, for सामान्य has no *further* सामान्य

Thus the हेतु, सामान्यवत्त्वे सति अस्मदादिबाह्येन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वम्, *is an unobjectionable* हेतु

(Line 32)—योगिनस्तानि प्रमाणम्—Atoms are knowable things, we might not be able to see them, but there must be some who are able to do that and they are yogins, gods etc

(Line 36)—सामान्यरहितत्व–सामान्य, विशेष and समवाय (and अभाव) have no सामान्य See section 83

(74)—See section 87. The passage ऐशी is not read in some manuscripts As Kesavamisra has not directly mentioned ईश्वर under Ātman (as the तर्कसंग्रह, for instance, does), this passage referring to ऐशी बुद्धि appears to be suspicious

(75-76)—सुख is defined as that which is experienced as agreeable by all This is a faulty definition For there can be nothing in this world which is experienced as agreeable *by all* Even the most unalloyed pleasure in the world will be looked down upon by a philosopher as being nothing but misery If we therefore drop सर्वात्मनां the definition will be all right The Tarkasamgraha gives the same definition, except that it substitutes सर्वेषाम् for सर्वात्मनाम् Annambhatta evidently knew the faulty character of his definition, for in the दीपिका he says "'सुखी अहम्' इत्यादि अनुव्यवसायगम्य सुखत्वादिकमेव लक्षणम्." This means pleasure is that after experiencing which one feels the consciousness 'I am happy' This criticism applies *mutatis mutandis* to the definition of दुःख as well —The सप्तपदार्थी divides सुख into two varieties सांसारिक and स्वर्ग, defining them as 'प्रयत्नोत्पाद्यसाधनाधीनं सुखं सांसारिकम् । इच्छामात्राधीनसाधनसाध्यं सुखं स्वर्गः ।'

(77)—इच्छा is explained as राग (इच्छा कामः, Tarkasamgraha)

(78)—द्वेष is क्रोध, section 91 gives one more synonym मन्यु

(79)—प्रयत्न is उत्साह (कृतिः according to तर्कसंग्रह) The word प्रयत्न is used in the sense of conscious mental effort (the word does not mean effort in general, which is the meaning of the word in Marathi)

बुद्धि, सुख, दुःख, इच्छा, द्वेष and प्रयत्न are perceived by the internal sense-organ, mind, and (together with धर्म and अधर्म and भावनासंस्कार) are the special qualities of Ātman, because they are *subjective* as opposed to other qualities such as रूप, रस etc which have an objective existence

Even the most ardent admirer of Kesavamisra could hardly argue that his treatment of the above six qualities बुद्धि etc is in any way illuminating But as they are hardly of any use to a Naiyāyika proper, they are treated with such scant courtesy

Cognition, desire and effort are non eternal in the individual soul, because they are lost when the individual soul is released

But in the case of God they are permanent Note 'बुद्धीच्छाप्रयत्ना अस्मदादिनिष्ठा अनित्या गुणत्वमपि तेषामुच्छइत्। ईश्वरनिष्ठा पुनर्नित्या एव तेषां सार्वत्रिकत्वात्।'

(80) धर्म and अधर्म are otherwise known as पुण्य and पाप Kesavamisra gives only an academical definition of धर्म and अधर्म The Tarkasamgraha gives a more useful definition, विहितकर्मजन्यो धर्मः, and निषिद्धकर्मजन्योऽधर्मः। विहित and निषिद्ध mean वेदविहित and वेदनिषिद्ध respectively Injunctions and prohibitions occurring in works other than the Veda such as the Smrtis etc receive their authority from the Veda on which they are based They are thus included under the terms वेदविहित and वेदनिषिद्ध विहितकर्मनूs or enjoined actions are those that are laid down by Vedic injunctions such as ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत, अहरहः सन्ध्यामुपासीत These lead to merit It may be noted by the way that according to the Naiyayikas सन्ध्यावन्दन is followed by a positive effect viz दुरितनिवृत्ति Actions which bring in demerit are those that are forbidden by Vedic prohibitions such as न कलञ्ज (flesh of a deer or any other animal struck with a poisoned weapon) भक्षयेत्, न सुरां पिबेत् The reading तौ चाप्रत्यक्षावप्यागमगम्यावनुमानगम्यौ च is clearly an improvement upon the original passage which does not refer to आगमगम्यत्व, and for that very reason is likely to be a later emendation The शरीरादिवैचित्र्य must obviously have been caused by something and that something is धर्म and अधर्म (Line 8)— प्रयत्नादीनां ,प्रयत्न cannot produce the शरीर, because प्रयत्न becomes possible only after the body has come into existence

(81) संस्कार is the last of the 24 qualities It has three varieties, वेग or velocity, भावना or mental impression and स्थितिस्थापक (संस्कार) or elasticity Our author does not define संस्कार in general Its first variety वेग is defined as क्रियाहेतु The सप्तपदार्थी defines वेग as 'कर्मज संस्कारो वेग ' When an arrow is shot from a bow, the action of discharging it produces velocity in it. So velocity is born from action Velocity resides in पृथिवी, अप्, तेजस्, वायु and मनस् These are मूर्त or corporeal substances The very idea of velocity or motion implies that its abode must be of limited dimension Hence it is natural that it *resides in corporeal things which are limited An all pervading* thing like ether cannot have velocity or motion

भावना or mental impression is produced by apprehension Every अनुभव that we have leaves an impression on our mind That impression is known as भावना Thus भावना is the cause of producing remembrance *We perceive Devadatta to-day* That *perception* leaves on our mind a certain impression which lies there in a latent state A few days afterwards we happen to see a person resembling Devadatta.

This सदृशानुभव excites or awakens the latent impression left by देवदत्तदर्शन and the impression thus awakened or उद्बुद्ध produces remembrance Thus भावना is स्मृतिहेतु —भावना or mental impression being of a subjective nature belongs naturally to soul only साहचर्यादृष्टचिन्तादा — न्यायसूत्र III 2 42 gives an exhaustive list of स्मृतिनिमित्त जनोधकप्रणिधाननिबन्धाभ्यासलिङ्गलक्षणसादृश्यपरिग्रहाश्रयाश्रितसम्बन्धानन्तर्यवियोगैककार्यविरोधातिशयप्राप्तिव्यवधानसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषभयार्थित्वक्रियारागधर्माधर्मनिमित्तेभ्य ।

स्थितिस्थापक —Supply संस्कार after this स्थितिस्थापक संस्कार means elasticity It is that quality which reproduces in an object its original condition when that condition is disturbed The best example of स्थितिस्थापक is a dog's tail Try to straighten it in any way you like, it will again assume its crooked character Kesavamisra gives the example of a bow When a bow is straightened, it bends back again This is due to its स्थितिस्थापकत्व After a time the bow may lose this characteristic But that is a different matter The Tarkasamgraha gives the example of a mat स्थितिस्थापक belongs to earth

These three kinds of संस्कार are so different in character that it is difficult to discover the exact reason of their inclusion under one class The same fact is responsible for the difficulty of giving a general definition of संस्कार The best definition of संस्कार is given by तार्किकरक्षा viz 'यज्जातीयस्य कार्यस्तज्जातं यस्य कारणम् । स्वयं यस्त्वविजातीय संस्कार स गुणो मत ॥' This means संस्कार is that quality which creates an effect similar to its own cause though it is itself dissimilar from that cause or effect This definition is applicable to all the three kinds of samskara Velocity is produced from action and it produces action in the arrow, though it is itself *not of the nature* of action Mental impression is produced from अनुभव and gives rise to स्मृति which is तज्जातीय or of the same kind as अनुभव, both being बुद्धि But mental impression is not of the nature of बुद्धि स्थितिस्थापक is created by the action of rolling For when mats are kept in a roll, they become elastic स्थितिस्थापक also produces the action of rolling when the mat is spread But स्थितिस्थापक is not itself of the nature of action Read 'स्वोत्पादककसजातीयस्य स्वकार्यस्य च … संस्कार । यथा स्मृतिहेतु संस्कार, स हि अनुभवज्ञानजन्य स्मृतिज्ञानहेतु स्वयं न ज्ञानजातीय । यथा वा वेग कर्मज कर्महेतु स्वयं कर्म न भवति । यथा च स्थितिस्थापक वेष्टनादिक्रियाजन्य वेष्टनादिकर्मकारण स्वयं च न कर्मरूप ।' सारसंग्रह on तार्किकरक्षा

(82) The Vaiseṣikasūtras give the same divisions of कर्मन् as in the text, and define कर्मन् as एकद्रव्यमगुण (residing in one substratum and having no गुणs, as कर्मन् by its very nature is opposed to गुण कर्मन् is सत्त्व वस्तुधर्म, while गुण is सिद्धवस्तुधर्म) संयोगविभागेष्वनपेक्षकारणम् (the absolute cause of संयोग and विभाग) The तर्कदीपिका practically says the same thing,

संयोगभिन्नत्वे सति (this expression is put in in order to exclude हस्तपुस्तकसंयोग which is the असमवायिकारण of कायपुस्तकसंयोग, and to confine the लक्षण only to कर्मन् direct) संयोगासमवायिकारणम्, कर्मत्वजातिमद्वा The divisions of कर्मन् or motion in the text are obviously based upon the popular view about motion in general, upwards, downwards, hitherward, thitherward and general भ्रमण need not be a separate division as it can be included in गमन अविभुद्रव्यपरिमाणेन समवेत—*This simply means that कर्मन् can reside in corporeal substances only*

(83)—सामान्य generality or genus Objects which belong to the same class have something common about them, which is known as सामान्य For instance, घटत्व can be said to reside in all घटs howsoever they might differ in size or shape It is thus the cause of अनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय It is also defined as नित्यमेकमनेकानुगतम् If the definition were simply एकमनेकानुगतम् it would extend to संयोग, so to exclude संयोग etc नित्यम् is put in नित्यमेकम् would extend to जलपरमाणुगतरूप which is नित्य and एक, so to exclude it अनेकानुगतम् is put in सामान्य is नित्य as even though the individual व्यक्तिs perish, the class notion would still remain The Vaiseṣikasutras simply say सामान्य विशेष इति बुद्ध्यपेक्षम्, thus pointing out how the idea of सामान्य really depends upon the angle of vision of the person concerned *Kesavamisra means exactly the same thing when he* says तच्च व्यावृत्तेरपि हेतुत्वात् सामान्य सद् विशेष । Whether a quality is to be *classed as सामान्य or विशेष would depend upon how you would look at it* If you consider it to be something common to a class of objects, it becomes a सामान्य, if you regard it as peculiar to something, it becomes a विशेष. Later on, सामान्य seems to have come to be regarded as a positive thing residing in the first three पदार्थs viz द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्.

It is easy to see how सामान्य cannot reside in the remaining four पदार्थs, viz सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय and अभाव सामान्य cannot reside in सामान्य, for there would thus be अनवस्थादोष, if घटत्व has a सामान्य घटत्वत्व, this घटत्वत्व should have also a सामान्य and there would be no end to this kind of argument So it is best to admit that सामान्य has *no further* सामान्य. सामान्य cannot reside in विशेषs, for thereby सामान्य and विशेष would both lose their very nature विशेष implying *as it does particularity* which enables us to distinguish one thing from another, cannot *possibly have any thing to do with सामान्य which implies an absolutely* contrary notion You might as well expect light to reside *in darkness समवाय cannot have any सामान्य as समवाय is only one* and there can not be any class notion with reference to one object *Again घट and its सामान्य घटत्व are related together by the समवाय relation,* what relation can there be between समवाय and समवायत्व ? Not another

समवाय, for there would be अनवस्था, how can we account for the existence and work of this other समवाय ? अभाव cannot have a सामान्य as सामान्य is obviously भावरूप and it cannot have any संबन्ध with an अभाव. Thus सामान्य can exist only in द्रव्य, गुण and कर्मन्. सामान्य is two fold, पर (highest, most extensive) and अपर (less extensive, or species). सत्ता is the परसामान्य as सत्ता (existence) resides in all objects. द्रव्यत्व, घटत्व are अपरसामान्यs as they are obviously less extensive. The Saptapadarthi recognises a third division viz परापर. Thus द्रव्यत्व is an अपरसामान्य with reference to सत्ता, but a परसामान्य with reference to घटत्व. सामान्य is explained as समानानां भावोऽनागन्तुको नित्यो धर्मः सामान्यम् or या समानां बुद्धिं प्रसूते भिन्नेष्वधिकरणेषु यया बहूनीतरेतरतो न व्यावर्तन्ते योऽर्थोऽनेकत्र प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिनिमित्तम् तत् सामान्यम् । (वात्स्या० २।२।६८)

It is usual to divide सामान्य into जातिसामान्य (which is also called simply जाति) and उपाधिरूपसामान्य (which is also called simply उपाधि or सामान्य). As the Saptapadarthi says सामान्यं जातिरूपमुपाधिरूपं च । जातिः सत्ताद्रव्यगुणकर्मत्वादिः । उपाधिरूपं पाचकत्वादि निबाधकं सामान्यं जातिः सबाधकं सामान्यमुपाधिः । Though जाति and सामान्य (or उपाधि) are often used promiscuously, there is a vital difference between the two notions represented by these two terms. सामान्य is more or less a loose idea of generality existing in a set of objects, while जाति represents a distinct class or genus and religiously respects the division of genus and species. Thus मनुष्यत्व would be a proper जाति representing as it does the genus of मनुष्यs, but अन्धत्व would be a mere सामान्य, as it exists in different well defined classes of मनुष्यs, पशुs etc. In other words, a जातिसामान्य is the very essence of the class of objects to which it refers, while an उपाधिसामान्य refers to certain adventitious features which are common to widely different objects that are not homogeneous. श्वेतत्व exists in घट, cows, men etc, but श्वेतत्व cannot be a जातिसामान्य, as श्वेतत्व does not make घटs, cows or men what they are. जातिसामान्य thus comprises members of a joint family, while उपाधिसामान्य takes into account hostel boarders who are mere birds of passage brought together by accident.

The following verse of उदयनाचार्य mentions the circumstances which must not exist in the case of a जातिसामान्य (an उपाधिसामान्य can exist in some cases) व्यक्तेरभेदस्तुल्यत्वं संकरोऽथानवस्थितिः । रूपहानिरसंबन्धो जातिबाधकसंग्रहः ॥ Thus (1) व्यक्त्यभेद —There can be obviously no जातिसामान्य or उपाधिसामान्य when there is only one व्यक्ति. (2) तुल्यत्वम्—when the individual व्यक्तिs are the same only differing in name घटत्व and कलशत्व can not be two different जातिs. (3) संकर — भूतत्व and मूर्तत्व can not both be जातिs for both मूर्तत्व and भूतत्व exist in पृथ्वी, आप, तेजस् and वायु, only मूर्तत्व is found

in मनस् and only भूतत्व in आकाश Thus if we were to regard मूर्तत्व and भूतत्व as जाति, what becomes of the द्रव्यत्वजाति which comprises all the द्रव्यs ? There would be all confusion and cross division so such जातिs should not be admitted We can have मूर्तत्व and भूतत्व as उपाधिरूपसामान्यs but not as जातिसामान्यs It would thus be seen that a जातिसामान्य alone is a true full fledged सामान्य, उपाधिसामान्य is a सामान्य only through courtesy (4) अनवस्थिति —As already seen before सामान्य cannot have a further सामान्य (5) रूपहानि —विशेषs cannot have a सामान्य, otherwise they would lose their very nature which is as poles asunder from that of सामान्य (6) असम्बन्ध —समवाय cannot have सामान्य, for it cannot be in समवाय relation with it as every सामान्य is required to be with reference to its possessor

(Line 6)-अत्र केचिदाहुः The objector says that it is unnecessary to understand सामान्य as distinct from the individual व्यक्ति The answer is that it is सामान्य alone that can properly account for the cognition of similarity or sameness in diverse, dissimilar objects Such a cognition must depend upon something and that something is सामान्य.

(Line 9)—ननु अतद्व्यावृत्तिकृतैवैकाकारा बुद्धिः , this represents the view of the Bauddhas who do not admit सामान्य According to them, गौ means गवेतरव्यावृत्ति, we do not know from गो what गो is (for every thing is क्षणिक), but what is different from what is not a cow In other words, cognition takes the form of negation or exclusion, it is never positive The एकाकारा बुद्धि in गोव्यक्तिs is therefore merely अगोव्यावृत्तिविषय. The answer is that what the objector represents, is opposed to all our experience and common sense The एकाकारा बुद्धि appears in a positive form. We get a positive idea of sameness from गोत्व, and not of अगोव्यावृत्ति

(84)—विशेष Individuality or particularity The विशेषs reside in नित्यद्रव्य (पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयस्य परमाणवः आकाशादिपञ्चकं च नित्यद्रव्याणि। तर्कदीपिका) and are व्यावर्तक that is, distinguishing one thing from another The Vaiseshikasutras call these अन्त्यविशेषs to distinguish them from the ordinary particular characteristics that distinguish objects from one another. The Vaisesikas are said to be so called, because they admit the existence of these विशेषs, a doctrine which is repudiated by modern *Naiyāyikas*, *Kumārila*, *the followers of Prabhakara and the* Vedantins The Vaisesikasutrakara Kanada also does not regard it as a characteristic doctrine of his school But as the Visesas alone *of the seven Padarthas directly refer to the atoms of* which the Vaisesikas are highly enamoured, they seem to have so much importance attached to them The necessity of admitting these Visesas, —every atom having its own particularity—is thus demonstrated We are able to distinguish gross objects from one another by means

of their different sizes and shapes, but the atoms are not possessed of parts at all (as they are supposed to be niravayava), hence unless we believe that the atoms of a Ghata are possessed of Viśeṣas different from those possessed by a Paṭa, all the atoms would be of the same kind and different objects would not come into existence The Viśeṣa of an atom is also capable of distinguishing itself from another atom of the same genus According to the Vaiśeṣikas the Viśeṣas do not stand in need of other Viśe as for distinguishing themselves from other Viśeṣas, for there would thus arise अनवस्था The Viśeṣa is therefore स्वत एव व्यावर्तक Against this it might be reasonably argued that if the Viśeṣa is स्वत एव व्यावर्तक what harm is there in supposing that a द्रव्य is also स्वत एव व्यावर्तक on account of its अवयव or समवायिविशेष? What need is there to postulate the existence of a separate Viśeṣa at all? (The Vaiśeṣikas have no satisfactory explanation to offer on this point Read the following from प्रशस्तपादभाष्य, अथान्त्यविशेषेष्विव परमाणुकस्मान्न स्वत एव व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययः प्रतिज्ञायते कल्प्यत इति चेत् न । तादात्म्यात् । इह तादात्म्यविलक्षणप्रत्ययो भवति । यथा घटादीनां स्वत एवाशुचित्वम् तद्योगाद् यथाम् । तेष्विह तादात्म्यादन्त्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव व्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययः । तद्योगात् परमाण्वादिष्विति ।) The परमाणुs are प्रत्यक्ष to the Yogins so these Viśeṣas residing as they do in the परमाणुs are useful to them only in distinguishing the atoms from one other The विशेषs reside in the नित्यद्रव्यs by the समवाय relation and have no जाति

(85)–See section 7 (Line 1)–न चावयवि घटा ते—The objector says – The अवयविन् is not different or distinct from the अवयवs so we cannot speak of any relation such as समवाय between them *For a relation exists only between those objects which are different* The answer is —When we perceive a jar, our cognition is that *one gross* object is perceived and not that *hundreds of minute supersensuous atoms* come in close connection are perceived You cannot argue that this cognition is wrong, *for that is not contradicted in any way* We can actually make use of that घट for purposes for which it is intended, with this very cognition

(Line 7)–विधिरूप–having a positive form of a positive nature

(86) अभाव–It has been remarked before that the Vaiśeṣikasutras do not explicitly recognise अभाव as a distinct पदार्थ and that Śaṅkaracarya also who is very scrupulous in giving the views of his opponent correctly, mentions only six Padarthas as having been admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas अभाव is usually explained as भावभिन्न पदार्थ प्रतियोगिज्ञानाधीनज्ञानविषय, that is the knowledge of अभाव can be had only when we have the knowledge of its counter entity (प्रतियोगिन्) Thus

घटाभाव can only be known if we have the knowledge of घट which is the प्रतियोगिन् of घटाभाव असमवायत्वे सत्यसमवाय or समवायभिन्नत्वे सति समवायशून्य are mere technical definitions There are in all four varieties of अभाव, अभाव is first divided into two (1) संसर्गाभाव and (2) अन्योन्याभाव, and संसर्गाभाव is further sub-divided into प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव and अत्यन्ताभाव

प्रागभाव -Before the घट is produced, the घटप्रागभाव exists and has been existing from times immemorial (घटप्रागभाव is thus अनादि) When the घट is produced *घटप्रागभाव comes to an end*

घटप्रध्वंसाभाव is produced when the घट is destroyed (it is thus उत्पत्तिमान्) and this प्रध्वंसाभाव would continue till eternity, hence it is *अविनाशी प्रागभाव* and *प्रध्वंसाभाव* have the idea of *संसर्ग* with *reference* to future time and past time respectively and so are varieties of संसर्गाभाव

अत्यन्ताभाव refers to a संसर्ग with eternity or त्रिकाल

अत्यन्ताभाव is defined in the text as त्रैकालिकाभाव which is a very simple definition The Tarkasamgraha defines it as त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताक (the Dipikā says अन्योन्याभावेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय संसर्गावच्छिन्नेति। ध्वंसप्रागभावयोरतिव्याप्तिवारणाय त्रैकालिकेति) It is absolute negation or non-existence शशशृङ्ग, वन्ध्यापुत्र etc are popular instances of this अभाव But they are not correct, as every अभाव must have a प्रतियोगिन् which exists. Now in the case of शशशृङ्ग etc, what प्रतियोगिन् could possibly be there? Annambhatta gives भूतले घटो नास्ति as an instance of अत्यन्ताभाव It is difficult to reconcile this instance with the expression त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्न in the definition given above For though the घट might not be on the भूतल *at the time of speaking, there is nothing to prevent the* घट *from* being there at any subsequent time Annambhatta seems to have been forced to include भूतले घटाभाव under अत्यन्ताभाव, for it could not be included under प्रागभाव (unless we take the अभाव to refer to भूतले अस्तित्व of the घट and not to the उत्पत्ति of घट, but there is गौरव in regarding *भूतले अस्तित्व as a कार्य) or प्रध्वंसाभाव or अन्योन्याभाव (for here we have घटाभाव* on भूतल but not घट भूतलाभाव, thus there is no mutual negation) So all cases of अभाव not covered up by प्रागभाव, प्रध्वंसाभाव and अन्योन्याभाव, have to be included under अत्यन्ताभाव As regards प्रध्वंसाभाव, Annambhatta says सादिरनन्त प्रध्वंस । उत्पत्त्यनन्तर कार्यस्य, about प्रागभाव he says उत्पत्तेः पूर्व कार्यस्य प्रागभाव is *always* there before the कार्य is produced, but प्रध्वंसाभाव can occur *only after* the कार्यविनाश which would necessarily be after उत्पत्ति, *but any length of time may intervene between* उत्पत्ति *and* विनाश. It would have been better therefore if the expression विनाशानन्तर had been used instead of उत्पत्त्यनन्तरम् Kesavamisra's illustrations and explanation of the different varieties of अभाव are distinctly better and simpler than those of Annambhatta

अन्योन्याभाव is illustrated by घट पटो न, that is we deny the तादात्म्य between घट and पट In the case of अत्यन्ताभाव, the संसर्ग (which may be संयोग or समवाय) is denied, in the case of अन्योन्याभाव, identity is denied In the illustration घट पटो न the अन्योन्याभाव has for its counter entity (प्रतियोगिन्) पट characterised by the relation of identity with घट, that is, the expression tells us not merely there is no पट, but also there is no पट which is identical with घट अभाव has no जाति which is भावरूप अभाव cannot have any अभाव, for घटाभावाभाव is nothing but घट itself, otherwise there would be अनवस्था

According to some अत्यन्ताभाव and अन्योन्याभाव are each two fold (Read the following from न्यायकोश, p 67, केचन्तु द्वन्द्वत्वाभावाद्वगुणाद्यसिष्टेरन्त्या भावातिरिक्त । एकसत्त्वेऽपि द्वौ न स्त इति प्रतीत्या द्वित्वावच्छिन्नाभाव संयोगेन घटवति भूतल समवायसम्बन्धेन घटाभाव तत्तद्धर्माभावाद्धर्मत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसामान्याभावश्चातिरिक्त । एव मन्योन्याभावभेदोऽपि बोध्य । अत्यन्ताभावाभाव घटप्रागभाव प्रागभावध्वसश्च नातिरिक्त । अपि तु प्रतियोगिस्वरूप एवेति प्राञ्च । नव्यास्तु तथात्यन्ताभावाभावातिरिक्त एव । तृतीयाभावश्च प्रथमाभाव एव इति नानवस्थेति प्राहु । अन्योन्याभावाभावस्तु स्वप्रतियोगिभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकरूप इति बोध्यम् । सौन्दडोपाध्याय घटत्वेन पटो नास्ति इति प्रतीत्या व्यधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नाभाव स्वीकरोति । इतरे नैयायिकास्तु त न स्वीकुर्वन्ति । किंतु घटत्वेन पटो नास्ति इति प्रतीते घटइति घटत्वाभावत्व विषय केवलान्वयित्व मन्यन्ते । यत्किंचिदधिकरणे घटो नास्तीत्यादिप्रत्ययस्य स्यात् केवलाधिकरणादेव नास्ति इति व्यवहारोपपत्तावभावो न पदार्थान्तरम् । किं त्वधिकरणात्मक एवेति प्राभाकरा आहु । अभेद वैध्वस्य प्रागभावस्यानादिसान्तत्वम् । ध्वसस्य तु सादिअनन्तत्वम् । अन्योन्याभावस्य प्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वम् । अत्यन्ताभावस्य तु नित्यत्वम् । अनयोश्च तुर्यो ह्रास भाव । अत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्च प्रत्येक द्विविध । एकमात्रपदार्थवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताक व्यासज्यवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकश्च । The Dīpikā also says सामयिका भावोऽत्यन्ताभाव एव सम्बन्धविशेषे प्रतीयमान । अभावाभावो भाव एव नातिरिक्त अनवस्था प्रसगात् । ध्वसप्रागभाव प्रागभावध्वसश्च प्रतियोग्येव । अभावाभावोऽतिरिक्त एव तृतीयाभावस्य प्रथमाभावरूपत्वान्नानवस्थेति नवीना ।)

(Line 15)—ननु च स्वेति—The objector is here referring to the views of the विज्ञानवादिन्s (a school of Bauddhas), and the अद्वैतवादिन्s (or मायावादिन्s)

The विज्ञानवादिन्s say—There is no बाह्य अर्थ at all We are able to cognise घट, only when the बुद्धि becomes घटाकारा Even if बाह्य अर्थ exists, there would be no cognition unless बुद्धि becomes अर्थाकारा So what is gained by saying that बाह्य अर्थ exists? In dreams cognition can be had, even though बाह्य अर्थ does not exist So no अर्थ over and above बुद्धि or ज्ञान exists

The अद्वैतवादिन्s say—Only Brahman is real, the world is a mere विवर्त The world has merely व्यावहारिक existence When the realisation of Brahman takes place, there is no soul, no world etc

The siddhāntin simply brushes aside these views, declaring that as the शब्द अर्थ is directly perceived by प्रत्यक्ष, it is futile to deny its existence [The matter, however, is not so simple as to be dismissed in *one sentence* The difference between the view point of the Naiyāyikas and that of the idealists, is fundamental and philosophically, the view of the Advaitavedantins is the only correct one The whole problem is exceedingly complex and cannot and need not be presented here even briefly]

(87)—बुद्धि —ज्ञानम्, उपलब्धि are synonymous terms with बुद्धि according to Gautama, बुद्धित्वसामान्यवती, जानामीत्यनुव्यवसायगम्यज्ञानम् (अनुव्यवसाय-*subsequent cognition in the form* घटज्ञानवानहम् When we perceive a घट, the चक्षुरिन्द्रिय comes into contact with the घट and the impressions are carried to the mind which transfers them to the Ātman in whom the प्रतीति घटज्ञानवानहम् or घटमहं जानामि arises This प्रतीति is called अनुव्यवसाय Without this प्रतीति perception does not become complete) are other definitions of बुद्धि बुद्धि is सर्वव्यवहारहेतु as contrasted with सख्या, सयोग etc which are the हेतुs of some particular व्यवहार It is clear that without cognition no व्यवहार (बुबोधयिषापूर्वकवाक्यप्रयोग or आहारविहारादय) of any kind is possible According to the Samkhyas बुद्धि is महत्तत्व, the first product of प्रकृति, *it is* निश्चयात्मकवृत्तिगुणवदन्तःकरणम् *according to the* Vedantins The बुद्धि of ईश्वर is नित्य, that of जीवात्मन् is अनित्य See section 5 for the meaning of यथार्थ

(Line 6)—अदुष्ट, because a diseased eye would give wrong knowledge यथार्थानुभव is four fold, referring to the four प्रमाणs

(Line 9)—अयथार्थ अनुभव is अप्रमा, शुक्तौ इद रजतम्, रजतत्वाभाववति शुक्तौ रजतत्वप्रकारक अनुभव तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकोऽनुभव as a definition of अप्रमा is taken exception to by an objector in this way A monkey is in contact with the top of a tree, the cognition वृक्ष कपिसयोगी is therefore correct Now applying the above definition of अप्रमा we can say कपिसयोगाभाववति (for the whole of the tree excepting the कपिसयुक्त portion is कपिसयोगाभाववान्) कपिसयोगप्रकारक अनुभव exists in the case of the tree So here प्रमा becomes अप्रमा The answer is obvious If there had been the अनुभव of कपिसयोग in those portions where there is no कपिसयोग, then alone the cognition would be अप्रमा We are not concerned with *the rest of the tree* at all The cognition concerns only with the portion where there is contact between the monkey and the tree The objector is thinking of वृक्ष as a whole one time (when he talks of the वृक्ष as कपिसयोगाभाववान्) and then only the कपिसयुक्त portion of it (when he *talks of the* वृक्ष as having कपिसयोगप्रकारक अनुभव). Thus he takes वृक्ष in two different senses which is responsible for the confusion in his mind

Read the following from the तर्कदीपिका ननु संयोगोऽपि समवायवत् नित्योऽस्त्विति चेन्न। [illegible] संयोगाभाव-[illegible] संयो- [illegible] सत्त्वात् संयोग-[illegible] सत्त्वाद्यनित्यत्वसिद्धिः।

(Line 9)—अनुपदमेव वक्ष्यते—in sections 96 and 101, below

(Line 11)—विपर्यय or error is really the proper incorrect apprehension When we cognise a thing to be what it is not, we commit error as when we mistake a rope for a serpent or a mother-of-pearl for silver

(Line 14)—दोषवशेन तदिति In स्वप्न we see things as though they are actually happening before our eyes, even though they are परोक्ष Thus when we see a horse in a dream, our knowledge ought to be in the form स अश्वः (because the अश्व is परोक्ष) but actually it is in the form अयम् अश्वः What should have been in the form of स्मरण takes the form of अनुभव

(88) (Line 2)—एतेन च ज्ञान निराकारमेव—This is intended to refute the Bauddha view (साकारज्ञानवाद) that cognition takes the form of the object, owing to the object producing its form in the cognition (ज्ञाने [illegible] साकारो जायत इत्येक पक्ष । साकारविशिष्ट [illegible] जायत इत्यपर) This has been already refuted in section 86 when the siddhantin showed that अर्थ was distinct from ज्ञान

When the साकारज्ञानवाद is refuted, it follows that the view (घटेन [illegible] इति) that the existence of अर्थ is to be proved by inference from the form of अर्थ which the cognition, assumes, is wrong As a matter of fact the object such as a jar is actually perceived by us, and all cognition can be had as proceeding from the object and connected with the object The cognition takes the form 'I know a jar' and not simply 'I know' If cognition were unconnected with the अर्थ the cognition ought to have been simply 'I know'

(89)—See section 98

(90)—[illegible] [illegible]—The Nyayasutra is प्रवृत्ति- र्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भ इति। (I 1 17) The reading [illegible] is therefore to be rejected as it is not warranted by the sutra

(91)—दोषा are प्रवर्तनालक्षणाः। (Nyayasūtra, I 1 18)

(92)—पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः। (Nyayasutra I 1 19)—[illegible], [illegible] [illegible] (वात्स्यायनभाष्य)

(93)—फलम्—प्रवृत्तिदोषजनितोऽर्थः। (Nyayasutra I 1 20)

(94)—बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम्। (Nyayasutra, I 1 21)

(95)—तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः। (*Nyayasutra I 1 22*). तेन दुःखेन अत्यन्त विमुक्तिरपवर्गः। कथम्। उपात्तस्य जन्मनो हानम् अन्यस्य चानुपादानम्। एतामवस्थामपर्यन्तामपवर्गं वेदयन्तेऽपवर्गविदः। तदभयमजरममृत्युपदं ब्रह्म क्षेमप्राप्तिरिति। (वात्स्यायनभाष्य)

मोक्ष is the absolute cessation of the twenty one fold दुःख, the twenty one divisions are (1) Body, +(6) sense organs +(6) objects of sense corresponding to the six sense organs +(6) likewise, six cognitions, (1) दुःख and (1) सुख (Line 1)—सुखमपि दुःखमेव is सुखं दुःखं सुख is गौण दुःख That सुख also is दुःख is a characteristic doctrine of the Vedantins and Indian philosophy generally For सुख is as much an obstacle to मोक्ष as दुःख is (Line 2)—उपचार figurative use, honey mixed with poison is figuratively called poison, and does act as such Similarly सुख being alloyed with दुःख is figuratively called दुःख and does act as such

Kesavamisra is not satisfied with the bald statement in Nyaya sutra I 1 1 that मोक्ष results from the तत्त्वज्ञान of the sixteen topics He thinks that निष्कामकर्मानुष्ठान as well as ध्यान (specially referred to in the Yogasutras) are necessary before one can secure salvation

The process is as follows —The true knowledge of the sixteen *topics makes a person disgusted with the world of विषय as thereby* he knows what value he should attach to the विषय then he takes to *meditation on the Eternal one, and gradually, through the efficacy of* meditation he becomes free from क्लेश (रागद्वेषमोहाः) As he is free from all अहंकार, he goes on doing his tasks without any desire for fruit so that कर्मन् no longer can bind him down and as regards the सञ्चितकर्मन्, he by his yogic power manages to enjoy the fruit of it all together in this very birth So when he departs this body there can be no re-birth or union with another body for him (as all सञ्चितकर्मन् is already exhausted and there is no fresh कर्मन्) and he becomes free from the twenty-one fold दुःख In other words he is Mukta

(96)—We have now to look back a little to section 87 where the quality बुद्धि was first divided into स्मरण and अनुभव अनुभव was then divided into यथार्थ and अयथार्थ यथार्थानुभव is four fold corresponding to the four pramānas and these four varieties of correct apprehension have been already dealt with We now turn back to अयथार्थानुभव or incorrect apprehension which has three varieties संशय विपर्यय and तर्क

संशय is defined as एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाधर्मवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि ज्ञानं संशयः। A simpler definition is 'एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि विरुद्धनानाकोटिक ज्ञानम्' where कोटि means alternative Three characteristics are necessary to constitute doubt proper *First the धर्मिन् or the entity with reference to which* doubt arises must be one Secondly the attributes must be

different and thirdly, they must be contradictory Thus 'इमौ घटपटौ' is no doubt, because though the attributes or alternatives, घटत्व, and पटत्व, are different and contradictory (they are contradictory because they can never be समानाधिकरण or reside in the same entity), the धर्मिन् is not one For we are here speaking of two entities, घट and पट Similarly, 'पट प्रतिद्वन्द्वघटत्ववान् अयं घटः' is no doubt, because though the धर्मिन् घट is one, the धर्मs or attributes are not many For घटत्वाविरुद्ध-पटत्वम् is just one attribute Lastly, 'अयं घटः श्वेतः द्रव्यम्' is also no doubt, because, though the entity is one and the attributes, घटत्व श्वेतत्व and द्रव्यत्व, different, they are not contradictory For they can all reside in one abode as they do in a घट So it will be seen that the words 'एकस्मिन्' 'नाना' and 'विरुद्ध' have each special significance attached to it Read 'घटपटौ इति समूहालम्बनेऽति व्याप्तिवारणाय एकेति । घटो द्रव्यम्' इत्यादौ अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विरुद्धेति । 'पटत्वाविरुद्धघटत्ववान्' इत्यत्र अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय नानेति ।' दीपिका A proper instance of संशय is the cognition 'स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा' arising with reference to one dimly visible entity Here स्थाणुत्व and पुरुषत्व are different attributes They are contradictory because they cannot reside in the same object One and the same धर्मिन् cannot both be a pillar and man

According to Gautama, संशय is समानानेकधर्मोपपत्तेर्विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातश्च विशेषापेक्षो विमर्शः । (Nyayasutra, 1 1 23)

संशय is three-fold —विशेषादर्शने सति

(1) समानधर्मदर्शनज –The stock instance is स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा The doubt arises owing to the fact that we are conscious of the common features (उच्चत्वादिकम्) of स्थाणु and पुरुष, but are not aware of any special feature such as वक्रकोटरादिकम् belonging to स्थाणु alone or शिरःपाण्यादिकम् belonging to पुरुष alone, which would enable us to resolve our doubt

(2) विप्रतिपत्तिज —When doctors differ the lay man is naturally puzzled Some one says शब्द is नित्य another asserts शब्द is अनित्य. Thus doubt arises and can be resolved only when one of the assertions is proved to be wrong

(3) असाधारणधर्मज —When it is possible to draw any conclusion you like, from a peculiar characteristic of an object, this doubt arises From भू गन्धवती, you can not say anything definitely, for as गन्ध is a peculiar property of पृथ्वी alone, it is not a safe guide for postulating anything about पृथ्वी, as there can be no similar instance

(97) प्रयोजनम्-यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम् । (Nyayasūtra, I 1 24)

(98) लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः । (Nyayasutra, I 1 25) It is necessary that both the disputants must accept the दृष्टान्त,

otherwise no inference can be drawn Of course, it is presumed that none of the disputants is deliberately perverse साधर्म्यदृष्टान्त is in accordance with अन्वयव्याप्ति, वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्त, in accordance with व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति

(99) सिद्धान्त —We quote here the relevant Nyāyasūtras in this connection, together with the वात्स्यायनभाष्य on them

Gautama defines सिद्धान्त as तन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थिति सिद्धान्त । (I 1 26), सर्वतन्त्रप्रतितन्त्राधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थित्यर्थान्तरभावात् । (I 1 27)

[सिद्धान्त is a category, on the nature of which the difference of view between प्राचीन and नवीन नैयायिक is clearly noticed Kesavamisra follows Vātsyayana, the Bhāṣyakāra of Gautama who follows the old view. Govardhana the commentator on the Tarkabhāṣā follows Visvanatha, the Vṛttikāra on Gautama the representative of the old school]

The four kinds of Siddhānts are as follows —

(1) सर्वतन्त्राविरुद्धस्तन्त्रेऽधिकृतोऽर्थ सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त ।

(Nyāyasūtra, I 1 28)

भाष्यम्—यथा घ्राणादीनीन्द्रियाणि गन्धादय इन्द्रियार्था पृथिव्यादीनि भूतानि, प्रमाणैरर्थस्य ग्रहणमिति ।

This means, according to Vātsyāyana and our author, a principle which is admitted by all schools According to Vatsyayana, the example of a सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त is the existence of the five senses and their objects etc शब्द would be an example, according to our author People may have a doubt as to the eternal or non-eternal character of शब्द But all admit that there exists such a thing as शब्द

According to the *modern school*, सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धान्त *possesses a special* and restricted sense, being applicable to a principle which has been accepted by two disputants as the basis of their discussion Thus when two parties dispute *regarding the nature of sound*, whether it is eternal or non-eternal they mutually admit the existence of sound as such Or when they dispute as to whether darkness is *भावरूप or अभावरूप*, they have already admitted that there is such a thing as तमस्

(2) समानतन्त्रसिद्ध परतन्त्रासिद्ध प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्त ।

(Nyayasūtra, I 1 29)

भाष्यम्—यथा नासत आत्मलाभ, न सत आत्महान, निरतिशयाश्चेतना देहेन्द्रियमनःसु विषयेषु तत्तत्कारणेषु च विशेष इति साङ्ख्यानाम्, पुरुषकर्मादिनिमित्तो भूतसर्ग कर्महेतवो दोषा प्रवृत्तिश्च, स्वगुणविशिष्टाश्चेतना, असदुत्पद्यते उत्पन्नं निरुध्यते इति योगानाम् ।

Older view —A doctrine, which, though not established in one's own school, is proved in another which is similar to it Thus the Naiyayikas hold mind to be a sense organ But it has actually been proved to be such in the Vaiseṣika system Other illustrations may be drawn from सांख्य and योग that hold common views

Modern view —A doctrine which is accepted by one school and rejected by another Thus शब्दनित्यत्व is admitted by the मीमांसक and rejected by the नैयायिकs

(3) यत्सिद्धावन्यप्रकरणसिद्धिः सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः । (Nyayasūtra, I 1 30)

भाष्यम्—यस्यार्थस्य सिद्धावन्येऽर्था अनुषज्यन्ते न तैर्विना सोऽर्थः सिध्यति तेऽर्था यदधि ज्ञाता सोऽधिकरणसिद्धान्तः । यथा देहेन्द्रियव्यतिरिक्तो ज्ञाता दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादिति । अत्रानुषङ्गिणोऽर्था इन्द्रियनानात्वं नियतविषयाणीन्द्रियाणि स्वविषयग्रहणलिङ्गानि ज्ञातुर्ज्ञानसाधनानि, गन्धादिगुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं गुणाधिकरणम् अनियतविषयाश्चेतना इति पूर्वार्थसिद्धावेतेऽर्थाः सिध्यन्ति न तैर्विना सोऽर्थः सम्भवतीति ।

Regarding this variety, the प्राचीन and the अर्वाचीन views are the same It means a principle which follows the establishment of another principle Thus when it is established that the earth etc being a product, must have a creator, it follows the creator of such earth etc must be omniscient

(4) अपरीक्षिताभ्युपगमात्तद्विशेषपरीक्षणमभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः । (Nyayasutra, I 1 31)

भाष्यम्—यत्र किंचिदर्थजातमपरीक्षितमभ्युपगम्यते अस्ति द्रव्यं शब्दः स तु नित्योऽथानित्य इति, द्रव्यस्य सतो नित्यता अनित्यता वा तद्विशेषः परीक्ष्यते सोऽभ्युपगमसिद्धान्तः स्वबुद्ध्यतिशयचिख्यापयिषया परबुद्ध्यवज्ञानाच्च प्रवर्तत इति ।

On the nature of this variety, the difference between the older and modern नैयायिकs, is most marked

Older view —When in arguing with an opponent one admits his view without question, and proceeding to draw a conclusion there from, shows that the conclusion contradicts another view of the opponent, such admission is called अभ्युपगम सिद्धान्त Thus a मीमांसक is arguing with a नैयायिक regarding the nature of sound He admits sound is a quality Then he proceeds to say that as sound is a quality of the all pervading ether, according to the नैयायिकs, it must be without parts, and so it cannot grow in size But this conclusion is against the Naiyayika view of the non eternity of sound, which is based exactly on the fact that it grows and diminishes in intensity

[This process has some common features with Tarka or hypothetical reasoning See section 101 below]

Now arises the occasion for using तर्क We admit for a moment his contention वह्निमान् We thus deliberately suppose वह्न्यभाव which is व्याप्य or less extensive and thereby force on him धूमाभाव which is व्यापक or more extensive by saying 'यदि अत्र वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यात्' But the presence of smoke is directly perceived Our opponent is thus reduced to the position of either pointing out an instance where there is smoke, but no fire, or of admitting that his assertion 'वह्निमान्' was wrong And as no such instance can be found, he admits the falsity of the contention 'वह्निमान्' and thus indirectly accepts the presence of fire on the mountain In this way by the supposition of the व्याप्य (वह्न्यभाव) we impose the व्यापक (धूमाभाव) तर्क is therefore व्याप्यारोपेण व्यापकारोप The सप्तपदार्थी defines तर्क as 'अनिष्टव्यापकप्रसञ्जनं तर्कः'

It will thus be seen that तर्क is quite a legitimate method of forcing a conclusion on an inconvenient opponent by making him admit व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति (यत्र यत्र वह्न्यभाव तत्र तत्र धूमाभाव) when he is unwilling to accept the अन्वयव्याप्ति But why तर्क should be regarded as a variety of अयथार्थानुभव does not appear to be at first clear The reason however is that because in तर्क we make the admission of the अयथार्थ thing viz वह्न्यभाव, it must be considered as a variety of अयथार्थ Looked at from another point of view तर्क would appear to be a kind of अयथार्थानुभव, because the धूमाभाव which is forced is अयथार्थ, since धूम is actually seen —It must be confessed that the reasons advanced for regarding तर्क as a division of अयथार्थानुभव do not appear to us to be convincing For neither the वह्न्यभाव nor the धूमाभाव which we hypothesize or force on the opponent can by any stretch of imagination be regarded as अनुभूत वह्न्यभाव and धूमाभाव are अयथार्थ we admit But that does not make तर्क which only deals with them in a hypothetical manner, assume the character of अयथार्थानुभव

तर्क and विपर्यय resemble in so far as in both something opposed to truth is realised But while in तर्क the incorrect admission made is deliberate or volitional, in विपर्यय the incorrect apprehension received is through some defect and we are not conscious of its incorrectness as long as we are labouring under the error


Ancient Naiyāyikas admit eleven kinds of तर्क, of which only five are accepted by the moderns viz आत्माश्रय or *ignoratio elenchi*, अन्योन्याश्रय or dilemma, चक्रक or reasoning in a circle, अनवस्था or *regressus ad infinitum* and प्रमाणबाधितार्थप्रसङ्ग or *reductio ad absurdum* Only the last has been mentioned and defined by Keśavamiśra

Tarka is different from संशय, as the latter is उभयकोटिक (स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा—here the cognition oscillates between the two कोटि or alterna-

tives स्थाणु and पुरुष), while तर्क comprises only one कोटि, namely the शक्ति The सप्तपदार्थी includes तर्क in संशय

(102) विमृश्य पक्षप्रतिपक्षाभ्यामर्थावधारणं निर्णयः । (Nyayasūtra, I 1 41)

(103) प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः । (Nyayasutra, I 2 1) वात्स्यायन says, तिस्रः कथा भवन्ति, वादो जल्पो वितण्डा चेति । (कथा is defined in section 105) Thus—



कथा or discussion can be carried on either (1) for finding out the truth or (2) for checkmating or triumphing over the opponent by means fair or foul [The second alternative is of course of inferior value and deserves to be discouraged] For निग्रह, see section 117

(104-105) *यथोक्तोपपन्नश्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानसाधनोपालम्भो जल्पः । स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा ।* (Nyayasutra, I 2 2-3) उभयसाधन A जल्पवादिन् aims at परपक्षदूषण as well as स्वपक्षसाधन, a वितण्डावादिन् is merely concerned with परपक्षदूषण, and does not care for स्वपक्षसाधन If in the course of discussion, a वितण्डावादिन् finds that he can demolish his opponent's arguments by giving up his प्रतिज्ञा, he would certainly do so

(106) In sections 106-114, the author is covering the same ground he had covered in sections 28-32 There he dealt with the हेत्वाभासs as a constituent part of अनुमान, here they are treated of independently as a separate topic The treatment here is naturally more detailed, but follows the same lines and most of the illustrations given are also the same A student who has mastered sections 28-32 thoroughly would be able to follow sections 106-114 very easily As *sufficiently exhaustive notes have been given on sections 28-32*, we shall only touch the new and important points in our notes on sections 106-114

(Line 2)—*न वाभिदृ* , the Nyayasutra names the *हेत्वाभासs* differently सव्यभिचारविरुद्धप्रकरणसमसाध्यसमकालातीता हेत्वाभासाः । (I 2 4) and defines them as follows —अनैकान्तिकः सव्यभिचारः । सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य तद्विरोधी विरुद्धः । यस्मात् प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः । साध्याविशिष्टः साध्यत्वात् साध्यसमः । कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातीतः । (I 2 5-9)

(Line 4)—अत्रोदयनेन उक्तम्—The reference is to उदयन's लक्षणमाला उदयन is an important name in the history of Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems He flourished in the last quarter of the 10th century His most famous work is कुसुमाञ्जलि which is 'the classic exposition of the proof of the existence of God' (Keith)

Udayana's definition of सिद्धि lays down two characteristics for सिद्धि, namely व्याप्ति and पक्षधर्मता of the हेतु, and the absence of these is असिद्धि Now this असिद्धि must exist in some way or other in all हेत्वाभास॰ The objector s contention therefore is, that all हेत्वाभास॰ should be called असिद्ध The division into five हेत्वाभास is incorrect, for surely the विरुद्ध or अनैकान्तिक हेत्वाभास does contain असिद्धि, why then are these different divisions made, with different names ?

The answer is the 'प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति न्याय It is perfectly true that असिद्धि in a general sense exists in all the five varieties But we are perfectly justified in ascertaining what kind of असिद्धि strikes us more, and then we name the हेत्वाभास accordingly When the striking feature of the असिद्धि is known and the हेतु proved to be a हेत्वाभास, we do not bother ourselves about the less prominent features of असिद्धि existing in the हेत्वाभास which depend upon or are subservient to the more prominent ones When, for instance, the व्याप्तिव्यभिचार strikes us more prominently, we dub the हेत्वाभास अनैकान्तिक, when the feature साध्यविपर्ययव्याप्ति is prominent we call the हेत्वाभास विरुद्ध and so on

(Line 15)—यत्र पुन is our emendation for न पुन The author says in line 14 that व्यभिचार and others give rise to अनैकान्तिक and other fallacies The reading न पुन would refer to व्यभिचाराद्य or अनैकान्तिकाद्य , in either case, that would come into conflict with असिद्धाद्य etc in line 16 It is more natural that the author should explain in this passage असिद्धत्वादि as he explains व्यभिचारादि in line 14 On these grounds, we have read यत्र पुन for न पुन

(107)—In गगनारविन्दं सुरभि । अरविन्दत्वात्, the हेतु is आश्रयासिद्ध because its आश्रय, गगनारविन्द does not exist at all

(Line 7)—घटोऽनित्य । कार्यत्वात् । This is given as an instance of आश्रयासिद्ध Now, unlike गगनारविन्द, घट actually exists, how can we then regard this as an instance of आश्रयासिद्ध ? The answer is —घट might be existing in reality, but for purposes of the above अनुमान, it *does not exist*. For अनुमान has scope for something about which there is a doubt The अनित्यत्व of घट is beyond all doubt, therefore घट is an unfit पक्ष for this अनुमान and so does not exist for the purposes of the अनुमान Non-

existence of the आश्रय therefore also means non existence for the purposes of the अनुमान

(108)—सामान्यम् अनित्यम् । कृतकत्वात्—Here the हेतु, कृतकत्व does not exist in सामान्य, so this is an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध

पृथिव्यादिचतुष्टयपरमाणवो नित्याः गन्धवत्त्वात्—

Here गन्धवत्त्व does not exist in the atoms of water fire and wind (existing only in the atoms of earth) thus the हेतु is not to be found in a part of the पक्ष, so this is an instance of भागासिद्ध

(109) (1) शब्दो नित्यः । द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टास्पर्शवत्त्वात्, this is also an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध (विशेषणासिद्ध variety) For द्रव्यत्व (the विशेषण) does not exist in शब्द, as शब्द is a गुण It cannot be argued that a part of the हेतु, अस्पर्शवत्त्व (विशेष्य) exists in शब्द, therefore it cannot be स्वरूपासिद्ध The answer is द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टास्पर्शवत्त्व is one idea, and even if only द्रव्यत्व or only अस्पर्शवत्त्व does not exist in a particular object, the whole द्रव्यत्वविशिष्टास्पर्शवत्त्व does not exist there For instance, दण्डविशिष्टपुरुष must be said to exist, even if only दण्ड (विशेषण) or only पुरुष (विशेष्य) does not exist

(2) शब्दो नित्यः । अस्पर्शवत्त्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात्, that is अस्पर्शवत्त्वविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वात्.

Here the विशेष्य, द्रव्यत्व does not exist in शब्द, therefore it is an instance of the **विशेष्यासिद्ध** variety

(3) शब्दो नित्यः । गुणत्वविशिष्टाकारणत्वात् ।

Here the विशेषण, गुणत्व is like अजागलस्तन, it serves no purpose, the विशेष्य, अकारणत्व is quite capable of proving the नित्यत्व of शब्द The addition of the विशेषण, गुणत्व, far from helping the विशेष्य, अकारणत्व, actually makes the हेतु fallacious For the हेतु गुणत्वविशिष्टाकारणत्व is a विशिष्ट हेतु, and any lapse on the part of either the विशेषण or the विशेष्य, reflects on the whole

One peculiarity must be noted here Here the विशेषण, *गुणत्व does* exist in शब्द, (so also the विशेष्य, अकारणत्व, at least according to some) how can then this be an instance of a स्वरूपासिद्ध? The answer is —It is true that गुणत्व exists in शब्द, but our contention is that गुणत्व being impotent cannot be regarded as a विशेषण at all That alone can rightly be called a विशेषण of the हेतु, which serves the purpose of excluding others by particularising it But here गुणत्व serves no purpose, as it is incapable, *and is therefore useless like the* धेनु या न सूते न दुग्धदा *The above* शब्दो नित्य etc is therefore an instance of **असमर्थविशेषणासिद्ध** variety of स्वरूपासिद्ध

(4) शब्दो नित्यः । अकारणत्वे सति गुणत्वात्—*Here the* विशेष्य गुणत्व is impotent, the विशेषण alone being capable of proving the साध्य The विशेष्य being असमर्थ is as good as not existing in शब्द, so the विशिष्ट हेतु

does not exist in शब्द, hence this is an instance of असमर्थविशेषणासिद्ध variety of स्वरूपासिद्ध

(110) There are two varieties of व्याप्यत्वासिद्ध —

(1) साध्येनासहचरित, where there is no प्रमाण to apprehend the व्याप्ति between the हेतु and the साध्य विवादास्पदीभूत शब्दः क्षणिकः। सत्त्वात्—Here there is no Pramāṇa to show that there is व्याप्ति between सत्त्व and क्षणिकत्व.

(2) सोपाधिकता यथा—

(a) स श्यामः। मैत्रीतनयत्वात्—Now मैत्रीतनयत्व is not the cause of श्यामत्व but शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम And प्रयोजक is the उपाधि, hence here the व्याप्ति would be correct only when this उपाधि, शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम is tacked on to the हेतु

(The definition of उपाधि, साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधि can be shown to be satisfied thus —

यत्र यत्र श्यामत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकाद्यन्नपरिणामः। (शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम, the उपाधि is the व्यापक of the साध्य, श्यामत्व), but यत्र यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वं तत्र तत्र शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम (this व्याप्ति cannot be correct as some of मैत्रीतनयs are not श्याम so शाकाद्यन्नपरिणाम, the उपाधि, is साधनाव्यापक)

(b) पर्वतो धूमवान्। वह्निमत्त्वात्—Here आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is the उपाधि, being the प्रयोजक of धूमवत्त्व Thus यत्र यत्र धूमवत्त्वं तत्र तत्र आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग (आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग, the उपाधि is the व्यापक of the साध्य, धूमवत्त्व) but यत्र यत्र वह्निमत्त्वं तत्र तत्र आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग (this is not correct, as the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित in the case of red hot iron ball where there is fire, but no smoke, so आर्द्रेन्धनसंयोग is साधनाव्यापक)

(c) क्रत्वन्तर्वर्तिनी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनम्। हिंसात्वात्—Here निषिद्धत्व, being the प्रयोजक of अधर्म, is the उपाधि

Thus, यत्र यत्र अधर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वम्। (निषिद्धत्व, the उपाधि is the व्यापक of the साध्य, अधर्मसाधनत्व) but यत्र यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र तत्र निषिद्धत्वम् (this is not correct, as the व्याप्ति is व्यभिचरित in the case of क्रत्वङ्ग-हिंसा where there is हिंसात्व, but no निषिद्धत्व, the killing in sacrifices being sanctioned by the Sastras So निषिद्धत्व is साधनाव्यापक)

(111) शब्दो नित्यः। कृतकत्वात्। Here the व्याप्ति is not between the हेतु कृतकत्व and नित्यत्व (the साध्य), but between the हेतु and साध्याभाव (अनित्यत्व) — यत्र यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्र तत्र अनित्यत्वम्।—This is an instance therefore of विरुद्ध हेत्वाभास.

(112) अनैकान्तिक has two varieties—साधारण and असाधारण

(1) शब्दो नित्यः। प्रमेयत्वात्।—Here the हेतु, प्रमेयत्व exists in the पक्ष, (शब्द), in the सपक्ष (व्योमन्) and in the विपक्ष (घट) It is पक्षत्रयवृत्ति and so this is an instance of साधारणानैकान्तिक हेत्वाभास

(2) भूर्नित्या गन्धवत्त्वात्—Here the हेतु exists in the पक्ष (पृथ्वी) alone, it does not exist either in the सपक्ष (आत्मन्) or in the विपक्ष (घट)–This is therefore an instance of असाधारणानैकान्तिक

(Line 14)–व्यभिचारस्तु Kesavamisra is now defining what व्यभिचार is (as the हेतु अनैकान्तिक is also called सव्यभिचार he points out how the two varieties of अनैकान्तिक illustrated by him are possessed of व्यभिचार, and so can rightly be called सव्यभिचार) For समक्षसपक्षविपक्षस्य हेतो, there is the reading नियमाभावात् सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ते हेतो It appears to us that the proper reading here should be व्यभिचारो नियमाभाव । समक्षसपक्षविपक्षस्य हेतो सपक्षवृत्तित्वे सति विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिरेव नियमो गमकत्वात् । तत्र च सत्य

What is meant is this — व्यभिचार means violation of the rule The rule is that an अन्वयव्यतिरेकी हेतु should be present in the सपक्ष and absent from the विपक्ष, because that alone enables us to arrive at a correct conclusion The violation of the rule is possible in three ways —

(1) When the हेतु is absent in the सपक्ष and present in the विपक्ष (This type of व्यभिचार is the proper province of the विरुद्ध हेत्वाभास, and so it need not be taken into consideration Strictly speaking this cannot be called a व्यभिचार To exclude this type from the province of अनैकान्तिक, the expression सपक्षविपक्षवृत्ति has been used in line 15, for a विरुद्ध हेत्वाभास is साध्यविपरीतव्याप्त)

(2) When it is present in the सपक्ष as well as in the विपक्ष (This is साधारणानैकान्तिक)

(3) When it is absent from the सपक्ष as well as from the विपक्ष (This is असाधारणानैकान्तिक)

The second variety and the third variety alone can legitimately be called व्यभिचार For व्यभिचार undoubtedly presupposes that there is सम्बन्ध between the हेतु and the साध्य, only that this सम्बन्ध is not invariable In the case of the first variety, there is व्याप्ति between the हेतु and the साध्याभाव, with which the question of the original व्यभिचारित्वगति is not concerned That is why Kesavamisra rightly speaks of व्यभिचार being two-fold To take a more familiar instance Suppose, we issue an order to a person in Poona On arriving at Bombay, purchase a Rolls Royce Now this order can be violated in the following two legitimate ways —

(1) On arriving at Bombay, he purchases not a Rolls Royce but a Ford

(2) On arriving at Bombay, he does not purchase the car

Here we presume that the man would go all right to Bombay In the same way, when a man tries to state a व्याप्ति, we

presume that the man is on right lines in having noticed some connection between the हेतु and the साध्य, only that he may be wrong in imagining an invariable connection between them in some cases But when a man states a हेतु which has व्याप्ति with the साध्याभाव, he is not playing the game, as far as the व्यभिचार idea in the व्याप्ति is concerned He is either a downright knave or a fool. Similarly in the above familiar instance, if the person goes to Mysore and purchases an elephant, that would be technically a violation of our order, but that would not be what we had bargained for in this case

(113) शब्दः अनित्यः नित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः, has for its rival the equally powerful शब्दः नित्यः अनित्यधर्मानुपलब्धेः । What is essential in the case of the प्रकरणसम हेत्वाभास is that its प्रतिपक्ष हेत्वन्तर must be equally powerful, for if the rival हेत्वन्तर were stronger, the original हेतु would go to the wall, if the rival हेत्वन्तर were weaker it itself would go to the wall In either case, there would be no rival हेतु in the field at all

उपजीव्यम्-That on which something else depends, the stronger one

उपजीवकम्-That which depends on something else, the weaker one

The author shows how the so called rival हेतु for अनित्यः परमाणुः । मूर्तत्वात् । is उपजीव्य or बाधक In other words the मूर्तत्व हेतु can not be regarded as a प्रकरणसम हेत्वाभास The so called rival हेतु is stated to be अनारब्धत्व, as in परमाणुः नित्यः । अनारब्धत्वात् । (see section 53) Now this अनारब्धत्व हेतु, while proving the नित्यत्व of the परमाणु proves *the existence of the* परमाणुs as well So that when the मूर्तत्व हेतु is put forward to prove the अनित्यत्व of the परमाणुs, the person in question has tacitly admitted the existence (and along with it, the नित्यत्व) of the परमाणुs For, unless the existence of the परमाणुs is admitted, there cannot be any question as to whether परमाणुs are नित्य or अनित्य. Any discussion as to whether the वन्ध्यापुत्र is fit for marriage or not is absurd The मूर्तत्व हेतु thus has for its उपजीव्य, the अनारब्धत्व हेतु on which it depends अनारब्धत्व हेतु is not its rival, but its task-master. अनित्यः परमाणुः । मूर्तत्वात् is thus उपजीवक or a दुर्बल हेतु

(114) अग्निः अनुष्णः । कृतकत्वात् । जलवत्—Here कृतकत्व is कालात्ययापदिष्ट, because the उष्णाभाव or उष्णत्व *of अग्नि* is actually directly perceived by the sense of touch, and so the साध्य is definitely contradicted by a stronger proof

घटः क्षणिकः । सत्त्वात्-Here the साध्याभाव, स्थायित्व is actually cognised by the recognition-perception We recognise the घट as the same which we had seen before Now this cannot happen unless the घट is not क्षणिक

In the case of this हेत्वाभास the साध्य must be contradicted by a stronger proof, usually the प्रत्यक्ष The reading प्रत्यभिज्ञानकालेऽस्य seems to be suspicious as it is more elaborate the emendator being anxious to state in detail how the perception of घट is characterised by recognition and hypothetical reasoning such as 'If the घट had been different, it would not have been recognised

(Line 14)-येऽपि लक्षणस्य The author now shows how the fallacies due to wrong definitions could be included in the five fallacies already described (For the three दोषs of लक्षण see section 3)

अतिव्याप्ति —इयं गौ गोत्वजातिमती । पशुत्वात्—Here the हेतु पशुत्व exists in the पक्ष (गौ), in the सपक्ष (another cow) and in the विपक्ष (अश्व) So this is an instance of अनैकान्तिक हेत्वाभास

Or this might be a case of सोपाधिकत्वव्याप्यत्वासिद्ध, for पशुत्व is not the cause of गोत्वजातिमत्त्व but सास्नादिमत्त्व (which being the प्रयोजक, is the उपाधि)

अव्याप्ति —If the हेतु is शाबलेयत्व (this might also mean being descended from शबला the कामधेनु) it exists only in some cows hence this is an instance of भागासिद्ध हेत्वाभास

असंभव —The हेतु, एकशफत्व does not exist at all in cows so this is an instance of स्वरूपासिद्ध हेत्वाभास

(115) छलम् वचनविघातोऽर्थविकल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् ।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 10)

छल consists in purposely perverting the meaning of the opponent and finding fault with his argument It is threefold, thus (Nyaya sutra *I 2 11*)—तत् त्रिविधं वाक्छलं सामान्यच्छलम् उपचारच्छलं चेति ।

(1) वाक्छलम्—अविशेषाभिहितेऽर्थे वक्तुरभिप्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना ।

(Nyayasutra, I 2 12)

This is the only variety referred to in the text नवकम्बलोऽयं देवदत्तः is the instance Unless we dissolve the compound in a particular way, we cannot know what the expression means The speaker uses it in the sense नव (new) कम्बल अस्य the छलवादिन् purposely understands it in the sense नव (nine) कम्बला अस्य, and takes the opportunity to preach a sermon to his opponent 'What rot are you talking ' Devadatta is known to be quite poor, he cannot afford to have even two कम्बलs ? How can he have nine ? Do you mean to tell us that he is a thief ?' and so on

(2) सामान्यच्छलम्-सम्भवतोऽर्थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसद्भूतार्थकल्पना ।

(Nyayasutra I 2 12)

सामान्यच्छलम्—When the speaker remarks about some one, ब्राह्मणोऽयं विद्याचरणसम्पन्नः, the छलवादिन् purposely misunderstands it to mean that the speaker wants to state a general proposition that a ब्राह्मण is विद्याचरणसम्पन्न, and goes on to say 'How could you say that a Brāhmaṇa is विद्याचरणसम्पन्न ? Then a व्रात्य (a संस्कारहीन ब्राह्मण) also would be विद्याचरणसम्पन्न This is absurd' and so on

(3) उपचारच्छलम्—धर्मविकल्पनिर्देशेऽर्थसद्भावप्रतिषेधः ।

(Nyayasūtra, I 2 14)

A word has three meanings, वाच्य लक्ष्य and व्यङ्ग्य When the speaker uses a word, say in a वाच्य sense, the छलवादिन् purposely misunderstands it in a sense other than वाच्य, and finds fault with the speaker's statement Thus, the speaker says मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति, using the word मञ्च in its लाक्षणिक sense मञ्चस्थाः बालाः The छलवादिन् understands मञ्च in its वाच्य sense and goes on to say How can the inanimate मञ्च cry ? It is a novel discovery that you have made for which the world ought to be grateful to you' and so on

It would be seen that उपचारच्छलम् is not the same as वाक्छलम् In वाक्छलम्, the word has *two* वाच्य meanings in उपचारच्छलम् the word is used in a figurative sense So the two have their respective *spheres*. (वाक्छलमेवोपचारच्छलं तदविशेषात् । न तदर्थान्तरभावात् । अविशेषे वा किंचित् साधर्म्यादेकच्छलप्रसङ्गः । Nyayasūtra, I 2 15–17) The reading आपन्न would mean 'Thus the छलवादिन् comes to grief and is made to eat his words, when the proper meaning is pointed out to him

(116) साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः । (Nyayasutra I 2 18) जाति is futile objection चतुर्विंशति—of twenty-four kinds Nyayasutra V 1 explains all of them Our author mentions only two

उत्कर्षसमा consists in attributing some धर्म which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the पक्ष on the strength of the दृष्टान्त being possessed of that धर्म Thus, when the syllogism is शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात् घटवत्, the opponent says if शब्द is possessed of अनित्यत्व like घट, then शब्द should be regarded as being सावयव, because घट is सावयव

अपकर्षसमा consists in attributing some धर्माभाव which is not concomitant with the हेतु, to the पक्ष on the strength of the दृष्टान्त being possessed of that धर्माभाव Thus in the same syllogism, शब्दोऽनित्यः । कृतकत्वात् । घटवत्, the opponent says if शब्द is possessed of अनित्यत्व, like घट then शब्द should be taken to be not audible, as घट is not audible

(117) निग्रहस्थानानि—Occasions for reproof Nyayasūtra mentions and describes the following twenty two of them —

प्रतिज्ञाहानि प्रतिज्ञान्तर प्रतिज्ञाविरोध प्रतिज्ञासन्यास हेत्वन्तरम् अर्थान्तर निरर्थकम् अविज्ञातार्थम् अपार्थकम् अप्राप्तकाल न्यूनम् अधिक पुनरुक्तम् अननुभाषणम् अज्ञानम् अप्रतिभा विक्षेप मतानुज्ञा पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षण निरनुयोज्यानुयोग अपसिद्धान्त हेत्वाभास ।

These are the pitfalls against which the disputant must guard himself if he wishes to carry his point. Our author mentions only seven of them

(1) न्यूनम्—हीनमन्यतमेनाप्यवयवेन न्यूनम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 12)

A syllogism must be put forth in a proper form, all complete with the five members If the disputant gives only four members or less, the निग्रहस्थान is न्यून

(2) अधिकम्—हेतूदाहरणाधिकम् अधिकम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 13)

Adding unnecessary adjuncts to the हेतु or उदाहरण etc (हेतूदाहरणेत्युपलक्षणम् । धूमादालोकाद् महानसवत्चत्वरादित्यादिक तु विना समयबन्ध वादादिभ्रमादुक्तमधिकम्—न्यायसूत्रवृत्ति)

(3) अपसिद्धान्त—सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेत्य अनियमात् कथाप्रसङ्ग अपसिद्धान्त ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V. 2 24).

When a disputant, having agreed to discuss according to the tenets of a particular system of philosophy, agrees, in the course of the discussion, to something contrary to those tenets, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अपसिद्धान्त

• (4) अर्थान्तरम्—प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थम् अर्थान्तरम् ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 7)

When a disputant talks at random about something not connected with the प्रकृत, there is the निग्रहस्थान called अर्थान्तर.

Thus after stating the syllogism, शब्दोऽनित्य कृतकत्वात्, the disputant goes on saying 'Sabda is a special quality of ether, the word Sabda begins with the letter sa, and ends with the letter da'—all of which is quite true, but has nothing to do with the matter in hand

(5) अप्रतिभा—उत्तरस्य अप्रतिपत्ति अप्रतिभा ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 19).

Being dumb-founded, or non-plussed or unable to answer the opponent

(6) मतानुज्ञा—स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षे दोषप्रसङ्गो मतानुज्ञा ।

(Nyāyasūtra, V 2 21)

यः परेण चोदितं दोषं स्वपक्षेऽभ्युपगम्यानुद्धृत्य वदति भवत्पक्षेऽपि समानो दोष इति स स्वपक्षे दोषाभ्युपगमात् परपक्षे दोषं प्रसञ्जयन् परमतमनुजानातीति मतानुज्ञा नाम निग्रहस्थानमापद्यत इति। (वात्स्यायनभाष्य) यथा त्वं चोर इत्युक्ते त्वमपि चोर इति कथनम्। (गोवर्धन)

(7) (प्रतिज्ञा) विरोध —प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः।

(Nyayasutra, V 2 4)

गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यमिति प्रतिज्ञा, रूपादितोऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धेरिति हेतुः सोऽयं प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोर्विरोधः। कथम्। यदि गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यम् रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिर्नोपपद्यते। अथ रूपादिभ्योऽर्थान्तरस्यानुपलब्धिः गुणव्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यमिति नोपपद्यते। (वात्स्यायनभाष्य)

(Line 11)—इह This sentence aptly describes the characteristic feature of the Tarkabhasa as a manual of Logic Kesavamisra says that he has described the important topics in all their characteristics, even rendering himself liable to the charge of repetition what is unimportant has been passed over without much ado This is the policy he has followed in writing this treatise, for that is the only one which would benefit the beginners, who are otherwise likely to be scared away by a scrappy treatment of important topics, and unnecessary stress on unimportant points

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